



V. J. Kirtikar,

KANT'S  
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

FOR ENGLISH READERS

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1329  
A NEW AND COMPLETED EDITION

VOL. I.

THE KRITIK OF THE PURE REASON EXPLAINED  
AND DEFENDED


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## PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION

THE able co-operation of one of my colleagues, together with class-room criticisms of others, has enabled this work to appear in a new edition, not only purged of many defects, but completed by the addition of several chapters on the Dialectic and Methodology of the Pure Reason. It is also offered to the public in a cheaper form, one volume containing the whole *Kritik*, while the second gives a revised translation of the *Prolegomena*. Without the help of Mr. Bernard, who has written the whole commentary from p. 237 onward, and who corrected and improved all the rest, it is not likely that this, my third declaration upon Kant, would ever have seen the light; and indeed I will here add, that I am not responsible for certain Hegelianisms which appear in his notes on the Dialectic. But *hæc hæc*. It is my desire to state candidly and unreservedly what my younger colleague has done to help me. For to make such

acknowledgment is a duty not always recognised among literary men of established standing.

The plan of this commentary is to adhere much more faithfully than Kuno Fischer, or indeed any other Commentator we have met, to Kant's text, which we have followed paragraph by paragraph, shortening and simplifying, but shirking no difficulties. We have also marked all our own reflections with a ¶, which refers only to the paragraph or chapter to which it is prefixed. It seems more advisable to do this than to encumber the book with foot-notes, which interrupt the reader's train of reading.

But though this Commentary claims to be clear and consistent, it is not, and cannot be, either easy or short. It is not easy, because the subject is not easy, and deals with notions exceedingly abstract, and only familiar to those who have made mental science a subject of special study. It is not short, because Kant's book, if worth reading at all, is worth reading and knowing accurately, and no pains are misplaced if they result in a full and comprehensive grasp of the greatest metaphysical system the world has yet seen.

We are too much accustomed to general histories, in which a few pages are devoted to each thinker, so

that the impressions left on the reader's mind, even if true (which is seldom the case) are at all events vague and misty. The greater lights in the philosophical firmament can only be understood by special study, and should therefore be made the subject of separate monographs. We have endeavoured to do this for Kant, being convinced that of all metaphysicians he is certainly the greatest, and perhaps the most imperfectly understood.

In the preface to the former edition I spoke of the fancy for philosophical novelties in England, and endeavoured to call attention to Kant, as of all modern Germans the greatest philosopher, and certainly the best adapted for practical minds. At all events it is absurd to begin the study of Schelling or Hegel without a prior intimacy with Kant, and how many men are there now in England who thoroughly understand the Critical Philosophy? It is also a remarkable fact that within the last few years, philosophy even in Germany has reverted, as I ventured to predict, from modern extravagance to the soberness of Kant. His works are being reprinted, illustrated, and attacked, on all sides. The sensual school have discovered that the refutation of Kant alone will give them a lawful victory, and to this task they are applying all their energies.

The influence of Grote and J. S. Mill, and the constant appointment of Mr. Bain as a State Examiner in Philosophy, brought this way of thinking into undue prominence. All the youth of the country have been crammed with Mr. Bain's handbooks, and have neither time nor inducement to read an antidote. We must therefore look to the Universities for a fair hearing, and trust that there at least enlightened teachers will not accept as true what the State has made fashionable. A polemical chapter on the Association School, which appeared in the former edition of this work, has been omitted, as the controversy may now be regarded as obsolete. The most important contribution to the better understanding of Kant, in my edition of Kuno Fischer's Commentary, was the true explanation of Kant's refutation of idealism. A patent absurdity had been universally attributed to him, and I showed that his attitude had been totally misconceived. My argument was candidly accepted by competent critics, and might now be called a commonplace, did not Prof. Kuno Fischer's recent declaration (*a Critique of Kant*, 1882) show that it has not yet penetrated into his mind.

As the work is intended for English readers, we have referred uniformly to the translation of Kant's *Kritik* in Bohn's Library, still the most serviceable,


and to my own edition of Kuno Fischer's Commentary. I may add that my other references are to the following editions of the respective books, viz. the ninth edition of Mr. Mill's *Logic*, and the third of his *Examination of Hamilton*, and the fourth edition of Mr. Lewes' *History of Philosophy*. The references to the *Prolegomena* of Kant are to the pages of my former edition, which will be indicated in the new edition appended as a second volume to the present.

I conclude this Preface as I did the last, seventeen years ago, with the earnest hope that the many readers of my former books on Kant will find in this a maturer and clearer exposition of the same views.

J. P. MAHAFFY.

TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,

March 16th, 1889.





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

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## CHAPTER I

### THE TWO PREFACES

§ 1. ¶ THE philosophical student who has been discouraged from opening the *Kritik* of the Pure Reason, by its reputation for obscurity and difficulty, will be agreeably surprised by the clearness and the elegance of Kant's first Preface. So easy is the flow of thought, so felicitous the choice of expression, that we can only find stray hints of the arduous task that awaits us. The explanations of a commentator are almost needless, and his analysis cannot do better than adhere as closely as possible to the rich and suggestive language of the great philosopher himself.<sup>1</sup>

§ 2. Among the various branches of human knowledge, says Kant, there is one in regard to which our reason is condemned to a very strange lot, being troubled with questions which we cannot decline, seeing that they are forced upon us by our very nature, but which, nevertheless, we cannot answer, since they transcend all our faculties.

Our reason falls into these perplexities unawares. It

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lewes's remarks (*History of Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 458) are, in the first place, too severe, and in the second place unjust, as they omit to mention the genuine and even sublime eloquence of some of Kant's writings. We may notice that Kuno Fischer's Commentary is silent on these Prefaces, *the second of which utterly destroys his theory as to Kant's idealism.*

commences from principles whose use in the field of experience is inevitable. From these it proceeds, according to its nature, to ascend higher, and to approach more remote conditions. But we soon discover that such a pursuit will never end, because fresh questions are ever starting up. Under these circumstances, nothing remains but to take refuge in first principles, which transcend all experience, and which, nevertheless, excite so little suspicion that even the common sense of mankind does not quarrel with them. These, however, lead the reason into such obscurities and contradictions that we cannot but infer the presence of some hidden errors. Yet the discovery of these errors is impossible; because the principles adopted by the reason, as they transcend completely the bounds<sup>1</sup> of experience, will neither acknowledge nor submit to any test which originates within it. This arena of endless dispute is called METAPHYSIC. There was a time when her claims to be called Queen of the Sciences were admitted by all. It is now the fashion to despise her, and, like the mourning Hecuba, she sits forgotten and forlorn; in the words of Ovid: *Modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens—nunc trahor exul inops!*

At first her rule, under the administration of the *Dogmatists*, was despotic. But this barbarous form of government degenerated through internal dissensions into complete anarchy; and the *Sceptics*, a sort of nomads who hate all settled conditions, periodically scattered the community. But they were too few in number to prevent mankind from continually attempting a reconstruction, though without any fixed or consistent principle. It seemed indeed once,

<sup>1</sup> We uniformly translate *Grenze*, bound, reserving the term *limit* for *Schranke*. Cf. Kant's *Proleg.* p. 154, for the distinction—an important one, though confused in all the translations.

in later times, as if the celebrated Locke's Physiology of the Human Understanding would put an end to the disputes, and settle for ever the lofty claims of Metaphysic. But no sooner had the descent of the pretended queen been traced to the low origin of common experience, and her assumptions accordingly questioned, than this *genealogy* was found out to be fictitious, and accordingly she persisted in her claims. And so things returned to the antiquated and rotten dogmatism, and to the consequent contempt in which the science was held. Now that men think every path has been tried in vain, disgust prevails, and total indifference, the mother of chaos and of night in the sciences, but the prelude of a better day.

For it is vain to assume an artificial indifference on subjects which *cannot be indifferent* to human nature; and the pretended *indifferentists*, though they may endeavour to disguise it by assuming a popular garb, are ever falling back into the metaphysical assertions which they profess to despise. Nevertheless, this indifferentism is a phenomenon deserving our deepest attention. It is the result of the ripe judgment of our age, which will no longer tolerate insecurity or false pretence. We hear,<sup>1</sup> indeed, complaints of shallowness, and of the decay of sound science. But well-founded sciences, such as Mathematic and Physic, refute this calumny, not merely by holding their ground, but even by making great onward strides. So would other branches of knowledge progress also, were their principles placed on a firm basis. 'In default of this indispensable requisite, doubt, indifference, and severe criticism are rather evidences of a thorough-going spirit. Our age is the proper age of Kritik (criticism), to which everything must submit. *Religion* desires to escape by its *sanctity*, *Legislation* by its *majesty*.' They con-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the first note to this Preface.

sequently excite just suspicion, when contrasted with those sciences which have freely and fairly met the test.

Reason is therefore challenged to begin afresh that most difficult task, the knowledge of itself, and establish its claims, not by oracular dicta, but according to fixed and unchangeable laws. The court which must decide this issue is the *Kritik of the Pure Reason* itself.

This does not mean a Kritik of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason, as regards what knowledge it may attain, *apart from all experience*. It is in other words the deciding of the possibility or impossibility of metaphysic in general, and the determining of its sources, extent, and bounds, exclusively from principles.

This path, says Kant, I have pursued, and flatter myself I have discovered the source of all the errors which divided reason against itself. I have not evaded these questions by falling back upon the impotence of the human reason, but have determined them completely from principles, and, after discovering the point at which reason fell into a misunderstanding with itself, have completely and satisfactorily solved them. I have aimed at completeness above all things, and I venture to say there is not a single metaphysical problem which is not either solved or provided with a key for its solution in this book. Pure reason being a unity complete in itself, any analysis which fails to solve a single question fairly suggested concerning it must be cast aside as perfectly idle.

The reader need not wonder at these pretensions as boastful and impertinent. They are infinitely more modest than the programme of any ordinary system that pretends to prove the simple nature of the *soul*, or the necessity of a first origin of the *world*. For these things far transcend all the bounds of experience, whereas the present work merely analyses the reason and its pure thinking. It is in

*a knowledge  
it is not far  
to seek concerning  
that it is to be found within myself -*

fact to be compared to common Logic, which analyses completely all the simple operations of thought, 'except that the question here proposed is, How much can we attain through these operations if deprived of all the materials and the assistance of experience?'

If, then, the *matter* of the book must be complete and explicit, it may also fairly be demanded that the *form* of its demonstrations should be *certain* and *clear*. Of course all mere *opinion* is worthless, when we seek to establish a *priori* knowledge. But it is for the reader to judge whether the grounds advanced by the author are certain, and equal to his pretensions. He has already asserted that he considers this quality absolutely indispensable. Some few points, however, which are not essential to the work might possibly excite suspicion, and may, therefore, be pointed out beforehand.<sup>1</sup>

There is no investigation more important, or that has given the author more trouble, than the so-called *Deduction of the Pure Categories*. This investigation has two sides. The first concerns the *objects* of the pure understanding, and is intended to explain the objective validity of its *a priori* concepts concerning them. This is an essential part of Kant's plan, since it shows what the understanding and the reason can know, apart from all experience. It stands upon a basis perfectly independent of the second side of the deduction, which considers the understanding *subjectively*, and endeavours to analyse its faculties. 'As the question, How is the faculty of thought itself possible? can only be answered by inferring a cause from its effects, my solution,' says Kant, 'may seem (though this is not really the case)

<sup>1</sup> As the reader can hardly understand them, before he has mastered the passages in question, he will be reminded of these explanations at the proper places.

to be a mere hypothesis, and the reader may think himself at liberty to differ from me.' But this will not invalidate the former side of the argument.<sup>1</sup>

As to *clearness*, the reader has a right to expect logical and discursive clearness in the arguments, which has been carefully attended to, and æsthetical and intuitive clearness, by means of sufficient examples and illustrations. The length and intricacy of the discussion have compelled the author to dispense with these to an extent he did not originally intend. A general survey of a system is often impeded by these illustrations, and '*many a book would have been far clearer if the author had not endeavoured to make it so clear.*'

Metaphysic is the only science, as we shall show, which is capable of absolute completion within a short time, by means of united efforts: for it is nothing but the systematic inventory of what we possess by pure reason. Nothing can here escape us; nor can any experience increase our knowledge. By means of the present Kritik the ground has been cleared and prepared, and here the reader must perform the part of an impartial judge. When we proceed to build up the system of pure reason, under the title, 'Metaphysic of Nature,' he should join us as a zealous co-operator, especially as the investigation of these details is easy, and more a recreation than a difficult task.

§ 3.¶ Such in substance, and to a great extent in words, was the remarkable Preface with which Kant introduced his great treatise to the philosophic world. It bears a strong familylikeness to the utterances of other intellectual reformers, and suggests the mental attitude of Bacon and of Descartes, of Locke and of Hume. There is the same boldness in

<sup>1</sup> The reader should bear in mind that this passage refers to the First Edition of the *Kritik*.

asserting the discovery, and the same modesty in attributing it not to genius, but to method. There are the same hopes of a speedy termination of error, the same conviction that even ordinary minds, when armed with proper weapons, can help in the victory.

Kant's analogy to Bacon was indeed so striking, that he prefixed to his second edition a memorable motto from the Preface to the *Instauratio Magna*—‘*De nobis ipsis silemus. De re autem, quae agitur, petimus, ut homines eam non opinionem sed opus esse cogitent: ac pro certo habeant, non sectae nos alicuius, aut placiti, sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanae fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut suis commodis aequi—in commune consulant, et ipsi in partem veniant. Praeterea ut bene sperent, neque instaurationem nostram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant et animo concipiant: quum revera sit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.*’

In his first Preface, therefore, Kant explained the *historical* position of the *Kritik*, and announced that he was about to revolutionise philosophy by a new method. And yet similar claims had often before been made, and had hitherto failed. What was the peculiar novelty of Kant's method which inspired him with such extraordinary confidence? How did he discover it? In the Preface to the Second Edition, published in 1787, six years after the First, these questions are fully answered; and, furthermore, the positive practical results of his apparently negative and speculative system are brought before the reader. This second Preface is therefore a material improvement to the work, and is of peculiar interest, as disclosing to us the line of thought that led Kant to his discoveries.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thus, at the very outset, those are in error who affirm that this Second Edition is no improvement on the first.



§ 4. 'We can easily determine,' says Kant, 'whether we are pursuing any branch of knowledge *scientifically* by our success in attaining results. If after much preparation, we are constantly coming to a standstill, and are obliged to recommence, and if our fellow-labourers cannot agree with us how our common object is to be pursued, our proceeding is no science, but a mere groping in the dark, which we shall do well to abandon, even with the sacrifice of many lofty aspirations.'

The history of any recognised science will prove this position. Consider *Logic*. Since Aristotle it has never lost one inch of ground. But what is far stranger, it has never gained anything either, and appears to be complete and settled. If modern writers have attempted to enlarge it by *psychological* chapters on the human faculties, or *metaphysical* on the origin of knowledge or the nature of certainty, or *anthropological* on human prejudices, they have merely shown their ignorance of its nature. 'We do not enlarge, but disfigure the sciences, by confusing their boundaries.' And the boundaries of Logic are strictly determined as the science which expounds the formal laws of all thought, and nothing but thought. The success of Logic is, however, owing to its narrow scope; for Logic is forbidden to consider any of the objects of knowledge, and must confine itself to the understanding and its form. It is accordingly but the outer court of those proper sciences which add to our real knowledge. With far more difficulty did reason enter upon the strict path of science, when objects also were concerned.

If such sciences are to be rational, they must contain a priori knowledge,<sup>1</sup> and this knowledge of the reason may be related to the object in two ways—either as merely deter-

<sup>1</sup> So far as this means *power of prediction*, no one will dispute it.

mining it and the concept of it (when given from elsewhere) or as *also making it actual*. This latter is the *practical* cognition of the reason [as when it produces from itself, for example, the idea of *duty*.] The former is *theoretical* cognition. In either case the direst confusion must result if the *pure* part, in which the reason determines its object altogether *a priori*, be not separately treated.<sup>1</sup>

*Mathematic* and *Physic* are the two theoretical branches of rational knowledge which aim at determining their objects *a priori*—the former quite purely, the later partly so. Mathematic attained the safe position of a science long since among the Greeks. Yet this does not prove that its safe highway was constructed easily, as in Logic. Kant thinks that for centuries, especially among the Egyptians, it consisted in mere groping, and that the great change was owing to a *Revolution*, produced by a happy thought of some forgotten genius. He notices that even in later times the discoverers of special principles were remembered though these principles were unimportant; and this he ascribes to the indelible effect produced by the first great Revolution.

In what did this Revolution consist? 'Whoever it was,' says Kant, 'that first demonstrated the equality of the [base] angles of an *isosceles* triangle found <sup>2</sup> new light dawning upon him; for he found *that he could not trace out and learn the properties of the figure from what he saw in it, or from mere thinking about it, but rather from what he had added to*

<sup>1</sup> Kant in no way implies that these different parts of cognition are *given* separately, but says that if we confuse them in our *treatment*, we are like men spending money without keeping accounts, and then unable to ascertain what part of their outlay can be diminished when economy becomes necessary.

<sup>2</sup> 'Who first demonstrated the right-angled triangle' is Mr. Lewen's translation, which makes no sense. He was probably misled by a clerical error (equilateral) noticed by Kant himself in one of his letters.

*the figure according to concepts a priori, and had then represented by a construction. He also found that all the safe a priori knowledge he could attain about it was merely the necessary consequence of what he had himself introduced into it, according to his own concepts."*<sup>1</sup> This statement may well be regarded as the very corner-stone of all Kant's discoveries.

In natural philosophy progress was far slower, and it is only since the days of Bacon that it has attained the high-way of science. But even from an empirical point of view there is a close analogy in its history to Mathematic. When Galileo and Torricelli and Stahl began to make their well-known experiments, the same light dawned upon them also. They comprehended that reason discovers what it produces according to its own plans; that it must, so to speak, take the initiative, according to fixed principles supplied by itself, and compel nature to reply, instead of waiting upon her for instruction, since chance observations are not connected by such necessary laws as the reason seeks and requires. Those phenomena alone that agree with some fixed principle of the reason can be regarded as the laws of nature. 'Armed with such principles, then, in one hand, and with experiments framed according to them in the

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lewes's translation of this passage (*Hist. of Phil.* vol. ii. p. 467) appears, through some oversight, not to be even grammatical, and, moreover, obscures the point of the argument. Mr. Meiklejohn's translation would here have afforded him a fair version. His interpretation of the passage is equally erroneous; for he thinks Kant is insisting on the metaphysical method as opposed to the experimental, and is highly indignant at the proposal to study nature through our ideas. But Kant is really showing the vast superiority of the experimental method over that of mere observation. In the latter case the mind can only note down occurrences; in the former it approaches the facts *with a theory of its own construction*, and compels nature to say whether the facts conform to it or not. Surely this just difference is acknowledged by every scientific inquirer. The next paragraph should have made the point plain to any careful critic.

other, our reason must approach nature to learn from her not in the capacity of a scholar, but in that of a judge, who compels his witnesses to give their evidence. And so even Physic owes its happy revolution to the idea of seeking from (*not inventing for*) nature that information, *of which reason could know nothing of itself*, according to what reason had itself introduced into nature.<sup>1</sup> Up to this discovery physical philosophers were merely groping in the dark.<sup>2</sup>

Metaphysic has not hitherto been so fortunate. It is a peculiar and isolated branch of knowledge, aiming at what lies beyond experience, and that through mere concepts,<sup>3</sup> without representing them in figures, like Mathematic. And here men have been constantly meeting with checks, and endeavouring to begin afresh, so that the science may be compared to the arena of a tournament, in which none can establish any lasting possession. This is evidently mere groping in the dark, and among pure concepts too, where verification is not easy.

Why has the high road of science not been discovered in this branch of our knowledge? Is it imaginary? Then why has our nature been visited with such unavoidable and restless longing? and can we trust it in other things, if it here proves a delusion and a snare? Or is it our fault, and have we hitherto failed to discover the right way, for want of the proper method?

Surely the examples of Mathematic and Physic, remodelled by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to induce us to make a similar attempt in Metaphysic,

<sup>1</sup> I have marked the italics by way of answer to Mr. Lewes's criticism.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bacon, "mera palpatio." *De Aug. Sci.* v. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 435, for the difference between the mathematical and philosophical methods. We refer throughout to Mr. Meiklejohn's Translation.

for they are obviously analogous to it as rational cognitions. Hitherto it was assumed that our knowledge of objects must conform to them, and all attempts to extend it *a priori*, by means of concepts, have failed. Let us attempt the problem of Metaphysic under the assumption that the objects must conform to our faculty of knowing them,—an assumption which at first sight agrees better with the required possibility of knowing objects *a priori*—that is, of determining something concerning them before they are given to us.

‘This idea resembles that of Copernicus, who, when he found that the motions of the stars could not be explained by assuming them to revolve round the spectator, tried the effect of making the spectator revolve, and the stars remain at rest.’ In Metaphysic a similar attempt can be made as regards the *intuition* of objects. And Kant made this attempt successfully some years before he discovered how to make it in the other parts of the science. If our intuition must conform to the nature of its objects, how can we know anything *a priori* about these objects? If the object must conform to the peculiar nature of our intuiting faculty, we may easily do so.

But we cannot stop at intuitions, and are compelled to consider them as representations of some object which we endeavour to determine through them. This object then must be *conceived*. I may either assume that the *concepts* by which I determine the object conform to it, and then arises the old difficulty of obtaining any *a priori* knowledge; or I may assume that the objects conform to these concepts. If I change the expression, and say that *experience* conforms to my concepts, the result is the same. For in and through experience alone do the objects become known to us. This assumption then seems to promise good results,

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for experience is a species of knowledge, and knowledge presupposes the Understanding that knows. The Understanding again presupposes certain rules, by which it acts, and these rules must be considered logically prior to the objects given through them. If we wish to express these rules, we can only do so by *a priori* concepts, to which, accordingly, the objects of experience must necessarily conform. Such is the result attained by Kant's Analytic, and these *a priori* rules, by which the Understanding proceeds, when it applies itself to experience, are the Kantian Categories. There are other objects of which the Reason alone forms Ideas, and indeed is bound to do so, but which cannot be given in experience, or at least given as they are thought by the Reason. In our attempts to think these objects we shall find an excellent test of our new way of regarding the problem, which is founded on the principle that we can only know that *a priori* of objects which we have ourselves introduced into them.<sup>1</sup>

This method, Kant adds, in a note, is borrowed from physical science, and consists in seeking the elements of the pure reason in such a way *that our results can be confirmed or refuted by an experiment*. We cannot indeed make experiments with the *objects* of the pure reason (as in natural philosophy), for they are ever beyond the bounds of all experience. But we can do it with the *concepts* and *principles* which we assume *a priori*, by so arranging them that the same objects can be regarded from two different aspects—first, as objects of Sense and Understanding suited to our experience; secondly, as objects that are only thought, and suited to the isolated Reason, transcending all experience. If we find that, when things are regarded from this double point of view, our reason is at harmony with itself, but if

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Mill, in citing this passage (*Exam. of Hamilton*, pp. 31, 32), omits the important words *a priori*.

from a single point, unavoidable contradictions arise, then the experiment has proved the justice of our distinction.<sup>1</sup>

Our attempt succeeds perfectly, and promises Metaphysic the sure path of science in its first part, which is concerned about such pure concepts as can have corresponding objects given in experience. The possibility of a *priori* knowledge can now be perfectly explained, and the laws which lie *a priori* at the basis of nature (in the sense above explained) can now for the first time be satisfactorily proved. But there results a conclusion very adverse to the second part of Metaphysic, which is that we can never advance beyond the bounds of experience, and yet this was the chief object of the science. 'Nevertheless, this very result tests the truth of our first estimate of rational knowledge *a priori*, which was that it concerns phenomena, and abandons the thing *per se* as actual indeed in itself, but unknown to us.' The Reason, indeed, necessarily requires the Unconditioned to complete the series of conditions we find in phenomena. [We cannot comprehend our mental phenomena without presupposing necessarily a substance called Mind, beyond and beneath all its various manifestations. This illustration will explain what Kant means by the necessary belief in the Unconditioned.]

Supposing that as long as we assume our empirical knowledge to conform to objects *per se*, the Unconditioned cannot possibly be thought without contradictions, but that assuming objects, as mere phenomena, to conform to our manner of representing them to ourselves, the contradiction vanishes [by confining the Unconditioned to things *per se*], then the

<sup>1</sup> Kant's second Preface was written in answer to the criticism and controversies excited by the First Edition, and therefore implies a general knowledge of the book, without which the following observations are necessarily obscure.

latter assumption is established. We may, however, be able, on practical grounds, to re-establish *a priori* what has been shown to be unattainable by the speculative reason. In fact, the ground may have been only cleared for such a result. (This test, as Kant's note says, is similar to that employed in chemistry, where the elements which have been separated by analysis are again combined to reproduce the original substance. Our *Analytic* separates pure *a priori* knowledge into two heterogeneous elements, viz. things as phenomena, and things *per se*. Our *Dialectic* combines them again into harmony with the necessary idea of the *Unconditioned*, and finds that this can only be done by adopting the distinction.) Kant expressly tells us he has adopted this hypothetical way of stating his conclusions, in order to show the train of thought by which he arrived at them. He insists that they have been perfectly established in his work, by the nature of Space and Time, and of the Categories. Copernicus's theories were at first mere hypotheses; they ended not only by being demonstrated, but by leading to the establishment of Newton's Law of Gravitation, which could never have been discovered had they not been assumed.

In this attempt, then, made after the model of geometers and physical inquirers, consists the Kritik of the pure reason. It is a treatise on the method, and not a completed system, of the science known as Metaphysic. But owing to the unity and completeness of reason within itself, the outline of the science is indicated by our method; and for the same reason Metaphysic, like Logic, is capable of completion once for all, when the faculties of the human mind have been surveyed in their nature and their use.

But what, it may be asked, is the value of this Kritik? It appears to be at first sight only *negative*, prohibiting our



speculative reason from transgressing the bounds of experience. This is indeed its first use. But this use becomes *positive*, when we consider that previous attempts have, as a necessary consequence, so extended the bounds of mere sense, as to interfere seriously with the proper practical use of the reason. For if such a *practical* use be necessary to morality, though it cannot be assisted by speculation, it must be secured against interference. You might as well say the police were of no positive use, because it is their negative duty to prevent peaceable citizens from being molested in the pursuit of their business. The analytical part of the Kritik shows that we cannot possibly have any speculative knowledge beyond the bounds of experience.

But it must be carefully observed, that though we cannot know objects as things *per se*, we are able to think them. (In order to know a thing, I must be able to prove its possibility either from its actuality in experience or *a priori* through reason. But I can *think* what I like, provided I do not contradict myself. Such a thought is only logically possible, and requires something additional to make it really possible; however, this addition need not be sought only in theoretical sources, but in practical also.) 'If we were unable to *think* things *per se* there would follow the absurdity of an appearance, without anything to appear.' Now let us suppose our distinction of things *per se* and phenomena had not been made. If so, the law of causality must bind all beings absolutely. It would follow that the Soul from our single point of view, could not be regarded as free in its volitions, for they are subject to causality. But the Kritik teaches us to regard it from two points, as a thing *per se*, and as a phenomenon. From this latter point of view its visible actions cannot indeed be free, but

the result is different when we regard it from the former. Without, therefore, being able to *know* my soul as free, I liberate my attempt to *think* it such from an apparent contradiction.<sup>1</sup> Suppose, now, that the freedom of the will were one of the conditions, without which practical morality were impossible, but that the speculative reason had proved such an idea contradictory to itself, then freedom must give way, and with it morality, to make place for the necessity of natural causes. From such a result we are saved by the *Kritik*.

The same great positive uses can be shown in our ideas of God and of immortality. These cannot even be *assumed* without checking the impertinences of the speculative reason, which, by applying its empirical principles where they are inapplicable, asserts all *practical extension* of the reason to be impossible. Such *knowledge* is the real source of immoral unbelief, and must be ordered to make way for *faith*. We aim then at improving the reason of our posterity by setting them to study a sober science, and saving them from wasting time and trouble on idle groping and pretentious dogmatism. Above all, we hope to dispose of all objections against morality and religion after the manner of Socrates, by proving clearly the ignorance of the objectors.

And if there be any supposed loss in the surrender of the claims made by the reason, the loss affects the *monopoly of the schools*, not the *interests of humanity*. Were the doctrines of the immortality of the soul, and of the existence

<sup>1</sup> It must be carefully remembered that in this remarkable discussion (*Antinomy*, sec. 9) Kant professed to prove, not the existence of freedom, nor its probability, nor even its possibility, but simply that it was not necessarily contradictory to causality. (See *Kritik*, p. 345.) This guarded attitude has not been transferred to Mr. Lewes's exposition (*Hist. of Phil.* ii. p. 519).

of God, ever really established by the subtle arguments and distinctions of the schools? Has it not been confessed that the public are unable to grasp such refinements, and that the former was rather proved by the profound inadequacy of the present life to satisfy our aspirations, and the latter by the harmony, beauty, and mercy of nature? These proofs rather gain than lose, for the schools are taught to pretend to no deeper knowledge, and to confine themselves to the arguments that are accepted by the many, instead of arrogating to themselves the sole possession of such truths. But the schools remain in the possession of a science most useful to the public, though the fact is not recognised; a science which cannot and need not ever be popular, which refutes the arguments of the philosophers who mystify the public, by objections equally subtle, but saves them from drifting unconsciously into the assumptions and the quarrels that have hitherto disgraced metaphysic. 'Only by means of this science—the Kritik of the Pure Reason—can *Materialism, Atheism, Fatalism, Enthusiasm, and Superstition* be disarmed. We also cut away the very roots of *idealism* and *scepticism*, but this rather affects the schools than the mass of mankind. It would be far more rational of governments to support such a science, than to countenance the ridiculous dogmatism of the schools, which raise an alarm about the public safety, when their cobwebs are torn in shreds, though the public neither notice nor miss them.' The reader will not fail to remember how very similar, even in expression, was the design of Bishop Berkeley.<sup>1</sup>

Our Kritik is not opposed to the *dogmatic procedure* of the reason in its pure cognition as a science, for every pure

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 265, for a like distinction between scepticism and the sceptical method.

science must demonstrate dogmatically—that is to say, from sure principles strictly *a priori*. It is opposed to *dogmatism*, which is the dogmatic procedure of the reason *without previous criticism of its faculties*.<sup>1</sup> But we do not therefore support shallow talking, which pretends to be popular, or scepticism, which abolishes all Metaphysic. We rather establish this science on a sound and systematic, not on a popular, basis; and in its future development we must follow the steps of the great dogmatic philosopher, Wolff, who may be regarded the originator of thoroughgoing and systematic inquiry in Germany. Had his ground been critically prepared, he might indeed have established metaphysic as a science.

§ 5. ¶ These reflections, which agree closely with the analytical and popular account Kant has given of his discoveries in the *Prolegomena* (published in 1783), conclude the exposition of his method and its results. There remains an explanation of the changes introduced into his Second Edition, a subject of less importance, had not Schopenhauer made his pretended discovery that these two Editions differed very materially, not only in exposition, but in doctrine. It was said that Kant had become afraid of the idealistic conclusions drawn from his principles, and had suppressed the passages which resolve the whole external object into our own sensations, and their form (imposed by the mind also). More particularly, there was one paragraph inserted into the Deduction of the Categories which distinctly states that the matter of our intuitions is given by a source apart from, and independent of, the understanding;<sup>1</sup> and a refutation of Idealism was introduced into the Principles of the pure understanding, in which Kant attempted to prove that the objective existence of things in space is

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Preface to  
the 1<sup>st</sup> edn  
of his trans.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 89.

the condition of our internal experience. Above all, in the First Edition the distinction between soul and body was explained to be a difference, not of substance (of which we know nothing), but of representation; and from this point of view the community or relation of both was discussed (cf. Appendix C, vol. ii. of this work). This was supposed to be contradicted or extenuated<sup>1</sup> in the Second and following Editions, for the purpose, Kuno Fischer thinks, of gaining adherents. The question therefore assumes considerable importance; for it must determine, in the first place, the degree of Kant's own conviction as to the truth of his doctrine; and, secondly, the real import of his system.

Let us then first of all consult the author himself, and consider what he says in his second and more elaborate Preface<sup>2</sup>:—'As regards this Second Edition, I naturally did not wish to let the opportunity escape of remedying, as far as possible, the difficulties and the obscurity from which may have arisen the sundry misapprehensions that have occurred to many acute men (perhaps without my fault) in their estimate of this work. *In the positions themselves, and the grounds of proof, as well as in the form and completeness of the plan, I have found nothing to alter*: a fact which must be ascribed partly to the long consideration to which I submitted my work previous to its publication, partly to the nature of the subject itself,—I mean the constitution of a purely speculative reason, which contains a veritable system of members, where everything is organic—that is, where

<sup>1</sup> In this particular case we have an exactly parallel statement in the Second Edition. Compare *Proleg.* p. 234, with *Kritik*, p. 252. This passage in the Second Edition does not seem to have been noticed by critics.

<sup>2</sup> The silence of Kuno Fischer as to these two Prefaces is very remarkable.

the whole is for the sake of each individual part, and each individual part for the sake of the whole; so that any defect, however trifling, whether it be a positive error, or a mere deficiency, is certain to betray itself in use.<sup>1</sup> . . . But in the *exposition* much remains to be done, and in this respect I have attempted to improve this Second Edition, with the intention of clearing away partly the misapprehensions of the Aesthetic, especially of the concept of Time;<sup>2</sup> partly the *obscurity in the Deduction* of the Categories;<sup>3</sup> partly to supply the supposed want of sufficient evidence in the demonstrations of the Principles of the Pure Understanding;<sup>4</sup> partly, in fine, to remove misapprehension as to the Paralogisms laid to the charge of Rational Psychology.<sup>5</sup> . . . But the necessary consequence of this improvement, except we made the work altogether too long, is a slight loss to the reader, since a good deal (that did not indeed belong substantially to the completeness of the whole) must be omitted, or put into a shorter form,<sup>6</sup> which, nevertheless, many readers might not wish to lose. This was done to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. xxxix.

<sup>2</sup> Kant added Section i. § 6, on Time, and the General Remarks, ii. iv. (pp. 41-43). In his Introduction, Sections i. and ii. were greatly expanded, and v. and vi. added.

<sup>3</sup> From Section ii. § 11, of the Transcendental Logic to the end of the Deduction it was completely rewritten.

<sup>4</sup> Under each of the Definitions of the Principles (with the exception of the Postulates) the first paragraph, headed 'proof,' was added; as well as two Appendices, entitled, 'General Remarks on the System of Principles,' and the Refutation of Idealism, on which he also adds a note in the second Preface.

<sup>5</sup> From the words, 'but we shall for brevity's sake' (p. 241), the whole discussion was rewritten.

<sup>6</sup> The third chapter of the Analytic (on Phenomena and Noëmena), and the Refutation of Rational Psychology, were considerably shortened, part of the latter reappearing in the *Refutation of Idealism*. The Deduction of the Categories is likewise abbreviated.

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make room for my present, and I venture to hope now intelligible exposition, which in substance, as regards the propositions, and even in their method of proof, CITANCES ABSOLUTELY NOTHING; but still varies [from the former] here and there in the method of the exposition in such a manner as could not be managed by interpolation. This slight loss, *which, by the way, can be supplied, if any one chooses, by a comparison with the First Edition*, is, I hope, more than counterbalanced by the greater clearness' [of the present Edition].<sup>1</sup>

In the face of this declaration, which explicitly asserts that nothing whatever has been altered in the system, and which invites the reader to compare the two Editions, we are told that the Second Edition is a mutilated, distorted, and depraved work, caused by the weakness of old age, and the fear of public opinion in Kant! It can be proved by the theological attitude of this, and of his later works, that these charges are perfectly absurd.\* It will be also shown in the course of this work that the supposed evidence of the theory is derived from a series of blunders and oversights (if not actual suppressions) in the interpretation of Kant's very clear, though not dogmatic declarations.

\* So says  
Max Müller  
also -

As Schopenhauer's opinion is fashionable in Germany, we do not wish to open the discussion without giving the reader the means of judging for himself, by comparing the two Editions; he will find, accordingly, in the footnotes and in the appendices to the second volume of this work, all the passages of any importance which appear in the First Edition only. The results of such a comparison are simply these: that we may safely defy the advocates of the First Edition to find any doctrine there stated to which there is not a corresponding assertion in the Second; or to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. xli.

point out a supposed alteration in the Second Edition which we cannot prove to be supported by quotations from the original work.<sup>1</sup> The assertion of the honest author is most decidedly true; in the propositions themselves, and even in their proof, *absolutely nothing* has been changed.


<sup>1</sup> In Appendix C are added short footnotes, showing the special points of agreement ignored by the critics, and explaining the supposed points of difference; and these will save us in this place from quotations, as well as from the discussion of them. The vacillating attitude of Mr. Mill and Mr. Lewes on this question has been noted in the Preface: they seem unable to resist the force of the argument, but at the same time they will not accept thoroughly the conclusions which these arguments justify. The long note in the second Preface, which refers to the Refutation of Idealism, and endeavours to improve the form of his proof, will best be discussed in connection with the passage to which it refers. The reader may therefore pass it by for the present.

Since the first appearance of this work a great deal has been written on the question of the divergence between Kant's First and Second Editions; in particular, Mr. Stirling has given a valuable history of the controversy in *Mind*, vol. viii. pp. 525 *sqq.* His conclusion is, that Kant, 'being scandalised by certain misrepresentations of his doctrine as mere Berkeleyanism,' 'allowed the idealistic standpoint somewhat to recede.' 'The passages most loudly idealistic in sound have been omitted from the Second Edition.' But this latter statement cannot be accepted without caution, in the face of the very passages quoted by Mr. Stirling himself. It may be that Kant was somewhat frightened at the charge of Berkeleyanism; but it still appears true, that though he altered his language here and there, he did not at all alter his opinions. This is the view of Ueberweg in his short Latin tract on the subject, and is substantially the view originally put forward in the text.



## CHAPTER II

For the benefit of the reader we here give a general analysis of the *Kritik*. Its main divisions are called respectively *Elementology* (pp. 1-430) and *Methodology* (pp. 431-517). The former is subdivided thus :—



### THE INTRODUCTION—PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

#### *The Distinction in Kind between the Cognitive Faculties*

¶ It is evident from the considerations urged in the Preface, that a precise theory of the human faculties lies at the basis of Kant's inquiry. He investigates the object through the subject and its conditions. What then are the faculties which teach us all we know of things? The general answer was given long ago, according to which they have been unanimously divided by philosophers into two classes : on the one hand, sense, sensation, external intuition or impressions from without ; on the other, intellect, reflection,

internal intuition, thought.<sup>1</sup> But while this distinction was generally admitted, there had ever been an *a priori* fallacy afloat (as Mr. Mill would say) that only one kind of knowledge could be true, and that all the information given us from other sources than this must be either illusory or defective. Hence Kant, who discussed the subject in several shorter treatises prior to his *Kritik*, notices, that under this assumption sensibility and understanding had been in turn exalted into the sole source of true knowledge.<sup>2</sup> The idealists, from Plato to Leibnitz, had mistrusted the senses, and considered sensibility a mere vague and confused copy of the reality attained by thought. The sensualists, from Epicurus to Condillac, had considered the senses as the primary source from which the understanding compounded or abstracted a faint reproduction of the external reality. While, therefore, idealists and realists<sup>3</sup> are opposed diametrically as to the true cognitive faculty, they agree in one point, that Sensibility and Understanding differ in degree only.

If Kant had joined either party it would certainly have been that of the idealists. But he perceived that the clearest of all our knowledge, that of geometrical figures, was given by Sense, and that many concepts of the Understanding, such as the notion of right, could only be apprehended with great difficulty. He concluded that there

<sup>1</sup> It will be seen, however, that Kant distinguishes between internal intuition and thought, as, indeed, Locke had done before him. Internal intuition belongs to sensibility, not to understanding.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 516.

<sup>3</sup> It has been customary in English Philosophy to confine the term *Realist* to those among the schoolmen who asserted the separate existence of *general* ideas, as opposed to Nominalists. There is no reason for this restriction. The term is here used to mean the philosophers who assert the separate existence of our external percepts, as opposed to the idealists.

were two cognitive faculties, totally distinct, and differing in kind—Sensibility and Understanding. This position is the basis of the whole critical philosophy. Kant himself has explicitly argued this point, and asserted this generic distinction, and any commentator who endeavours to refine it away, by speaking of these faculties as mere laws of development,<sup>1</sup> or by insisting that it is after all the same mind that knows in either case,<sup>2</sup> must be rejected as a misleading guide. It is even questionable whether we should designate them both under the same name of faculty; for we shall see that Sensibility is a passive receptivity, whilst Understanding is an active spontaneity. We find, indeed, at a later stage of the *Kritik*, a third faculty introduced, and called the Reason, as distinguished from the Understanding. But if we attend to Kant's own explanation,<sup>3</sup> he tells us 'that the Reason does not give birth to any [new] concept, but only frees the concepts of the understanding from the limits of experience.' In fact, it differs from the understanding not in its essential nature, but in its aim, which is the unconditioned. This second distinction, then, though very important, is by no means so fundamental or so trenchant as that which has just been explained. In accordance with the latter, Kant divides his *Kritik* of the reason into the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, or *Kritik* of the Sensibility, and the *Transcendental Logic*, or *Kritik* of the Understanding. The former had been sketched, completely enough, in his earlier treatises, and seems to have cost him far less labour to discover (as it also costs us far less to understand) than the latter.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Webb, *Intellectualism of Locke*, p. 168, note.

<sup>2</sup> This question has been fully discussed by Dr. Ingleby and Professor Sylvester. See Sylvester's *Laws of Verse*, Appendix.

<sup>3</sup> *Kritik*, p. 256.

<sup>4</sup> In pointing out the relation between Reason and Understanding in

We can now follow Kant's Introduction, observing closely the order of his exposition. He claims particularly to have been the first who understood, and who therefore stated correctly, the *Problem of Metaphysic*. We are about to investigate the human faculties. We can only do this by analysing the effects which they produce, and these effects are knowledge or cognition.<sup>1</sup> The question, therefore, of the Kritik is this: How is the fact of cognition possible? and more particularly, how is synthetical a priori cognition possible?<sup>2</sup>

#### KANT'S INTRODUCTION

§ 1. *Of the Distinction of Pure and Empirical Cognition.*  
—There can be no doubt that our knowledge begins chronologically with experience. For our senses are first affected by external objects, and our understanding is first occupied in<sup>3</sup> comparing or arranging the materials so obtained. But though all knowledge begins with experience, this does not imply that it originates<sup>4</sup> from experience. For it might, even when obtained from experience, be a composite thing, consisting partly of impressions, partly of additions made (in the act of receiving them) by our understanding. And the *Kritik*, it must be observed that Kant uses the latter term in two distinct meanings—(1) as the general faculty of thought, as opposed to Sensibility; (2) as the special faculty of concepts, as distinguished from Judgment and Reason. The word *concept* also is used ambiguously, generally being opposed to *intuition*, but is sometimes used in a wide sense, to signify any mental state [Cf. *infra*, p. 31, note]. Cf. the analytical table on p. 24. *Supra* a.

<sup>1</sup> These terms are in the following work used synonymously.

<sup>2</sup> As Kuno Fischer puts it, there are three questions to be answered in the sequel—(1) What is cognition? (2) Does it exist? (3) How is its existence to be explained, or how is it possible?

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Locke, *Essay*, book ii. chap. 12, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the distinction between *origo* and *exordium*.

it may be very difficult to separate these additions, and recognise them as such. The question, whether there be cognitions independent of all the impressions of the senses, is not therefore to be lightly decided. [It may be objected, that elements added by the cognitive faculties cannot properly be called cognitions, for they do not teach us to know things different from the mind, but rather interfere with such knowledge. We may admit this objection so far as to allow that if our understanding fuses its own conditions with the impressions received from without, these things, as they are apart from us, cannot be known. But surely, in things as they appear to us, these elements must be of the last importance.]

The cognition of these elements is called *a priori*, as distinguished from that which is derived from experience, which is a *posteriori*. The popular meaning of *a priori* is simply that our knowledge is derived, as opposed to special experience, from a general rule, which may have been itself originally derived from experience. You say that a man who undermines the foundations of his house might have known *a priori* that it would fall. Yet he must have learned from experience that bodies are heavy, before he could make this inference. We intend, then, to use the phrase *a priori* cognition of such as is *absolutely* independent of *all* experience. *A priori* cognitions are *pure*, if they have no empirical elements mixed with them; if they have, they are *mixed*. So the assertion: every change has a cause, is a mixed cognition, because change is a notion that can only be obtained from experience.

§ 2. *We possess certain a priori cognitions, and even the ordinary understanding always contains them.* — By what mark, says Kant, can we surely know that we possess any pure, as opposed to empirical, knowledge? *Firstly*, Should

there be a proposition which is thought together with its necessity, then it is an *a priori* judgment, and if underived from any other<sup>1</sup> not itself necessary, absolutely *a priori*. Secondly, Experience never gives us strict and absolute, but only comparative universality, gained by induction, and which asserts merely that so far we have found no exception. Should any judgment be thought in strict universality, *i.e.* so that no exception is regarded possible, it cannot be derived from experience, but is valid absolutely *a priori*. Empirical universality is then but an arbitrary or contingent exaggeration from the cases we and others know, to all cases; whereas strict universality is essential to the judgment in which it is found, and points to a peculiar source of knowledge, which we have designated *a priori*. Necessity and strict universality are certain marks of an *a priori* cognition, and are inseparable. But as empirical limitation is at times more easily shown than contingency, and it is often more convincing to show the unlimited universality of a judgment than its necessity, we may use these two criteria separately, each of them being in itself infallible.

¶ This view of the criteria of *a priori* knowledge has not met with general acceptance. Kant says indeed very justly, that exceptions in experience are more easily shown than abstract contingency in judgments, but many philosophers would demur to having necessity proved by universality. Sir W. Hamilton, indeed, distinctly deduces the latter from the former. But the school of Mr. Mill, while admitting the importance of universality, hold that it can prove only a *subjective* necessity, or conviction, stronger in *degree* than empirical conviction, but not differing from it in *kind*. We cannot enter now into the details of this con-

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Stirling, in his translation, omits the important words, 'not itself necessary.'—*Text Book to Kant*, p. 117.

troversy ; but the important point to be noticed is that the necessary judgment is *thought* as necessary and exceptionless ; in thinking that A is B in such a case, we simultaneously think that it could not be otherwise.

29  
That there are strictly universal and necessary, and therefore *a priori* judgments in human knowledge, says Kant, is easily shown in science, by mathematical judgments, in ordinary life, by the assertion that every change must have a cause ; so plainly indeed does the latter concept contain these criteria, that it would be altogether lost were we to deduce it, as Hume did, from mere frequent association, and so allow it only a *subjective* necessity. But Kant thinks that without any examples, pure *a priori* principles can be shown indispensable to experience. For experience must deduce its certainty from some fixed principles, and not from rules, which are themselves all empirical and consequently contingent. These, he adds, could *hardly* count as first principles. [Had Kant expanded this proof, it would have been an instance of what he calls his transcendental proof, which, from the existence of a fact in our cognition, proves the existence of the necessary conditions from which alone the fact can result.<sup>1</sup>] He is 'content however, in this place, to note the existence of a pure use of our cognitive faculties, and its attributes.' We must remember that they belong, not only to judgments, but sometimes to notions. So the space occupied by a body, or what we consider its substance, cannot be abstracted from it.

¶ It is, I think, much to be regretted, that Kant did not give more weight to the force of custom, or subjective necessity, as he calls it, and show clearly that it may in all cases be distinguished from real or objective necessity. And this omission in the *Kritik* is the more remarkable, as he

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 478.

had before him the writings of Hume, in which the effacing of this distinction was a capital feature.

§ 3. *Philosophy requires a (special) science to determine the possibility, the principles, and the extent of all a priori cognitions.*—We have seen in the Preface how certain cognitions attempt to transcend all experience, and to enlarge our knowledge independently of it. Nay, this very knowledge is generally regarded as the most noble and important. Such are the problems that concern God, Freedom, and Immortality. But it might naturally have been expected that we should have determined accurately the origin, validity, and value of the principles we have applied in these researches. If we mean by *naturally*, what ought to be, this remark is just; but if we mean what usually happens, there are solid reasons for expecting this investigation to be long delayed.<sup>1</sup> For the recognised security of mathematical knowledge leads us to expect the same from other *a priori* cognitions, though they are quite different in nature. And these we pursue with such ardour, that only clear contradictions will check us. Unfortunately the facts of experience, which in other sciences test idle theories strictly, have here no application. We ignore the fact that Mathematic, which has made brilliant advances in *a priori* knowledge, is strictly confined (as we shall see) to intuition. But the intuitions with which Mathematic deals are given *a priori*, and are therefore hardly distinguishable from pure concepts.<sup>2</sup> This example then excites us with the hope of great results. The fleet dove, that cuts the resisting air in her flight, might think to increase her speed if space were a vacuum. So

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 434.

<sup>2</sup> This remark shows why Kant vacillates in his language about space and time, calling them, in an earlier treatise, even *conceptus spatii et temporis*. He also speaks of the "Begriff des Raumes," at the beginning of the *Metaphysical Exposition of Space*. Cf. note, p. 24, *supra*.



Plato left the world of Sense, and ventured on the wings (as it were) of Ideas, into the vacuum of the pure Understanding. He failed to perceive that he could make no way, for want of a resisting medium, in which to apply his powers.

Speculation is ever hastening to complete her structure, and only then begins to consider the soundness of the foundation. Our suspicions are generally lulled during the construction by this fact, that perhaps the greater part of the work of our reason consists in the mere analysis, in *formal* explication of the concepts we already (though perhaps confusedly) possess. This sober and useful process seduces the reason to make unwittingly quite a different sort of assertion about given concepts, in which new *matter* is joined to them *a priori*, without questioning our right to do so. This distinction must be forthwith explained at greater length.

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§ 4. *The distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments.*—Though this distinction has become a household truth in philosophy, Kant's analysis has never been accurately expounded. The reader must pay particular attention to it, if he wishes to understand clearly the objective necessity of mathematical judgments.

If I assert, says Kant, of a body, that it is extended, I only assert an attribute necessarily contained in the notion. It is by an analysis of the notion that I form the judgment, and it is hence called analytical or *explicative*, as enumerating clearly elements contained obscurely or confusedly in the concept. But if I assert of a body, that it has weight, I assert what cannot be discovered by any analysis of my notion of a body. This judgment is therefore synthetical or ampliative, enriching our notion by the addition of a new attribute.

¶ It was pointed out in a former work<sup>1</sup> that Locke had completely anticipated this celebrated distinction. Mr. Lewes<sup>2</sup> thinks that a glance at the *Prolegomena* (p. 24) would have shown any one that Kant fully recognised Locke's priority. We do not know what a *glance* at the passage might have done, but a *careful perusal* of it has convinced us that Kant (who was not 'fully alive to Locke's priority') did not know the really decisive passage. It is not that cited by Mr. Lewes (Locke, Essay iv. 8, 8) and Kant (iv. 3, 9), but that cited by Dr. Webb in the first chapter of the 4th book of the *Essay*, where Locke enumerates the *four kinds of agreement and disagreement between our ideas*: (1) Identity and diversity, viz. 'blue is not yellow;'; (2) Relation, viz. 'the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right;'; (3) Co-existence: 'gold is soluble in aqua regia;'; (4) Real existence, viz. 'God is.' Here are Kant's analytical, his *synthetical a priori*, and *synthetical a posteriori* judgments accurately distinguished, and his very examples almost anticipated; and in the fourth the distinctness of *existential* judgments is asserted, which, as we shall see, Kant proved to be synthetical, but *subjectively* so, by the addition, not of an attribute, but of a relation to ourselves, and therefore he also distinguished them from other synthetical judgments. It may be noted, however, that Locke nowhere gives an example of a proposition which would correspond to Kant's synthetical *a priori* in Physic, e.g. every event has a cause. That a proposition such as this might be synthetical and yet *a priori* was perhaps Kant's greatest discovery.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Fischer's *Comm.* p. 28, note.    <sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* vol. ii. p. 475, note.

<sup>3</sup> Indeed, though the distinction between analytical and synthetical may have occurred to Locke, he does not consistently uphold it—e.g. in iv. 3, 18, when discussing the possibility of an *a priori* science of ethics, the propositions that he suggests as its basis are only analytical.—Cf. Essay i. 2, 9-20, and iv. 8, 13, on this subject.

¶ I agree with Kant that mere hints are not anticipations, and do not, therefore, claim any exaggerated importance for a curious passage in Descartes's 14th *Règle pour la direction de l'esprit*, though in it he lays down the Kantian distinction of analytical and synthetical as plainly as it can well be expressed, and shows how previous philosophers had confused these judgments, and consequently fallen into errors. Here is the passage :—

'Passons maintenant à ces paroles : *un corps a de l'étendue* ; bien que nous comprenions que dans cette phrase *étendue* signifie autre chose que *corps*, cependant nous ne formons pas dans notre imagination deux idées distinctes, l'une d'un corps et l'autre de l'étendue, mais une seule, celle d'un corps qui a de l'étendue. Au fond c'est comme si je disais : *un corps a de l'étendue* ; ou plutôt *ce qui a de l'étendue a de l'étendue* ; cela est particulier à tout être qui n'existe que dans un autre et qui ne peut être compris sans un sujet ; il en est autrement pour les êtres qui se distinguent réellement des sujets. Si je dis, par exemple, *Pierre a des richesses*, l'idée de *Pierre* est entièrement différente de celle de *richesses* ; de même si je dis : *Paul est riche*, je m'imagine tout autre chose que si je disais, le *riche est riche*. Faute d'apercevoir cette différence, la plupart pensent à tort que l'étendue contient quelque chose de distinct de ce qui a de l'étendue, comme les richesses de Paul sont autre chose que Paul.' Descartes, however, in trying to evolve the existence of God out of our idea of Him, asserts, at least in this particular case, that existential judgments are analytical. The truth is, though other philosophers may have hinted at the distinction, Kant was the first to grasp it thoroughly. It is also approached by Hume, *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 165 :—'That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides, cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly

defined, without a train of reasoning and inquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that *where there is no property there is no injustice*, it is only necessary to define the terms and explain injustice to be a violation of property.' But to return.

All analytical judgments depend upon the Laws of Identity and Contradiction.<sup>1</sup> You cannot deny to a concept any of its parts, without at once contradicting your own act of conception. All analytical judgments are also *a priori*, however empirical the concept concerned may be, for they require no additional experience, but a mere dissection of given notions. But here *a priori* is used in the popular sense explained above. Synthetical judgments must of course conform to the logical law of Contradiction also, but still they can never be obtained from it alone, and require some distinct principle in addition. What can this principle be?

All empirical judgments are synthetical. For it were idle to apply to experience for any information that could be obtained by analysis of our concepts. But if these judgments join new elements to our previous concepts, what guarantee have we that these elements ought to be so joined? We must *know* that the predicate belongs to the subject, or we have no cognition. Kant has replied to this difficulty very fully, especially in his First Edition. Let us first take the case of *a posteriori* judgments, such as 'all bodies are heavy.' How do we know this? From experience. The concepts *body* and *heavy* are distinct from each other, and can only be brought into connection by comparing them both with some third thing (*x*, as Kant calls it) with which they will both agree. For all synthetical *a posteriori* judgments this *x* is our past experience. 'Both concepts (al-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Proleg.* p. 17.

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though the one is not contained in the other) still belong to one another (though only contingently) as parts of the whole experience, which is itself a synthetic combination of intuitions.<sup>1</sup>

A more difficult problem remains. All synthetical judgments are not *a posteriori*, for many of them are universal and necessary. If they be synthetical, and also *a priori*, what is the  $x$ , which affords us the real synthesis?<sup>2</sup> When we assert of an effect, that it must have some cause, this never could be obtained from the analysis of the concept of effect; where then did we find the combination *a priori* of effect and cause? for as this judgment is absolutely universal and necessary, we could not as before have recourse to our complete experience, of which it is indeed one of the very conditions. The answer to this question was one of Kant's greatest discoveries. But he made it first in the field of Mathematic.

<sup>1</sup> The question whether propositions can ever pass from the class of synthetical to that of analytical has been much debated. The truth seems to be this: a judgment must be one or the other; either the predicate is thought in the subject, or it is thought out of it: there is no alternative. At the same time, a proposition (i.e. a judgment expressed in words) may be analytical for one man, and synthetical for another; but then it does not represent the same judgment for both individuals, for they are using terms in different senses. And even for the same individual a proposition may at one time be synthetical, and at a later period, when larger experience has added to his concepts, analytical. For omniscience all true propositions are analytical, but for a finite intelligence the distinction is fundamental. Cf. Monck, *Logic*, pp. 122 *sqq.*, for a discussion of this question.

<sup>2</sup> Kant's answer to this question is, we shall see, briefly this: In *a priori* synthetical judgments in Mathematic, the  $x$  is the *a priori* intuition; in those in Physic it is the possibility of experience; in Metaphysic such judgments are impossible, for no  $x$  can be found. Hence Knowledge of the existence of God as the Sole & Intelligible Cause is not attainable according to Kant, by the Pure Speculative Reason.

— not even of the wisdom of your own god

See 139  
+ 139

§ 5. *All theoretical Sciences contain Synthetical Judgments a priori as Principles*

1. While Philosophy<sup>1</sup> is satisfied with *discursive* judgments about concepts, MATHEMATIC insists on proving each step by *intuition*, and this observation gives us the clue to its first condition. This condition must be intuition, and it must be *a priori*. For though mathematical, like all other true judgments, must conform to the Law of Contradiction, such mere analysis does not explain their real nature. Consider the judgment  $7 + 5 = 12$ . All previous philosophers considered this a mere analytical inference. But Kant denies that the concepts of 7, of 5, and of their addition, actually contain 12 as a necessary element. 'We must go beyond these concepts, and obtain the assistance of the intuition corresponding to either of them—suppose the fingers of a hand, or five points in a space—and add the units of the five given by intuition successively to the concept of 7.'<sup>2</sup> When this operation is completed, and then only, do we see the result to be 12. All such arithmetical judgments are therefore synthetical, as may be easily proved by considering the addition of large numbers. We there find that no analysis of our concepts will give us the required result.<sup>3</sup> Geometrical judgments are equally

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Proleg.* p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> The reader will observe that Kant proposes to add the *intuition* of 5 to the *concept* of 7, the very expression repeated verbatim in the *Prolegomena*. He appears to mean that the 7 is a made up group, whereas the 5 units are added seriatim.

<sup>3</sup> It is curious to find, in a book published in 1886, a reiteration of the opinion that mathematical judgments are analytical; and yet Professor Knight in his *Hume* falls into this blunder (p. 164), and remarks that the difference between mathematical judgments and the law of causality is practically that the first are analytical, the second synthetical. This, he says, 'leads straight to Kant's reply to Hume!' As to

synthetical. If I say that a right line is the shortest possible between two points, I cannot elicit anything about its shortness, which is *quantity*, from the mere concept of its straightness, which is *quality*.<sup>1</sup>

(There are indeed,<sup>2</sup> Kant parenthetically observes, in geometry and also in arithmetic analytical judgments depending on the Law of Contradiction, such as  $a = a$  and  $a + b > a$ , but neither are these the principles on which the demonstration is based, nor would they be admissible in mathematics were they not capable of being expressed in intuition.) What misleads us about the synthetical judgments of mathematic, and makes us regard them as analytical, is an ambiguity of expression. To have a synthetical *a priori* judgment we must necessarily join the predicate in thought to the subject, the given concept. But the question is not, what we *must* join in thought to the given concept, but what we actually think *in* it, though only obscurely; and then it becomes manifest, that the predicate in synthetical *a priori* judgments pertains to the concept, necessarily indeed, yet not as thought in the concept itself, but by virtue of an intuition, which must be added to it.<sup>3</sup>

the nature of the judgment,  $7 + 5 = 12$ , which Kant regards as synthetical, the curious reader may find a long controversy in *Mind*, vol. viii.—Mr. Sidgwick, in opposition to Mr. Monck, upholding the opinion of Ueberweg, that such a judgment may be regarded as analytical if we go back to the *definitions* of 7, 5, &c.

<sup>1</sup> In the *Prolegomena* Kant adds a still clearer example. All the proofs of equal triangles resolve themselves ultimately into *super-position*, which is no logical analysis, but a direct appeal to intuition.

<sup>2</sup> Professor Max Müller, in his Translation, puts this sentence in a parenthesis, and remarks (Preface, p. lviii.) that Dr. Vaihinger first gave this explanation of the passage. But that these words are parenthetical was pointed out long ago by Mr. Monck, and they were placed in brackets in the first edition of this book.

<sup>3</sup> The ambiguity is in the words, 'we *must* join the predicate to the subject.' This, in synthetical judgments, says Kant, does not mean

2. PHYSICAL science contains *a priori* synthetical judgments as its principles. The examples which Kant gives are not the principle of causality [as Kuno Fischer alleges],<sup>1</sup> but the assertions that *the quantity of matter in nature is constant*, and that *action and reaction are always equal*. Permanence is not part of our concept of matter; Reaction is not so either, and so these propositions are synthetical.

3. METAPHYSIC, whether we grant its scientific value or not, at all events pretends to occupy itself not about analysing concepts, but about extending our *a priori* knowledge, and it employs such *a priori* synthetical principles as our experience cannot even grasp. We can take as an example, *the world must have had a beginning*. Metaphysic then aims, at all events, at consisting of nothing but synthetical *a priori* judgments. [When Kuno Fischer gives as an example *judgments asserting existence*, he forgets that the synthetical nature of such judgments is only established in the latter part of the Kritik by a long and difficult discussion, and could therefore not be here quoted as a commonly received truth.]

§ 6. *The general Problem of the Pure Reason.*—It is very useful to comprehend a number of investigations under a single formula. Both the proof and the refutation are thereby simplified. A single question expresses the problem of the pure reason, how are synthetical *a priori* judgments possible? By the solution of this problem or the proof that such judgments are not possible, Metaphysic must stand or fall. David Hume, of all previous philosophers, approached nearest to this problem, but that the predicate is a *part* of the subject, but that it must be necessarily added to it.

<sup>1</sup> Ueberweg goes wrong in giving the Law of Causality as an example of a synthetical *a priori* judgment in *Metaphysic (Hist. of Phil. vol. ii. p. 156)*.

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did not state it to himself either distinctly or universally enough. He confined his attention to the Principle of Causality,<sup>1</sup> and exploded Metaphysic as in truth borrowed from experience, though decked out with an apparent necessity engendered by habit. A larger consideration of the question would have shown him that his conclusion, viz. that no synthetical proposition could be *a priori*,<sup>2</sup> disproved the possibility of Mathematic, a result at which his good sense must have revolted.<sup>3</sup> Kant tells us, in his *Prolegomena*, that this scepticism of Hume was the exciting cause that prompted his first critical doubt.

The solution of the above problem explains<sup>n</sup> the possibility of all sciences which contain a theoretical cognition of objects *a priori*, and therefore answers the questions: *How is pure Mathematic and how is pure Physic possible? That they are possible, their actual existence proves. As to Metaphysic, its want of success excites reasonable doubts as to its possibility. Yet as a fact in human nature, a certain spontaneous Metaphysic cannot be denied. The reason is irresistibly impelled to discuss those questions which transcend the bounds of experience, and in this sense there has been since the dawn of speculation, and there will ever be, Metaphysic. The question therefore*

<sup>1</sup> Kant did not know Hume's *Treatise*, in which *substance* is discussed at length, or he would not have said this. His knowledge of Hume was confined to the *Enquiry*.

<sup>2</sup> But, of course, as Mr. Stirling points out (*Text Book*, p. 359), the notion of *a priori* in this reference never occurred to Hume.

<sup>3</sup> Kant says that Hume regarded the propositions of mathematics as analytical (*Proleg.* p. 28; *Theory of Ethics*, Abbott's Translation, p. 142). This, however, is not so certain. The passage Kant seems to have had in his mind is at p. 22, vol. ii. of the *Essays*, viz. 'Mathematical propositions are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.' (See p. 34, *supra*.)

remains: How can this impulse be explained from the nature of the reason, or *how is spontaneous metaphysic possible?*

But as it has confessedly led to perpetual contradictions, we must insist upon the further and last issue: how is Metaphysic as a science possible?<sup>1</sup> These are the strictly scientific, and closely defined limits of the Kritik, which is concerned, not with objects, but with reason itself, and its problems. All previous dogmatic attempts at Metaphysic may be completely ignored, as either affording a mere analysis of concepts, which though useful is not Metaphysic, or as consisting of assumptions which have long since become suspicious, owing to the contradictions which they originated.

§ 7. *The general Conception and Subdivisions of a special Science, called Kritik of the Pure Reason.*—The reason is the faculty which gives us the principles of a *a priori* knowledge. An *organon* of the pure reason would then be a summary (*Inbegriff*) of these principles, and its detailed application would be the *system* of the pure reason. The present work is a mere preliminary (or *propædæutic*<sup>2</sup>) to this system, of negative use, and devoted to clearing and purifying our reason from errors on the subject, by means of searching *criticism*.

'I call all knowledge transcendental which is not directly concerned with objects, but with the way in which we cognise them, so far as it is possible to do so *a priori*.' A *system* of such knowledge is properly called *transcendental philosophy*. Yet even this exceeds our design, as it should contain a complete account of our analytical, as well as our synthetical knowledge; whereas we shall only carry our analysis as far as is absolutely necessary to the understand-

<sup>1</sup> Considered in the Methodology.

<sup>2</sup> προπαιδευτική.

ing of the principles of the *a priori* synthesis. This work is then merely a transcendental criticism, or *Kritik of the Pure Reason*. The main point in subdividing such a science is to admit no concepts that have the smallest empirical element. Thus the principles of morality, though they are by no means based on pleasure and pain, or on desires and inclinations, all of which are empirical in origin, yet imply them necessarily either as obstacles to duty, or incitements to action. They must therefore be excluded.

Our science must of course contain first *Stoicheiology*,<sup>1</sup> and next *Methodology*. Each of these will be subdivided according to principles explained in the sequel. One point must here be mentioned: that there are two stems or trunks of human knowledge which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root, and these are *Sensibility* and *Understanding*; through the former of which objects are given to us, through the latter they are thought. So far as the sensibility may contain *a priori* representations that are the conditions of objects being given to us, so far does it enter into transcendental philosophy. And as objects must be given to us, before they can be thought, this transcendental doctrine of Sensibility, or Aesthetic, must be our first consideration.

#### ¶ CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON THE INTRODUCTION

§ 8. *The History of Kant's Discoveries, and his peculiar Method of Proof.*—Kuno Fischer has given, in his *Commentary on the Kritik*,<sup>2</sup> a very interesting sketch of the chronological development in Kant's earlier writings. This sketch is particularly valuable, because it shows that the

<sup>1</sup> Or Doctrine of Elements, στοιχεῖα.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 28-33. Cf. also Kant's *Proleg.* (Introduction.)

critical philosophy was not adopted by Kant till he had actually supported some of the most popular solutions adopted in the present day. They were tried by him, and found wanting. As early as the year 1762, Kant declared that all logical judgments were analytical and *a priori*. The following year he contrasted with them the connection of cause and effect, which he declared to be synthetical. He had then discovered that real cognitive judgments, as opposed to logical, were synthetical. But a few years afterwards he declared with Hume, that the concept of cause was obtained empirically. He did not yet perceive how synthetical judgments could be *a priori*. This is in fact the attitude of Mr. Mill, and his school, who explain the apparent necessity of judgments by association. It cannot be said therefore of Kant, as has been said of Sir William Hamilton and of Dean Mansel, that he 'ignored' inseparable association, and did not give that theory his serious consideration.

But a deeper reflection on mathematical judgments altered his views. Surely these cannot be empirical, and yet they most certainly give us real knowledge. As early as 1764, Kant saw that they depended upon intuition, and he declared space to be that intuition. But still he ascribed to it 'a reality proper to itself,' which lay at the basis of all matter. This was the view of Hamilton and his school. But if space were thus given from without, how could its judgments be anything but empirical, and hence how could they be universal and necessary? If they are such, space must be an intuition not given with objects from without, but *a priori*. This step he made between 1768 and 1770.

By maintaining the *a priori* and yet synthetical character of mathematical judgments, Kant parted company with

Hume, and entered upon his critical path. It was obvious when the existence of such judgments was ascertained in one science, that the same problem must be solved in other sciences. How about Metaphysic? If it means the science of things in themselves, all judgments whatever about such things are rendered impossible by our late discovery. For if space and time are necessarily imposed by the mind upon all the objects it can know, how can things apart from these conditions ever be brought before the mind? How can we speak of things as they are in themselves, when we only know them under these all-important modifications? *Under the conditions of Space & Time*

There is only one other sense in which a metaphysic of things is possible—in the sense of *phenomena*. Is there any universal and necessary knowledge of phenomena possible? Is there such a thing as a *priori* Physic? This was the last and by far the most subtle of all Kant's discoveries. He would not publish his *Kritik*, or consider his system complete, till he had ascertained that as we *intuite* phenomena under *a priori* conditions, so we also *think* and connect them under *a priori* conditions. As the *a priori* conditions of intuition give us synthetical *a priori* judgments in *Mathematic*, so the *a priori* conditions of thought give us similar judgments in *Physic*. But we only mean thought about phenomena—thought applied to experience. *The cognition of the things of sense need not itself be sensuous cognition.*<sup>1</sup> Ten years of thought brought him to this conclusion. The critical philosophy therefore, like most great discoveries, was

<sup>1</sup> See *Kritik*, p. 238. There is a curious analogy in Descartes's great discovery—the application of mathematics to nature, which consisted of two steps: first, the solution of figure-problems by algebraic symbols; secondly, the principle that all nature is reducible to figures, i.e. modes of extension. Cf. 'Descartes' in *Blackwood's Philosophical Series*.

not the offspring of a happy guess, or a sudden inspiration, but the slow and gradual result of a long life of labour.

We are left in no darkness as to all these points. Not only the chronological sequence of Kant's works but the general account of his discoveries given in the second Preface, and in his *Prolegomena*, are explicit. In this latter work, published for the use of teachers in expounding the Critical Philosophy, he gives the analytical or regressive view of the system synthetically constructed in the *Kritik*. We have endeavoured to combine both in the preceding Commentary. One point, however, deserves special attention, before we enter upon our task. The nature of Kant's demonstration throughout the *Kritik* may appear at first sight illogical, inasmuch as he argues from the position of the consequent to the position of the antecedent, and this he calls his *transcendental proof*<sup>1</sup> (p. 478). But this argument is only illogical on account of the plurality of causes. Given a cause, its effect will follow; but given the effect, we cannot infer the particular cause, except we are certain that no other cause could have produced the effect. We may safely argue from the effect to its *only possible cause*. And such is Kant's investigation, which infers from the fact of cognition the only possible conditions under which it could exist. When these conditions are established, they show not the *existence* of the fact, by which they were themselves proved, but its legitimacy. Thus the legitimacy of Mathematic and Physic, and the illegitimacy of Metaphysic, as a science of things *per se*, are demonstrated from the conditions they involve. It may be objected that if Metaphysic be a fact, its conditions must be as real as those of any other science: how then can it be rejected? In answer it may be observed, firstly, that the conditions of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kuno Fischer, pp. 24-28.

Metaphysic are absolutely inconsistent with those matic. This raises a strong presumption against doubtful science. Secondly, if it be found that conditions of Mathematic and Physic the possible illusory science of Metaphysic can be explained from those of Metaphysic the very existence of Mathematic and Physic can be shown impossible—in such a case we cannot hesitate as to our decision. The Aesthetic proves the legitimacy of Mathematic, the Analytic that the Dialectic proves the illegitimacy, as well as the existence of Metaphysic. These are the main divisions of the *Kritik*.

## CHAPTER III

### THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

§ 1. [*Definitions.*].—The immediate knowledge we have of objects is intuition. This only occurs if an object is given us—that is to say, if it produces an affection or modification of our minds. The faculty of obtaining representations through this affection produced by objects, is sensibility. Kant notices that this so-called faculty is properly a receptivity, as opposed to the spontaneity of thought. Sensibility alone gives us intuitions: when these are thought by the understanding, we obtain concepts. All thinking must refer either mediately or immediately to sensibility. In no other way can an object be given us. 'The effect of an object on our sensibility, so far as we are affected by it, is sensation. So far as an intuition is of this sort, it is empirical. 'The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called an appearance, or phenomenon.' The element in it that corresponds to sensation is the matter; the element that renders its variety reducible to fixed relations is the form of the phenomenon. The form differs completely from the matter in this, that while the matter is given a posteriori, the form exists a priori, as it were, ready in the mind, and can therefore be considered quite separately.<sup>1</sup> Representa-

<sup>1</sup> Kant says expressly (*Kritik*, p. 98, note) that there are elements



tions are therefore *pure*, in the transcendental sense, if nothing belonging to sensation is to be found in them, and the pure form of intuition, that reduces the variety of phenomena to order, is in the mind, and may be called *pure intuition*.<sup>1</sup> Abstract from a body what the understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force, and divisibility; abstract also what belongs to sensation, such as incompressibility, hardness, colour, etc., and there still remain extension and figure. These belong to the pure *a priori* intuition which exists in the mind, even without an actual object of sense, as a mere form of sensibility. The science of all *a priori* principles of sensibility may be called *transcendental aesthetic*, using this word not in the sense of the philosophy of taste, but in the Greek sense of *αἰσθητικὴ*, as opposed to *νοητικὴ*. Our investigation shows that there are two such forms, space and time, which we proceed to consider.

§§ 2 and 4. *Metaphysical Exposition of Space and Time.*—

Although Kant considers the two forms separately, we may combine them, so far as the same observations apply strictly to both. This is the case with the *metaphysical exposition*,<sup>2</sup> defined by Kant, as ‘containing the description of a notion, as given *a priori*.’

By means of our external sense, which is a property of

not given by sensibility included in his Aesthetic, so difficult is it to separate in treatment what is one in nature. But many of his critics have assumed, in direct opposition to this statement, that Kant made a sharp separation between the two faculties in their actual use, and have proceeded to charge him with want of psychological insight. Cf. also *Kritik*, p. 84, note.

<sup>1</sup> It is very misleading to find Mr. Stirling telling us (p. 352, *loc. cit.*) that Anschauung by itself means *pure intuition*. Surely Kant's language is plain enough; and Mr. Stirling himself admits on p. 358 that Anschauung is also used of empirical intuition.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 444.

our minds, we represent objects as without us, and their form and relations are determined in what we call Space. The internal sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its own internal states, gives us indeed no intuition of the soul itself, as an object, but has nevertheless a form, viz. Time, without which no such internal experience is possible. What then are Space and Time? Are they actual beings? [This is the popular belief.] Or are they mere relations, that belong however to things in themselves, whether we intuite them or not? [This was the view of many previous philosophers, e.g. Leibnitz and Wolf.] Or do they belong merely to the subjective nature of our mind, as forms of its intuition, through which alone they can be added to things?

¶ Kant does not consider the possibility of their coming under more than one of these three heads. For in the first place, if any one of these suppositions satisfies all the phenomena, the philosophical law of *Parcimony* forbids us to assume an additional one *without any reason at all*. Secondly, if the subjective origin of space and time be established, it is specially absurd to assume that the peculiar element added to objects by the mind, which constitutes in fact the essential difference between the phenomenon and the thing *per se*—that this element is added by the mind to objects which have it already in themselves. Recent controversies will make it necessary to revert to this subject, when we have considered Kant's express utterances on the point.

(1) Space and time are not empirical concepts, deduced from our experience. For we cannot refer our sensations to anything without us (that is, in space), nor can we assert them to be simultaneous or successive, unless the representations of space and time were already in the mind.

(2) Space and time are necessary *a priori* representations, lying at the basis of external and internal intuitions respect-

ively. It is impossible to conceive either of them annihilated, though we can easily conceive all objects in them removed. They are therefore the necessary conditions of this very possibility of phenomena.<sup>1</sup>

(3) Space and time are not general concepts of the relations of things, but pure intuitions. For there is but *one* space and *one* time, of which all separate spaces and times are parts.<sup>2</sup> And these parts are not considered as constituent elements, composing space and time, and therefore prior to them, but rather as limitations of space and time, and existing in them. Hence an *a priori* intuition lies at the base of all our notions of space and time.

(4) Space and time are represented as unlimited quantities.<sup>3</sup> [And the infinite parts which they contain are neither constituent elements chemically fused to produce them, nor logical parts contained under them.] Every concept indeed is represented as comprising a possibly

<sup>1</sup> (1) shows that Space and Time are *a priori* and not empirical, i.e. not products of special sense; (2) shows that they are not only *a priori*, but that they are the necessary conditions of all intuitions.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. note, *Kritik*, p. 98 and p. 274. We now go on to show that they are intuitions, not concepts, from the peculiar nature of their unity in (3), of their infinity in (4); they being *integral* not *universal* wholes.

<sup>3</sup> Kant says of space that it is represented as an *infinite given quantity*, a statement justly attacked by his German critics (especially Montgomery), who deny that on his own principles infinity can be given to sense, or indeed given at all (cf. *Kritik*, p. 270). Possibly he meant to say *unlimited*, for he is far more cautious in the parallel remark on time, where he says the 'infinity of time means but this, that all definite quantities of time are only possible by limiting the single (total) time lying at their basis' (cf. also *Kritik*, pp. 257, 262). Hence time is originally given as *unlimited*. A knowledge of the absence of limits may be given, though positive infinity cannot. Kant's opponents should have given him the benefit of this reasonable explanation. Even as to space, he spoke of its infinity, in the first Edition, as the absence of bounds in the extension of intuition (*die Grenzenlosigkeit im Fortgange der Anschauung*).

infinite number of individuals under itself, but it cannot be conceived as containing them within itself. The parts of space and time are in infinite space and time, not contained under our concepts of them. Our original representation of space and time is therefore not concept, but *intuition*. [Kant had added, in his first Edition, that no general concept of relations (in space) could of itself imply the endlessness of these relations, as our notion of space certainly does.]

§§ 3 and 5. *Transcendental Exposition of Space and Time*.—Kant defines this to be 'the explanation of a concept as a principle from which the possibility of other synthetical *a priori* cognitions can be understood.' It is necessary to show (a) that such cognitions actually flow from the given concept; (b) that these cognitions are only possible by presupposing this particular explanation of the concept.

Geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet *a priori*. What then must our representation of space be, to produce such cognitions? It must obviously be intuitive, for from mere concepts we cannot obtain synthetical propositions; and also *a priori*, for these propositions are apodeictic, and carry with them necessity, such as the statement that space has but three dimensions.<sup>1</sup> So also there are axioms concerning the relation of time equally demonstrable and necessary: e.g. Time has but one dimension, different times cannot be simultaneous (as different spaces are), but successive. So also the concept of Change, and with it of Motion (change

<sup>1</sup> Briefly: the propositions in geometry are *synthetical*—therefore space is an *intuition*; they are *necessary*—therefore space is a *priori*. Mr. Watson puts the argument thus: 'As specifications of the forms of intuition mathematical judgments are *a priori*, and as specifications of those forms they are synthetical.' (*Kant and his English Critics*, p. 41.)

of place), are only possible through our notion of time ; and through this latter only as an *a priori* intuition, for no concept could possibly make us understand the possibility of change, which is, in fact, the combination of contradictory predicates—the existence and non-existence of the same thing in the same place. It is only in time—that is to say successively—that this is possible. All the synthetical propositions, therefore, derived from our idea of motion in general (and they are not a few) are wholly dependent on our idea of time.

¶ The expositors of Kant<sup>1</sup> have uniformly derived the science of Arithmetic from the intuition of Time—a derivation so important, if true, that he could not possibly have omitted to mention it. If Arithmetic be based on Time, it would be natural to make use of the propositions of Arithmetic to prove that Time is an intuition, in the Transcendental Exposition. But although in his *Prolegomena*,<sup>2</sup> he has (perhaps in deference to his critics, and seduced by his passion for symmetry) conceded *en passant*, that this view is possible, he has left us in no doubt, from several passages in his *Kritik*, that the units of the science of arithmetic, being essentially simultaneous, and not successive units, are given us primarily in space, and not in time. The original intuition of 5, for example, is not a group of five successive thoughts or intuitions, but the immediate perception, through sight, and perhaps through touch also, of five simultaneous, adjacent units. The fact that we can, if we choose, apprehend them successively in five separate acts of attention, makes us apply arithmetical laws to sensations in time also ; but we do not see how a summation, or subsumption of several units under a

<sup>1</sup> E.g. K. Fischer, Dean Mansel, Sir Wm. Hamilton, Ueberweg, and many others.

<sup>2</sup> P. 45.

higher number, regarded as a unit itself—how this would ever have been accomplished, were we not aware intuitively of the simultaneous presence of the units within a small definite portion of space. There is no other practical way of teaching arithmetic to a child or savage, than by appealing to space intuitions. Let us add that the subdivision of units into fractions is equally unattainable, originally, through intuition of time, but is easily obtained through space, where all the units assumed are intuitively divisible. It has been pointed out in another work<sup>1</sup> how the opinion appears to have arisen. Our only way of exemplifying quantity in time is by the act of adding (mentally) units to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Fischer's *Commentary on Kant's Kritik*, p. 95, note. Dr. Tarleton has an able paper in *Hermathena* No. I., in which he develops a positive theory of the growth of arithmetic from subdivisions of Time. As he observes, we can conceive a mind ignorant of space distinguishing units and their addition by the striking of a clock. And if any given number of strokes were gathered, he thinks, by means of some longer division of time under a larger unity, an acute reasoner might even under such conditions construct an arithmetic. This is, we believe, the only attempt yet made to meet the difficulty in a full and scientific manner. We are not disposed to deny the *possibility* of arithmetic being so obtained in the absence of *spatial* data, as, for instance, in blindness or perpetual darkness; but we are certain that, as a matter of fact, ordinary human beings do not learn it so, and that Kant felt this, and intended to derive our ordinary notions of number from space, though he admitted the other. The apprehension of units may no doubt be successive, and so involve time, but we deny that in the early counting of small numbers, which the eye can take in simultaneously, this succession is a *conscious* element, and except it be explicitly present in consciousness, it has of course no claim to be regarded as the basis of arithmetic. We must add that Dr. Tarleton has supplied solutions to some of the difficulties which have been raised, but surely his derivations are too subtle for ordinary use. In any case it is doubtful whether similar representations repeated in time would have given the same notion of different units, which we derive from co-ordinated units in space. *The units in time may be the same thing reproduced; this cannot be the case with separate units in space.*

one another, in other words by number. But this *schema* of quantity, which will be discussed in its proper place, is *expressly contrasted by Kant*<sup>1</sup> *with any representation which can be reduced to an image*. The derivation of arithmetic from the intuition of space has never yet, so far as we know, been refuted, and though not definitely stated hitherto, was distinctly implied as far back as Descartes.<sup>2</sup>

§ 6. *Deductions from the preceding Notions.*—(a and b) Neither time nor space represents any properties of things in themselves, nor do they express any relations of such things to one another which still exist, if we abstract from things the subjective conditions of intuition. For in no case can properties, absolute or relative, be intuited *a priori*, prior to the existence of the things which they determine. To assert then the absolute reality of space and time is to assert that we know *a priori* the properties or relations of things which we do not know. Such an assertion has no meaning whatever, unless we assume that space and time belong to the conditions imposed on the mind, and are, therefore, logically prior to the cognition of objects.<sup>3</sup> Upon this supposition the necessary and universal judgments obtained from the intuitions of space and time follow as a matter of course. Also our external image of time is an endless right line, which expresses all its relations in an intuition, and, therefore, proves it to be such.

It is then only from the human point of view that we can speak of extended beings, or of events in time. If we abandon the subjective conditions, under which alone we

<sup>1</sup> *Kritik*, p. 110.

<sup>2</sup> See his *Règles pour la Direction de l'Esprit*, xiv. and xv.

<sup>3</sup> Space is nothing more than the 'formal capacity of the subject to be affected by objects' (*Kritik*, p. 25). Time is 'the mode in which the mind is affected by its own activity' (p. 41).

can be affected by objects, then both space and time have absolutely no meaning. These forms are a necessary part of every intuition which we can have, because we intuit through them. But we may not impose the conditions which limit our cognition of things on things themselves. Space and time then include all things which *appear to us*, but beyond this we can give neither of them any reality. For as they are not things, but our particular way of looking at things, it is absurd to imagine that they can belong to things *per se* as qualities. Again, as we cannot possibly investigate the conditions which limit the intuition of other beings than ourselves, we cannot say whether any of them are obliged to look at things as we do. We are, therefore, incompetent to affirm the existence of space and time, even in this sense, which is the only possible sense in which they can be conceived beyond our own experience without absurdity. But when thus limited, nothing can be more objectively certain. There is no possible intuition which we can have apart from space and time. We hold, therefore, as strongly as possible, their *empirical reality*, but assert their *transcendental ideality*,—that is, that they are nothing, if we omit the conditions of experience, and regard them as belonging to things in themselves. [We also deny their *absolute reality*, which can never be revealed to us, and which is in some senses absurd.<sup>1</sup>]

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<sup>1</sup> When Trendelenburg says that Kant forgot to inquire whether space and time might not be *both* subjective and objective, as a third possibility, he shows by his very statement of the question his ignorance of Kant's system. To say, as Trendelenburg does (*Beiträge*, pp. 215 sq.), that Kant made them purely subjective is equally false. Kant would never have conceded such a statement of his views. He denied the subjectivity in the usual sense of space and time. He asserted them expressly, in the sense which Trendelenburg desires, to be both subjective and objective. He never denied their objectivity except in an absurd sense.



Space is the only one of our subjective representations relating to what is without us which can be called objective *a priori*. For synthetical *a priori* propositions cannot be deduced from any other of them, so that such sensations as heat, colour, and sound can claim no ideality at all, accurately speaking.<sup>1</sup> They agree, indeed, with space in belonging to the subjective nature of sensibility, but being sensations and not intuitions, they in themselves give no object, not to say an object *a priori*.

(c) Time is the formal condition of all phenomena generally. Space is confined to those which are external.<sup>2</sup> But all representations, whatever be their object, must belong, as affections of the mind, to our inner states; and as these inner states are subject to the formal condition of time immediately, even external phenomena are mediately subject to the same condition. There is therefore no part of our experience free from the condition of time.

Kant cautions the reader repeatedly not to attempt to illustrate his transcendental doctrine of space and time by comparing them to the subjective affections which objects excite in us, and which are known as secondary qualities. It might be thought that as heat, colour, and taste are not attributes of objects, but affections excited in us, and wholly subjective, so space and time are also subjective affections added by us to objects to which they really do not belong.

<sup>1</sup> He means that we cannot conceive a mere sensation as having even an ideal existence separate from our thinking. To afford us this possibility, we must conceive objects as distinct from mere affections of the senses.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Hodgson shows (*Space and Time*, p. 116) that Kant need not have denied to space its universality even as a condition of internal experience. For as external phenomena come secondarily (as thoughts) under the form of Time, so internal states come indirectly under space, being always localised within our bodies. It would appear indeed that Kant felt this in his *Refutation of Idealism*.

Such an illustration would mislead the student, for it is based on the contrast between the reality of the object, and the subjectivity of the affection, which may vary in different minds. The rose is more real than its colour or fragrance: the wine is more real than its flavour. These qualities are neither universal nor necessary. But space and time are as universal and necessary as anything in our experience can be; they are as real and as objective as any part of our experience. To contrast them with the objects to which they belong, would be to lapse into the old error of regarding these objects as things *per se*. Concerning these latter, experience knows and asks nothing; they are perfectly unknown correlatives of the phenomena which appear to us in space and time only. These latter are in no wise sensations, produced by an affection of our sensibility, but pure forms of intuition, perceived by us as figures and relations.

§ 7. *Further Explanations.*—It was objected almost unanimously, by intelligent critics of Kant's First Edition, that changes were actual, as is proved by our internal experience, even abandoning the evidence of our external experience. But changes being only possible in time, time must be actual. To this Kant replies by admitting the whole argument, which is perfectly true, but also perfectly irrelevant. Kant never denied the actuality of Time, as a part of *our* experience. But suppose that some other being could behold our minds with an intuition free from the limitations by which ours are bound, what we call changes would produce a cognition in him in which the representation of time, and therefore of change, would form no part. In other words the empirical reality of time is asserted by both Kant and his opponents; but they have sought to infer from it absolute reality, which cannot be conceded on his principles.

The objectors did not press the same argument in the case of space, [because idealism had long since proved that the actuality of external objects was not demonstrable, whereas the objects of the internal sense are proved actual by consciousness. They did not consider, that without disputing for a moment the actuality of either as representations, both only belong to [the genus] phenomenon, which has always two sides : (1) in regard to which the object is viewed as in itself, apart from the manner of its intuition (in which case its nature is always problematical), and (2) where the form of the intuition is considered. This, though actually and necessarily belonging to the phenomenal object, must be sought in the subject.

The objection is in fact retorted with great force by Kant. For while this theory supports the reality of all our empirical cognition, those who hold the absolute reality of space and time are at variance with the principles of experience. They must either regard space and time as subsisting independently of things (the prevalent theory of mathematical physicists), and so assume two eternal and infinite self-subsisting nonentities [Undinge]<sup>1</sup> which exist merely for the purpose of containing all that is actual ; or they must regard them, with some metaphysical philosophers, as relations of phenomena, abstracted from experience, and confused in the process. In this latter case they must deny the validity, or at least the apodeictic certainty of the mathematical *a priori* deductions which concern actual things in space, for such certainty cannot be obtained *a posteriori* ; and space and time are, on this hypothesis, the creatures of the imagination, abstracted from experience, generalising its relations, but for that very reason depending for application on

<sup>1</sup> They are *Undinge*—that is, unlike sensations, they are not referred to objects other than themselves.—*Cf. Stirling, loc. cit. p. 377.*

the restrictions which nature has imposed. The former school save their mathematical conclusions, but create for themselves endless difficulties when they leave this (phenomenal) field. The latter have the advantage of not being hampered by space and time, when they desire to consider objects not as phenomena, but in relation to thought; they cannot, however, explain the possibility of *a priori* mathematical cognitions, or bring the laws of experience into necessary harmony with them. Kant's theory solves all these difficulties.

Finally, the transcendental Aesthetic cannot contain more than these two elements, space and time. For every other notion pertaining to our sensibility, even that of motion, which combines them both, presupposes something empirical. Space itself does not move, but *something (empirically given) in space.* Time changes not, but something perceived in time.<sup>1</sup>

¶ This remark refutes the attempts which have been made to construct an *a priori* Mechanic on the presentation of Force.<sup>2</sup> We cannot perceive or intuit dynamical force, without motion, and for this empirical data are required, which will destroy the *a priori* purity of the deductions from such intuition. When the late Dean Mansel in another work (his well-known *Bampton Lectures*) endeavours to deduce moral laws from the datum of Personality, he is guilty (we conceive) of a different error, for the notion of Personality, though *a priori*, is not an intuition at all, but, as will be seen in the latter part of this Commentary, a logical supposition of thought, giving us no definite knowledge or basis for further deductions such as are found in pure Mathematic.

#### § 8. *General Remarks on the Transcendental Aesthetic.*—

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 95 note, and *Proleg.* p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> See Mansel's *Prolegomena Logica*, Appendix A.

I. Kant here again sums up his doctrine, insisting that space and time are not necessary even to [rational] beings as such, but to the subjective sensibility of all *human beings*. They are its pure form, and therefore cognoscible apart from the sensation, which is the *matter* given *a posteriori*, and infinitely various. The form being a necessary part of all our intuitions, no possible analysis or increased clearness in them can bring us in the least nearer to things *per se*. To say then that our sensibility is only a confused representation of things, containing what really belongs to them as such, but under a congeries of attributes and partial representations, which we do not consciously explicate—to say this is to falsify the whole notion of sensibility and of phenomenon, and make it idle and void. The contrast between distinct and indistinct representations is merely logical, and does not concern their content. No doubt such a concept as that of *right* is the same in sound common sense, and when analysed by the subtlest speculation; the latter merely develops what is unconsciously felt in the former. 'But the common notion of right is not therefore sensuous, or a mere phenomenon, for in any case it is a concept of the understanding, and represents a property of actions which belongs to them as such. The representation of a body in intuition, on the contrary, contains nothing at all which could belong to an object *per se*, but only the phenomenon of something; and the way in which we are affected by it, and this receptivity of our cognitive faculty, which is called sensibility, must ever differ *toto caelo* from a cognition of the object *per se*, however thoroughly we may penetrate the phenomenon to its deepest elements.' The logical distinction therefore drawn by the school of Wolf and Leibnitz between the two divisions of our knowledge<sup>1</sup> is false, the

<sup>1</sup> That is, between the Sensibility and the Intellect, which latter they

distinction is transcendental, and concerns their origin and content. Abstract from objects our subjective constitution, and they must disappear with the qualities which this very constitution gave them, thereby determining their form as phenomena.

We distinguish indeed in phenomena that which affects the senses of all men in the same way, and that which depends on the peculiar organisation of isolated individuals. We say commonly that the former is the object in itself, the latter only appears to be such. But this is merely an empirical distinction. We must go further and regard even the object as it appears to all mankind, as a mere phenomenon, in which no property at all of a thing *per se* is to be found; otherwise our transcendental distinction (just now made) is lost.

In the case, for example, of a rainbow, we say *physically* that it is a mere appearance, while the rain is the reality<sup>1</sup> itself (*die Sache an sich selbst*). But if we inquire further into the question whether this thing which is real to the senses of all men, also represents a thing *per se* beyond these senses, 'then the question of the relation of the representation to its object becomes transcendental, and not merely the drops of rain, but their round form, and even the space through which they fall, are mere modifications or conditions of our sensibility; the transcendental object remains totally unknown.'

'The second point of importance in the transcendental Aesthetic is this, that it should not find favour merely as a plausible hypothesis, but claim to be as certain and un-

regarded as capable of knowing things *per se* more distinctly. Kant does not dispute this latter point yet, as it here suffices for his argument to establish the true character of sensibility.

<sup>1</sup> Not, as Mr. Stirling renders it, *the thing in itself* (Ding-an-sich).

doubted as can possibly be demanded from a theory, which is to serve as organon, or basis of a scientific system. Let us illustrate this by an example. Suppose that space and time were objective *per se*, and conditions of the possibility of things in themselves. It is a fact that from them (especially from space) a number of propositions demonstrable *a priori*, and synthetical, are derived. Whence can these geometrical truths, with this twofold character, be obtained? There is no way possible, except either through intuitions, or through concepts, and these either *a priori* or *a posteriori*. All *a posteriori* knowledge of either kind is at once excluded, because mathematical judgments are strictly necessary, a feature which no experience can supply. All concepts are also excluded, for from them we can only obtain analytical, and not synthetical judgments. Torture the concepts of right lines, and of the number *two* as you please, you will never obtain from them the proposition: *Two right lines cannot enclose a space*. We must therefore have recourse to intuition, and intuition *a priori*, as just established.

But if space and time were given to us as properties of things apart from our way of looking at things (our sensibility), how could we possibly know anything about these things *a priori*? Or granting, as we must do, that this *a priori* knowledge of them must come from our subjective conditions, how could we assert it to belong to a triangular object as such? Both these alternatives are impossible. From the fact that these qualities belong to *all* objects *a priori*, they must come from our sensibility; from the fact that propositions concerning them can be unconditionally asserted—that we can assert for example that the mathematical properties of a triangle belong to any triangular object in nature—from this we must infer that it can be

nothing beyond our sensibility. It is therefore not probable, but indubitably certain, that space and time are nothing but the necessary, though merely subjective conditions of our intuitive experience—for this reason universal and necessary, but relating only to experience, not at all to things in themselves.

II. In his Second Edition Kant adds the following supplementary reflections.

To corroborate this theory of the ideality of both external and internal senses, and therefore of all the objects of our senses, as mere phenomena, the following remark may be of service. Whatever in our cognition belongs to intuition (the emotions of pleasure and pain, and the will, are not cognitions) is nothing but *relations*, whether they be of extension, motion, or moving forces—all of which are relations or changes of place, or else the laws that determine them. Now relations tell us nothing of a thing absolutely, it might therefore be fairly inferred that our external sense merely gives us the relation of an object to the subject. The same may be said of our internal intuition. For, in the first place, the representations of our external senses are the matter which supplies our minds. Secondly, time, which is the formal condition of all our experience, and is logically prior to it, existing in the mind as a form of intuition—time contains relations of sequence, simultaneity, and permanence. Being prior to any thought of an object, it must be our intuiting; and if it contains nothing but relations, it must be the form of this intuiting, or the way in which the mind, when acting, is affected by its own activity. Whatever is represented to us through a sense must be a phenomenon; there must therefore either be no internal sense, or else our mind or subject, when it is the object of this sense, must be given to us merely as a phenomenon



and not as it would judge itself, were its intuition self-acting, and therefore purely intellectual. The great difficulty is to explain how a subject can have internal intuition of itself, but this difficulty is common to every theory. Our self-consciousness (apperception) is the simple representation of the Ego, and cannot by a pure act of spontaneity cognise all the variety which exists in the subject. It must apprehend this variety by permitting its internal intuiting faculty to be affected, and then this faculty must receive the variety *in time*, ordering it according to the laws and conditions under which alone the mind can act. Our faculty of internal intuition is not a spontaneity but a receptivity, and does not therefore present to us the Ego in any way more distinctly than our external intuition presents to us foreign bodies; we know both only as phenomena.

¶ The late Dean Mansel, failing to apprehend the force of this remark, was led to distinguish between the data of our external and our internal sense, and to ascribe to the latter the first origin of our ideas of substance. Descartes long ago set up our internal experience as more trustworthy than our external, but he ascribed our knowledge of self not to intuition, but to thought. This theory is more reasonable than that of Mansel, for unless our intuition be made intellectual, like Schelling's, it must act under the condition of time (as well as of the categories, as we shall see), and therefore adulterates the object, so as to prevent us from knowing it *per se*. It will be seen in the sequel that this is not the only conclusive objection to the theory.

III. This critical view of space and time does not by any means reduce the objects given in them to mere illusion—the charge, of all others, most warmly denied by Kant. He calls it, in his *Prolegomena*, ‘an objection arising from an unpardonable, and, he would almost say,

intentional misconception.<sup>1</sup> In phenomena both the objects and even the qualities we add to them are regarded as really given ; but as these latter qualities depend upon a particular relation, we contrast things *per se* with such phenomena, without in the least denying the reality of the latter. Kant never said that bodies only *seemed* to exist without us, or that our minds *seemed* to be present in consciousness, when he asserted that space and time, the conditions (to us) of knowing them, are in the subject only. Phenomenon is not illusion. It is not asserting an *illusion* to say that a *rose* appears to be red, or scented. But if we think that Saturn has handles, as was once believed, we are subject to an illusion, which consists in attributing to the object *per se* what belongs to it merely in relation to our senses. If I said that a rose was red *per se*, and not merely that it appears to us red, then I am subject to an illusion like that concerning Saturn. Just so if I assert that space is a property of objects *per se*, I attach to them what they possess only in relation to me. The common theory therefore is actually that which turns reality into illusion. For if we regard space and time as conditions of things in themselves, and consider the absurdities that follow : how two infinite things, that are neither substances nor attributes, exist and are the necessary conditions of all things, and remain even when things are removed—considering all this, we cannot blame Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusion ; nay even our own existence, if depending on the self-subsistent reality of a nonentity, time, might come to be regarded an illusion—an

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 67. It is melancholy to see a man of Trendelenburg's position clinging to these foolish objections, and followed by second-rate English writers. As Stewart thought the Berkeleian idealism a test of metaphysical acumen among the Scotchmen of his day, so Kantian idealism might serve us at present.

absurdity with which no one has as yet ventured to identify himself.

IV. What notion do we form of the cognitive faculties of the Deity in our natural theology? His knowledge cannot be a process of thinking, which always must imply limits; it must be intuiting. And as we cannot regard the Divine intuition as sensuous, we are careful not to attribute to it the limitations of space and time. But how could we avoid doing this, if they were the conditions of the existence of things *a priori*, and existing independently of them? And in such case they must be the conditions of God's existence also. It remains for us to make them the subjective forms of our intuition, called sensuous, because it is not primitive, but a faculty of the subject depending on the presence of the object, and affected by it. Primitive intuition,<sup>1</sup> which belongs, as far as we can see, to the Prime Being only, is that which gives of itself the existence (*Dasein*) of the object of intuition, without depending upon such affection.<sup>2</sup>

It is possible, that not only men, but all finite intelligences, have their intuition thus limited. Even if this be the case, it is not the less sensibility, because it is not a primitive (*intuitus originarius*), not therefore an intellectual intuition which belongs perhaps to the First Being only, but a derived (*derivativus*) intuition, belonging to a being dependent both in its existence and in its intuition.

This latter remark is to be considered an illustration of the Aesthetic, not an argument in support of it.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Theory of Ethics*, p. 235.

<sup>2</sup> In other words, a primitive intuition would perceive the object as existing, whereas we only perceive it as affecting us. Our intuition is therefore dependent on the present existence and action of the object; that of the Deity is conceived as not so dependent, but as perceiving the object directly, and without waiting to be affected by it.

*Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic.*—One part of the problem of the transcendental philosophy is now settled, which problem is this: *how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?* We have discovered pure *a priori* intuitions, space and time, in which, when we wish to enlarge a given concept *a priori*, we discover *a priori* what is not given in the concept, and join these additional features to it synthetically. But owing to this origin, such judgments only concern objects of the senses, and are only valid for objects of possible experience.

¶ Those who are not satisfied with these proofs and illustrations are invited by Kant to consider the absurdities<sup>1</sup> which result from regarding the world of phenomena as a real aggregate of things (*per se*) in real space and time. This he does in the seventh section of his *Antinomies of the Pure Reason*,<sup>2</sup> at which we shall arrive in due time. If the world be a thing *per se*, it must be either finite or infinite. But both these suppositions can be proved false, for we cannot conceive space and time either as having bounds, or as having none absolutely. It follows that our hypothesis was false, and that the world is not an aggregate of real things in space and time, but of intuitions necessarily subject to the forms of our faculties, which must therefore always accompany them, and appear infinite, though they are only indefinitely extensible. He also notices (p. 98, note) that mathematical figures presuppose not merely intuition, which gives the parts, but the gathering of these parts into a unity, which is an act of the understanding.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Theory of Ethics*, p. 196.

<sup>2</sup> *Kritik*, p. 316, or else Kuno Fischer's *Commentary*, p. 230.

<sup>3</sup> This remark, though contained in a footnote, and not brought prominently forward by Kant, is of the greatest importance owing to recent objections (such as Mr. Caird's), which assert that Kant unphiloso-

This action of the understanding is treated fully in the next chapter of the *Kritik*.

sophically isolated the mental faculties, and regarded them as acting separately. He found it necessary to treat them logically as if they were separate, but was not so stupid an observer as to mistake plain facts. As far as the *Aesthetic* is concerned, he regards individual objects as known by the special senses without the aid of understanding; but this is only a provisional statement, which is corrected in the *Analytic*.

## CHAPTER IV

### INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

¶ BEFORE entering on a new division of Kant's *Kritik*, a few general remarks will not be out of place. The *Analytic* affords the reader a far longer and more weary task than the *Aesthetic*. The latter is perhaps too compressed, owing (probably) to Kant's earlier discussions having to a great extent forestalled it. At all events, there is hardly any repetition, or enforcing of the same truth in slightly varied language, when Kant discusses the basis of *Mathematic*. The *Analytic*, on the contrary, just thought out by the great philosopher, is born, if we may so say, with the pangs of labour. We see Kant wrestling with his utterance to put it clearly before the world. As might have been expected, such a discussion defeated its own end. Repetitions and explanations weary and confuse us, when they are carried beyond reasonable limits. And so Kant labours again and again at the *Deduction* or justification of his *Categories*, in the first Edition, then in the *Prolegomena*, then in his second Edition; and yet his first exposition, though not the most complete, is by far the clearest he has given. The difficulties, however, of any of them seem quite sufficient for most English philosophers. A few have made bold to discuss and comment on the *Aesthetic*, or its doctrines. But as soon as we approach

the Analytic, we find little to help us, but either servile repetition or silence. In truth, the duty of a commentator on this part of Kant's *Kritik* is not merely to paraphrase, or to expand. If he would have his author receive full justice, he must, above all things, abbreviate. He must bring together Kant's varied reassertions of the same fact, and reproduce them in a single but complete form. This will be the plan of the Commentary now offered on the Deduction of the Categories, and, therefore, the practice of adhering to the paragraphs of the original will be sometimes advisedly abandoned.

The division on which we now enter is the second part of the Transcendental Stoicheiology, viz. *Transcendental Logic*. Kant's Introduction is naturally devoted to the accurate definition of this expression, which is not in itself obvious.

I. *Of Logic Generally*—'Our knowledge springs from two sources within us. The first is the faculty of receiving impressions (*sensibility*), the second, that of knowing objects by means of these impressions—or the faculty of producing concepts (*understanding*). By means of the former an object is given to us; by the latter the object is *thought*, in relation to this given representation, as a mere determination of our minds.' The distinction of *pure* (*a priori*) and *empirical* (*a posteriori*), already applied<sup>1</sup> to intuitions, holds good of concepts also. As the pure intuition contains the mere form, in which something is intuited, so the pure concept contains the mere form in which we think an object generally. This receptivity of impressions and this spontaneity of our understanding are both essential to knowledge. Though perfectly distinct in their nature, they combine in their action, and there is no ground for pre-

<sup>1</sup> Above, pp. 27, 28.

ferring one to the other. No object can be given without sensibility, no object can be thought without understanding. Taken by themselves, concepts without intuitions are *vacua*, intuitions without concepts *caeca*. 'It is, therefore, as necessary to make our concepts sensuous, as to make our intuitions understandable, or bring them under concepts. For the understanding can intuite nothing, and the senses can think nothing—they cannot exchange duties; we can only have knowledge, or cognition, by combining them. *But this affords no reason for confusing their respective contributions*, which we should rather carefully distinguish and separate. We have done so under the titles *Aesthetic* and *Logic*.'

¶ It has been a common objection to Kant, urged among others by Mr. Lewes and by Edmund Montgomery, that Kant separated faculties which are never separate in nature. The previous paragraph shows, we think, that they have not done justice to Kant. He knew, as well as they, that sensibility and understanding cannot be severed in use. He even shows, what he claims as an original psychological observation, that, in our ordinary perceptions the understanding is necessary, acting through the imagination.<sup>1</sup> But if scientific analysis means anything, it means the separate consideration of the fused elements given in our ordinary experience. We cannot forbear to add, that whatever mistakes in theory Kant may have made, his psychological observation was far too subtle to allow any obvious fact to escape his notice; any objection founded on such grounds can generally be straightway refuted from his own express statements.

We may approach *Logic* with two different objects: either to ascertain the rules of our understanding, which

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 211, note.



are absolutely necessary for using it in any way whatever, or to ascertain those which guide its use when applied to a particular class of objects. The latter is called the *organon* (or logic) of this or that science. In the schools it is generally supposed to be a preliminary to the study of a science; in reality it is the very last question settled in each science. We must know the objects very well before we can state the rules which make a science of them possible. Thus, for example, while mathematical studies are in a very advanced condition, what is called the *Logic* of Mathematic is still in obscurity. The first notions necessary for a sound method in Geometry, in the Differential Calculus, or in Mechanics, still divide the minds of competent inquirers.

Turning back then to the former—general Logic, which makes no distinction as to objects—even this Logic may be applied Logic, as well as pure. For *pure general Logic* must abstract from all empirical conditions, not only external but internal. It must exclude the influences of the senses, the play of imagination, the laws of memory, and all those sources of particular prejudices, which only affect us in particular cases. It merely contains a *canon of the understanding and reason*, as regards the formal elements in their use. So far the matter is plain enough. But how can a general Logic be *applied*, for this seems to imply particular objects? There is one set of conditions, which, though empirical, yet apply to all mankind. These are the psychological conditions that may hinder or advance reasoning. Logic can be general, and yet include a consideration of these, viz. attention and its consequences, the causes of error, the conditions of doubt, of conviction, and such like. For these, though individually contingent, are, as a whole, necessary for any concrete use of the

understanding. This is the only sense in which Kant admits the term applied Logic, as a *kathartikon*, or purifier, of common sense. It bears the same relation to pure general Logic that moral teaching, or practical Ethic bears to pure Morals, a science which contains nothing but the necessary moral laws of a free will, while practical Ethic discusses the difficulties and hindrances with which men must contend in carrying out these laws.

It is necessary for logicians to sever most carefully the pure from the applied (though still general) side of Logic. The former alone is strict science. They should keep before them two rules; (1), as general pure Logic abstracts from all content whatever in our knowledge; (2), as being pure it possesses no empirical principles, more especially it must borrow nothing from empirical Psychology. In a demonstrative science everything must be certain *a priori*.

II. *Of Transcendental Logic*.—We spoke above of the Logic of a particular use of the understanding. When this particular use is determined by a special class of objects (or special science), its Logic becomes the *organon* of that science. But the particular use may be determined not by the *object*, but by the special *procedure* of the understanding. As there are not only empirical but pure intuitions, so there may be a similar distinction between empirical and pure thinking. We might then have a Logic which did not abstract from all the content or matter of knowledge. For though the analysis of the pure thinking of objects must (1) exclude all cognitions of empirical content, in order to be general, it may (2) discuss the origin of our knowledge, when pure—a subject quite beyond the range of general pure Logic, which must take the facts as it finds them, and in no way concerns itself about their origin, but only about the way in which the understanding connects them.

Kant here inserts a remark of great importance. The term *transcendental* is not applied in the *Kritik* to every *a priori* cognition, but only to such as inform us, that certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied altogether *a priori*, how they are so applied, or that they are possible *a priori*, and how so. For example, space or any of its geometrical figures is no transcendental representation, but the knowledge that it is *a priori*, and the possibility of its applying, though *a priori*, to the objects of the senses, this may be called *transcendental*. The contrast of empirical and transcendental concerns a distinction *in our cognitions, and not their relations to their objects*.

Let us assume that there are concepts referring *a priori* to objects, as we found intuitions so doing. These concepts being mere acts of pure thinking, neither empirical nor aesthetical in origin, suggest to us the notion of a peculiar science, the science of that cognition by which we think objects completely *a priori*. Such a science determining the origin, sphere, and objective validity of such cognitions, may be called *Transcendental Logic*, being concerned with the laws of understanding and reason only, and with these only so far as they apply to objects *a priori*.

III. *The Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.*—The celebrated old question by which men thought either to puzzle logicians, or make them confess their ignorance, was this: *What is truth?* The definition of the term—the agreement of cognition with its object—is here pre-supposed; what we demand is the universal and safe criterion of the truth of each single cognition. *Prudens interrogatio dimidium scientiae*. A silly question may not only disgrace the interrogator, but mislead the incautious respondent into silly answers, and so (according to an old

proverb) while one milks the he-goat, the other holds the sieve for him.

If truth means the agreement of a cognition with its object, it is implied that this object is distinguished from all others, for the cognition, whatever other agreements it may contain, is only true if it correspond to its particular object. Now an universal criterion of truth must be valid for all cognitions, without distinguishing their objects. As, therefore, such a criterion must abstract from all content of knowledge, and is at the same time to concern this very content, to demand it is absurd and self contradictory. An universal as well as sufficient mark of such truth cannot be found. As the content is called the matter of knowledge, our result may be stated thus: 'No universal criterion of the truth of our cognition as to its *matter* can be required, because such a criterion is self contradictory.'<sup>1</sup>

As regards mere *form*, the science of Logic, in expounding the universal and necessary rules of the understanding, must evidently present us in these rules criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts them must be false, or the understanding would be in conflict with its own general laws. But these criteria are insufficient, as they only affect the form of truth. For a cognition might fully satisfy the logical form,—that is, not be self-contradictory,—and yet contradict the object. The mere logical condition<sup>1</sup> of truth, or agreement of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is then the *sine qua non*, or negative condition of all truth: but logic can do no more, and is powerless to detect the errors which affect not form, but content.

General logic analyses all the formal operations of understanding and reason, and determines the principles of all logical estimating of our knowledge. 'This part then

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Mansel, *Proleg. Logica*, p. 189, 190.

may be called *Analytic*, and is the negative touchstone of truth, whose rules must be thoroughly satisfied before we examine our knowledge as to matter, to see whether it contains positive truth as regards the object.<sup>1</sup> But as the mere form of knowledge, however perfect, is quite insufficient to guarantee the material (objective) truth of knowledge, no man can venture to assert from Logic anything about objects, without obtaining farther information. He may then attempt to use or combine his materials according to logical laws, or better still, merely to test them in this way. But the act of giving all our cognitions the form of understanding, however indigent we may be as regards their matter, is so seductive that general logic, which is a mere *canon* for testing, has been used (and accordingly abused) as an *organon* for producing, or apparently producing, objective assertions. General logic, when it claims to be an organon, is called *Dialectic*.

However the ancients may have varied in their acceptance of this term, they practically used it as the *Logic of illusion*. They applied the accurate method of logic sophistically to give their ignorance, or even their deliberate fallacies the appearance of truth. But we may lay it to heart as a safe and useful caution: that universal Logic, *considered as an organon*, is always dialectical, or a logic of illusion. The pretence, therefore, of using it as an instrument (organon) to extend, even apparently, our knowledge, turns out mere idle talk. Such a proceeding is totally unworthy of philosophy. Dialectic has therefore been included in Logic as the *Kritik of dialectical illusion*, and as such we shall here use it.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Meiklejohn has seen the true sense of this sentence, in which the pronouns are very confused. We have followed his version, which is not the obvious one.

IV. *The Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic.* In transcendental Logic we isolate the understanding (as we isolated the sensibility in the transcendental Aesthetic) and select from our knowledge that part of thinking which has its origin in the understanding. But we cannot use this pure cognition except objects be given us in intuition—a necessary condition, without which cognition is void. The part of transcendental Logic, then, which expounds the elements of pure rational cognition, and the principles without which nothing can be thought, is called 'Transcendental Analytic, and is a Logic of Truth. But though experience alone provides us with the matter to which these pure concepts of the understanding can be applied, there is the strongest temptation to use them by themselves, and beyond the limits of experience. Hence the understanding is in danger of making a material use of its formal principles, and of judging about objects which are not, and perhaps even cannot be, given. Thus a mere canon for controlling the empirical use of the understanding, is misapplied into an *organon* of universal and unlimited use, and the understanding ventures without further aid to assert and decide *synthetically* about objects in general. The second part of our transcendental Logic must therefore criticise this dialectical illusion, and is called transcendental Dialectic—not in the sense of the art of producing such illusion, but—as the Kritik of the Understanding and Reason in their hyperphysical employments, which exposes the illusion of their false pretensions, and reduces their claim of discovering and extending knowledge by purely transcendental principles to a mere protecting the understanding from sophistical illusions

## CHAPTER V

### TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. PART I

*The Transcendental Analytic.*—This Analytic is the resolution of our whole *a priori* cognition into its component elements. It requires the following conditions:—(1) the concepts must be pure; (2) they must belong, not to sensibility, but to thought and understanding; (3) they must be elementary concepts, well distinguished from those deduced from them, or composite; (4) the list must be complete. This last quality cannot be obtained by a mere aggregate of observations. We must start from a notion of *a priori* cognition as a whole, and subdivide it into the concepts belonging to it, which are then *connected systematically*. The pure understanding, apart from all that is empirical, and even from all sensibility, is an independent self-contained unity, not to be enlarged by additions from without. Hence the sum total of its cognition forms a system falling under one idea, and the completeness and perfect articulation of this system will be a touchstone to test the claims of all cognitions that belong to it. The Analytic is divided, on the model of ordinary Logic, into two books, of which the first contains the *concepts*, the second the fundamental *judgments* [or Principles, *Grundsätze*] of the pure understanding.

## TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC, BOOK I.

*The Analytic of Concepts.*—Kant does not mean by this term the ordinary analysis of concepts, in order to make them clear and distinct, but rather the analysis of the faculty of Understanding itself—a task seldom attempted. For we shall endeavour to ascertain the possibility of *a priori* concepts by seeking them in the understanding alone as their place of birth, and analysing its pure use; this is the proper business of transcendental philosophy. These pure concepts lie prepared in their forms and dispositions in the human understanding, until they develop by occasion of experience, and may then be found in the same understanding, freed of the empirical conditions that attach to them.

## ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS [CHAPTER I.]

*Of the Clue to discover all pure Concepts of the Understanding.*—If we bring any of our cognitive faculties into action, in due time sundry notions present themselves, which make this faculty known to us, and which can be collected more or less completely, according to the number or acuteness of our observations. But we can never make sure that our task is completed; and moreover the concepts attained in this accidental way come in no order or systematic unity, nor can they attain these qualities by being ranked according to their greater or less comprehension, however methodical this arrangement may be.

Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and is also under the obligation, of seeking its concepts on a fixed principle, as they spring pure and unmixed from the understanding as an absolute unity, and must therefore be connected according to some one notion. This connection must afford a rule, according to which every pure concept



may be ranked, and the completeness of the list fully determined *a priori*.

¶ It appears manifest from these introductory remarks that the common charge made against Kant, of having picked up his Categories empirically, and without proper reduction, can only be true in one sense. He may have blundered in the carrying out of his idea—a question which cannot be discussed as yet—but he certainly did not intend to proceed empirically, nay, he even professedly repudiated the error attributed to him by his critics. His mistake then, if he really made it, was not a mistake in principle, but a mistake in psychological insight—an inability to see how several of his separate heads might really be reduced to one. We must repeat that such a fault is not likely to occur in a great master thinker, and that if his starting point be right, as his critics must confess (according to their own statements, which coincide with his), he is less likely than they to have committed an error from want of acuteness. But of this anon.

¶ We now come to the first really difficult discussion in the Kritik. The Aesthetic, however the commentators may have blundered in details, has been, as a whole, comprehended even by English philosophers, and has had its full and fair effect on philosophical thought, ever since Kant's days. But with the exception of Hegel, whose system implies a profound knowledge of Kant's transcendental Logic, it would be difficult to find any philosopher who had fully utilised Kant's teaching in this part of his work. The later commentaries are indeed progressing towards a fuller knowledge. That of Kuno Fischer, for example, following the lead of Schopenhauer, is tolerably clear and precise on the difficult Deduction of the Categories, so far as it was expounded in the First Edition, though he shirks all com-

parison with the changes in the later Editions. But even Kuno Fischer settles the hard question before us, the passage from the ordinary table of logical judgments to that of the Categories, in a single short paragraph, omitting all mention of Kant's close analysis of the *function* of thought, and the *functions of unity* produced among phenomena of the understanding. We can here obtain no help but from the author himself, and must seek from a careful analysis of his argument and from the short explanations in his Prolegomena to develop his meaning.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE TO DISCOVER ALL THE PURE  
CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING [SECTION I.]

*Of the logical Use of the Understanding generally.*—We know already that our understanding has no faculty of intuition. As there is no other way of cognising except through concepts, the understanding must cognise through them, but discursively, as opposed to intuitive cognition. All intuitions are affections of sense, all concepts functions of the understanding. By Function Kant means 'the unity of action in ranging various representations under a higher one.' So the understanding is *spontaneous* in forming its concepts, not receptive of impressions, like the sensibility. What we here desire to ascertain is the exact number of the primitive functions of the understanding—that is, of its various *a priori* unities of action, or ways of ordering its representation under higher notions. How does Kant set about doing this? In the first place, suppose we have the concept ready, how can we make use of it? It is confessed, that no concept refers directly to objects. Intuitions alone are immediate representations of objects, for we still hold [in spite of Sir Wm. Hamilton and other Scotchmen] that external objects (in the common sense) are not pre-

sented to the mind, but represented by intuitions, or modifications of our sensibility. Therefore we regard both intuitions and concepts as representations, but the former as immediate, the latter as mediate; and when the concept refers to objects through the intuition, it produces in us the representation of an (immediate) representation. But as we cannot use concepts to intuit objects through them, there is no use left for them except that we should *judge* objects by means of them. For in a judgment we can bring an intuition (as subject) under a concept (as predicate), and so we indirectly cognise an object through our concept. We may repeat the process, making a lesser concept the subject, and bringing it under a greater, as predicate. For example, in the judgment *all bodies are divisible*, both terms are concepts, but we have previously brought many intuitions under the former, by judging: *this is a body*, and *that is a body*. But then we bring the concept *body* under a higher concept of *divisibility*, which applies to other concepts also. Judging, therefore, consists in bringing many intuitions, or many lower concepts, under one higher concept, which embraces the many. Hence judgments are called by Kant *functions of unity*—that is to say, functions producing unity, in our cognitions. But, if concepts can only be used in judgments, then the understanding has no action apart from judging; it may, in fact, be called *the faculty of judging*. For what is *thinking* (as opposed to intuition) but cognising through concepts? Whenever we do this, we regard the concept as the predicate of a judgment in which we assert that another representation comes under it. Every concept, therefore, as it must contain many representations, so it must be also regarded as the predicate of many possible judgments. If therefore all the acts of the understanding can be classed as judgments, and if concepts can only be

used in judgments, it is obvious that an analysis of the various kinds of judgments will be the clue to discover the various kinds of concepts. In Kant's language, the functions of unity in judgments, if they can be reduced to fixed classes, will discover to us all the functions of the understanding.

¶ We think we have left no difficulty unresolved in the above paragraph, except the definition of the word *Function*, which Kant says is 'The unity of the act (die Einheit der Handlung) of ranging diverse representations under a common one.' The reader must not confuse this with what Kant calls *functions of unity*, which are evidently functions producing unity, as is clear from his exposition of judgments, which he describes in these words. We had once thought of suggesting a slight emendation (der Einheit die Handlung), so that the passage would run thus: 'I mean by function of unity, the act of ranging, etc.' This would evade the difficulty, and give a true and easy sense. But the recurrence of the words, 'the unity of the act of combining,' etc., in at least three other places in the Critick, is decisive against the solution of the difficulty.

These are two of the passages (p. 85): 'I cannot know a line, or anything else in space, without *drawing it*, and so producing a certain combination of various elements synthetically, so that the *unity of this act* is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the notion of a line), and so alone can an object in space be cognised.' He accordingly says, in a very decisive passage (p. 80), when talking of synthesis, as a spontaneous combination of variety by the understanding: 'You here perceive easily, that this action is originally one [*einig*] and equally valid for all combination.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This sentence is completely ruined in Mr. Meiklejohn's translation,

The third is a passage expounding the very same subject as we are now treating, and is a sort of appendix to the Aesthetic thrust into the Deduction of the Categories in the Second Edition.<sup>1</sup> He is speaking of the action of the understanding on the materials supplied by intuition, and says, 'the synthesis [of the understanding], considered separately, is nothing but the unity of the [act or] action, of which, as such, the understanding is conscious, even without sensibility, but by which it determines even the sensibility,' etc. He proceeds in the next paragraph to illustrate his meaning by the very example adduced in the previous passage, adding several other similar ones.

¶ It will thus appear that Kant declares no object can be considered by the mind as such, till its parts or qualities have been brought together by a spontaneous act of the mind, and that though the various parts must be gathered successively, there is an unity in this act in every case, and this is really the unity attributed to the object. A slight variation in expression will be found in the corresponding passage of the First Edition to that last quoted.<sup>2</sup> He there speaks of the *identity* of the function, and even of the *identity* of the act, which subjects intuited impressions to an *a priori* unity. There is good reason to speak of the identity of the function, for it is in every case a synthesis of variety; but we think Kant wisely changed his expression in the Second Edition, and spoke of the unity of the act, for though the various Categories are indeed phases of the same identical function of synthesis, yet the acts of unifying

who strangely substitutes the following: 'The reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of the conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act,' etc. 1

<sup>1</sup> Latter part of §§ 24 and 25, or §§ 20 and 21.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 201.

multiplicity in each can hardly be called identical. And so, in the Second Edition, in the close of the passage we have been expounding, he says that an analysis of judgments will disclose to us the Functions of the understanding; that is to say, the phases of that higher function, which is identical in all consciousness, and consists simply in making all representations *our own*, or modifications of an identical self. The action of the understanding in the case of each Category is identical, for each Category is *one way* of producing unity in our representations. The action of the understanding in all the Categories together is *one kind* of action, and so far one, though it may vary in the detail of each Category.

THE CLUE TO DISCOVER ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF THE  
UNDERSTANDING [SECTION II.]

§ 9.<sup>1</sup> *Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments.*—If we abstract from all content, and apply ourselves to the mere form of judgments, we find that the function of thought in them can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three phases [Momente]. Here is the table :

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<sup>1</sup> This numbering of paragraphs continued (after a long suspension), from p. 60 above, is used by Kant down to the end of the Deduction, merely for the convenience of reference, and has nothing to say to the divisions and subdivisions of chapters and sections in which he luxuriates. We have preserved it for the same reason. Mr. Meiklejohn has unwarrantably changed it, and so confused some of Kant's references. He has inserted §§ 1-4 in the earlier part of the Analytic, where Kant does not use them, and so finds himself at § 5, where Kant resumes with § 9. The reader who refers to his translation will note this, as we shall refer to Kant's paragraphing, even when we give the pages according to the English translation.

1. Quantity of Judgments.	2. Quality.
Universal.	Affirmative.
Particular. <sup>1</sup>	Negative.
Singular.	Infinite.
3. Relation.	4. Modality.
Categorical.	Problematical.
Hypothetical.	Assertative.
Disjunctive.	Apodeictical.

Some remarks on this table are necessary.

1. Logicians say justly, that singular judgments can be treated as universals in syllogisms, for the predicate is affirmed of the whole subject. But in their quantity, as cognitions, they differ as unity does from infinity, and are, therefore, essentially distinct. Hence the *judicium singulare*, as a mere cognition, compared in quantity with other cognitions, must have a separate place in a complete table of the phases of thinking, though indeed this would not be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use of judgments in reference to each other.

2. Similarly in transcendental Logic, infinite judgments must be distinguished from affirmative, which is contrary to the practice of General Logic. The latter abstracts wholly from the content of the predicate, and merely examines whether it is affirmed or denied of the subject. But the former is concerned about the value of this affirmation by means of a negative predicate, and what our cognition can gain by it. If I say *the soul is not mortal*, this judgment, regarded as negative, at least guards against an error. Regarded as affirmative (not-mortal), it divides all the universe into mortal and immortal things, and excluding the mortal,

<sup>1</sup> Kant calls these *Plurative* judgments.

includes the soul in the infinite number of non-mortal things. Many other parts might in like manner be abstracted, without in the least increasing or determining our notion of the soul. These infinite judgments then, as regards logical extension, are really limitative of the general content of a cognition, and must not be passed over in our transcendental table, as this function of the understanding may be important in the field of pure *a priori* cognition.

3. All the relations of thinking in judgments are either ( $\alpha$ ) that of predicate to subject, ( $\beta$ ) that of antecedent to consequent, ( $\gamma$ ) that of a divided cognition to its combined members. In the first kind two concepts, in the second two judgments, in the third several judgments, are considered in relation to each other. This is obvious in the first and second cases. The relation of the various parts in a disjunctive judgment is not only one of opposition, in that they are mutually exclusive, but also of community, in that they jointly make up the sphere of the cognition concerned. Each then completes the rest. For example, 'the world exists either through blind chance, or through internal necessity, or through an external cause.' Each of these judgments embraces a portion of the sphere of our possible knowledge about the world's existence: taken together they express the whole of this sphere. Remove one and you posit the rest, and *vice versa*. There is then this community in these judgments, that though mutually exclusive, they make up, when combined, the whole content of one given cognition.

4. The Modality of judgments is a peculiar function, in that it adds nothing to their content, but only affects the value of the copula in relation to our thinking. Problematical judgments are those in which the affirmation or negation is only considered *possible*, or optional. In assert-



ative, it is considered *actual*, or true; in apodeictical, *necessary*. Thus in a hypothetical judgment, both antecedent and consequent are optional, and only the consequence is assertative. Whether you assume them true or not, the consequence is actual. So the various judgments contained in a disjunctive judgment are problematical, and may be merely assumed for a moment, to lead the mind towards the true solution. The assertative judgment asserts logical actuality or truth, as, for example, in a hypothetical syllogism the antecedent which has occurred problematically in the major premiss, is repeated assertatively in the minor, and shows that the proposition is no longer optional, but connected with our understanding according to its laws. The apodeictical judgment considers the assertion as determined by these laws of the understanding, and, therefore, as making its assertion *a priori*, or necessarily. As these various stages are reached gradually, the mind proceeding from an assertion first to its truth, and then to its necessity, the three functions of modality may be counted as distinct phases of thought.

THE CLUE TO DISCOVER ALL THE PURE CONCEPTS OF  
THE UNDERSTANDING [SECTION III.]

§ 10. *On the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Categories.*—¶ We now come to the second serious difficulty in the *Analytic*, which has not yet been adequately explained. Even Kuno Fischer's professed *Commentary* quietly ignores all the argument in this paragraph, and contents itself with stating the result.<sup>1</sup> As Kant's own exposition has not penetrated the minds of his readers, it seems advisable to abandon paraphrasing, and to state the argument in an independent form.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kuno Fischer's *Commentary*, pp. 71 *sqq.*

¶ We saw above (p. 82) that the function of the understanding was simply to gather up objects, or lesser concepts, under higher notions—in fact to produce unity in our knowledge; and we saw that this was done by acts of judging, which compared the lesser notion with the greater, and either reduced it under this notion, or referred it to some notion, to be otherwise determined. But an analysis of judgments is a task long since accomplished by logicians, and from this analysis it appears that our judgments, or acts of producing unity among our representations, must assume, and can only assume, one in each group of the forms laid down in the logical table of judgments. This fact points to an original feature in the constitution of our understanding, and indicates that our power of combining variety is confined to these forms, or to something corresponding to these forms.

Now let us consider that all the subjects of our earliest judgments are not concepts, but intuitions of objects. We cannot in fact have a general concept till we have formed it by means of a number of such judgments. Nevertheless, from the very outset our judgments must have taken the various forms laid down in the table of judgments—that is to say, we must have considered the objects about which we judged as one, as many, or as both; as substances, as causes, etc., etc. How did we come to range our intuitions under such classes? For we received through our sensibility nothing but various impressions or representations, which our sense placed in space and in time, but which were *in sense* not otherwise combined, and were nothing but a confused congeries of single impressions. How, in fact, have we come to consider them as separate objects at all, and judge about them as single, as plural, as substances, or as causes?

¶ Kant says there is from the very beginning another faculty besides sense at work, unconsciously indeed and darkly working, but occupied in binding up the various data of sense into groups or unities. This faculty is the imagination, and its function he calls *synthesis*. We can never obtain a notion of any combined set of impressions, or of such a complex as distinct from surrounding impressions, without the action of this faculty. It is not, however, left to combine impressions at random, upon no principle, for being closely allied with the understanding, the spontaneous action of the understanding supplies it with its rules, and so it proceeds to combine and form objects according to the laws prescribed by the understanding.

But we saw above that the laws of combination under which the understanding acts are expressed by the forms of the various judgments. Hence these forms are a clue to the laws which the understanding prescribes to the imagination in its synthesis of representations, in order to form objects. It is the same action which produces unity in the judgment, and unity in the intuition—taking unity in a large sense, to signify systematic connection among the parts. Hence the various phases of this synthesis of intuitions correspond to the various forms of judgment, and both are called by Kant *Categories*. They must of course be general phases, general ways of combining—in Kant's words, *synthesis, represented generally*.<sup>1</sup> They must affect the pure synthesis of the imagination, and must involve no data save those given by the transcendental

<sup>1</sup> So general, as he observes of the science of nature in his *Prolegomena* (p. 65), as to reduce nature generally, including both the object of the external and that of the internal sense (the object both of physic and of psychology) to universal laws.

Aesthetic, viz. multiplicity generally, presented in space and time.

Let us endeavour to make the whole matter plain by an illustration. When you sit in a room, the senses supply you with a number of impressions all separate in space or in time, various patches of colour, various sensations of texture, of sunlight, of cold, of odours, and many others. The sensibility may give these partly simultaneously, partly in succession, but no more than these. How does the mind come to sever them all into distinct groups, and call them separate objects, or the qualities of separate objects? Surely in this way, that the imagination, by reproducing some of the sensations just past, binds them up with those really present, and so produces a certain grouping of representations. This grouping, however, is not carried on at random, but according to laws imposed on the imagination by the understanding. What are these laws? They are not special laws binding up any particular kind of representations, but general laws, applicable to any sort of representation, and they are not difficult to indicate.<sup>1</sup> We

<sup>1</sup> It will be observed that Kant's theory of our empirical knowledge is just as much a 'psychological theory' as Mr. Mill's, inasmuch as he holds the external world, as we know it, to be made up of our perceptions and their relations, and of these only. But Kant differs from the Association School in attributing the notions of Externality, and also of Permanence and Substantiality, to original laws of our minds, and not to the gradual teaching of associations. Mr. O'Hanlon's difficulties, even as they appear in Mr. Mill's short extracts (*Exam. of Hamilton*, chap. xi.), are not answered, and there are many others in reserve.

For instance, Mr. Mill's object (pp. 222, 223) consists of an indefinitely large group of sensations, of which a few only are present, but suggest all the rest by inseparable association. This implies such a set of distinct inseparable associations of each of the present sensations with each of the remainder, that our completed notions of substances should be very slowly obtained.

He next (p. 224) advances the statement that the constant ante-

see a single chair close to us, we see several others through the room, we speak of the whole furniture of the room. This means that the understanding has directed our imagination to consider a certain quantity of sensations as making up a single chair, and has therefore imposed the Category of Unity on these sensations. When we speak of several chairs, then a larger group of sensations, in which certain features recur, has been arranged by the imagination as a plurality of units—here is the Category of Plurality. The whole mass of representations produced by the objects around us (as we call them) is again considered as a

cedences and consequences which we observe in Nature, and which form the most important part of our knowledge of external things—that ‘almost all of these do not obtain between [present] sensations, but between the [absent] permanent possibilities of sensation!’ We confess we have not yet thought ourselves into the attitude of Mr. Mill’s school, so as to comprehend how a series of all-important indissoluble associations can arise between a set of absent possibilities, which are only suggested by certain present sensations not so associated.

Here is a third difficulty. He thinks (p. 230) that with every sensation we have, we associate the idea of something different from it. This, of course, must be some different sensation. He argues that, in like manner, we come to associate with the sum total of our sensations this notion of something different from it. This inference appears to violate all the conditions of inseparable association. We seldom think of this sum total at all, and when we do, it comprises all the differing sensations; so that, of all our ideas, it is that which does not imply any idea of difference, except that of individual sensations, as opposed to a whole of sensations. For how could an association between two differing sensations suggest an association between a sensation and a thing not a sensation? He goes on to state (p. 230) that this something, regarded as different (we suppose in kind) from a sensation, or a *possibility of sensation*, is identified with *permanent possibilities of sensation*, because these latter are extremely unlike actual sensations [only]. Are they unlike possibilities of sensation also? Surely this part of Mr. Mill’s argument falls to pieces whenever we try to grasp it.

plurality of units, making up one great unity—this is the Category of Totality in application. It appears, then, that we could not obtain our ordinary knowledge of objects, if the understanding did not order our receptive faculties to group the representations they receive, as to quantity, into units, pluralities, and totalities. In like manner, the sensations which affect us are classed as Real, such as those of light and heat in the room, as the Negation of real, such as darkness and cold, or as Limitations of the real, as when we feel transitions from the one to the other. We must also consider our groups of representations in relation to each other, and so we judge that the hardness, colour, and texture of the chair are Accidents of a Substance, that the heat of the room is the Effect of a Cause (the fire), and that the various articles of furniture in the room are not related in either of these ways, but are substances simultaneously existing, and determining each other in place, as, for example, we indicate the place of a stool by its proximity to a sofa or a chair. Finally, we consider certain sensations *possible*, as when we see the end of the poker bluish,<sup>1</sup> or brick colour, and judge that it will possibly burn us if we touch it. The judgment becomes *actual*, if we make the experiment, and burn our fingers. A person sitting in the room before we came in, who had seen it thrust between the bars of the grate, and removed just when it was becoming red, would judge its burning heat to be *necessary*. Thus, then, in our ordinary experience, we are perpetually using the Categories, not only as the frames, or pure forms of our judgment, but as the frames, or pure notions, of the objects of intuition around us.<sup>2</sup> Such is Kant's famous

<sup>1</sup> We do not say *red* hot, in which case the judgment is stronger than a possible one.

<sup>2</sup> It was noticed by Mr J. C. Malet, that this binding up of in-

derivation of his Categories from the forms of judgments—a derivation imperfectly comprehended for want of holding fast to Kant's express statement, that these pure *a priori* concepts were the rules not merely for judgments, but for all *objects of our intuition*.

The following is accordingly the table of these pure concepts of the understanding :—

1. Quantity.	3. Relation.
Unity. <sup>1</sup>	Of Inherence & Subsistence. <sup>2</sup>
Plurality.	Of Causality & Dependence.
Totality.	Of Community (reciprocal action between agent and patient).
2. Quality.	4. Modality.
Reality.	Possibility—Impossibility.
Negation.	Existence—Non-existence.
Limitation.	Necessity—Contingency.

¶ Kant has called them *Categories*, because his original design is identical with Aristotle's, though the execution of it differs widely. On this observation English philosophers, especially Hamilton and Mansel, have made such comments as disclose a complete ignorance of Kant's derivation of the Categories. They say that he brought a new, nay an

tuitions produces *integral* wholes, whereas the binding up of concepts in judgments produces *universal* wholes—a remark worthy of notice, as suggesting a transcendental affinity between logical and real unity. Cf. *Prolegomena*, pp. 73, 76. Kant there holds that the Categories determine our intuitions, *in order to fit them for judgments*.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 75, note, where we see, as is otherwise plain, that the Category of Unity corresponds to singular judgments.

<sup>2</sup> In the Categorical judgment A is B, B is regarded as inherent in A, which is the relation of accident and substance. The Category of Reality signifies *presence* to sensation; that of Actuality existence at *some definite time*, not necessarily the present time.

opposed meaning into Aristotle's time-honoured nomenclature, because the investigations were totally diverse. Hamilton, in his usual antithetical style, which palms off rugged clearness upon us as good sense, says that Aristotle was investigating the laws under which the object is known; Kant, on the contrary, the laws under which the subject thinks.<sup>1</sup> If the reader has followed the exposition in the previous pages, he will have seen that Kant's Categories are just as much as Aristotle's, 'the highest classes to which objects of our knowledge could be generalised,' nor was Kant likely to make so silly a blunder as to assert his intention to be the same as Aristotle's, if it were only to be contrasted with it. This is not the only place in which commentators have had the audacity to contradict the plain statements of the Kritik as to Kant's intentions.

But as Kant says, the execution of the plan differs widely from Aristotle's. For the above is the list of all the pure notions of combination, or synthesis, which the understanding contains, and through which it is an *understanding*, for by them alone can it *understand* the variety of intuition, by grouping it into objects. This table then and its divisions are deduced from one general principle (that of judgments) instead of being picked up at random by mere empirical induction, which can neither certify the completeness of the list, nor give any reason why these and no other should be in the pure understanding. Hence Aristotle's table, even with the post-predicaments,<sup>2</sup> was never complete; it includes modes of sensibility (*quando, ubi, situs, etc.*), an empirical notion (*motus*), and even deduced concepts (*actio, passio*).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Note A to Reid's Works, p. 762.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. *oppositum, simul, prius, motus, habere*

<sup>3</sup> Mansel considers these criticisms to be wrong, for (1) the post-



*Apropos* of the last-named notions, Kant observes that the Categories, as generic concepts of the pure understanding, have their *pure deduced concepts* under them, which he proposes to call *predicables* of the pure understanding, e.g. subordinate to the category of cause we should have *force, action, passion*; under community, *presence, resistance*; under modality, *origination, extinction, change*, etc. To draw out a table of these would be here to turn from his object, and he therefore passes the matter by with this notice. He also declines to define the Categories, as he wishes to avoid collateral controversies,<sup>1</sup> and is only here concerned with analysing them for his special purpose, not building up a system of pure reason, in which such definitions would be fairly demanded. He considers that with the basis here supplied the task will not be difficult.

§ 11. In the Second Edition, two sections of reflections on the Categories were appended, which we shall pass over as briefly as possible, as not belonging to his main argument. But we must call attention to the very first statement in these sections, which contains a vindication of the common charge brought against Kant, that he was enslaved by the love of symmetry, and forced such Ideas as those of predicaments were not so called by Aristotle—the term is of scholastic origin, and was employed to denote the five subjects treated of by Aristotle after the Categories proper. (2) The Categories, with Aristotle, belonged to the *matter* of thought, and were of course generalised from experience.—*Proleg. Logica*, App.

<sup>1</sup> In a passage of his First Edition, which will be found in vol. ii. p. 220 *sqq.*, he goes more fully into the reasons why the mere Categories cannot be defined. Cf. note, chap. xv. § 2. These passages were modified in the latter Editions. Notwithstanding there are, in the discussion of the Schemata of the various Categories (*Kritik*, pp. 110-112, 181) various indications of the Categories, which amount almost to Definitions, by means of the schemata. Cf. *Kritik*, p. 79, 'They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is contemplated in relation to one of the logical functions of judgment.'

the world and God into the scheme supplied by the Categories and logical syllogisms. Not only is the table, says Kant, necessary in the theoretical part of philosophy, both in giving us a plan for a *complete system* of our science, as well as its *division on fixed principles*; but as it contains all the elementary notions of the understanding, and even the form of their systematic combination, so it must suggest for any speculative science both the *heads*, and the *arrangement* of them. Kant himself applies them to natural science in another treatise. If the critics had objected to Kant that he was violating the natural relations of things by forcing them into his classification, he would answer that not he, but nature, had prescribed it. All our thinking is only comparison, all comparison is judging. Analyse therefore the possible forms of judgment, and you have all the possible kinds of thinking. If this be so, the arrangement according to the Categories (and of course according to the syllogisms derived from them) is not artificial, but the most natural and necessary possible, and moreover one which will apply equally to all theoretical sciences.

Remark 1. The table naturally falls into two subdivisions, the one referring to objects of intuition, the other to the existence of these objects, either in relation to one another or to the understanding. These he distinguishes as *mathematical* and *dynamical* Categories. The second, as they consist of relations of objects either to other objects, or to us, have correlates.<sup>1</sup>

Remark 2. Instead of a division by dichotomy, each


<sup>1</sup> Mathematical Categories are concerned with the *construction* of objects; *Dynamical* with their connection either with each other (*Relation*) or with experience as a whole (*Modality*). Cf. chap. xi., *infra*, *sub fin.* Kant's view, to which we adhere, differs from that of Mr. Caird, cf. *Phil. of Kant*, p. 438.

class has three members, the third arising from a combination of the first and second. So *totality* is nothing but plurality considered as unity; *community* the *causation* of different *substances* in determining one another, and so of the rest. Nevertheless, this third Category is no mere *predicable*, or deduced concept. For it requires a distinct act of the understanding. So our notion of a *number* (which is a totality of several units) is not always possible, even when we have the concepts of unity and plurality before us, as for example in the case of infinity. Neither do substance and cause explain, when merely combined, how one substance can *influence*, or be the cause of something in another.

Remark 3. The agreement of the Category of *Community* with the corresponding form of the disjunctive judgment is not at first sight obvious. But we have already seen (above, p. 87) that the sum of the predicates in a disjunctive judgment makes up a total sphere of knowledge, in which the parts are not subordinate, but co-ordinate, as mutually exclusive, being the parts of an aggregate. A similar combination is conceived in the *totality of things*, which are not subordinated to one another as effects are to causes, but thought as co-ordinate, and affecting one another; as, for example, in a body the various parts are co-ordinate, and mutually attract and repel each other. The understanding pursues the same proceeding, when representing to itself the sphere of a divided concept, and the parts of a divided thing; both consist of a whole, containing mutually exclusive parts.

§ 12. The celebrated position, *Quodlibet ens est unum verum bonum*, though not included by scholastic philosophers in the list of Categories, nevertheless holds among them a position which ought to give it this *status*. It is worth inquiring whether some real though misunderstood rule of the

understanding may not be at the basis of this principle, though it is now antiquated and in desuetude in our philosophical books. These pretended transcendental attributes of things are nothing but logical requisites and criteria of our *concepts of things* generally, and place the Categories of Quantity at the basis of this cognition. But though the schoolmen were using these Categories only logically, in a formal sense, they incautiously raised them to the position of the properties of things *per se*. In every cognition of objects there is a *unity* of the concept, which may be called *qualitative unity*, as when we speak of the unity of a play, a speech, or a story. Secondly, there is *truth* as regards its consequences. The more true consequences follow from a given concept, the more evidences have we of its objective reality. This may be called the *qualitative plurality*. Finally, *Completeness*, in that this plurality can be reduced to the unity of the concept, and to it alone—this we may call its *qualitative completeness* or totality. It appears, then, that the Categories of Quantity in which the units that produce the *quantum* should be thoroughly homogeneous, are here used to combine *heterogeneous* parts of our cognition, by using the quality of cognition as our principle. So the criterion of a hypothesis (or other concept) is its *unity*, *i.e.* its not requiring auxiliary hypotheses; the *truth*, or agreement with itself, and with experience, of the consequences deduced from it; and, finally, its *completeness*, in that the consequences point back to this, and this alone, so that what we conceived synthetically can be shown analytically. The list of Categories is not then to be increased by these pretended attributes of things, which only come into existence by leaving out all relation to things, and reducing our mere treatment of concepts to general logical rules.




¶ *Kant's Table of Categories, and his Critics.*—It is curious that the very ground upon which Kant attacks the categories of Aristotle has been urged as the particular objection to Kant's own list. 'It was a design,' he says (p. 65), 'worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle, to search for these fundamental concepts. Destitute, however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they occurred to him.' Now, let us hear Schwegler:<sup>1</sup> 'The method of Fichte, just like that of Hegel afterwards, is a combination of the analytical and synthetical methods, by which Fichte earned the credit of having first deduced the Categories of philosophy from one single point, and of having brought them into connection, instead of taking them merely empirically, and co-ordinating them, as had been done, even by Kant.' The same view is taken by Mansel:<sup>2</sup> 'The Kantian Categories are not deduced from an analysis of the act of thought, but generalised from the forms of the proposition, which latter are assumed without examination, as they are given in the ordinary logic. A psychological deduction, or preliminary criticism, of the forms themselves, might have considerably reduced the number.' And so both Fichte and Mansel have given further analyses, which the curious reader may find in the treatise just quoted of Mansel's, and in Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*.<sup>3</sup> These analyses are in substance the same, and consist in identifying quality with quantity, and discarding relation and modality, on the principle that substance and cause are implied in them, and that these notions exclude them from the first rank. We suspect that, upon a careful perusal of Mansel's discussion, the reader will be glad to fall back upon Kant's plainer classification, and will agree with him in not taking

<sup>1</sup> Ed. Stirling, p. 262.

<sup>2</sup> *Metaphysics*, p. 193, note.

<sup>3</sup> *Works*, vol. i. p. 166 sqq.



any interest in the subtleties of modern philosophers of the subject.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, one charge from which Kant must be cleared, and that is, that he did not go upon a fixed principle in his table. His introduction to the subject is quite explicit. 'Transcendental philosophy,' he says (*Kritik*, p. 56), 'has the advantage, and moreover the responsibility, of searching for its concepts upon a principle, because they originate pure and unmixed from the understanding, as an absolute unity, and must hence be connected according to one concept or notion. Such a connection gives a rule,' etc.

What is the principle according to which we must proceed? He shows that the Understanding has no power of intuition, and hence can only regulate and bring into classes and unities the intuitions given by our sensibility. This spontaneous faculty he calls the function of the Understanding. And what is the only use we can make of these unities? To judge by means of them. And how do we judge by means of them? We repeat the process by which they have been already formed, and bring an additional representation under them. The understanding has no other duty at all; hence it may be simply called our judging faculty. This is the *a priori* argument and principle upon which he bases his Table of the Categories; so that, in this sense, his list is neither purely empirical, nor picked up at random.

The number of the classes of judgments he did take for

<sup>1</sup> The great diversity of philosophers as to the reduction of Kant's Categories is remarkable, and is an argument against such reduction. Cousin reduces them to substance and cause; Fischer and Schopenhauer, to cause only; Hamilton to Condition, which appears to be the Category of cause without the schema, or of relation generally. When philosophers differ so widely, it may be well to inquire whether any remedy is really required.

granted, from the existing treatises on logic (which, we suppose, discovered them empirically); but this because there could not be a class of judgments without a corresponding expression for them in human language, and the grammatical analysis of language is long since completed; and because he saw distinctly that psychologically they depended upon different acts of the mind.<sup>1</sup> That it was possible to reduce them in number, was a point which came distinctly before him, and which he combats in his observations on the Table of Judgment; and in further remarks (p. 67), he even insists on some judgments, which are logically reducible under one head, being kept apart as psychologically distinct. It is not fair then to charge Kant with having evaded or overlooked a more complete psychological deduction; but we must rather place his authority (and his psychological acumen) over against those of the critics, and supposed improvers, of his system.

It is obvious that two sorts of reduction are possible: we may either reduce the number of the Categories under each head, or we may reduce the various heads or classes to a lesser number. The first description of reduction has been (as was observed already) noticed and rejected by Kant. The second has been attempted by Mansel. Now, that there exists an analogy between the classes of Categories would be naturally suggested, and probable, from the unity of the pure reason, upon which Kant insists frequently, and this would also suggest the same number of judgments under each head. But the question remains—Is this similarity *Identity*, or merely *Analogy*? Kant could only regard them as identical, if the quantity and quality of judgments were proved identical. Take, for example, the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. for another defence of Kant, Stirling in Schwegler's *Hist. of Phil.* p. 423.

supposed identical Categories of unity and reality. Because affirmation asserts unity between two representations, can we jump at the conclusion that affirmation is identical with unity? Certainly not; an asserted unity between representations has nothing to do with the Category of unity, derived from singular judgments. Of what does a judgment consist? Of a subject, a predicate, and a copula. What can we say about the subject? It may be either one, or many, or a totality (the many regarded as a unity). What about the predicate? We may assert it to be identical with this one, or many, or whole, or the reverse. How can this act of mind be declared the same as the former? If the predicate of a judgment were singular, and we affirmed it of any sort of subject, we should be much nearer the Category of unity.

So, again, in a negative judgment we regard one attribute as not co-existing with another; but here, if we take a singular judgment, viz. 'Socrates is not foolish,' we do not *necessarily* imply other subjects which have this attribute, and hence we do not obtain plurality. But supposing a class were here implied, it would surely be just as much implied in the corresponding affirmative judgment, which would accordingly suggest plurality as much as unity. Possibly Mansel was misled by his own statement, that in a judgment two concepts are considered 'in relation to a *common object* of intuition.' Perhaps the correct expression would be, 'in relation to *common objects*,' viz. how far the objects which rank under one of these concepts rank also under the other. If so, to think the co-existence or non-existence of attributes in one or more subjects is obviously distinct from thinking the unity or plurality of these subjects themselves. The former are, indeed, unifying and dividing processes, but so are all functions of thought, as Kant has said.



It would be tedious in this place to urge all the similiar objections which could be made in detail to Mansel's reduction. But in general, except we can reduce the psychological acts expressed in the various classes of judgments to the same act, we have only demonstrated analogy, and not identity. The attempts, then, of Fichte and Mansel corroborate Kant's view of the symmetry and harmony between the various acts of the understanding as one complete whole ; for these analogies are strong enough to suggest to acute minds complete identity.

## CHAPTER VI

### INTRODUCTION TO THE DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING. SECTION I.<sup>1</sup>

§ 13. *Of the Principles of Transcendental Deduction generally.*—Jurists, in discussing claims, are wont to distinguish the *quæstio facti* from the *quæstio juris*, and used to call the proof of the latter the *Deduction*—that is to say, the deduction of the claim from acknowledged principles, or documents. We use a number of empirical concepts without any such justification being required by ourselves or others, because experience is always at hand, to prove their objective reality. Yet here, too, there are some concepts, such as *luck* and *fate*, which, though commonly recognised, cause us great difficulties when the question *quid juris* is asked as regards them, seeing that neither experience nor reason affords the grounds of answering it.

But among the various concepts in the complex tissue of our knowledge there are some meant for pure *a priori* use, and their claims always require a deduction, for proofs from experience are here insufficient, and yet we must know how these pure concepts can refer to objects. The explanation of the way in which they do so Kant calls their

<sup>1</sup> The heading is: 'The Transcendental Analytic,' book i., part 2.

transcendental deduction, as distinguished from the empirical, which shows how a concept is acquired by experience or reflection upon it—that is to say, the facts from which our use of it arose.

There are two very diverse kinds of notions which agree in referring *a priori* to objects—the notions of Space and Time as Forms of Sensibility, and the Categories as concepts of the understanding. If a deduction of these (or proof of their possibility) is necessary, it must, of course, be transcendental, as their distinguishing feature consists in applying to objects, without drawing anything from experience in order to represent them.

Of course, we may inquire quite independently into the occasions when both this part and the rest of our knowledge arose in experience—an experience which contains two dissimilar elements, the Matter given by the senses, and the Form for ordering them, springing, on the occasion of the former, from pure intuition and from thought. Locke deserves the credit of first opening this path. But a *deduction* of pure *a priori* concepts can never be thus obtained. For then we only explain from experience *the fact that we possess* pure cognition, whereas these concepts must exhibit a very different pedigree from that of empirical concepts. No one, therefore, who understands their nature can accept anything but a transcendental deduction of them.

But granting all this, is such a deduction absolutely necessary? We have, indeed, pursued the notions of space and time to their source, by means of such a deduction, and so explained and fixed their objective value. Yet Geometry follows its course through nothing but *a priori* cognitions, without asking for any certificate of the legitimacy of its fundamental notion—space—from philo-

sophy. But the use of this notion here applies to the external world of sense, where all geometrical cognition is immediately evident, being based on a *a priori* intuition, in which the objects are given (as to form) by our cognition. When we come to the pure *concepts of the understanding*, the necessity becomes apparent, not merely of justifying them by a deduction, but of giving a deduction even of the notion of space. For these concepts refer to objects not through intuitive predicates, but through pure thinking. They refer to them generally, and are neither based on experience, nor can they show any object in a *a priori* intuition, affording a basis for their synthesis. Hence they not only excite general suspicion about their objective validity, and the limits of their use, but even involve the *concept of space* in this suspicion,<sup>1</sup> as we are disposed to apply it beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition. This is the reason why a transcendental deduction<sup>2</sup> (of space) was given above, *i.e.* to show that space and time have no application beyond experience. The reader who is not convinced of the inevitable necessity of the deduction of the *Categories* also will only grope in the dark, and end as ignorant as he began. But he must also perceive the *obscurity and difficulty of the investigation*, and not complain of weariness in its solution. For upon this it

<sup>1</sup> As Mr. Caird puts it: 'If we have general conceptions which are independent of sensible experience, it is not at once obvious that the knowledge we get by their use should be confined to the objects given by sense. And not only so, but the mind which is possessed of such conceptions is inevitably driven to consider whether the forms of time and space also, inasmuch as they give rise to necessary and universal perceptions, may not apply to objects in general, irrespective of sensible experience.'—*Phil. of Kant*, p. 320.

<sup>2</sup> He calls it a transcendental exposition in the *Aesthetic* above, p. 51.

depends whether we are to give up all our claims to any possessions in the favourite department of metaphysic, beyond the bounds of all experience, or bring this critical investigation to a successful issue.

There was no great difficulty in showing (in the Aesthetic) how the notions of space and time, though *a priori* cognitions, were yet related necessarily to objects, and rendered a synthetical cognition of them possible, independent of all experience. No object can appear in empirical intuition except by means of these pure forms; hence they are pure intuitions, which render objects possible as phenomena; their synthesis is therefore objectively necessary.

But as phenomena<sup>1</sup> can appear in intuition, without being necessarily related to the functions of the understanding, a difficulty arises which did not occur in the Aesthetic, viz. How are subjective conditions of thought to have objective validity, or be the necessary conditions of all cognition of objects? Take, for example, the concept of cause, which signifies a peculiar kind of synthesis, by which we put after *A* some quite different *B*, according to a fixed rule. It is not obvious *a priori* (empirical evidence being inadmissible), why phenomena should contain anything of the sort, and we may doubt whether such a concept is not idle, and baseless in experience. Objects would not be objects did they not conform to space and time, but it is not so clear that they must conform to the conditions which the understanding requires to produce unity in its thinking. Phenomena could appear without any such conformity. It has been suggested (by Hume and others) that experience is perpetually offering us examples of these regularities in phenomena, which are quite sufficient to suggest the notion

<sup>1</sup> See p. 47 for the definition of *Phenomenon*.

of cause, and establish its objective validity. Kant thinks that such concepts must either show an *a priori* basis, or be abandoned as mere chimeras. He points, as usual, to the *strict necessity* of the sequence of cause and effect, and the absolute universality of its application, as attributes which cannot possibly be given by experience. In fact the Categories cannot be derived from experience, for that very experience implies them.

#### TRANSITION TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION • OF THE CATEGORIES

That our synthetical representation should necessarily correspond or coincide with its objects is only possible in two cases ; either if the object makes the representation possible, or if the representation, and it alone, makes the object possible. In the former case, the relation is empirical, and the representation could never be possible *a priori*. This is the case with phenomena, so far as they are sensations. In the second case, our representation does not, indeed, cause the object to exist (if we except the causality of the will, to be elsewhere discussed), but nevertheless determines it *a priori*, if through the representation alone we can know anything *as an object*. This knowledge requires two conditions necessarily : intuition, by which the object is given merely as an appearance ; and a concept, by which an object is thought, corresponding to the intuition. We have above explained how all phenomena must necessarily agree with our intuition, as they only appear (and are intuited) through it. Now comes the question, whether there are not also concepts within us, as antecedent conditions *a priori*, under which alone anything can be thought as an object. If so, all empirical knowledge of objects

must correspond to these concepts necessarily, or else no *object of experience* is possible. But as soon as we go beyond the mere data of the intuition of the senses, all our experience does contain *concepts* or notions of objects given in intuition, or appearing in it; so then concepts of objects in general do lie at the basis of all our empirical cognition, as *a priori* conditions. Consequently the objective validity of the Categories, as *a priori* concepts, depends on this, that through them alone experience (as far as the form of thinking is concerned) is possible. Of course, they have a necessary relation to objects of experience, if it is only by means of them that such an object can be at all thought.

This then is the principle on which the transcendental deduction of all *a priori* concepts depends. To explain the development of experience in which they occur, is not a deduction, but an illustration of them, as it does not prove them necessary. Without showing their primitive relation to all the possible experience in which objects occur, their relation to any single object could never be comprehended.

In his First Edition, Kant closes this preface to the Deduction with a mention of the three faculties of the mind that afford the clue to the succeeding discussion,<sup>1</sup> viz., sense, imagination, and apperception. In the Second Edition he substituted the following observations. 'The celebrated Locke,' he says, 'ignoring totally any such deduction, and finding the pure concepts of the understanding in experience, deduced them from it, and was yet so illogical, that he attempted in this way to reach cognitions far beyond the

<sup>1</sup> This passage, for which see Fischer's *Comm.* p. 76, note, merely anticipates the after discussion, and therefore requires no farther mention here. Cf. also Appendix A, vol. ii.

limits of experience.'<sup>1</sup> David Hume saw that this latter attempt necessarily required concepts with an *a priori* origin. But as he could not see how the understanding came to think certain concepts as necessarily joined in the object, which were not in themselves joined in the understanding, and as it did not occur to him that the understanding might, through these very concepts, be the originator of experience, he was compelled to derive them from experience, and through constant association, which produces *custom* or subjective necessity, falsely deemed objective. He was logical enough to deny that with such principles we could ever pass the bounds of experience. But these empirical deductions are refuted by the fact, that we actually possess scientific cognitions *a priori*, viz. pure *mathematic* and *general physic*.

The former of these celebrated men opened the door to *enthusiasm*, for if the reason has pretensions or claims on its side, it will not be restrained by vague exhortations to moderation; the latter abandoned himself to *scepticism*, as he thought he had discovered so universal a delusion mistaken for sound reason in our faculty of knowledge. We are now to essay whether the reason cannot be steered safely between these rocks, and whether we cannot save for it the whole sphere of its proper activity, while assigning to it fixed and determinate boundaries.

<sup>1</sup> This is the ordinary view of Locke's philosophy, which ignores the intellectual side of his system. But this is not the place to correct it. Cf. Prof. Webb's *Intellectualism of Locke*, *passim*. Cf. also Schwegeler, *Hist. of Phil.* p. 182, who makes this criticism on Locke's proof of the Existence of God.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. THE FIRST EDITION, AND THE PROLEGOMENA.

¶ We have now arrived at the great *crux* to most readers of the *Kritik*, the famous Deduction of the Categories. The solution has been, to some extent, implied in the foregoing discussion, and the intelligent student will, doubtless, anticipate the gist of Kant's argument; but we must not be content with stating the theory; we must also give some comparative account of the various forms which the discussion assumed in the First Edition of the *Kritik*, and in the *Prolegomena*, published in 1783. Were this omitted, the reader might ask why Kant had obscured by prolixity and by repetition a discovery in itself plain and comprehensible, and which can be stated in a brief compass.

¶ Perhaps the first and most important help the student can obtain from a commentary on this part of the *Kritik* is to have the repetitions in Kant's argument carefully pointed out. The discussion in the First Edition goes over the same ground three times. As he tells us himself,<sup>1</sup> 'I have thought it better, in the four following paragraphs, rather to prepare than instruct the reader, and

<sup>1</sup> Vol. ii. p. 194.

not to lay before him the systematic discussion till the succeeding third section.' All the *momenta* of the proof are, however, contained in this preparatory discussion;<sup>1</sup> and he accordingly, in opening the third section (p. 207), says, 'The detached observations made in previous section (containing the four paragraphs) we shall here unite and present in a connected form.' The reader will, therefore, find in this section a *repetition* of the observations in the previous section, not, however, without some modifications. For having hitherto pursued the analytical method, starting from empirical perceptions, and passing up by analysis to the *a priori* elements contained in them, he now tells us (p. 207) that he will 'begin from pure apperception'—in other words, give us the same proof *synthetically*. He does this briefly and completely (pp. 207-210); but having done it, he reverts to his former analytical procedure, and says (p. 210), 'We shall now expound the necessary connexion, etc., beginning from below, from the empirical extremity.' He then goes over the very same ground, and in the very same order, as in the four preparatory paragraphs, amplifying a little here and there, modifying a few expressions, but adding little, except (as we shall see) that he shows the close relation between the three faculties expounded, and so brings into a connected form the observations before detached. If the reader will attend to these hints, he will considerably curtail his labour, and save himself the perplexity of endeavouring to find new arguments, where Kant is merely repeating and enforcing old ones.

As the Second Edition differs mainly from the First in developing at great length the synthetical proof, very briefly given at first (pp. 207-210),<sup>2</sup> we shall consider that part of the discussion by the light of the Second Edition, and

<sup>1</sup> Vol. ii. pp. 194-207.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 120, 121, *infra*.

shall give an account, as brief as possible, of the First Edition, omitting this short passage.

A few words will here show us the attitude of the *Prolegomena* on the same subject, in a passage following the analytical method also, as Kant expressly tells us at the outset of his shorter work. We already called attention to the twofold character of the Categories, which are both general concepts, or frames of objects of intuition, and also pure general forms of judgments. These two functions are closely related, for the frames into which the former bring intuitions are necessary conditions of these intuitions becoming fit for judgments; our intuitions are, as Kant says, determined by these Categories, in relation to some one of the pure forms of judgments.<sup>1</sup> The deduction of the Categories need therefore only establish their objective necessity in either of these relations, and the other will necessarily follow. For when we speak of the Categories being necessary for our experience, what do we mean by experience? We mean a great complex, embracing a vast number of *objects*, and we also mean the legitimate and orderly *connexion of these objects* into a great harmony, or unity.<sup>2</sup> This connexion of objects, which implies certain necessary relations among them, can only be expressed or conceived in judgments concerning objects. If the Categories are necessary for the formation of the judgments of experience, it is clear that they must also be necessary for the objects of these judgments, since nothing can be for us an object except it be either the subject or predicate of some judgment. The necessary laws, therefore, of the connexion of objects must hold good of these objects themselves. Such an inquiry Kant calls a deduction of the possibility of [the

<sup>1</sup> See especially his statement in the *Prolegomena*, vol. ii. p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Proleg.* p. 65.

faculty of] experience, as contrasted with a deduction of the possibility of the objects of experience. The latter side of the deduction had been brought forward prominently in the First Edition, and it is only<sup>1</sup> in the two summaries of the discussion that he notices the power of the understanding to make laws for nature—in fact, to establish *necessary connexions* among the objects of our experience. This latter is then the aspect of the Categories which he takes up in his *Prolegomena*<sup>2</sup> in this way.

Starting from the statement that Nature means a necessary synthesis of phenomena, not of things *per se*, he shows (§ 15) that there is a pure science of such nature, which possesses universal and necessary synthetical judgments applicable to all nature, whether internal (psychology) or external (physics). These judgments are the *laws* of nature. But the word nature, he adds (§ 16), also means the complex of all the objects of experience. He proceeds to inquire (§ 17) which form of the problem (the same in either case) is preferable, and he decides that, owing to the ambiguity of the word *object*, the Kantian sense of which was then new and strange,<sup>3</sup> it is better to take the formal side, and discuss the possibility of [the faculty of] experience, upon which the possibility of the objects of experience necessarily depends. Following this course, he shows (§ 18) that our ordinary judgments of perception cannot

<sup>1</sup> In the fourth paragraph, in section 2, and at the end of section 3, especially p. 203, vol. ii.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. ii. pp. 63 *seq.*

<sup>3</sup> An object, in the proper Kantian sense, consists of a number of sensations, bound up into a necessary unity. As this latter element cannot be given by mere sense, an act of the understanding, or of the imagination, is necessary in knowing any object. As the former element can only reach us through our sensibility, objects only exist in our experience, and things *per se* are improperly called by the same name. This will appear more fully in the sequel.

become judgments of experience without expressing a *necessary* connexion, or a connexion in the object, as it is called, when all men agree in the connexion. But this objective validity or necessity is merely equivalent to universality. What, then, must be added (§ 20) to the perceptive judgment, to make it a necessary judgment of experience? Simply this: the perception in question must be subsumed under such a concept as determines for it a place among the general forms of judgment.<sup>1</sup> These general forms of judgment will, therefore, suggest the table of pure concepts which correspond to them. The whole

<sup>1</sup> It is very difficult to reconcile Kant's language on p. 69 of the *Prolegomena* with his general doctrine that *all* judgments have a category at their basis. What he seems to mean is that judgments of perception only involve the *Mathematical* Categories, judgments of experience the *Dynamical* as well. This is the common sense of the matter, and it is quite consistent with the examples he gives (pp. 71-74). As to these there is no difficulty except in the case of the proposition, 'the air is elastic.' He arrives at this in a peculiar way, and himself confesses that the illustration is obscure. If we compare the analogous case of 'the sun warms the stone,' discussed in his note (p. 74), we shall see that he considers the proposition 'when the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm,' to express the attitude of the mind in mere perception, whereas the categorical equivalent marks the classing of the representations under an *a priori* concept. But the other case is not so clear. Kant indicates that after we have established the air to be the necessary condition, or cause of expansion, we then advance to the judgment, 'the air is elastic,' in which we regard elasticity as a quality necessarily belonging to the air. Mr. Monck has suggested that Kant had the experiments of Torricelli in his mind, by which both the weight and the elasticity of air were demonstrated. It was shown that if the pressure on the atmosphere be diminished, its volume increases, as, for example, if a partially filled bladder be placed in a vessel from which the other air can be removed by a pump, the bladder will become fully distended, or even burst. This expansion depends on the nature of the air itself (requiring only the absence of counteracting causes) as its positive cause. This explanation is probably the true one, and clears up the difficulty as to Kant's illustration.

argument is clearly and concisely summed up in § 23, which the reader is recommended to study carefully. It is briefly this: We have objectively valid judgments, as distinct from mere judgments of perception. These are only possible by means of the Categories, which have therefore objective validity.

We now revert to the exposition of the First Edition (vol. ii., Appendix A), for the most part analytical, like that of the *Prolegomena*, but differing, as we have said, in two points: (a) there is a short synthetical exposition at the opening of section 4; (β) with the exception of the concluding passages in the duplicate analytical exposition, the Categories are rather considered as pure concepts of objects, than as pure forms of judgments combining objects. If we omit these passages, and eliminate repetitions, we may sum up the argument as briefly as possible in the following way.<sup>1</sup>

A concept (p. 191) is nothing but a combination of attributes. If this combination is to mean anything more than a mere empty frame, the attributes must be supplied by intuition; thus only can our concepts refer to the sole objects we can know, the objects possible in our experience. If then there be in us *a priori* concepts, even they must refer to experience, not of course as its offspring, but as rendering it possible; on this ground only can they be objectively valid. The possibility of experience, therefore, is the real point to be investigated. Whatever attempts we may make to grasp such notions as God or spirits by the aid of the pure concepts or Categories at the basis of experience, we must still conceive these things as objects, and therefore start from the same basis as we do in our

<sup>1</sup> We cite here the pages of the English version in vol. ii., Appendix A, so that the reader may verify the commentary at every step.

legitimate experience. The Categories, therefore, will be sufficiently justified, and proved objectively valid, 'if we prove that through them *alone* an *object* can be thought.' (Here, then, he keeps out of sight the Category as a pure form of judgment, and treats it as a pure frame of objects of intuition.) But as other faculties are concerned, Kant proceeds to expound the subjective sources which make objects possible, and how far these sources are of transcendental use, or at the basis of our experience of objects.

Let the reader hold fast to Kant's prefatory remark (p. 194) that all our representations are bound together by one bond at all events, that of Time, the formal condition of our internal, and therefore indirectly of all our sense. All our representations are brought into at least one mutual relation, in Time. But (1) as all our knowledge of objects requires a successive series of representations (both separate in space and differing in kind), there must be in the mind a power to grasp these separate details, and consider them as one complex object of intuition. This act (which is a function of our imagination applied to present objects of sense) Kant calls the *synthesis of apprehension*. And since even pure space and time, regarded as objects, cannot come into the mind without their parts being grasped together in this way, though they are *a priori* representations, it follows that this synthesis is possible *a priori*, and there is in us a *pure* as well as an *empirical* synthesis of apprehension. (2) There is, moreover, another combinative faculty of mind, which causes past representations to come back to us in groups, and not singly. Our imagination reproduces them according to a law of association, which implies some prior affinity existing among them. This reproduction of past phenomena is equally necessary to our experience, for we could not think of a large number, or a long time, if we

lost from our minds the earlier numbers or moments without recovery. This faculty of the imagination may then be called the Reproductive synthesis of the Imagination.<sup>1</sup> Even this, however, is not enough. (3) When we have apprehended the present details, when we have reproduced the past impressions, what guarantee have we that they are identical with those formerly intuited? They must be recognised in the concept we form of them—a concept which reduces this multiplicity to unity, and declares them to be the phenomena of a single identical consciousness. When we have produced this unity, we call it an *object*. What is this object? As we can know nothing beyond our representations, an object can only mean a necessary combination of them—a combination that cannot be made at random, or capriciously. But such necessary combination can only be produced *by the understanding*, for the senses merely give us isolated representations. Thus an external object of these representations, such as *body*, is conceived just as we conceive (p. 199) a *triangle* to be an object, and yet this consists in nothing but a certain necessary combination of three right lines, under a concept, and may not exist in external nature.<sup>2</sup> If the combination be necessary, it must, according to Kant's fundamental principles, depend on a transcendental condition. How can the necessary unities, which produce in us the notion of objects, be produced *a priori* by the understanding?

The required condition Kant finds in the *Transcendental apperception*. This does not mean the empirical consciousness of self, given in what is called the internal sense, but the transcendental condition, which renders this internal sense possible; that is to say, the mental unity, or identity,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 133, *infra*, for the further account given in the Second Edition of the office of the imagination.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 215.

*Handwritten notes:*  
Self-consciousness  
internal sense  
transcendental condition  
mental unity  
identity



which we feel even when intuiting such *a priori* objects as space and time. All representations must be mine, they must come under the identity of my permanent conscious self. Yet it is not the *existence* of this self, but its *action* or *function*, of which we are conscious.<sup>1</sup> We mean no more by this feeling of personal identity than that it is the same identical function which combines phenomena into objects in all our experience. We cannot, therefore, be conscious of the identity of self except as the 'unity of the synthesis of all phenomena,' of course according to some plan, or some concepts yet to be determined.

Let us now turn back and consider what our notions are of *object* in general, and what we mean by a concept having objective validity. Our thoughts are said to refer to objects, when they apply to our intuitions, which again are supposed to refer immediately to (phenomenal) objects. But even these objects are only phenomena, and are, therefore, referred further to a transcendent object, which is a mere indefinite supposition of thought, not obtainable by any intuition, and therefore the same in all cases, a mere unknown quantity, or  $x$ .<sup>\*</sup> Our whole notion of a definite object is a number of intuitions, necessarily combined. As the determinate intuitions are *ex hypothesi* absent in a general notion of object, what remains but the necessary combination, or synthesis, the framework, so to speak, of the intuitions? If this be so, the transcendental apperception just explained affords us the necessary bond of unity, or synthesis, and supplies us with the general notion of object,

<sup>1</sup> Observe that it is the business of internal intuition to inform us *how* we exist. As Mr. Caird puts it: 'We are thus conscious of ourselves as a *transcendental* subject (*that* we are) because we distinguish our own activity from the matter on which it is exerted; but we are conscious of ourselves as a *phenomenal* subject (*what* we are) only under the form of time as distinguished from space.' Cf. p. 139, *infra*.

which contains nothing else. This, then, is the form of phenomena, as space and time are the form of intuitions.

Kant adds a paragraph explaining how the Categories may be *a priori* cognitions, and enforcing this truth. When I speak of my experience, I mean one great unity, one vast combination of all the phenomena presented to me as my phenomena. Except they belong to this unity, they are no part of my experience. But whatever conditions are imposed on my (faculty of) experience must, of course, be equally imposed on the objects of experience acquired through that faculty. But the Categories have above been shown the necessary conditions of judging, therefore of thinking, in any experience; therefore they afford to objects also of experience their possibility. Thus they are *a priori* cognitions, and yet objectively valid. The Categories are, in fact, phases of the pure apperception, and all consciousness must be subject to it. Through it, therefore, or under it, they legislate for phenomena.

All empirical derivations of these Categories are idle, for they do not account for their *necessity*; and secondly, they postulate an universal law of association among phenomena, which suggests to us laws, and they give no explanation of this association. How can phenomena be conceived as related to one another by a thoroughgoing *affinity*, which alone explains our associating them? On Kantian principles, this affinity is transcendental, and produced by their all being subject to one condition—the pure apperception, which binds them together by a pure synthesis. So it comes that the understanding prescribes laws for nature. Hence we can make *a priori* assertions about nature, and a strict science of nature is possible.

But the reader who desires to avoid repetitions, and obtain the shortest possible exposition of the analytical

deduction, may pass by the four preparatory paragraphs, and confine himself to the repetition of their substance in pp. 210-217. For there, as Kant tells us, he has connected and brought into relation the isolated facts of these paragraphs. There it is that he declares the synthesis of apprehension to be the work of the imagination, which is necessary in knowing even ordinary objects (p. 211, note), and so brings the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction into relation. There it is more especially that he expounds the relation of the imagination and pure apperception, showing that association must be based on affinity; that this affinity is given by the union of all phenomena in one consciousness, but that this synthetical unity of consciousness, which is intellectual, can only act on sense by directing the productive imagination to combine phenomena according to fixed laws. The Imagination is, in fact, the go-between, which mediates between the pure understanding and the phenomena; it is only reproductive as regards these phenomena themselves, but *productive as regards the order* in which they are reproduced. Kant here trenches upon the ground to be hereafter occupied in the schematism. We shall therefore say nothing more concerning it now. Finally, the statement that the understanding prescribes laws for nature is more fully developed in the end of the discussion (pp. 215-217). He adds a caution, that we cannot suppose empirical laws to be directly deducible from the pure Categories, any more than all the varieties of intuition could be conceived from pure space and time. But nevertheless, according to this very analogy of space and time, all empirical laws must be built on the type of the Categories, —in other words, all our experience, *as to form, must be conformable to them*. More than this our deduction never attempted to prove.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. THE SECOND • EDITION OF THE KRITIK

¶ We now approach the discussion in its ultimate form, as it appears in all the later Editions of the Kritik. The first point to be noted is that in his first Preface, he had himself carefully distinguished two sides of his Deduction—one consisting of a view of the subjective faculties of the mind, the other a mere explanation how objects can become possible. This latter is the proper Deduction; the former, which consists in assigning a particular set of causes for a given effect, is not so.<sup>1</sup> It was, therefore, naturally to be expected, that when he desired to compress some parts of his original work, in order to make room for expansion in others, this highly important but unnecessary exposition should be curtailed. Moreover, the first four paragraphs of the First Edition were fully reproduced in the sequel, and besides the publication of the *Prolegomena* during the interval supplied an independent analytical exposition. We may add that these paragraphs, and especially an introductory statement,<sup>2</sup> also suppressed, seemed to attribute to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. above, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. K. Fischer's *Commentary*, p. 76, and Hartenstein's *Kritik*, p. 112, note.

*sense* a power of combination which Kant carefully qualified on further consideration. He would not speak in the Second Edition of a *synopsis of sense*, and he was more careful to show that the synthesis of apprehension was really the work of the imagination.

¶ As therefore the *pure apperception*, or synthetical unity of apperception, was the point most obscure, and most difficult of comprehension, he determined to develop his brief synthetical exposition in the First Edition,<sup>1</sup> in order that he might 'begin from pure apperception,' and explain it more fully to his critics. It was necessary to do this in two directions—first, for those who could not understand him, or see how the synthetical power of the understanding could form a principle of unity in nature; secondly, for those who exaggerated our knowledge of this very pure apperception, and held that the Ego was given to us directly, not as a phenomenon, but as a noumenal reality.<sup>2</sup> The sections 16-19, therefore, contain his fuller exposition of the synthetical unity of apperception. The second part of § 24 and § 25 contain his expanded refutation of the second error. <sup>137</sup> This latter passage, then, may be postponed by the reader as not forming a necessary part of the deduction.

In the next place, the opening of § 15<sup>3</sup> is to some extent a repetition of his remarks on synthesis, in § 10, adding a few important points, but almost ignoring what he said of

<sup>1</sup> Vol. ii. pp. 207-210.

<sup>2</sup> The danger of being misunderstood in this direction affords another reason for his striking out the passage (p. 213) in which he spoke of 'the fixed and permanent Ego' as the correlate of all our representations. He insists here more strongly on what he had already stated in the First Edition, that we are directly conscious only of a faculty of combining (synthesis), not of a subject exercising this faculty.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the note on this numbering above. Mr. Meiklejohn numbers these §§ 6 and 11 respectively.

*O.V. in original  
V.V.*

synthesis in the former section. The same observation applies more strictly to §§ 16 and 17, which merely amplify and reinforce the same points in varied language. Let us observe, lastly, that the first part of § 24 anticipates the schematism of the Categories, and discusses the function of the productive imagination, which must again come before us at greater length in that chapter. In brief, then, we recommend the reader the following course in this discussion. Let him read § 15, comparing it with § 10, and let him next read § 19. Let him then read § 16 or § 17, either of which suffices for Kant's argument. Proceeding directly through §§ 18, 20, 24, let him postpone the second part of § 24 and § 25 till he has read the concluding sections. By this means he will greatly curtail his labour, and be better able to apprehend Kant's argument. We now proceed to accompany him through these sections in the order prescribed.

§ 15. If we look back to the exposition of § 10, we there see *synthesis*<sup>1</sup> put forth as the original and primary condition of knowledge, at first rudimentary and almost instinctive in its action, afterwards explicating itself into certain definite phases, or ways of combining, which Kant calls Categories. As his object at first is mainly to discover or determine the pure Categories, he passes over the earlier or undeveloped

<sup>1</sup> It may be asked why we have adhered to Kant's strange word *synthesis*, and not used the English word *combination*, which may mean the same thing. We have done so to avoid an important ambiguity, which Kant saw when he avoided the word *Verbindung*. Combination oftener means *the result of an act* (σύνθημα) of combining, than *the act itself* (σύνθεσις). This kind of ambiguity is common to *imagination*, *conception*, and many other such words. But nothing is more vital in this discussion than to hold fast that we are speaking of combination as *an act or function of the understanding*. This definite sense is exactly expressed by *synthesis*. Adhering strictly to this sense, the reader may substitute *combination*, or any other word he pleases.

stage of synthesis, which is in existence and at work before we can form a concept, as its necessary condition. It is to this stage that Kant now turns his attention. It had been mistaken by some of his critics, and it had been asked whether the Category of unity was not sufficient to account for the unity in objects of intuition. But, granting that our intuition is sensuous, or purely receptive, it is plain that representations are given us through it merely as such, *i.e.* not as objects. Their form may also be *a priori* in us, and yet be nothing but the way in which we are affected. Neither of these can give us combinations of various representations [objects], for this is not an act of receptivity, but of spontaneity, and therefore the work of what we call the understanding, as opposed to sense. Whether we are conscious of it or not, whether the things combined be concepts, or sensuous intuitions, or pure intuitions, the *combination* is an act of the understanding, which Kant calls *synthesis*, indicating that this alone cannot be given by objects, but is the self-activity of the subject, and that we can represent nothing as combined in objects which our understanding has not previously itself combined. Kant thinks it obvious that this act of the understanding is originally one and equivalent in all combinations,<sup>1</sup> and also the necessary condition of analysis.<sup>2</sup> It will be remembered that he spoke in the First Edition of the *identity of function*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. above, p. 84.

<sup>2</sup> He shows this in an ingenious note to § 16. My notion of *red* is obtained by *analysing* several red things, and abstracting the colour. But I cannot do this without presupposing red as an attribute already combined with others in this or previous representations. An attribute common to many different representations, implies that they each contain something different combined with it. These, then, are synthetical unities, which must be presupposed before I can obtain an unity by analysis.

of the understanding, and also of the *unity of the action*, in this synthesis.

But the very notion of such combination implies that variety is brought into *unity*, and this unity is a prior condition, not a result of the combination, which has no meaning without presupposing unity. We cannot, therefore, proceed to a judgment, or to a Category (such as that of unity), which is based on the power of judging, without presupposing this combination, or unity of given representations. We must therefore seek it at the very earliest stage of cognition. Let it be observed (§§ 10 and 19) that this unity is presupposed by all judgments, which are very inadequately described as the assertion of a relation between two concepts. In what does the relation consist? In nothing but reducing them to an unity, by means of this synthesis of which we are speaking. I may do this myself personally, in which case I call it a judgment of perception, or may conceive it as being done by all mankind, in which case I call it a judgment of experience, or a law of objects—in either case every judgment implies unity produced by this synthetical action of the understanding.

§§ 16, 17. Beyond the necessary reference of all intuitions to space and time, they must be subject to another condition, viz. they must be present in our consciousness. There must be a conscious I to intuite them, or they are nothing. But this conscious I is not a receptive, but a spontaneous faculty—in short the faculty which combines them, as has just been explained. Furthermore, it is nothing but this consciousness of a combining faculty, the same in all acts of consciousness. This faculty Kant calls pure, or original apperception, since it is *a priori* and spontaneous. He also calls it the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, because this oneness of the conscious self is the source of a priori cogni-



tions.<sup>1</sup> If representations could not be brought under the condition of being recognised as belonging to my single self-consciousness, they could not be considered as mine at all. The consciousness which merely accompanies different representations is fragmentary, and may be called empirical consciousness. But when I combine these various acts, and am conscious of this synthesis, then only do I become aware that my consciousness in them all was one and identical. When I say then that all these representations belong to me, I mean this, and this only, that I am combining, or am able to combine them by this mental synthesis into one whole—the unity of self-consciousness, or, as Kant calls it, the synthetical unity of apperception. To say, therefore, that the understanding means the faculty of combining *a priori* our various representations under the unity of apperception (or consciousness), is to state an identical proposition, but it explicates our notion of pure consciousness, and shows that our identity of self cannot be thought without a synthesis of the variety given in intuition.<sup>2</sup> These conditions are imposed on us because the faculty (intuition) which gives us multiplicity, and the faculty (self-consciousness) which gives us unity, are different in kind. If our understanding could intuit, then the multiplicity of intuitions or objects would be given directly in its representation, and it would not require the act of synthesis which our understanding, which only thinks, must perform. To us this condition is so necessary that we cannot even conceive an intellect directly intuiting, or even intuiting through other conditions than space and time; but if these other conditions made its intuition receptive, a synthesis similar to ours would

<sup>1</sup> See his explanation of transcendental above, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> This is the transcendental parallel to the law of Identity. Cf. p. 159, *infra*, for the parallel to the law of Contradiction.

still be required for the understanding attached to such an intuition.

When we speak of the understanding, or the faculty of *cognitions*, we regard the latter as referring to *objects*. But an object implies a group or combination of intuitions. This combination, as we have seen, can only be made by the synthesis of our consciousness. It follows that the unity of our consciousness is the necessary condition of our forming any notion of objects. Here is an illustration: mere space gives us no object, but only the materials for an object. In order to know *something in space*, as for example a line, I must *draw* it, and so produce a synthetical unity of parts. The unity of this act, as comprising several successive acts, is the unity of my consciousness, which gives me the notion of a line, and so only can I obtain such an object. The synthetical unity of consciousness is therefore an absolutely necessary or objective condition of all cognition, for not only do I require it in order to know an object, but every intuition must come under it, before it can even become to me an object.

§ 18. This *transcendental unity* of apperception is (as we have said) the unity by means of which we combine the variety of intuition into the notion of *an object*. For this reason we call it *objective*, to contrast it with such *determinations of our internal sense* as are merely suggestive and empirical, and therefore not necessary. Every man makes some of these combinations for himself *a posteriori*. But the pure form of intuition (given *a priori*), considered as mere presented variety, must stand under the original and primitive *I think*, which alone contains an objectively valid unity, viz. valid for every understanding. It is under this objective unity (§ 19) that intuitions are brought in the act of judgment. When we say a body *is* heavy, we do not

merely assert what seems to us by association subjectively combined, but we make an assertion which, whether true or false, is only possible by understanding what *necessary unity of apperception* is, and consequently bringing two representations under it. We assert these notions to be necessarily combined into unity, not in our empirical intuition, but by the synthesis of our perceptions in our pure consciousness.

Thus the first step in the Deduction has been reached. It has been shown that *objects* of intuition can only be obtained by a combination of multiplicity. This combination is not given in a sensuous intuition, which is pure receptivity. It is therefore added by the understanding, which is a faculty whose function is to combine. But all the several acts of combining are recognised by us as belonging to one and the same consciousness. The importance therefore of the unity of apperception, and its objective character, are manifest.

§ 20. But what have the Categories to do with this argument? What relation have they to the pure apperception? It is this. The intuitions can only be brought under it by the logical function of judging. Whatever variety therefore is given in intuition can only be brought under the pure apperception by being brought under one of the functions of judging (as exhibited in the table, p. 86). But the Categories are these very forms of judging, so far as they merely combine the variety of intuition (§ 13). This variety therefore stands under the Categories as various phases, or ways, of reducing it under the unity of apperception.

§ 21. We have now proved that the Categories, which arise in the understanding, quite apart from sensibility, can introduce unity into intuitions quite generally, for this might still be the case, even were our faculty of intuition different

from what it now is, provided it were receptive. We have not yet considered how empirical objects are actually given us, or whether we can identify the unities given in them with the unity imposed by the Category. When this is done, our deduction will be complete. But though we have hitherto abstracted from the way in which intuitions are given us, we could not abstract from the fact that they are *given to us*—that is, given from some other (here undetermined) source than our understanding, and independent of it. If our understanding possessed a power of intuiting, the Categories, which are mere acts of combining variety *given to it*, would be idle, for the objects would then be given directly to it in the act of intuiting. This peculiarity of our understanding, as opposed to an intuitive understanding, is, of course, a primitive fact, and inexplicable.

§ 22. But before we consider how empirical intuitions are given to us, as contrasted with other possible sensuous faculties of intuition, it is important to limit the other side of the process, and show that *the Category is of no use in cognising things, except when applied to objects of experience*. For *thinking* and *knowing* (cognising) an object are not the same. To know it, we want both a Category, or concept, and also an intuition, without which the former is mere form, or possibility of knowledge. But we can have none but *sensuous* intuitions either of pure space and time, or of sensations in space and time; and, moreover, the objects given by the former (mathematical figures) are mere forms, which do not prove the existence of things corresponding to them. Things in space and time must be representations accompanied by sensations, or empirical perceptions. Hence the Categories, even when applied to pure intuition, give us no knowledge of things, till we appeal further to empirical intuition, or experience. Our assertion is therefore proved.

§ 23. It was easy to perceive the corresponding limitation in the case of space and time, for we cannot carry them beyond our senses. The pure Categories are not so restricted, and may apply to the objects of any *sensuous* [or receptive] intuition, whether it be in other respects like ours or not. But this extension proves vain. For beyond *our* sensuous intuitions they are mere empty forms of objects, since there is no actual intuition at hand, to which they can apply their synthesis to produce an unity of apperception, and this is the only function they can exercise. We can only then describe an object of an intuition different from ours by negative predicates—by judging, for example, that it is not in space and time, or subject to change. But these negations contain no positive cognition whatever. And even if they did, we should still not have the least notion what Category to apply to such an object, for empirical intuition must determine this point also, as will appear when we consider the schematism.

§ 24. In this paragraph Kant comes to explain the office of the imagination, as intermediate between the pure understanding and the sensuous intuitions. He anticipates to some extent the schematism, but this is nevertheless requisite to the full comprehending of the Deduction. The pure Categories, referring to the combination of the data of intuition generally, are mere *forms of thought*, and not only transcendental, but purely intellectual. But as the form of sensuous intuition lies *a priori* within us, the understanding can act upon this, and through it upon sensuous intuitions. By this means the purely intellectual synthesis of the naked Category passes into an intuitible or figurative synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*), though still *a priori* and transcendental.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The *synthesis intellectualis* would then be the same for all rational beings, but the character of the *synthesis speciosa* depends on the peculiar

Kant regards this latter synthesis as the work of the imagination, which therefore performs a transcendental synthesis, to be distinguished from that of the mere understanding. As reproductive of intuitions, it is indeed a faculty belonging to *sensibility*; but as exercising a spontaneity which actively determines intuitions in harmony with the Categories, it is allied to the understanding, and may be called the *productive* imagination, which performs a transcendental synthesis under the direction of the understanding.

Omitting for the present the Appendix to the Aesthetic here inserted by Kant, we proceed at once to the conclusion and summary of the whole deduction.

§ 26. In the *metaphysical Deduction* (or *exposition*, as he calls it in the Aesthetic), the *a priori* origin of the Categories was proved generally by their perfect coincidence with the general functions of thinking (§ 10). In the *transcendental* (§§ 20, 21) their possibility was shown as *a priori* cognitions of the objects of intuition generally—that is to say, of any sensuous or receptive intuition. We now proceed to complete the deduction by showing the possibility of cognising *a priori*, according to the laws of their combination, whatever objects can be presented *to our senses*. Our combination of variety in space and time, an act of the imagination, called by Kant (above, p. 118) *the synthesis of apprehension*, must obviously conform and correspond to the *forms* of space and time. But space and time are not mere forms of sensuous intuition, but themselves intuitions—that is to say, their variety is represented *a priori* as combined into *unity*.<sup>1</sup> It appears then that *unity in the synthesis*

nature of the sensibility and its forms. The former is the skeleton, as it were, of the latter.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 98, n. "Space represented as an *object* contains more than the mere form of the intuition: namely, a combination of the

of *variety*, both within us (in time), and without (in space), is given as the first condition of sensuous apprehension along with the very act. This can be no other unity than the combination of sensuous intuitions in general, which takes place in pure consciousness, according to the Categories, as above explained (p. 127); it is here applied to *our sensuous intuitions*. As, therefore, experience is nothing but a knowledge of connected perceptions, and these are shown to stand under the condition of the Categories, the Categories are fully proved to be the conditions of the possibility of experience. Here are some examples showing that the conformity of the objective synthesis to the unity (1) of space and (2) of time is equivalent to its conformity to the Categories.

When I perceive a house, the *necessary unity* of space, and of my external intuition generally, must be presupposed. It is in accordance with this that I, as it were, draw its figure, and separate it from surrounding perceptions.<sup>1</sup> This is the synthesis of apprehension. But abstracting from space, we find that the understanding exercises the same spontaneity more generally by the *synthesis of homogeneous*

manifold given according to the form of sensibility into a representation that can be intuited; so the *form of the intuition* gives us merely the manifold, but the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation . . . and as by means of this unity alone, space and time are given as intuitions, it follows that the unity of this intuition *a priori* belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding.'

<sup>1</sup> That is to say, to perceive a house implies that we know it as a single object, separated from the surrounding perceptions given at the same time; also that it exists in space, in which the surrounding perceptions also exist. Two unities, the larger one of space, the lesser one of the house, are both implied in our knowledge of it as an object. Kant further states that we separate the house from its surroundings by a spontaneous act, which he calls drawing the figure, or mentally marking it out from the rest.

*parts* in any intuition, which is the Category of quantity. The former synthesis must correspond with this latter.

When I perceive the freezing of water, I apprehend two states of water standing in a time relation. But time is an *internal intuition* (as well as a form) with a necessary *synthetical unity* of parts, and the necessary condition of perceiving this relation. This is the synthesis of apprehension. But apart from time, the unity under which the understanding combines such varieties in intuition generally, is the Category of *cause*, which, when applied to my sensibility, determines all events in time according to its relation. Therefore the apprehension of the event, and therefore the event itself, stands under the relation of cause and effect.

The conclusion of the paragraph repeats the argument already (ii. pp. 206, 215) developed, that as the Categories prescribe laws for phenomena, or objects of nature (*materi-aliter spectata*), they must consequently legislate for the legitimacy or order of nature (*formaliter spectata*). There is no difficulty whatever in the argument, and as we have explained it already,<sup>1</sup> we shall not weary the reader with repetitions.

§ 27. We have come to the strange conclusion that for us no *cognition a priori* is possible, *except of objects of possible experience*. Yet though thus limited, it is nevertheless not borrowed from experience, but as regards both pure intuitions and pure Categories, found in us *a priori*. As, therefore, experience and the Categories are in harmony, and experience is not the ground of possibility of the Categories, the reverse must be the case. This Kant calls the *Epi-genesis of the pure reason*, which begets the frame and order of nature by means of its Categories.

<sup>1</sup> Above, p. 115.



Another alternative<sup>1</sup> has been proposed: That we are so organised as to have subjective dispositions implanted in us, corresponding to the independent laws of nature. This is a sort of pre-established harmony. In the first place, Kant argues in reply, if we once begin to postulate such hypotheses, there is no limit to their further use in explaining other difficulties. But it is still more decisive, that in such case the Categories must lack that *necessity*, which belongs to their very nature. He thinks that the law of Causality, for example, which asserts the necessity of certain consequences, would be false. For we should only be entitled to say: I am so constituted that I cannot think the effect and cause except thus conjoined. This is just what the sceptic wants, for then all our supposed objective judgments would be mere illusion; and when men were found, as there surely would be, who denied the necessity, though they must feel it, we could, at all events, never dispute with them about a matter depending on the peculiar constitution of their thinking subject.

¶ The reader will at once perceive the close analogy between this reply and that of Locke to the idealist sceptics of his day [Locke's *Essay*, iv. 2, § 14]. It is too, like that passage in Locke, one of the weakest passages in the great work of a great author. Surely if we are all agreed that the laws of nature are a mental relation superadded to the bare successive feelings given to our nerves of sense, then the only question which remains is this: Did the mind impose them originally, or abstract them from repeated sensations? That there should be an unknown order of nature, in addition to and corresponding with the order which our understanding is, on either theory, competent to impose on its

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 101, note, where we see that he is alluding to the opinions of Crusius.

sensations—to require this is so perfectly otiose and gratuitous, as to be wholly inadmissible in any reasonable theory of human knowledge. We might as well assume a real space and time, after all the *phénomènes* have been perfectly and adequately explained by the Kantian theory.

If the reader has been able to follow this long and intricate discussion, he has mastered perhaps the greatest difficulty in the *Kritik*.

We may conclude this chapter with an account of the supplement to the Aesthetic, which is inserted in the middle of the discussion on the Categories, in §§ 24, 25. 'This,' Kant says, 'is the place to explain the paradox which must have struck every one in the exposition of the internal sense' (§ 6), where it is said, 'that our internal sense represents us to ourselves as phenomena, not as we exist *per se*,'—in other words, that we only intuit our internal *affections*, not our internal being (self). As this puts us into a passive relation as regards ourselves, it has been usual to identify the faculty of *apperception* with the *internal sense*, whereas we distinguish them carefully.

In order to know ourselves, as in the knowledge of any other object, our understanding must employ its primitive faculty of combining the variety given in internal sense, and bringing it under the unity of apperception. We have seen that our understanding is not a faculty of intuiting, and must regard such a faculty, when acting in the sensibility, as a faculty differing from itself, and the variety given in it as a variety not obtained by its own direct action. If, then, we turn our attention to the synthesis of the understanding, regarded purely by itself, it is nothing but the unity of the action, of which we are conscious even without sensibility, and which binds up the variety of sense, given internally, according to the form of internal intuition. So it is that

our understanding, by a *transcendental synthesis of the imagination*, as it is called, being one of this subject's faculties, acts upon the passive subject, and thus affects the internal sense. Apperception and its unity, as the source of all combination, act upon all intuitions in general, under the title of Categories, before they act upon objects in sensuous intuition; in other words, the unity of apperception is necessary to obtain the frame, or Category, which is logically prior to our knowledge of any object (whether internal or external) in this frame. The internal sense is the mere *form* of intuition, which does not give us a *definite* intuition, or object, till its variety has been combined by that transcendental action of the imagination above called the figurative synthesis.

We can easily observe this in ourselves. We cannot conceive a line, or circle, or other figure, without *drawing* it in thought, or conceive even time, without drawing its external image, a right line. This means that we direct our attention merely to the action of combining multiplicity, by which we determine our internal sense successively, and so observe the succession in that sense. This motion, as an act of the subject<sup>1</sup> (not as a determination of an object), if we attend to the mere action by which we determine the *internal sense* according to its form, is what produces in us the very notion of succession. The understanding does not find the combination in sense; but *produces* it by *acting upon* sense. The difficulty as to how the thinking self can

<sup>1</sup> Kant notices that the motion of an *object* in space belongs not to pure science, and therefore not to Geometry, as it requires experience to know that anything is movable. But motion, as the act of *drawing* figures, which is presupposed by Geometry, is a pure act of successively combining multiplicity in external intuition generally by our productive imagination; it therefore takes its place even in transcendental philosophy. Cf. above, p. 59.

be regarded as different from the self-intuiting self, and yet identical with it, cannot be avoided or diminished by any other theory, if we regard ourselves (as we must) as objects of our own internal perception. That this latter is an intuition is plain, when we consider that the only image we can form of time, in which we represent ourselves, is a line in space, and that all measures of time are imaged by changes in external things; in fact, that the determinations of the internal sense in time are strictly analogous to those of the external in space. But we only intuit external objects, when we are affected through the external sense; we only intuit internal when we are affected through the internal sense; in other words, we know ourselves as phenomena in time, not directly, as to our real nature. Every act of *attention* gives us an example of this internal relation. Here anybody can perceive how his understanding, as an active faculty, determines his internal sense, as a passive state; in other words, we actively choose that our minds (here controlled as passive) shall attend to something different from the natural succession of ideas. § 25. But the phenomenal self given in internal intuition by the synthetical action of our understanding, is not the only datum we have. This very transcendental synthesis implies a consciousness, not of what we are, but *that we exist*. This representation we reach by *thought*, not by *intuition*. Now, every human cognition, or knowledge, requires (*a*) a combining action of the understanding, which unites (*β*) the multiplicity given in some kind of intuition. It follows that this consciousness that we exist, as it wants the second element, is not a cognition of itself. This self is indeed no phenomenon, far less an illusion, but can only become an object by an appeal to internal sense. All the thinking in the world, all the Categories, will not supply this element. I exist therefore

as an intelligence, conscious merely of its faculty of combining, but subject to a limiting condition in the things combined, viz. that they must be obtained by the internal sense, and therefore in time. This time modifies all the data we receive through it, and thus makes them phenomena, that cannot inform us of things *per se*. To obtain these latter we should possess an intellectual intuition.

The *I think*, gives us the *act of determining* our own existence, but no *determination* of our existence. As I have no self-intuiting faculty, to intuit the subject, prior to its act of determining, like as I have a pure sensuous intuition in time, prior to objects in time, it is impossible for me to determine my existence, as a self-acting being. I represent myself, therefore, as spontaneous in thought, but with an existence determined only, as other phenomena are, sensuously. It is the consciousness of spontaneity, however, which enables me to call myself an *intelligence*.

¶ Probably this long and difficult parenthesis has been one of the main reasons why the Deduction was not better understood. It really does not bear on the argument of the Deduction, but on the Aesthetic, and was inserted here, because Kant could not treat it till he had explained pure apperception and the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. It is a direct refutation of the theory propounded by Dean Mansel, that we are presented with ourselves directly, or intuitively, as substances, in contrast to the indirect presentation of external things through their attributes. His theory shows how little Mansel had apprehended this part of the Kritik, as he seems to have followed Kant pretty closely whenever he could understand him. It is bad enough to say that we have an intuition of self, when, as a matter of fact, we cannot make a single assertion about the intuition, or explain it, but merely

reiterate the assertion—unmeaning in itself—for the sake of a philosophical theory. But surely the further collocation of words, 'intuiting ourselves as substance,' might have made Mansel pause. How is it conceivable that we should intuit substance, as distinguished from its attributes? Surely if such a thing were conceivable, the substance which we postulate for external things would not be such an utterly negative, inconceivable representation? In a private communication, as regards this criticism, he defended himself by saying, that if we were conscious of self as a cause, which Kant has explained just now, we must necessarily be conscious of ourselves as substance, as substance and cause are in this case identical. We hold, on the contrary, that we may be conscious of causation, or action, without knowing anything more of the substance which is the subject of the action. We hold the present case to be a very striking instance of this fact. The ultimate appeal is to each man's consciousness, and in this appeal the great majority of readers will probably agree with the great majority of modern philosophers, who, whenever they have avoided amplifications of language, and stated the facts clearly, have plainly denied the immediate presentation of self as a substance.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC, BOOK II. THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES

GENERAL Logic is built on a basis agreeing perfectly with the higher faculties of knowledge, which are *understanding*, [the faculty of] *judgment*, and *reason*. We have accordingly the doctrine of *concepts*, *judgments*, and *sylogisms* arranged on this plan. As this formal Logic merely discusses the form of thinking, it can even comprise in its Analytic the canon of the reason, for this faculty, apart from the peculiar nature of the cognitions used, must have its proceedings prescribed and fixed.

Transcendental Logic, which is limited to a definite content, viz. pure *a priori* cognitions, cannot follow in its wake. For it appears that the transcendental use of Reason is not objectively valid, and so not the *Logic of Truth*, or Analytic, but occupies, as a *Logic of illusion*, a separate place, under the title of *transcendental Dialectic*. It is then Understanding and Judging only that have a canon of their objectively valid use in Transcendental Logic. The *Analytic* of Principles is simply a canon for the proper use of the *faculty of judgment*, and teaches it to apply to phenomena the Categories, which contain the *a priori* conditions for rules. Taking then the proper principles of the

understanding for his subject, Kant indicates his scope by the title *Doctrine of the Faculty of Judging*.

INTRODUCTION.—*Of the transcendental Faculty of Judgment generally.*<sup>1</sup>

If the understanding be the faculty of rules, the judging faculty is the power of *subsuming* under rules, or distinguishing whether a given case comes under the rule. General Logic cannot possibly give any rules for this faculty. For as Logic abstracts altogether from the *content of knowledge*, and adheres to the pure form only, were we to attempt to show generally what should come under its general rules, this could only be done by another general rule, and the application of *this* would raise the same difficulty. The faculty of judging is then a special talent, which can be practised, but not imparted. It is, in fact, that mother-wit, which no schooling can replace, for even though we cram our minds with any quantity of rules derived from other sources, the faculty of using them must belong to ourselves naturally, and no learning can cure stupidity. But it is very useful to exercise this faculty by examples, especially as they seldom conform exactly to the rule, and so teach us to apply it in a wider sense; from this point of view they are specially requisite to men whose natural talent for judging is weak.

We have seen above that *general Logic* can prescribe no

<sup>1</sup> The reader will observe that throughout this chapter Kant uses the word "judgment" in a sort of practical every-day sense, not merely as the general faculty of comparing representations. In this latter sense he stated above (p. 82), "that judging and thinking were coextensive." He now uses it as we do, when we speak of a "man of judgment," viz. a man who knows how to apply his principles, or bring (subsume) particular cases under the right principles. This ambiguity was first noticed by Dr. Toleken.



rules for the faculty of judgment. It is so very different a case with transcendental Logic, that it appears to be its special business to direct and secure the use of the pure understanding by fixed rules. For in obtaining extension for our field of knowledge *a priori*, or as *Doctrine*, to use Kant's word, philosophy appears ill equipped, and has done nothing; but as *Kritik*, to prevent errors of judgment in the few pure concepts that we possess—in this negative duty it must exercise all its skill and acuteness.

But transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity, that beyond the rule (or better, the general condition of rules) given in the Categories, it can also show *a priori* the case to which the rule should be applied. It shares this advantage with Mathematic alone of other sciences, because it treats of concepts which are to refer *a priori* to objects; consequently its objective validity, as well as the general conditions under which objects can be given, in conformity with these Categories, can only be shown *a priori*. Were this not done, they would be mere logical forms, and not Categories. Our *transcendental theory of judging* contains two parts—first, the *Schematism*, treating of the sensuous condition, under which Categories must be used; secondly, the *Principles* of the pure understanding, or the synthetical judgments, which flow from the Categories under these conditions, and lie *a priori* at the basis of all the rest of our knowledge.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL THEORY OF JUDGING, OR  
ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. CHAP. I.

*Of the Schematism of the Pure Understanding.*—Whenever we *subsume* an object under a concept, the two representations must be *homogeneous*, as a matter of course.

Thus the concept of a plate is homogeneous with the purely Geometrical notion of a circle, for the roundness thought in the former, can be intuited in the latter. But the pure Categories are completely heterogeneous from all sensuous intuitions. How then can the latter be subsumed under the former, and how is, consequently, the *application* of the Categories to objects of sense possible? For surely none will assert that any Category, such as *Causality*, can be intuited in phenomena and contained in them. Here then the necessity of the Theory of Judgment, or applicability of the *pure Categories* to experience, becomes apparent. In other sciences this divergence between the general concepts and their concrete representation does not exist. There must obviously be something intermediate, homogeneous on the one hand with the Category, on the other with the phenomenon, and this must make the application possible. This mediating representation must be *pure*, and yet not only *intellectual* but *sensuous*. We shall call it the *transcendental schema*.

We saw that the concept of the understanding produces pure synthetical unity of various parts generally. Now time, as the formal condition of the variety given in internal sense, and so of the combination of all our representations, also affords us an *a priori* multiplicity in pure intuition; that is to say, the (pure) times, in which a series of various representations are given and combined by the mind, may themselves be regarded as an *a priori* multiplicity, combined, or combinable *a priori* into a pure unity. Therefore a transcendental *determination* of time must have this in common with the *Category* (which brings this time-determination into unity), that it is *universal*, and depends on an *a priori* rule. But, on the other hand, it is also in conformity with the *phenomenon*, inasmuch as time is contained

in every empirical representation of variety. Here then we have the schema we require. The deduction has already taught us that the Categories are only applicable to objects of experience, as distinguished from things *per se*; that they consequently must require modifications of our sensibility, and this implies that formal conditions of sense (especially internal sense) are also necessary, as constituting the universal condition under which alone we can apply the Category to an object. This last condition is the schema of the Category,<sup>1</sup> and the proceeding of the understanding as regards these schemata we call the *schematism* of the pure understanding.

The schema in itself is indeed, like the image, the product of our imagination, but also differs in not being an individual picture, as it merely aims at representing the general way in which the unity of intuition is produced. Thus I can place five points together thus . . . . ., and they produce a picture of *one number 5*. But when I think of what *number in general* means, I have before me the peculiar way in which the imagination proceeds to form such an arrangement of points. "When we represent to ourselves the general procedure of the imagination, in procuring an image for a concept, I call this the schema belonging to this concept."

¶ The illustration used by Kant shows that he was a Conceptualist, as regards the object of the mind in part at least of its thinking concerning general ideas, as they were called by the schoolmen. It also shows that, as usual, he took a deeper and fuller view of the mental state which was once the subject of such bitter controversy. Locke's abstract idea of a triangle, which had roused the ire and

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.* the schema is the way in which we determine time in order to apply the Category.

the laughter of so many critics, is here shown to be not only free from absurdity, but even the truest account of the matter contained in any previous philosophy. But Locke's fault had been to attend to the unimportant part of the process. It is the *act* of the mind in putting together the image of a triangle, not the completed *image*, which affords us the proper object in general thinking.<sup>1</sup> For the actual images are in every case different, and even inconsistent, but the act of making them in general is one and the same in all cases. It is what Kant calls a 'unity of action.' 'In fact,' he says, 'not images, but schemata, lie at the basis of our pure sensuous concepts. No image could ever be adequate to the general concept of a triangle, as it cannot embrace right-angled, scalenon, etc. The schema of a triangle can exist in thought only, and means a rule of the synthesis of the imagination, when applied to pure objects in space.' The same is the case with empirical concepts. My notion (schema) of a dog means a rule followed by my imagination in drawing the general features of a certain quadruped, without confining myself to any particular figure.

This schematism of the understanding, as regards the pure form of objects, is a hidden craft in the secrets of the human mind, which we can hardly expect ever plainly to discover and to expound. But so much seems certain: the *image* is the product of the empirical working of the productive imagination; the *schema* of sensuous concepts, such as figures in space, is as it were a sketch (*monogram*) of the pure imagination *a priori*, through which alone images can be brought into agreement with the concept. The schema of a pure concept of the understanding (Category), on the contrary, can never be reduced to an image, but is only a

<sup>1</sup> On this view of the schema as an act, cf. *Kritik*, pp. 110, 435.

pure synthesis, according to a rule of unity supplied and expressed by the Category. This schema is, of course, a transcendental product of imagination, affecting the determining of our internal sense generally, as to its form—Time. It produces that unity expressed by the concept, which is a phase of the transcendental unity of apperception. Let us proceed to details.

The pure image of all quantities (*quanta*) in external sense is space; for all objects of the senses generally, it is time. But the pure *schema* of quantity [*quantitas*], as a Category, is *number*, or the successive addition of homogeneous units. The act of numbering is nothing but the unity of combining the variety of a homogeneous intuition; in fact, I generate time itself in the successive apprehending of my intuition. [Kant here means that the Category of Unity is exemplified or imitated by the mind considering the perception in a single act, or moment of time, to indicate unity. The Category of Plurality is exemplified by the mind requiring several successive moments to apprehend a perception, of which the parts are separate but homogeneous, and therefore the several acts appear as separate units. Totality implies the adoption of a large unit, under which many smaller are combined.]

Reality in the Category is that which corresponds to sensation generally, that of which the concept indicates being in time, as opposed to Negation, or non-being in time. Their opposition is therefore that of the same time full (of sensation) and empty. 'As time is only the form of intuition, or of objects as phenomena, that which in these objects corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects, as things *per se*,<sup>1</sup> in fact their

<sup>1</sup> Not 'actual things,' as Mr. Watson renders (*Selections from Kant*, p. 88).

*reality*.<sup>1</sup> We must judge of this reality by the amount of sensation produced upon us. But every sensation has a degree, or quantity, by which it can affect our faculty of representation during the same length of time, more or less, varying from the maximum of sensation down to its complete absence, or *negation*. Thus a continuous transition from reality to negation is possible, which enables us to regard every reality as a *quantum* (of sensation). The schema of a reality, in this sense, is its continuous and uniform generation in time, when we pass from total absence of sensation in time to some particular degree of sensation. [As we before had several successive homogeneous perceptions in successive moments, giving us number, so we must here suppose several successive perceptions homogeneous in their character, but differing in the increasing intensity of the sensation they produce. Kant considers that we must conceive the maximum of sensation as made up of all the lesser degrees which we could apprehend successively in time. But as the sum of them is given to us in an equally short time as each of the lesser degrees, we come to know the difference between the same subdivision of time as either full or empty. So it is that an object which affects even three different senses together has more reality than an object which affects only one. The moment in which it affects us is a full time, and the fulness may be measured by three times of equal length, each filled by one of the sensations. The same fact is implied when we speak of one object being ten shades darker than another

<sup>1</sup> This statement, occurring in the First Edition, as well as the succeeding ones, is a strange way of preaching the absolute idealism which Schopenhauer and Fischer ascribe to Kant! He regards sensation here as directly suggesting something apart from our cognition, though we have no means of studying it save through our sensation.

of the same kind. Quality is, after all, a quantity of reality.]<sup>1</sup>

'The schema of substance is the *permanence* of the real in time, or the representation of it, as the substratum of an empirical time-determination generally, which remains, while all else changes. Time does not elapse, but rather the existence of changeable things elapses in it.' Consequently substance, or the permanent in existence, is what corresponds in phenomena to time, itself unchangeable and permanent. It is therefore by substance alone that we can determine sequence and co-existence of phenomena in time.<sup>2</sup> The schema of Causality consists in the succession of various phenomena, so far as it is subject to a rule [*invariable sequence*]. The schema of community or reciprocal causation of substances as regards their accidents, is the necessary *simultaneity* of the determinations of both. The schema of possibility is the agreement of our synthesis of various representations with the conditions of time generally. For example, contradictory attributes can only exist in a thing successively; consequently possibility determines the existence of a thing at some time. The schema of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Proleg.* p. 86, n.

<sup>2</sup> As he tells us afterwards that impenetrability is the empirical criterion of substance (*Kritik*, p. 169), we may take this as a specimen of a permanent reality (of sensation), which remains the same, and so enables us to determine changes in other qualities. So the chameleon remains a solid body while its colours change, and we accordingly talk of its substance remaining the same, while its accidents vary. But were there not a permanent phenomenon of some kind, corresponding to the general lapse of time, we should not know that other sensations occupied shorter time, and changed while the cause of them is conceived unchangeable. We may add, that these illustrations of the various schemata are developed and explained by the succeeding chapters on the Principles which embody them, and that it is impossible to make them clear to the reader till he has studied the theory of the Principles.

actuality is its existence at a definite time ; that of necessity its existence at all times.

We can now see the relation of all the schemata. That of quantity is the putting together (synthesis) of portions of time, in our successive apprehension of an object or objects. That of quality is the putting together of (feebler) sensations in time, or filling time with them. The schema of relation is the attitude of perceptions to one another in all time (either as transient and permanent, as necessarily consequent, or as necessarily simultaneous). The schema of modality represents to us time itself, regarded generally as the correlate for determining an object, when we consider how or whether it belongs to time. The schemata affect therefore respectively *a priori*, and according to rules—1, the succession of time ; 2, the content of time ; 3, the order in time ; and 4, the sum total (*Inbegriff*) of time, as regards all possible phenomena.

Kant concludes the discussion by reiterating what he had said above (§§ 22, 23), as to the use of the Categories being only empirical, and that they have no meaning except as applied to objects of sense. The discussion of the schematism has shown this more plainly, in that it proves that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is wholly employed in *time* and its determinations. The schema is only the sensuous concept of an object in accordance with the Category. If we lay aside this restriction, the Category preserves nothing but a logical meaning, and can determine no object, not to say a thing *per se*.

¶ It will tend to put this schematism as well as the deduction of the Categories in a clearer light, if we consider Schopenhauer's criticism, which at first sight appears somewhat plausible. Kant's plan (he tells us) was to find for



every empirical<sup>1</sup> function of the understanding its transcendental parallel. Now when we use a very abstract empirical concept symbolically (as Leibnitz would say), we often glance back towards the empirical intuitions from which we have obtained the concept, and we call up in imagination a sort of imperfect image momentarily, merely to assure ourselves that our thinking is possible in intuition—a psychological fact which any one will discover for himself easily by reflection. This fugitive phantasm, intermediate between abstract concepts and clear intuitions, Kant called a schema, and thence concluded that between the pure intuitive faculty of sensibility and the pure faculty of thought there are similar schemata of the pure Categories. But what is the use of this schematism in empirical thinking? Merely to secure that the *content* of the concept be correct. The matter has been abstracted from empirical intuition: we refer to it occasionally, to make sure that our thinking is about *reality*. But Schopenhauer objects that the pure *a priori* concepts come from within, and are not derived from intuition; hence, such concepts cannot be referred to any intuition to guarantee their reality. It was, then, upon the misapplication of this psychological fact above mentioned, that Kant based his elaborate schematism of the pure understanding.

¶ Although Schopenhauer's criticism is unsound, it has been here stated, as the refutation of it will bring the real doctrine of Kant into a clearer light. Schopenhauer has well described the 'abstract idea' of Locke as a fugitive phantasm, which gives reality to our symbolical concepts. What is the exact office of this schema? To insure to us that our (empirical) concepts are applicable in experience; to show us that they are not merely logically possible, but

<sup>1</sup> He should have said *logical*, when he refers to Kant.

objectively real. Now, in empirical concepts this requirement is satisfied, if the content of the concept answers to the schema, as the law of contradiction secures its possibility, or logical correctness. But all our objects of experience stand not only under representative concepts (genus, species, etc.), but also under assertative concepts (substance, cause, etc.). These are the Categories, which were already proved to be part of the (transcendental) content of representations. Hence, such concepts must be shown to be applicable to objects of experience just as generic concepts are. These latter establish their claim by means of the schema just mentioned—how can the Categories do so?

¶ Let us look back to the deduction of the Categories. All phenomena were found to agree in one point at all events—they must be *my* phenomena. It is this unity which makes us speak of Nature as a unity, and yet as consisting of many lesser units, called objects. For there is no unity in our experience except what is imposed by our minds. Accordingly this highest and most general synthetical unity of consciousness acts upon phenomena by imposing upon them various phases of its unity, various lesser unities, all dependent upon the highest synthetical unity. These lesser unities are the Categories. They are imposed by the mind upon phenomena, which thus become objects. But how? The sensations which are the component elements of the object, being received into the mind successively, are reproduced, but not simply; the imagination moulds them, and so produces, not only the received phenomena, but also the form of a concept along with them; so that, owing to this addition (which is the transcendental content of the representation), that faculty is properly called *productive*. But what is the form added to the received elements by the imagination and under-

standing in this its action? Surely no additional sensation, no heterogeneous intellectual something, called a Category. The imagination can only arrange or regulate the relations to *time* of all our sensations. This is the point upon which the imagination fixes; for all our thoughts whatsoever must be in time. The Categories must be thought under this condition. The Categories then are imitated (so to speak) or exemplified in time-determinations, which are imposed by the productive imagination upon phenomena. Thus the pure Category of substance is that which can only be subject—and not predicate. An image of such a concept is impossible; but the nearest sensuous representation we can get is something which is absolutely permanent in time. This, then, is the schema under which the imagination brings certain phenomena, which are accordingly declared to be substance, and it is only by means of such schemata that we can assure ourselves that our thought is applicable to experience. In Mr. Monck's briefer words:—Sense or experience has its formal as well as its material conditions. The office of the schema of an empirical concept is to show that the material part is right; that of the schema of a pure concept to show that the formal part is so also. Such is, in brief, the general notion of the schematism, which follows necessarily from the productive imagination, and which forms one of the most remarkable claims of Kant for originality and acuteness.

## CHAPTER X

### SECOND CHAPTER OF THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES

. *Of the System of all the Principles of the Pure Understanding.*—So far we have only considered the *general* conditions, which alone justify the transcendental judgment in using the Categories for synthetical judgments. We now proceed to give a systematic sketch of the judgments thus usually produced. Of course, our clue will still be the use of the Categories, since it is *their* relation to experience which constitutes all pure rational cognition.

*A priori* Principles (lit. *fundamental principles*<sup>1</sup>) are not called, merely because they contain the foundation of others, but also because they themselves are not based on other and more universal cognitions. Yet this property does not free them from requiring to be proved. Such a proof cannot, indeed, be objective, being rather the foundation of all knowledge of its object. But a proof from the objective sources, which make it possible to produce cognition of objects in general, is not only itself possible, but is necessary, for otherwise such assertions must run the risk of being considered mere assumptions.

Furthermore, we here confine ourselves to the Principles

To avoid cumbrousness, we uniformly translate *Grundsatz* by *Prin-*

which refer to the Categories. We therefore exclude the Principles of the transcendental Aesthetic, that space and time are the conditions of the possibility of phenomena, and of phenomena only. For the same reason, mathematical Principles are not part of this system. Yet still their necessity, since they are synthetical and *a priori*, must find place in it, not to prove their accuracy or necessity, but merely to explain and justify (*deduce*) the possibility of such pure cognitions. We shall first discuss the Principle of analytical judgments, in order to free the synthetical, with which they are contrasted, from misapprehension, and illustrate their real nature.

*Of the highest Principle of all Analytical Judgments.*—The highest, though but negative, condition of all our judgments, quite irrespective of their objects, is that they shall not contradict themselves. It is negative, because judgments may conform to it, and yet be either false, as combining concepts otherwise than the objects direct, or baseless, as having no foundation either *a priori* or *posteriori*. This proposition, then: *no thing can have a predicate which contradicts it*, is the Law of Contradiction, is an universal but negative criterion of all truth, and is merely logical, referring to cognitions as such, apart from their content. We may, however, make a positive use of it, not merely to avoid error, but to know truth. In *analytical judgments* whether affirmative or negative, the truth can always be adequately known according to this principle. For that which is already thought in the concept of an object, must be rightly affirmed of that object, and its contradictory denied, else the object would contradict our concept of it. The law, is, therefore, the universal and adequate principle of all *analytical knowledge*, but here its use as a sufficient criterion ends. It is, of course, a *sine qua non* of all judg-

ments, but cannot determine their truth generally. And as we are concerned only with the synthetical part of our knowledge, we must, of course, beware of violating it, but cannot expect from it any light as to the truth of this kind of knowledge.

But there is a formula for this celebrated, though purely formal law, which does contain a synthesis, unnecessarily imported into it through inadvertence. Here it is: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be *at the same time*. Here apodictic certainty, which is implied of course, is superfluously added by the word *impossible*, and, what is more important, the proposition is affected by the condition of time. It affirms a thing A, which is something = B, cannot at the same time be not-B; but it can be both B and not-B successively. For example: a man who is young, cannot at the same time be old, but becomes so in the lapse of years. It is quite wrong to make the purely logical law of contradiction depend on time relations, and such a course obscures its real import. The mistake arises from first separating the predicate of a thing from our concept of it, and then connecting its contradictory with that predicate. This produces no contradiction with the subject, but only with the former predicate, which we had connected synthetically with the subject, and even then only when the two predicates are posited simultaneously. If I say a man who is unlearned, is not learned, I must add, *at the same time*, or it may be false. But if I say, No unlearned man is learned, the proposition is analytical, and is evident without the addition of *at the same time*. For this reason, then, Kant alters the formula, in order to express clearly the analytical nature of the law.

§ 2. *Of the highest Principle of all Synthetical Judgments.*  
—To determine the possibility of synthetical judgments is,

as we have seen, the duty not of general but of transcendental Logic, and is indeed its most important function, for thus alone can the compass and limits of the pure understanding be determined. As, in synthetical judgments, I must pass out of the concept (*subject*) to consider something quite different in relation with it—this is never a relation of identity or contradiction, and so in the judgment, *per se*, we cannot see either truth or error.

Granted, then, that we must pass out of a given concept, to compare something else synthetically with it, some third thing, or medium, is necessary, to contain the synthesis of two concepts. What is this medium? There is but one envelope (*Inbegriff*) which embraces all our representations, viz.—the internal sense, and its form, Time. The synthesis of these our representations depends on the Imagination, their synthetical unity on the unity of apperception. Here, then, we must seek the possibility of synthetical judgments,—nay, more, of synthetical *a priori* judgments, which will be shown necessary from these sources, if a cognition of representations can be accomplished, resting exclusively on the synthesis of representations.

If a cognition is to have objective reality—that is, to refer to an object, and have in it significance, the object must of course be somehow given. To have an object given immediately, by representing it in intuition, means nothing but to refer its representation to experience, either actual or possible. Even space and time, pure and certainly *a priori* as they are, would have no objective validity, and no meaning, were not their necessary use exhibited in objects of experience; nay, our very representation of them is a mere schema, ever referring to the reproductive imagination for matter to fill it, without which they would

bear no signification. So it is with every one of our concepts.

*The possibility of experience*, then, or of being experienced, is what gives all our *a priori* cognitions objective validity. Experience again is based on a synthetical unity—a synthesis of phenomenal objects according to the Categories, or principles of its form, which lie *a priori* at the basis of experience. These are indeed universal rules of the unity of phenomena, but their objective reality, nay, even their possibility, can only be shown in experience. This is the medium in which synthetical *a priori* propositions can exhibit their objective reality.

We do, indeed, in the case of space, and of the figures which the productive imagination draws in it, discover a great deal *a priori* by way of synthetical judgments, and actually without requiring any experience; but such knowledge would be occupation with what is a mere chimera, were not space considered as the condition of phenomena, which are the materials of external experience. Hence, even the pure synthetical judgments of Mathematic refer to possible experience, or rather to its very possibility, and on this alone is based the objective validity of their synthesis.

‘As, therefore, experience as an empirical synthesis is, in its possibility, the only sort of cognition which gives to all other syntheses reality, so experience as a cognition *a priori* can only have truth, or agreement with its object, by containing nothing more than what is necessary for the synthetical unity of experience generally. Here, then, is the highest Principle of all synthetical judgments: every object comes under the necessary conditions of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuitions in a possible experience’ Thus *the possibility of* (the general faculty of) *experience*, and the *possibility of* (there being) *objects of ex-*



perience, lie under the same conditions, and thus our synthetical *a priori* judgments about the former obtain (through the latter) objective reality.<sup>1</sup>

§ 3. *Systematic Exposition of all the synthetical Principles of the pure Understanding.*—We must ascribe it purely to the understanding that there exists such a thing as principles. For the pure understanding is not only a faculty of rules, but the very source of Principles, according to which every possible object stands necessarily under rules, which add to phenomena the cognition of an object corresponding to them. Even laws of nature, regarded as principles of our ordinary experiences, carry with them the expression of necessity, or at least the suggestion of being determined by grounds valid for all experiences. But such laws again stand under the higher Principles of the understanding, which they merely apply to particular cases. There is no danger of confusing these two classes of Principles, for the absence of that necessity according to concepts, which the latter have, is easily perceived in the former, however universally valid. But there are pure *a priori* Principles, which are not properly to be attributed to the pure understanding, because they are drawn (not from pure concepts, but) from pure intuitions, by means of the understanding; such are those of Mathematic. Still, their objective reality in experience, and the deduction of their possibility, must rest on the pure understanding.

Hence, says Kant, I shall not enumerate among my Principles those of Mathematic, but only such as Mathematic requires for an *a priori* basis of its possibility and objective validity. These are the principles on which

<sup>1</sup> The reader should compare the corresponding discussion in the *Prolegomena* (pp. 63 sqq.), entitled, *How is a pure Science of Nature (Physic) possible?*

Mathematical judgments are based, and proceed from *concepts* to intuitions, not *vice versâ* (as the ordinary Mathematical axioms do).

In applying the Categories to possible experience we may use them either *mathematically* or *dynamically*, for as they may refer merely to the *intuition*, so they may also refer to the *existence* of a phenomenon.<sup>1</sup> The *a priori* conditions of intuition as regards possible experience are absolutely necessary; those of the existence of objects of a possible empirical intuition are, as such, only contingent. Hence the Principles of Mathematical use must be unconditionally necessary, and be apodictical in form; those of dynamical use, though also (of course) necessary *a priori*, are so mediately, under the condition of empirical thinking in some experience. The latter have not therefore such immediate evidence, though equally certain, as generally applied to experience.

The table of the Categories is of course our natural clue to the Principles, inasmuch as these are merely the rules of objectively applying them.

These Principles are therefore—

1.

*Axioms of Intuition.*

2

*Anticipations*  
of Perception.

3.

*Analogies*  
of Experience.

4.

*Postulates of*

Empirical thinking in general.

These terms are carefully chosen, to indicate distinctions of evidence and use. It will soon appear that the determining

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 97, *supra*.

of phenomena by the Categories of *Quantity* and *Quality* (regarding merely the Form of the latter) differs from that of the others, one being intuitively, the other discursively certain. Hence they are distinguished as *Mathematical* and *Dynamical Principles*.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, they are not the Principles of Mathematic, nor of general Dynamic (Physic), but the Principles of the understanding in respect of our internal sense, upon which depends the possibility of both these more special classes of axioms. Kant's Principles are therefore so called on account of their application, not their content.

<sup>1</sup> Kant adds a note in the Second Edition, giving a sketch of the various classes of combination.—All combination (*conjunctio*) is either *composition* or *nexus*. The former is the synthesis of multiplicity not necessarily inseparable, as, for example, the two triangles formed by the diagonal of a square. This is the nature of all synthesis of *homogeneous* parts that can be *mathematically* estimated. It is *aggregation*, if extensive; *coalition*, if intensive. *Nexus* again is the synthesis of inseparable parts, such as accident and substance, effect and cause, which are *heterogeneous*, though combined *a priori*. This combination, as being arbitrary [*willkürlich*, he means that no reason can be assigned why these particular heterogeneous elements are combined], I call *dynamical*, because it concerns the combination of the *existence* of multiplicity, and this again is either *physical*, of phenomena among one another, or *metaphysical*, of phenomena in the cognitive faculty *a priori*. These four kinds of combination evidently answer to the four classes of Principles.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES

(1.) AXIOMS OF INTUITION.—Their Principle is: *All intuitions are extensive Quantities.*<sup>1</sup>

#### PROOF.

All phenomena contain as to form an intuition in space and time, which is their *a priori* basis. They cannot therefore be empirically apprehended except by combining multiplicity, and so generating the representation of a definite space or time, the parts of which are homogeneous, and conceived as a synthetical unity. This is the notion of a

<sup>1</sup> See what he says about the relation of this Principle to axioms proper in his more special discussion in the Methodology, *Kritik*, p. 446. Kant, with that habit of repetition and variation of statement common to the books of almost all great discoverers, has in his Second Edition inserted after the Definition of each of the first three classes of Principles an additional paragraph, entitled *Proof or Demonstration*. With one exception (that of *Community*) these inserted paragraphs merely repeat in varying language what follows them, and what had stood in the original edition. The reader who compares our Commentary with Kant's text will therefore find that we have curtailed the arguments considerably, but only by leaving out repetitions. We trust there is no distinct point, however small, omitted. The parallel discussion in the *Prolegomena*, §§ 24-32, will be found in vol. ii. pp. 81 *sqq.*

quantity (*quanti*). As therefore the perception of an object as phenomenon is only possible through this synthetical unity of multiplicity, all phenomena are *extensive quantities*, because they must be represented by the same synthesis which determines space and time generally as quantities.

Kant defines an extensive quantity as that in which the notion of the part precedes and renders possible the notion of the whole. So I cannot conceive a line without drawing it in thought, and thus generating successively all the parts which make up the whole intuition. It is so also with every time, even the shortest. As every phenomenon must be intuited through space and time, it must also be an aggregate, or combination of given parts, and this is only the case with those quantities which we apprehend as *extensive*.

‘On the successive synthesis of the productive imagination in generating figures is based Geometry and its axioms, which express the *a priori* conditions of intuition under which alone the schema of a pure concept of an external intuition can exist; *e.g.* between two points only one right line is possible; two right lines cannot enclose a space. These axioms properly concern only *quantia* as such.’

But as to determining the *quantitas* of a thing, and answering the question, How large is it?—though there are various synthetical and indemonstrable propositions about it, yet they cannot be called axioms. For that equals added to equals make equals is an analytical proposition, whereas axioms must be synthetical. On the other hand, the self-evident propositions about particular numbers are synthetical, but not universal, like geometrical axioms. They should therefore be called numerical formulae.  $7 + 5 = 12$ , as has been already seen (above, p. 37), is synthet-

ical.<sup>1</sup> But it is also singular. For this synthesis of unities can only be made in one way, though the use of the numbers is afterwards universal. The construction of a triangle, as a pure function of the productive imagination, may be produced in a thousand ways, but 7 and 12 only in one way. Were such propositions, then, axioms, they would be infinite in number.

This transcendental Principle of the Mathematic of phenomena extends our *a priori* cognition widely. For now we see why pure Mathematic in all its precision is applicable to objects of experience. Empirical intuition is only possible through pure intuition. What Geometry says of the latter must therefore be true of the former. All evasions of the laws of construction of space (such as the endless divisibility of lines and angles) must vanish. For these theories, which deny the objective validity of space and of the Mathematic based on it, are only the devices of a misguided reason, which endeavours to free the objects of the senses from the formal conditions of our sensibility, in which case nothing whatever could be asserted of them *a priori*, and Geometry itself would become impossible.

(2.) ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION.—Their principle is: *In all phenomena the Real, which is an object of sensation, has intensive quantity, or degree.*<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kant (and Mansel) seem to have overlooked such numerical axioms as  $a(b+c) = ab+ac$ , and  $ab=ba$ , which are both synthetical and general.

<sup>2</sup> This Principle was worded in a slightly different way in the First Edition. 'The Principle, which anticipates all perceptions as such, is thus expressed: In all phenomena sensation and the *real*, which corresponds to it in the object (*realitas phenomenon*) has a degree, or *intensive quantity*.' It will be seen that the form of the First Edition is more realistic here than that of the Second. At the same time, we should be most cautious not to suppose that the *real, which corresponds to sensa-*

## PROOF.

Perception is empirical consciousness, in which there is sensation. Phenomenal objects of perception are more than mere formal intuitions (of space and time). They contain in addition the materials for some object, represented as existing in space and time. This is the real (element) of sensation, and accordingly a mere subjective representation, which makes us conscious of being affected, and which we refer to an object in general. Now from this empirical consciousness down to pure consciousness a gradual change is possible till we reach a mere formal intuition of space and time. So we may also regard sensation as a gradual production, beginning with 0, in pure intuition, and rising to a certain quantity. Thus, while it is not an objective representation containing space and time, it still has an *intensive quantity*, or a degree of influence on our sensibility, which must accordingly be attributed to all objects of perception.

All cognition, which determines empirical cognition *a priori*, may be called *πρόληψις*, and this was doubtless Epicurus's meaning for the term.<sup>1</sup> But sensation, or the matter of perception, is the very thing which distinguishes the empirical as such from *a priori* knowledge; this therefore should be the element never anticipated. On the other hand, we may call any pure determinations in space or time, whether of figure or magnitude, anticipations of phenomena, *tion*, is a thing *per se*. It will appear from Kant's discussion on the first *Analogy* that we are obliged to conceive a phenomenal substratum, distinct from each particular representation, and this we call the substance, or the substratum of what is *real* in nature, as it is permanent, and neither increases nor decays. The fuller explanation must be postponed to its proper place. It was probably this obscurity of anticipation which caused Kant to alter the form in the Second Edition.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Diogenes Laertius, x. i. 21.

because they represent *a priori* that which may always be given *a posteriori* in experience. But supposing we can find an universal feature in sensation as such, apart from particular sensations, this might with exceptional propriety be called anticipation, as outrunning experience in the very province which we owe to it alone. This is here really the case.

Apprehension, if regarded not as a succession of sensations, but as one, fills an instant only; if it be absent, then the empty instant = 0. But on the other hand, the instant of time when filled with sensation is regarded not as an extensive quantity that can be dissected, but as an unit = 1.<sup>1</sup>

*Intensive Quantity* may then be defined: that which is apprehended as unity, and in which multiplicity can only be represented by approximating to 0. Kant observes parenthetically that when this reality of phenomena is regarded as a *cause*, e.g. of sensation or of change, the degree of reality as cause is called *moment*, as in the 'Moment of Weight,' because its apprehension is momentary—a very curious criticism.

Every sensation, then, and every reality in phenomena have a degree, which can be diminished, and between reality and negation there is always a series of possible realities and possible lesser perceptions. Every colour, every temperature, has a degree, which, however small, is not the least possible.

This attribute of quantities, that no part of them is the least possible, or simple, is called their *continuity*. So there is no part of space or time which is not itself space or time. Points and instants are only boundaries or limitations, which themselves presuppose the intuitions which they limit. Of such boundaries, then, as elements, time and

<sup>1</sup> Vol. ii. p. 86, note.



space could never be composed. As generated by the productive imagination in the equable lapse of time, they may also be regarded as equally *flowing* quanta.

If this synthesis be interrupted, we have an *aggregate* of many phenomena, produced by the repetition of an ever-finitishing synthesis. If I call twenty shillings a sum of money, I may rightly consider this as a continuous *quantity*, no part of which is the least possible, but might be a coin, containing under it further subdivisions. But if I speak of twenty shillings as so many *coins*, it were improper to call them a quantum of shillings; they are an *aggregate*, or number. But in this number each unit is a quantum, and as such a continuum.

All quantities, whether extensive or intensive quanta, being continuous, we could here easily demonstrate with mathematical precision the proposition, that all change is continuous, did not the causality of change lie quite beyond the reach of transcendental philosophy, and presuppose empirical principles. The understanding gives us no light *a priori* how a cause should be possible, which alters one condition of a thing into another, and besides in this particular case only a certain number of the features of phenomena are affected, which experience alone can show us, while their cause is to be found in the unchangeable. As we are here using nothing but pure *a priori* fundamental concepts, we must postpone such inquiries.

But we are in no want of evidence how important our Principle is, in anticipating perceptions, and in precluding false impressions drawn from their deficiency. It is obvious if all reality in perception must have a definite degree, separated from negation by an infinite gradation of lesser degrees, that no perception or experience can possibly prove a total absence of reality in phenomena. In other

words, we can never from experience demonstrate empty space or empty time. For such a thing can never be perceived, nor can it be inferred from, or brought to explain, the differences in degree of reality in any phenomenon. For though the whole intuition should be real in every part, yet there are infinite degrees between this and negation of reality in such intuition, regarded as an intensive quantity, though the extension may remain the same.

Here is an example. Almost all physicists, perceiving a great difference of weight in the same volume or extension of different bodies, have inferred that this volume contained vacuities, but in various measure. Who could have thought that these chiefly mathematical and mechanical inquirers would have based their conclusions on a metaphysical hypothesis—a thing which they so studiously avoid? They assumed that the *real* in nature was *homogeneous in every case*, and only variable in the number of its parts, or extensively. To this purely metaphysical assumption Kant opposes a transcendental proof, which does not indeed pretend to explain the differences in the filling of space, but destroys the notion that it can be explained by assuming empty spaces, and leaves the mind free to adopt some other explanation. We now see that though equal spaces be perfectly filled with matter, this matter has in quality a degree (say of resistance or of weight) which may be infinitely various. Thus the heat of a room may diminish indefinitely without leaving a single particle of its space empty, [by filling them still completely, but with a lesser degree of its quality. 'I am not asserting this,' says Kant, 'as a fact, but as a probability which overthrows a very prevalent false assumption.'

Nevertheless, this Anticipation of Perception does seem strange to an inquirer trained to transcendental reflection,

and so rendered cautious. How is it that the understanding can presume an *a priori* principle of distinction in sensation, abstracting from its empirical quality? For here we are declaring synthetically *a priori* concerning that which is purely and specifically empirical. This is the answer. The particular *quality* is always empirical, and in no sense *a priori*. But the Real, which corresponds to sensation generally, as opposed to negation or voidness, is nothing but a notion of being, and is a mere synthesis (of quantity and of quality) in empirical sensations generally. For without changing the quantity, and abstracting from it completely, we can conceive a full sensation as affecting us equally with an aggregate of lesser sensations conveyed to us separately, each in its own moment; so we can anticipate *a priori* that quality must have intensive *quantity*, just as we determined *a priori* that all quantity must have a *quality*, viz. continuity.

## CHAPTER XII

Umm 146

### THE DYNAMICAL PRINCIPLES

(3.) ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE.—Their Principle is:  
*Experience is only possible by representing a necessary combination of perceptions.*<sup>1</sup>

#### PROOF.

Experience is an empirical cognition, or one which determines an object by perceptions; and this of course by a synthesis of perceptions. This synthesis is not in the perceptions, but consists in their variety being combined in one consciousness; this is the essential feature in cognising *objects* of sense. But as perceptions occur in accidental or contingent order in time, we cannot conceive any necessity in their combination derived from this source. Since, then,

<sup>1</sup> The First Edition has this principle in a different form, and brings into prominence the element of time. 'All phenomena as to their existence come *a priori* under rules of their mutual determination in a [portion of] time.' It is a mistake of Kuno Fischer to assert (*Comm.* p. 107) that Kant in the Second Edition omitted the all important element of time in his analogies. He does the reverse, for instead of merely stating it, he adds a new paragraph under the title *proof*, in which he *argues* it out. The reader should observe that the reasoning in all these proofs is of a similar character. We see that the *necessity* in experience does not come (*a*) from the *matter* nor (*b*) from the *form* of Sense, and therefore we conclude that it is due to the Understanding.

experience is a cognition of objects not as they are accidentally represented in time, but as they are in time objectively, and this pure time itself cannot be perceived, the *a priori* combination which determines objects can only be that of the categories and schemata which connect them *a priori*. These carry with them necessity, and so a necessary combination of perceptions becomes essential to experience.

The three modes of time are—*Permanence, succession,* and *simultaneity*; from hence come our three rules. They are in fact phases of the one great form of all our empirical consciousness, viz. the necessary *unity* of apperception in all time, whereby all perceptions must be *mine*, and so bound together in one great chain. This apperception affects and orders the internal sense, of which it is the form. Thus 'all empirical time-determinations must come under rules of universal and *a priori* time-determination,' and these latter are the rules now under consideration.

These Principles have the peculiarity that they concern, not phenomena and the synthesis which we make in intuiting them empirically, but only their existence and their mutual *relation* as regards this existence. This was stated above in our first sketch of the Principles, as we saw that the way in which any phenomenon must be apprehended can be so determined *a priori* as to give us a rule applicable to every particular case. But the existence of any phenomenon cannot be known *a priori*, or known determinately, so as to distinguish it from others, even if we could infer *a priori* some existence or other.

For this reason Kant called the former two Principles mathematical, as showing that phenomena are only possible, in intuition as well as in perception, by reason of a mathematical synthesis. Even in the second case we construct the sun's light, for example, which means our degree of

sensation, by combining 200,000 moonlights. These principles may therefore be called *Constitutive* (of phenomena). The others must be called in contrast *Regulative*<sup>1</sup> (of the existence of phenomena). We cannot dream of having axioms and anticipations here. But although, when one perception is given to us in a time-relation with other (though undetermined) perceptions, we cannot say *a priori* *what other* and *how much* perception must be conjoined with it, we can still declare how they are necessarily combined in this mode, or particular description, of time. Philosophical are very different from mathematical analogies. These latter assert such an equality of *quantitative* ratios that if the first three members be given, we can construct the last (as in the ordinary 'Rule of Three'). A Philosophical analogy<sup>2</sup> is an equation not of quantitative but of *qualitative* ratios, where the first three terms give us, not the fourth term itself, but the *relation* to a fourth term—in fact only a rule for seeking it in experience, and an attribute by which to recognise it there. An analogy of experience is then a rule which gives us unity of experiences in various phenomena, and is accordingly a Principle merely *regulative* of phenomena. The same remark holds good of the Postulates of empirical thinking generally, which regard the form, the matter, and the relation of perception to our empirical thinking generally. All these regulative Principles differ from the constitutive, not in certainty, but in the nature of their evidence.

It is of great importance to observe here that all these synthetical principles have their meaning and validity not

<sup>1</sup> They are regulative of *intuitions*, but nevertheless 'are constitutive in relation to *experience*, inasmuch as they render the concepts without which experience could not exist, possible *a priori*' (*Kritik*, p. 407).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 162, note, for an example.

in the transcendental, but in the empirical use of the understanding; we must hence subsume the phenomena not directly under the Categories, but under their schemata, which are the exemplifications of the Categories in Time. These schemata are merely (cf. above, p. 146) sensuously restricted syntheses of the functions of the pure Categories. The pure Category has no such restriction. Hence we can only combine phenomena by means of *these* Principles according to an *analogy* with the logical and universal unity of the Categories. While therefore we use the pure Category in the statement of the Principle, we must employ in the application of the Principle the schematised Category, which is its restricted formula, and which will give us the key to its use.

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A. FIRST ANALOGY.

*Principle of the Permanence of Substance.*

*In all succession of phenomena substance remains permanent, and its Quantum in nature neither increases nor diminishes.* This statement varies slightly from that of the First Edition, which asserts that all phenomena contain the permanent (*substance*) as the object itself, and the changeable as its mere determination, or way in which the object exists.

PROOF.

Phenomena are in time, in which alone, as the unchangeable substratum, or permanent form of internal intuition, *simultaneity* and *sequence* are represented. But time in itself cannot be apprehended. We must therefore find in the objects of perception the substratum which represents time, and by relation to which we apprehend change or simultaneity. If this were not so, the very notion of the unity of time and its consequences just stated were im-

possible. But if we turn to phenomena, that which is the substratum of all that is real is known as *substance*. Hence the permanent element, by which all time-relations of phenomena can alone be determined, is the substance in the phenomena, or the real element, which always remains the same, as the substratum of modifications. As this (*ex hypothesi*) can never alternate, its quantum can never be increased or diminished in nature.

This proof requires fuller development, being at first sight both obscure and inconclusive. Kant accordingly adds: our *apprehension* of multiplicity is ever successive and changing. We can therefore never know whether as objects of experience its parts are simultaneous or successive, if it have not something *permanent* and *constant* as its basis. Change and simultaneity are only so many modes of the existence of this permanent. In it alone, therefore, are time-relations (*viz.* the two just mentioned) possible, and thus the *permanent* is the *substratum* of our empirical representation of time itself, and expresses this time as the constant correlatum of all existence and change in phenomena. For alternation affects not time itself, but phenomena in time. By comparison with the permanent, and thus alone, does existence in various parts of the ever-fleeting equable time-series become a *quantum*, which we call *duration*. Consequently, as time itself cannot be apprehended, this permanent in phenomena is the substratum of all time-determinations, hence of the synthesis of phenomena, hence the condition of the possibility of experience itself. In all phenomena the permanent is the object itself, the phenomenal substance; all that alters is but a determination of this substance.

Philosophers have at all times agreed with the vulgar in assuming this distinction, but expressed themselves a little



more precisely, and have said: in all changes the *substance* remains, and the *accidents* only alter. But, says Kant, I can find nowhere any trace of proof for this very synthetical proposition; it is also seldom placed, as it ought to be, at the head of the pure *a priori* laws of nature. To say that *substance* is permanent, is a mere tautology. For this permanence is the sole ground for our applying the *Category* of substance to phenomena. It should rather have been proved that there *was* something permanent in all phenomena. As this synthetical *a priori* proposition could never be demonstrated dogmatically, from mere concepts, and as no one ever considered that such propositions are limited to the sphere of possible experience, and so provable only by its possibility being shown to depend on them—under these circumstances it was of course assumed, as being a necessary want, but never proved.

The philosopher who determined the weight of smoke by subtracting that of the ashes from that of the wood burnt, postulated that even by fire substance or matter cannot be destroyed, but only changed in its form. Similarly the proposition *ex nihilo nihil fit*, is but a consequence of the Principle of Permanence, or of the constant presence of the subject proper in phenomena. Being the substratum of all time-determination, it must have been so in all past time, as well as now and henceforth. We can therefore only call a phenomenon substance because we postulate its existence in all time—a thing inadequately expressed by *permanence*, except that future duration is inseparably bound up with the necessity of permanence *a parte ante*. Thus the ancients never separated these statements:

‘Gigni  
De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti,’

which we do, because we falsely apply them to things *per se*, and therefore suppose they might shake the dependence of the world on an ultimate cause. But they do apply strictly to phenomena, and to them alone, as the unity of these in experience would be impossible if new substances originated. We have no other way of representing the unity of time than by the identity of the substratum, which unites with its bond all alteration. This permanence is accordingly nothing more than the way we have of representing to ourselves the existence of things (in phenomenon).

¶ We call particular attention to this argument on the nature of the substratum of phenomenal objects, as of the last importance when we come to consider Kant's *Refutation of Idealism*. It contains the really fundamental contrast between his system and that of Berkeley; nay, it constitutes, perhaps, the most peculiar feature of the whole *Kritik*. All other idealists, or preachers of the Relativity of knowledge, had assumed that the substratum of phenomenal objects was identical with the things *per se*. Berkeley in particular denied any such substratum, on the grounds that being heterogeneous from phenomena, it could never be perceived by any human faculty. Now Kant used this very argument against our knowledge of things *per se*, yet here he supports and explains our notion of substance, as phenomenal, though a substratum, and separate from each of our representations. It is the abolishing of this substratum, because he confounded it with things *per se*, which brings Berkeley under Kant's censure of making our external experience mere illusion—a censure which has often puzzled commentators, and made them charge Kant with injustice to his predecessor. But we must carefully separate in Kant's system three things—(1) representations; (2) the substance or substratum in which they inhere

as phenomena, which must be in space and time, and is therefore itself phenomenal; (3) a hidden thing *per se*, which by its action, likewise occult, produces in us both the changing representations and the notion of their substratum in space, but is totally unlike either, and may be one or many, the same for internal and for external phenomena, or diverse—this we can never tell.<sup>1</sup> It will at once be seen that Kant's originality lies in the position given to the second element. Its permanence need not be a perception, but a representation that we always can have perceptions, because we are always in time, and we can only know this by having perception in time. It is then a representation of the permanent, not a permanent representation,<sup>2</sup> which forms the phenomenal substratum of the qualities of bodies. In a former exposition of this passage, appended to Kuno Fischer's Commentary, this all-important doctrine was not made clear. We trust there will no longer be any doubt or difficulty as to Kant's meaning.

The particular ways in which a substance exists are called its *accidents*, which are always real, as affecting the *existence* of the substance; negations are merely assertions of their absence. If we choose to assert a separate existence for any of these real accidents, as, for example, for motion,

<sup>1</sup> In direct proof of this subdivision of substrata, cf. vol. ii. p. 223, where, in discussing the relation of Phenomena and Noumena (First Edition), he says: '*But as to the reason why we, not satisfied with the substratum of sensibility, have added noumena to the phenomena.*' etc. Perhaps we should not have spoken of these latter (noumena) as substratum, an expression which Kant uses in the phenomenal sense, but it will serve to put our meaning more clearly, with this remark as to Kant's use here added, for the sake of accuracy. He shows in the sequel (p. 225) how loosely we must understand the word *noumenon*, if applied to things *per se*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. note to second Preface, *Kritik*, p. xli. *sub fin.*

as an accident of matter, it is called inherence, as opposed to the subsistence of the substance. As many mistakes may thus arise, it is better and more accurate to speak of accidents as above, and call them the ways in which the existence of substance is positively determined. But as it is impossible to avoid separating them logically from substance, and contrasting them with it, the Category of Substance is placed under the head of Relation—rather as containing the conditions of such, than as being itself a relation.

From the same point of view we can now clear up the notion of *change*, which is not the origination or extinction of the object changed, but a mode of its existence, following upon another. The object is *constant*, and its condition only alters. This paradox therefore is true: that only the permanent (or substance) is changed, the transient suffers no change, but *alternation*, or substitution of one determination for another. It follows that changes only can be perceived in substances, never absolute origination or extinction. For if we would pass from not-being to being, there must be a time when the object which originates is not yet. As empty time is no object of perception, we could only perceive it by placing in it things which last up to the moment when the new thing originates. If so, it would only be a determination of these things regarded as permanents. The same difficulties meet us if we try to conceive extinction. There is only one time, in which all different times are placed not as co-existent, but as successive, and accordingly permanence is a necessary condition, under which alone we can determine phenomena, as things or objects, in possible experience. The empirical criterion of this substantiality will be discussed in connection with the next analogy.

¶ Perhaps Kant should have here stated as a legitimate inference of the Principle, that we regard substance in general as one, and of the same kind. Being the substratum which represents to us the single time in which all our experience takes place, and not being identical with its manifestations, which constantly vary, we regard this sum of real substance in the world as one, identical and indestructible. We shall see that as to the criterion of its presence he agrees with Hamilton in making resistance and its modes the proper proof of permanence. But we must first understand clearly his notions as regards *action*, before this feature in his system can be clearly explained.

#### B. SECOND ANALOGY.

*Principle of succession in time according to the law of Causality.*

*All changes come under the law of Cause and Effect.<sup>1</sup>*

#### PROOF.

All apprehension of multiplicity is with us successive, but whether the parts are successive in the object, as well as in our apprehension, is another question. We may doubtless call all conscious representations *objects*, but what this word means, apart from mere representation, requires deeper investigation. As mere representations they can in no wise be distinguished from our apprehension of

<sup>1</sup> The original form was: Everything which happens (begins to be) presupposes something, which it follows *according to a rule*. With his usual love of repetition, Kant added in the Second Edition two paragraphs entitled *Proof*, which merely repeat what follows after in the original edition. We therefore omit commenting on them. The same remark holds good of almost all the paragraphs inserted in the Second Edition immediately after the statements of the Principles.

them, and are always successive. Were these objects things *per se*, no one could possibly guess from their representations in us how matters stood in the objects themselves, for we can only know them by our successive representations. It remains for me to determine what combination in time belongs to the manifold of intuition apart from our apprehension, which is always successive. For example, I apprehend the parts of a house successively, and yet no one thinks that these parts are themselves successive. Yet remember that this house is no thing *per se*, but a phenomenon. What, then, is understood by the question: How is multiplicity connected in the phenomena, which are in themselves nothing? For here the sum of our representations is contrasted with our separate representations, and we desire to investigate their agreement. It is evident that on Kantian principles we are concerned here with nothing but the formal conditions of empirical truth, or of correspondence between cognition and its object; and phenomena can only be considered separate from the acts of our apprehension, if they come under some necessary rule (imposed, of course, by the understanding), which distinguishes them from every other apprehension and makes a specific sort of combination necessary. That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension, is the object.<sup>1</sup>

As we cannot empirically perceive creation or extinction, any apprehension of an event is a perception following another (positive) perception. But though all our perceptions are successive, in some we perceive that the sequence cannot

<sup>1</sup> This 'condition,' Mr. Stirling tells us, is the Category (p. 298, *loc. cit.*) It is not so. There must be something in a Sense Apprehension which determines us to apply one Category rather than another to it; and this 'cue' is what Kant means by the 'condition of the necessary rule of apprehension,' viz. that in the sensation units which demands any specific Category.

be reversed. When, for example, I see a boat carried down a river, I cannot reverse the order, and apprehend the boat at first below, and then above in the parts of the river observed. In apprehending a house, on the contrary, I can begin with any part indifferently. Here there is no rule. But in the other case, which is an *event* that happens, there is *necessary* order, and therefore a rule.<sup>1</sup>

In this case, then, the *subjective sequence* of apprehension must be deduced from the *objective sequence*, which gives a necessary *rule* to the arbitrary order of the former. Thus I can distinguish phenomena from my apprehension of them, and say that it is determined by them. The rule implies that in the antecedents of every event are to be found the conditions upon which the event necessarily follows; but the rule will not allow me to reverse the order, and determine the antecedents from the event, for the order in time cannot be reversed, and this is a necessary condition of the rule. Were there no such antecedents, and no such rule, then all the sequences of our perception would be merely subjective, and we should possess a mere play of representations referring to no object, as the order might be reversed

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Stirling's objection to Kant's proof comes to this. The irreversibility of the sequence, and therefore the necessity, lies in the facts themselves, and hence the Category is superfluous (*contradictory*, as Von Kirchmann says). Now the *cue*, viz. that in the sense apprehension which calls for the Category, *is* in the facts themselves; but the *necessity* is not and cannot be. A child has the same sense experience as an adult, but there is no notion of necessity for it, as it has not applied the Category. When irreversibility has been cognised, the Category is already applied.

Schopenhauer misinterpreted the whole proof, for he thought that Kant's position was that sequence implied causality. All that Kant said was that those sequences are causal which are irreversible. Attention to this point will enable the student to answer Mr. Caird's criticisms, which have been fully discussed by Prof. Watson, as well as by Mr. Stirling.

at pleasure. We should then not have two *states* of the object in succession, but one apprehension following another subjectively, without determining any object for us. It is only by making my subjective apprehension objective by means of the rule that I can ever have experience of an *event*.

This view opposes the old empirical derivation of causes from the observation of uniform consequences [in fact from what J. S. Mill calls the Method of Agreement]. Were this the real derivation of the notion, it would of course lose, with its *a priori* character, its objective universality and necessity. But the case is quite similar to that of space and time, as regards which we only draw clear notions from experience, because we have ourselves put them into experience, and even made experience possible by doing so. We shall not deny that experience is of use in giving us clear examples of the rule; but the existence of the rule as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time is nevertheless the *a priori* basis of this very experience.

We are therefore called upon to show by an example that even in experience we never attribute the sequence to the object, nor separate it from our subjective apprehension, except for a rule compelling us to adopt one peculiar order of perceptions; nay, more, that this compulsion is what makes succession in the object possible. Seeing that all our representations are equally internal modifications given to us in the lapse of time, how is it that we add to them an object,—in other words, that over and above their subjective reality, as modifications (of mind), we give them an objective reality? It cannot be a mere reference of some representations to some other, for then the same question must still arise as regards that other. What, then, is this new dignity, this *reference to an object*, which we give our representation? On investigation it will be found to



affect representations in no other way than combining them necessarily in a particular way, and so subjecting them to a rule; it is only by means of this rule that they on the other hand obtain an objective signification. As all my apprehension is successive, it is only when I assume a necessary reference to an antecedent state that I assert an event, or that something has happened; that is to say, I cognise an object, which I put into a definite place in time, a place fixed by the foregoing circumstances. To say, then, that something happens, implies an antecedent, which defines the time. But this time must be fixed by a rule, which cannot be reversed, and moreover the antecedent must be necessarily followed by the event in question. Hence arises an order among our representations, in that the present points to an antecedent state, which, though an undetermined correlate, refers to its consequent as determining it, and necessarily connected with it in the series of time. If it be a *formal condition* of our perceptions that the prior moment of time determines the posterior, it is of course a necessary *law of the empirical representation* of time that phenomena, by *which alone we can know empirically this continuity in time*, should be similarly determined.

No experience is possible without the understanding, and its first duty is to render objects not distinct, as former philosophers have said, but *possible*. This is done by transferring to phenomena and their existence the order of time, and assigning to them a fixed place in it. This place is fixed not by the relation of phenomena to absolute time, as it cannot be apprehended *per se*, but to one another. An event, then, is a perception belonging to possible experience, which becomes actual by my regarding the phenomenon to be determined in place as to time, and so by my regarding it as an object, which I can always find by a rule in the

connection of my perceptions. The rule is, that there are antecedent conditions, upon which the event necessarily follows. Consequently, says Kant, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is [in this sense, viz.], as to succession in time, the basis of possible experience.

After again recapitulating, for about the tenth time, the momenta of his proof, Kant approaches a new difficulty. We have hitherto confined the law of Causality to successions, whereas, in fact, it applies to simultaneous phenomena. A room is warmed by a fire now present in it. Here, then, is cause and effect, but no succession in time. The greater part of the efficient causes in nature are of this kind, and their effects are only *consequences*, because the cause does not produce its whole effect in an instant. But in the moment, when the effect first originates, it must be [as it were, in contact, and] simultaneous with the causality of its cause, for had this causality ceased for an instant, the effect could not have arisen. It is not, then, the *lapse*, but the *order* of time which is of importance; the interval may be *evanescent*, but still the time-relation remains. If I place a bullet on a soft cushion, it produces a cavity, which is simultaneous with the bullet. But I nevertheless distinguish them by the time-relation of their dynamical connection. The cavity follows upon my laying the bullet down; the bullet will not follow upon the cavity, supposing it otherwise produced.

This Causality leads us to the notion of action, action to that of force, and so we reach that of substance. Kant declines to turn aside in his discussion of synthetical *a priori* cognition for the sake of expounding mere analyses, but here makes an exception as regards *the empirical criterion of substance*, so far as it appears to manifest itself better and more easily by action than by the permanence of the pheno-

menon. Where action is—that is, efficiency and force—there must we seek for substance, the seat of a fruitful source of phenomena. But if we proceed to explain what we mean by substance, it is hard to avoid reasoning in a circle. How can we directly infer from an action the *permanence* of that which acts, and yet this is the essential and peculiar attribute of phenomenal substance? The problem cannot be solved by the ordinary analytical method, but presents to Kant no peculiar difficulty. Action implies the relation of the subject of the Causality to its effect.<sup>1</sup> Now, as all effects consist in events, which are changeable and successive, the ultimate subject of the changeable is the *permanent*, as being the substratum of all that changes, and this is substance. For according to the Principle of Causality actions are always the first cause of all alterations of phenomena, and cannot therefore be in a subject which itself alters, as this alteration must then be determined by other actions, and another subject. Action is accordingly a sufficient criterion of substantiality, without my requiring to seek out permanence by a comparison of perceptions, in which way we could hardly obtain the strict universality required in the notion of substance. That the first subject of the causality of all origination and disappearance cannot itself originate and disappear in the field of phenomena, is a certain inference, and coincides with the notion of substance in phenomena.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is Kant's consistent definition of action, which shows that he distinguishes between the cause and its causality in a manner foreign to Hamilton and Mansel.

<sup>2</sup> The result of this argument is that the permanent is the simultaneous condition, not the cause, as Kuno Fischer seems to understand it (*Comm.* p. 119), for Kant expressly states (*Kritik*, p. 259), that substance and accident do not stand in the relation of a regressive series. But the question remains, *What* effects suggest to us action, as dis-

When something happens, the mere happening, apart from the particular thing that happens, the passage from the non-existence of a state to its existence, is worth investigating. Affecting not substance, but its states, it is only a change, not an origination from nothing. If this origination is regarded as proceeding from a foreign cause, we call it creation, which cannot be admitted in phenomena, as its very possibility would destroy the unity of experience. What may happen if I regard things *per se* is not here under discussion. But how a thing can change its state in time, we have not the least notion *a priori*. We require actual forces empirically given to us. But the *form* of every change, as opposed to the matter, this can be determined by the law of Causality and the conditions of time *a priori*. Observe, says Kant in a note, that I am not speaking of the change of relations generally, as when a body moves uniformly, but of a change of state, as when it changes the quantity of its motion.

We now approach another inference. When a substance changes its state, the new state  $\beta$ , even when only differing in quantity from the first  $\alpha$ , is related to it as to  $\circ$  or nontingished from mere causality? This question Kant has answered in pp. 169, 379 of the *Kritik*, where he distinctly suggests *impenetrability*. He is still more explicit in p. 193 (when discussing Leibnitz's system): 'Substance in space we only cognise through forces operative in it [the term *force* is with him equivalent to action] either drawing others towards itself (attraction) or preventing others from entering into itself (repulsion and impenetrability); we know of no other properties that make up the notion of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter.' In other words, while we attribute other qualities of a substance to causes acting upon it from without itself, we consider impenetrability (Locke's *solidity*) as the action of the substance itself upon us. This is the plain, common sense belief. The reader will see that Hamilton might have found both his division of the Qualities of bodies into three classes, and the importance of Resistance and its modes, in Kant's system.

existence, for even in this case  $b - a$ , which did not before exist, has come into being. How does a thing pass from this  $a$  to  $b$ ? Between any two moments there is time, and between any two states a distinction, which has a quantity (by our Axiom of Intuition). Every change, then, takes place in the time-interval between the moment which determines the former and the moment which determines the latter condition. But every change has a cause showing its causality through the whole time in which the effect is being originated. It follows that all changes are produced not suddenly, but gradually, and through lesser degrees continuously up to the full result. The action of Causality, so far as it is homogeneous, Kant calls a moment. The change does not consist in these moments, but is generated by them as their effect. This is the *law of Continuity of all changes* depending on the fact that neither time nor anything appearing in time can be a *minimum*. No distinction of state can be the smallest possible, and so there are infinite gradations from 0 to any given state  $a$ .

The uses of this Principle in the science of nature do not concern us; but how such a Principle, however right and obvious, can be possible *a priori*, this is worthy of note, as there are so many pretended extensions of our knowledge by pure reason, without proper *deduction*, in our critical sense.

It is simply this. Every increase in our empirical knowledge is nothing but an additional determination of our internal sense, a progress in the determination of time, whatever the objects may be. Accordingly, every transition in perception to some succeeding perception is a gradual generation of the latter in time, which is always a quantity, through degrees, which are consequently never absolute *minima*. Thus, then, we can assert a law *a priori* con-

cerning changes as regards their form. The understanding, by means of the unity of its apperception, enables us to determine all the places in this time continuously, through the series of causes and effects, which impose a necessary order and sequence.

### C. THIRD ANALOGY.

*Principle of Co-existence, after the law of mutual action in community.*

*All substances, so far as they can be perceived as being together in space, are in systematic (durchgängiger) mutual action, or community.<sup>1</sup>*

### PROOF.

Things are said to be simultaneous empirically when their perceptions can follow mutually, as, for example, I may perceive the earth and then the moon, or *vice versa*; or I can consider the various parts of a house in any order I please. This means that they co-exist in the same time. But I cannot perceive time itself, and take these perceptions out of it, and all perception is successive; so, then, without some further clue, I should merely infer that the one is there, when the other is not, and *vice versa*, but not that the objects were simultaneous, that where one is the other must be also, in order that the perceptions may succeed each other mutually. We require, then, a concept of the understanding to declare this simultaneity to be objective. But the relation of substances, one of which contains determinations based upon the other, is the relation of *influence*;

<sup>1</sup> The First Edition is not at all so cautiously worded: 'All substances, so far as they are together, stand in systematic community (mutual action).'

and if this be reciprocal, it is the relation of Community, or reciprocal action. The simultaneity of substances in experience cannot be cognised, except under this supposition, which is accordingly a condition of the possibility of things as objects of experience.

¶ It will be noted that Kant carefully avoids stating this law as one of reciprocal *causation*—an error into which Kuno Fischer and other commentators have fallen. The statement of the Principle in the Second Edition confines Community to relations of space, and we think rightly. For there it is strictly true that if our experience is to have any unity or connection, the places of all objects are mutually determined by each other. I determine the place of a table, a room, a house, a town, by its relation to other simultaneous objects—nay more, the very earth itself by its position in the Solar System. These objects do not stand in the relation of reciprocal cause and effect, but in that of mutual influence, or community, as Kant has above strictly and accurately defined. The exposition of the First Edition, which follows that inserted in the Second under the head of *proof*, is not so accurate, though of greater length, and contains a statement which has led to this misunderstanding. 'That only can determine the position of anything in time which is the cause of it, and [or?] of its determinations. Therefore must every substance (for it can only be a consequence as regards its determinations) contain within itself the causality of certain determinations in another, and at the same time the effects of the causality of this other—in other words, they must be in dynamical community, or reciprocal action.' It is not correct to speak of the place occupied in space by a substance as part of its causality, and yet this is the principal 'ground of determination' which it possesses as regards other substances. We hold,

then, that Kant, when inserting his new paragraph, should have modified his old proof. But to resume.

The word community may mean either *communio* or *commercium*. We use it in the latter sense, as that without which the former could never have been ascertained. We can see in experience that but for mutual relations, but for a continuity of perceptions, influencing each other (at least as regards place) in space, we could never proceed from one perception to another. There may be such a thing as empty space if you like, but its occurrence in the field of phenomena would break up and destroy the unity and system of our experience. This *commercium*, then, controls our ever successive apprehensions, and compels us to place those substances which are subject to it, not as successive, but as simultaneous, and objectively so. Thus phenomena are brought together into a *compositum reale*, or system of simultaneously existing objects.

The three dynamical relations, which are the sources of all others, are therefore Inherence, Consequence, and Composition.

By Nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of phenomena in their existence, according to fixed rules. There are therefore certain laws or rules, which are *a priori* conditions of nature; on those the empirical rules must depend. Our analogies express the unity of nature in this connection of phenomena under certain exponents, which express nothing but the relation of time (as comprising all existence) to the unity of apperception. They declare as their whole result: that all phenomena must be comprised within a *single* Nature, since without their *a priori* unity, no unity of experience or determination of objects in it would be possible.

Kant's method of proof in establishing these transcend-



ental laws of nature is declared by him a model according to which all such demonstrations must proceed. He contrasts it with the dogmatic method, by mere analysis of concepts. By this method such synthetical Principles could never be attained, for where is the medium, the  $x$  (cf. above, p. 36) in which we are to seek the evidence of such synthesis? It is in the possibility of experience, as a system or complex of cognitions, or acts of knowing, under which all the objects of cognition must come. Here we found rules of synthetical unity *a priori*, and so anticipated nature. It was for want of this clue that so many abortive attempts have been made to prove the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The other Analogics, though often assumed, were never even stated, which could not have been the case had the infallible clue of the Categories been known. Thus the unity of the world, he adds in a note, is a mere inference from our Third Analogy; and were not the mutual influence of objects a necessary condition of their very existence, the unity of their connection could not be inferred from it.

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## CHAPTER XIII

### (4.) THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THINKING GENERALLY.

1. What agrees with the formal conditions of experience (intuition and concepts) is *possible*.

2. What is connected with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is *actual*.

3. What has its connection with the actual, determined according to universal conditions of experience, is (exists) *necessary*.

§ 1. *Exposition.* The Categories of Modality have this peculiarity, that as predicates they do not increase the attributes of the subject, but only alter its relation to our knowing faculty. Let the concept of a thing be ever so perfect, I may still inquire whether it is possible or actual, or if so, whether it be necessary; and each of these mean, what relation has it to our faculties of experience? <sup>1</sup> These Principles of Modality are, then, nothing but expositions of the

<sup>1</sup> Hence it is that Kant afterwards calls propositions of existence *subjectively* synthetical, as adding no objective predicate; and hence it is, probably, that older philosophers sought to discover existence analytically in the notion of God. Locke, however, saw the distinction, unconsciously perhaps, but nevertheless clearly, and accordingly separates judgments of existence into a fourth class, distinct from both analytical and *objectively* synthetical judgments.

notions of possibility, actuality, and necessity in their empirical use, and also restrictions of all Categories to mere empirical use. For if these Categories are to be anything more than mere analytical expressions of the form of thinking, and are to apply to *things*, they must be applied to possible experience, in which alone these things can be given us.

§ 2. *The Postulate of Possibility.* The objective form of experience in general contains all the syntheses necessary for cognising objects. A concept implying a synthesis is void, and applies to no object, except the synthesis is borrowed from experience (as in *empirical concepts*), or is an *a priori* condition of experience (as in *pure concepts*), which still belongs to experience, as its object must be there found. It is, of course, a necessary logical condition that the concept shall contain no contradiction, but this is far from proving the objective reality of the object denoted by it. For example, a bilinear figure is not self-contradictory; its impossibility depends on the conditions of space, in which we must construct it; these conditions have objective reality, because they contain in them the general form of experience. The Postulate is therefore of great importance. Supposing I represent to myself the pure Categories of Substance, of Causality, of Community, how can I infer from these arbitrary syntheses themselves that they are to be found in the field of experience? I can only discover their objective reality and transcendental truth by perceiving that they express *a priori* the relations of all our perceptions, and they are thus independent indeed of experience, but not of the form of experience and its synthetical unity.

But if we endeavour to construct new notions of substances, forces, and community from the matter of our perception, without finding in experience itself examples of such connections (syntheses), we are adopting mere hallucina-

tions, with no evidence of their possibility. Such imaginary notions cannot be deduced from the *a priori* conditions of experience, but must have their possibility shown *a posteriori*, or not at all. A substance permanently present in space, without filling it, like the *tertium quid* of philosophers, a peculiar power of intuiting the future, without inferring it, or a power of being in a community of thought with other men, however distant from us—these are concepts whose possibility has no basis, as not being founded on the known laws of experience. They are not self-contradictory, but have no claim to objective reality, or the possibility of such an object as we here imagine. Here Kant is not concerned with possibilities derived from experience, but with those through *a priori* concepts, and such cannot be obtained from mere concepts, but from the objective conditions of experience generally.

It might be thought that the possibility of a triangle could be inferred from our concept of it, which is quite independent of experience, and to which we can give an object by a pure *a priori* construction. But this is after all only the form of an object, and would remain a creature of the imagination, the possibility of which is doubtful, until we see that space is the formal condition of all external phenomena, and that the very same formative synthesis by which we construct the triangle *a priori* is exercised in apprehending a phenomenon and obtaining from it an empirical concept; then such an object becomes possible. The same can be shown in any other case, such as that of continuous quantity, etc.

§ 3. *The Postulate of Actuality* requires *perception* or conscious sensation, not indeed of the object itself, but of its connection with some actual perception, according to the analogies of experience. In the *mere concept* of a thing not

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a single mark of its existence can ever be discovered. However complete internally, all this has nothing to do with the question, Is it given to us?—given in such manner that the perception might come to us before the concept. For perception is the matter of the concept, and alone gives it actuality. Prior to the perception of the thing, however, and therefore comparatively *a priori*, we can assert it to be actual, when we infer it by the analogies from other actual perceptions; but these tell us that if we pursue the clue given us, or that if our senses were more acute, we should have actual perception of it. Such, for example, is the case of magnetic particles, which our senses are too coarse to perceive directly. But we must strictly follow the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena.

¶ These rules for proving actual existence mediately are directly opposed to idealism in the ordinary sense, which asserts the actuality of mental phenomena, but will not concede it to anything else. Kant accordingly turns aside here to give (in the Second Edition) his celebrated and much decried *Refutation of Idealism*. As the clear understanding of this argument will require a comparison of other passages, and also some polemical discussion, we shall postpone it to a separate chapter, and shall here follow the remainder of the exposition as regards the Postulates of Modality.

§ 4. *The Postulate of Necessity* of course regards material necessity in existence, not logical necessity in the combination of concepts. But as actuality can be inferred only comparatively *a priori* by the connection of perceptions, so this necessity must be inferred, as necessarily implied by it; and as there is no existence necessarily given on condition of others, except the effects of given causes, it is not the existence of substances, but of their states, which we can know to be necessary, and this in consequence of other

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states which imply them as their effects. Hence the criterion of necessity is simply the law of possible experience, that every event is determined *a priori* by its cause in phenomena. So we cognise the necessity of *effects* in nature, of which the causes are given us, and the law reaches no further, not even to the existence of things as substances, for we cannot perceive them as *empirical effects*. The law, therefore, that every event is hypothetically necessary is a rule of necessary existence, without which we can have no nature. In other words, *in mundo non datur casus* is an *a priori* law of nature, and this necessity being hypothetical is rational. So is the other brocard, *non datur fatum*. These laws bind the myriad variety of changes into one *nature*, or synthetical unity imposed by the understanding. The first is properly a consequence of the Principle of Causality, the second of those of Modality. The Continuity of time shown in the earlier Principles adds another, *in mundo non datur saltus*; that of space, a fourth, *non datur hiatus*, as we saw that a vacuum was inadmissible. These Principles being of transcendental origin can be ranged according to the clue of the Categories, and Kant says any practised reader can do it for himself. He seems to regard all these propositions as of the *dynamical*, not the *mathematical* order. If this be so, *saltus*, *casus*, and *hiatus* are respectively excluded by the Principles of Substance (p. 179), Cause, and Community (p. 191); whilst the Principles of Modality exclude *fatum*.

§ 5. Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of actuality, and this again than that of necessity—these are interesting questions, and purely within the jurisdiction of Reason. They mean to inquire, whether the whole complex of phenomena belong to one experience, and to it alone, or whether they may on the contrary belong to some

other experience as well. Our Understanding lays down its rules subject to the conditions of *our* sensibility. Different forms of this sensibility, and different forms of the understanding, even were they possible, we cannot grasp or explain in any possible way; but could we do so, they would certainly not belong to that experience in which objects are given to us. The Understanding, therefore, has nothing to say to such questions. Apart from these considerations the proof usually urged in favour of a very extended field of possibility is palpably weak. 'All that is actual,' say they, 'is possible, and then by conversion *per accidens*, some possible is actual, which indicates that the actual does not exhaust *all* the possible. It seems, then, as if we added something to the possible to make it actual.' Such a view Kant disputes. Whatever, he says, could be added to the possible must be the impossible. What *is* added is not in the possible, but in my understanding—that is to say, a connection with some actual perception is added, and this does not restrict the field of the possible, but brings some part of it into a new relation towards me. All that is possible, then, can become actual, and there is no sphere of phenomena apart from our experience to be inferred from this shallow argument. Let it be remembered that what is possible only under conditions which are themselves possible, is in no sense absolutely possible, or possible in *every* respect (*in aller Absicht*). Yet this is the only sense in which we can employ the term possibility, when inquiring into the possibility of things beyond experience. These questions, as transcending experience, belong properly to the Reason, and will be considered more fully hereafter.

But in what sense are the Principles of Modality Postulates? Certainly not in the sense lately given it by philosophers, and opposed to that of the mathematicians

from whom they borrowed it—I mean in the sense of assuming a proposition as immediately certain, without proof or justification. Such a proceeding must ruin our whole Kritik, in which for every synthetical judgment we demand either a proof, or at least a deduction of its claims.

But as was already observed, these Principles are synthetical in a peculiar sense, not adding to the concepts of phenomena any attribute, but merely adding a particular relation to the mind, and hence *subjectively synthetical*. Thus a thing, without in the least changing its attributes, is considered by us as *possible*, *actual*, or *necessary*, according as it is connected with the formal conditions of experience, with perception, or with the connection of perceptions by concepts. These Principles, then, express the action of the understanding, by which a certain concept is generated. Now this is precisely the mathematical notion of a postulate. We are told to describe a circle with a given line about a given point, and this requires no proof, because the very act postulated creates the notion of the figure which we want. In like manner our present Postulates direct the mind how to put together its concepts of things.


§ 6. Kant adds in the Second Edition a *General Remark on the System of the Principles*, which recapitulates the general result of the discussion. In the first place, it was shown that from the pure Categories we can never ascertain the possibility of a thing, but we must always have recourse to intuition, whenever we desire to prove objective reality. Without doing so we have no *cognitions*, but merely *forms of thought*. For the same reason no synthetical proposition could ever be *constructed*, far less *proved*, from mere Categories. Take, as an example of the latter, the proposition: Every contingent existence has a cause. We could never

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get beyond this point, that without such relation to a cause we cannot comprehend the existence of the contingent. But how does it follow that it is also a condition of things as well as of our thoughts? Our Principle of Causality was proved for things of experience, and for them alone; it was valid of objects given in *empirical intuition*, and not proved from mere concepts. It is indeed true that the proposition, Everything contingent has a cause, is plain enough from mere concepts, but only by so constructing the concept of contingency as to contain not the Category of Modality (something, of which we think the non-existence), but that of Relation (something, which can only exist as the effect of something else). It is then an identical proposition to say, what can only exist as an effect must have a cause. So it is that all examples of contingent existence are taken from *changes*, and not from the possibility of *conceiving the reverse*; because a change depends upon its cause as a condition, and this may not exist, hence it is an identical proposition to say, that a contingent thing must have a cause. On the other hand, the ancients, who could very well conceive the non-existence of matter, did not therefore make its existence contingent. Even the successive being and not-being of any given state of a thing does not prove the contingency of this state, except it be shown that *at the same moment* in which it was in one state it might have been in the opposite. *Ex. gr.*, to show the motion of a body to be contingent, we must prove that it could at the same moment have been at rest.

It is still more remarkable, that in order to show the possibility of *things* in accordance with the Categories, and so show the *objective reality* of the latter, we require *external* intuitions. To show something permanent in intuition corresponding to the Category of *Substance* we require an



intuition of matter in space, as time is always fleeting. So as to *Causality* we must take change in space or motion, to explain to us the combination of contradictory states in the existence of one and the same thing. For the same reason, we can only represent time by a *line*, and internal succession by the drawing of a line, as the internal sense gives no permanent intuition, whereby to perceive changes. So as to *Community*: we cannot understand it or illustrate it except by the relation of substances in space, as before explained. Thus Leibnitz, when he gave to substances, as thought by the understanding, a community, was compelled to bring in the Deity to produce it, as being in itself inconceivable.

The importance of this remark will be felt in the *Refutation of Idealism*, which we shall now discuss, and it is also of the last importance in refuting the false notions as to our knowledge of self, which we shall meet in rational psychology.

## ¶ CHAPTER XIV

### KANT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS IDEALISM

§ 1. THERE is no part of the Kantian philosophy clearer or more precise than his careful distinction of his own position as a mere critical idealist from that of Descartes the sceptical, and Berkeley the dogmatical idealists. There is no more masterly discussion in all the *Kritik* than his refutation of the fourth paralogism of rational psychology, as it stands in the First Edition,<sup>1</sup> and yet, owing to this fuller statement being greatly curtailed, and also transposed, in the later editions, its importance has been overlooked, and its import strangely falsified. Even now, the German Kantians are in the dark on the subject, and Kuno Fischer in his latest work (*Critique of Kant*, 1883) repeats his former blunders, but brings forward no new arguments.

The passage which misled the Germans was the well-known *Refutation of* (material or problematical) *Idealism* (*Kritik*, p. 167), not introduced into this edition as a novelty, but transferred to a new place from its old place among the Paralogisms. Internal experience was preferred to external by Descartes, and was called certain as opposed to the uncertainty of the knowledge gained from external sense. In the First Edition, Kant, refuting this (supposed) superior

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. ii. pp. 242 *sqq.*

certainty of internal experience, showed it to be merely phenomenal, and therefore of the same kind as external experience. This is the gist of his long discussion on the fourth Paralogism of the ideality of external relations. In the Second Edition, Kant, supporting the original dignity and importance of external experience, showed it to be not only equal to internal experience in certainty, but logically prior to it, in that it is presupposed by internal experience. This discussion naturally comes into the *Analytic*, being an important question in the Metaphysic of phenomena. Hence it becomes necessary to transfer the argument from its original place in the *Dialectic* to this earlier position. But the identity of the two discussions is perfectly obvious to anybody who will study them, though it has been ignored by most commentators. This oversight was the main cause of their subsequent errors. Regarding the new form as a new argument, believing Schopenhauer's audacious assertion about the retracted idealism of the First Edition, they imagined that Kant had inserted this passage to prove the existence of things *per se* in space,—an absurdity so monstrous, in Kant's system, that it must indeed be, as they said, the sign of a broken-down intellect. The absurdity, however, is not in Kant, but in his critics. A short comparison of the two passages, and an exposition of their true import, will show that they are consistent, logical, and strictly necessary to Kant's system.

§ 2. There are other passages, in which he officially approaches the question, and in a polemical attitude. In his *Prolegomena* (ii. pp. 56-62), as well as in an appendix to his *Prolegomena*, where he replies to the strictures of Garve in the Göttingen *Gelehrte Anzeigen*, he gives a short and precise sketch of his attitude as regards Berkeley and other idealists; and we shall quote the relevant part of it

*verbatim* in the course of this exposition. The discussion is so full and clear in its earliest form, that we need do little more than point out the slight modifications in form with the identity of matter, in the corresponding places.

But there is one more passage, of capital importance, in which Kant repeats his assertion of critical idealism. It is the sixth section of the *Antimony of the Reason* in the *Kritik*, and is entitled *Key to the Solution of the Cosmological Dialectic*. In this discussion, which *maintained its form unaltered in the two editions*, the reader will find a precise and official re-assertion of the views contained in the fourth *Paralogism* of the First Edition, and it was probably this very recurrence which made him curtail that discussion. There are no other passages of importance in Kant's works which bear directly on the question. We have then these six: (1) the discussion of the *fourth Paralogism* in the First Edition; (2) the substance of this argument transferred from the *Dialectic* to the *Analytic*, and entitled *Refutation of Idealism*, in the Second Edition; (3) a note appended to the preface of the Second Edition, in which he expands and explains this *Refutation*; (4) the sixth section of the *Antimony of pure Reason*, in both editions; (5) his polemical statement under the heading *Remarks 2 and 3*, at the conclusion of the section, 'How is pure Mathematic possible,' in the *Prolegomena* (vol. ii. pp. 54-62); (6) Kant's statement of his doctrine in reply to Garve, published at the end of his *Prolegomena*, between the appearance of the First and Second Editions of the *Kritik*.

- 4 'Let us then see,' says Kant, in this last passage, 'what  
3 sort of idealism it is which runs through my whole work,  
2 though it be far from constituting the soul of the system.  
1 The attitude of all genuine idealists, from the Eleatic school

to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: all cognition through sense and experience is nothing but mere illusion, and only in the Ideas of the pure understanding and Reason is there truth. The fundamental principle, on the contrary, which thoroughly rules and determines my idealism, in this: all cognition of things from mere pure understanding or pure Reason is nothing but illusion, and only in experience is truth. As this is the exact opposite of that proper idealism [which I have just described], how did I come to use the term for an opposite purpose? The solution can easily be found from the context of the book. Space and time, with all they contain, are not the things, or their properties *per se*, but merely belong to their phenomena; so far I am in agreement with these idealists. But they, and among them especially Berkeley, considered space a mere empirical representation, known to us, with all its determinations, like the phenomena in it, only by means of experience or perception. I show on the contrary that space (and time, which Berkeley overlooked), with all their determinations, are known *a priori*, as the pure form of our sensibility. Hence it follows that as truth depends upon universal and necessary laws as its criteria, experience cannot have for Berkeley any criteria of truth, for he puts nothing *a priori* at the basis of its phenomena. It follows further that experience is nothing but illusion; whereas in my system space and time, combined with the Categories, prescribe their laws *a priori* to all experience, and this affords a sure criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion in experience.

'Idealism proper,' he adds in a note, 'cannot but have a visionary object, whereas mine is merely intended to explain the possibility of our knowing objects of experience *a priori*,—a problem never yet proposed, far less solved. By it we

remove all this visionary idealism, which, as we can see even from Plato, inferred from our *a priori* cognitions, even of Geometry, some other intellectual intuition than that of the senses, because it was never suspected that the senses could intuit *a priori*.

'My so-called (critical) idealism is accordingly quite peculiar, both in upsetting the ordinary idealism, and by giving to all *a priori* cognitions, even those of Geometry, their objective reality, which, without my proving the ideality of space and time, could not be asserted by the most zealous realist. I wish I could change the title of my doctrine; but as this seems hardly possible, I may be allowed in future, in order to avoid misrepresentation, to call it formal, or better, critical idealism, as distinguished from the dogmatical of Berkeley and the sceptical of Descartes.'<sup>1</sup>

§ 3. We do not think any comment can make either this statement or the other passage in the *Prolegomena* clearer, nor is it needful to do much more than call the reader's attention to the excellent *resumé* in the *Antinomy of the Pure Reason* (*Kritik*, pp. 307, *sqq.*), where he repeats that this idealism of his, which he calls indifferently formal, critical, and transcendental, is not only totally distinct from materal, problematical, and sceptical idealism, as he calls that of Descartes, but even subversive of it. He shows that the objects given in external intuition are indeed only phenomena, but as such fully as real and certain as those of internal intuition, and that these latter in no sense give us anything more than phenomena in the sensibility of a self unknown apart from them. Internal phenomena, because in time, are as far from being things *per se*, as external phenomena are, because they are in *space*. Actuality, apart

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the analogous note in the *Kritik*, p. 307.

from our present perceptions, means that in the progress of experiences we should come upon the object, or it means nothing at all.<sup>1</sup>

Why, then, should Kant ever mention things *per se*?—why should we speak as if such things were in any sense existent? Because, though to us such things *per se*, as opposed to things of experience, must for ever remain completely unknown, there is yet a feature in our experience which necessarily suggests them. Our sensibility is a *receptivity*, as opposed to the *spontaneity* of thinking. We can only conceive this receptivity as being affected by some foreign cause, and therefore 'we may call this intelligible cause of phenomena generally the transcendental object (or thing *per se*), in order to have something to correspond to our receptivity.'<sup>2</sup> But, of course, this is no object in the only positive sense in which we can use the term. It is not in space, not in time, not under a category—not in fact definitely conceivable. It may be the same for all phenomena, or different; it may be of the same kind with the substratum of our thoughts, called the Ego, or it may not. All this we can never know; in fact, we are so completely ignorant of its conditions that we cannot possibly deny its existence, any more than affirm it. So, then, while as to the possibility of *our* KNOWING things *per se*, Kant is a strong and thorough (critical) idealist, as to the possibility of the EXISTENCE of things *per se*, he is a problematical Realist, especially guarding himself against the folly of denying

<sup>1</sup> Here is a strictly Berkeleyan statement.

<sup>2</sup> 'Consequently, I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is things, which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less real.'—*Proleg.* (vol. ii. p. 54.)



it—a thing, he says (*Proleg.* p. 61), 'which it never came into my head even to doubt.'

This subject naturally came before him in the *Paralogisms of Rational Psychology*, of which, perhaps, the most salient, and even now widely extended, is that of the certainty of internal experience, and the doubtfulness of the information given us by external sense (ideality of external relations, ii. pp. 242 *sqq.*). 'Cogito, ergo sum,' said Descartes, 'is alone certain; all else is doubtful, being a mere inference from affections of self, of which the causes may be various, and are therefore necessarily doubtful.' This is problematical or sceptical idealism, which Kant calls empirical idealism, because it calls in question the reality of our experience, which he strongly asserts. These empirical idealists, however, strangely enough, when they go beyond experience, are found to be transcendental Realists, as they hold that the external objects of our senses, though not accurately known by us, are, nevertheless, really existent in space and time, apart from our perceptions. Kant, on the other hand, owing to his doctrine of the necessity, of the subjectivity (and therefore of the objectivity), and of the mutual independence, of space and time, is an empirical Realist, asserting our experience to be as real as anything can possibly be to us; he is an Empirical Dualist, asserting phenomena in space to be essentially different from those in time, both immediately perceived, and both equally real; he is also a transcendental Idealist, asserting that (whatever may be the case concerning unknown things *per se*) the things of experience can have no existence beyond it, and are in no sense transcendently real. And yet it is in this sense that ordinary idealists have been asserting the reality of the things which we imperfectly know. He repeats again and again, in this his First Edition, that he does not

deny an unknown cause *without us, in the transcendental sense*, as a thing *per se*, but he insists that this is not the point at issue, which is rather the nature of things *empirically without us*, which he declares to be *immediately perceived and really known phenomena*, while the sceptical idealists think them *mediately perceived and doubtfully known things per se*.

§ 4. But hitherto we have confined ourselves to Kant's criticism of Descartes: what does he say about Berkeley? Apart from the sceptical idealist, says he, there is the *dogmatist*, who affirms the objects suggested by external sense to be non-existent, and that the reality of our external experience is an *illusion*. This theory proceeds, says Kant,<sup>1</sup> from finding in the notion of matter insoluble contradictions. These again proceed from the false theory of regarding space as an attribute of things, and not a form of sensibility. This kind of idealism will be disposed of, says he in his First Edition (ii. p. 251), by my discussion of the *Antinomies* of the Reason by and by; it has already been disposed of, says he in his Second Edition (*Kritik*, p. 166), by my transcendental *Aesthetic*. How are we to justify this view of Berkeley's philosophy, and to explain this refutation of Berkeley's doctrine? *by Kant*

After considering with all possible care the works of Berkeley, viewed from the aspect suggested by Kant's criticism, we are of opinion that Kant has not clearly stated the source of Berkeley's idealism, and also the exact difference between Berkeley's system and his own. Berkeley is explicit in telling us that although his system does answer many objections and difficulties raised by men of science, by sceptics, and by atheists, nevertheless, his case rests upon the *a priori* impossibility of conceiving matter or sub-

<sup>1</sup> Vol. ii. p. 251; cf. *ibid.* p. 61, and *Kritik*, pp. 41 and 167.

stance apart from its attributes. It is in the imperceptible substratum (which he identified with the thing *per se*), and not in the attributes derived from space and time, that he finds his difficulty. He expressly makes extension, in the perception of space, subjective, and within the mind; he never once, so far as we can find, makes space and time essential attributes of substance, while holding its other qualities to be within us and subjective;<sup>1</sup> and lastly, there is no assertion which he has repudiated in all his philosophical discussions with more warmth than the imputation that his theory was one of illusion as to external bodies. X On this point he speaks in the very same tone in which Kant did (above, page 64, and *Proleg.* pp. 56-57), in answer to the very same charge. Perhaps the most ornate passage in all his works<sup>2</sup> is devoted to showing what he considers its absurdity. The very fact, then, of Kant making this charge repeatedly against Berkeley, while he was suffering under it himself, seems to prove that he had done what is perpetually being done with philosophers, and with none more than with Kant himself—he had taken some second-hand account of Berkeleianism for Berkeley's own views, and this he applies himself to refute.<sup>3</sup> It is just like the

<sup>1</sup> Nay, his very argument, asserting for primary qualities that subjectivity which had already been proved for secondary qualities, is an almost verbal anticipation of one of Kant's arguments. Cf. Berkeley's *Principles*, §§ 14-15, and Kant's *Proleg.* p. 55.

<sup>2</sup> Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, near its commencement, vol. i. pp. 158-160 (Ed. 1820).

<sup>3</sup> It was quite competent for Kant to argue that although Berkeley repudiated the charge of holding our external perceptions to be illusions, he was nevertheless justly liable to that charge. This is what many of Kant's opponents have said as regards Kant's repudiation. There is no doubt that according to Berkeley our internal intuitions justly and necessarily suggest to us the presence of mental substance, whereas he will not allow a similar inference in the case of external intuitions, which

celebrated critique which Cousin wrote on Locke, in which he refuted, not that philosopher, but his *natural* daughter, the French sensual school. The vulgar Berkeleians certainly did and do regard objects in space as an illusion, and when they give reasons are apt to cite those very difficulties about the infinity of finite things, and so forth, which Berkeley has discussed towards the close of his *Principles*, and which Kant explains in his *Antinomies*. But the doctrine of Berkeley himself was far nearer to Kant's doctrine than Kant imagined—in fact, it requires a careful weighing of the two systems to discover the deeper differences. There are, however, three capital points of contrast, which it may be well to set forth here in a few words.

In the first place, Berkeley, while asserting clearly and positively the subjective nature of space and time, while asserting that our perceptions of extension, as well as of succession, could be only *in the mind*, and nowhere else, yet did not explain or appreciate the universality and necessity of these two forms of our intuition, and hence failed to assign them an origin in any wise different from that of secondary or contingent qualities of bodies. Here Kant's superiority is incontestable, as is fully explained by him in the passage above cited from the *Prolegomena*. Secondly, Berkeley, in his zealous polemic against the doc-

nevertheless suggest material substance with equal cogency. So far, then, Berkeley, whether he will concede it or not, is guilty of preaching illusion in two directions—first in overrating the evidence for an immaterial Ego given by internal phenomena; secondly, in underrating the evidence of external phenomena in comparison with it. Kant showed clearly that both stand exactly upon the same footing. But in charging Berkeley with preaching illusion, he was bound to notice Berkeley's repudiation of it, and show that such repudiation, however well meant, was not warranted. This omission, in such a man as Kant, seems to prove his imperfect acquaintance with Berkeley's own exposition.

trine of an unknown and unperceived substratum, though in much of his argument, and even in his very words, he agrees literally with Kant's disproof of things *per se* in space and time, yet falls into the error of denying that our sensations may be the effect of a heterogeneous thing *per se* as their cause. He was probably bound by the old fallacy, which made men believe the cause to be necessarily *like its effect*, or homogeneous with it. Here, too, Kant is more cautious and more philosophical. He maintains a critical, not a dogmatical attitude. Thirdly, in disproving the substratum of qualities, Berkeley confused and identified the thing *per se* with the substratum of phenomena, and consequently failed to give a satisfactory account of *Permanence*, as the criterion ordinarily applied to phenomenal substances. He holds in fact that there is no such thing, except so far as the ideas we have perceived continue to exist in other minds. But these ideas, which render our perceptions permanent, by continuing them in other minds, must be either numerically identical with those we have had or not so. If not so, the permanence is only an illusion produced by the occurrence of ideas exactly similar in other minds. If, on the contrary, it be held that the ideas preserved in other minds are numerically identical with ours, then their permanence is doubtless secured, but at the expense of their spirituality, and in contradiction to Berkeley's own repeated statement, that their *esse* is *percipi*; for that my bare perception should become another man's bare perception, and still maintain its numerical identity, is evidently inconceivable.

Here the contrast of Kant's views is really striking, and shows the immense advantages of a sounder theory on the origin of space and time. Holding these latter not to be empirically given, as Berkeley did, but necessarily to

accompany all our sensations, Kant first showed that we can form no notion of Permanence except in space, thus getting rid of all speculations as to the permanence of unknown things *per se*. He next showed that Permanence was no illusion, but the necessary condition of change, and therefore an objective and necessary element of our experience. To what do we apply this notion of Permanence, and whence do we obtain it? From the fact that all our experience is comprised in one time, which time cannot be perceived in itself, but only when occupied by some perception. Hence we infer the permanence of the matter of experience, of phenomenal substance, the changing states of which correspond to the various portions of changing time comprised in the one great complex of time. Thus we represent to ourselves the permanent, even though we have no permanent representation; and as an empirical criterion of this permanence in time, we use impenetrability, or modes of Resistance in space, for reasons already expounded (above, p. 187, n), and thus this feature in our experience, the belief in the permanence of phenomenal matter, and even in the invariability of its quantity at all time, is vindicated and explained.

This remarkable analysis was completely beyond the range of Berkeley's mental vision. But still Kant's assertion that he had overthrown Berkeley is only true as regards this special point. Here Kant is right in saying that Berkeley, considering things *per se* to be in space, denied them altogether, because of the absurdities which resulted. But he should have added that this remark applies only to Berkeley's argument about the substratum of things in space, and not to their qualities. It is by distinguishing two substrata, one phenomenal, and the other a thing *per se*, that Kant answers this difficulty, positively in his *Aesthetic*,

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negatively in his *Antinomies*, where he solves the apparent contradiction which results by means of his distinction. He has therefore rectified and modified the idealism of Berkeley, making it critical where it had been dogmatical, but embodying all the truth and the soberness of that celebrated system.

§ 5. We now return to the controversy between Kant and Descartes. This *sceptical* idealism, says Kant, which demands that our inferences from the data of sense shall be proved, is a thoroughly philosophical proceeding, and of great value in compelling men to sift the foundations even of their most ordinary experience. But the transcendental Aesthetic has already for us settled the whole question. Both space and time are within us, but are representations distinct in kind, and of equal authority. If internal phenomena suggest a mental substance in which they inhere, it must be a phenomenal substance, in time, and subject to the conditions of all phenomena. If external phenomena suggest a material substance in which *they* inhere, this matter must be in space, and phenomenal substance, and subject likewise to the universal conditions of phenomena. In neither case do these phenomenal substances give us the least clue to the nature of any thing *per se*, or supra-sensible and hidden cause of phenomena, itself existing out of space and time. Descartes, no doubt, thought that things *per se* might exist in space; he merely wanted proof that our intuitions are trustworthy representations of this external reality *per se*. Kant shows that this is a completely false basis, that the only positive notion we have of reality is phenomenal, and that if hidden things *per se* are indeed the causes of phenomena, they are such absolutely heterogeneous causes that phenomena can give us no clue whatsoever to their nature.

These are the considerations adduced by Kant in his First Edition against sceptical or problematical idealism. He enters upon them when discussing the supposed superior certainty alleged by all rational psychologists (and Descartes among them) in the case of internal experience. They all consider mind as given immediately and certainly, whereas matter is only given mediately, through what they call ideas, and therefore with inferior certainty. Kant shows (if we may be allowed to repeat this important point) that our external experience is as immediate, and therefore as certain, as our internal experience. He also shows that neither can give us any information concerning things *per se*.

But in his Second Edition he advances to a still bolder position, as regards the dignity of external experience, and asserts not only its equality with internal experience, but in some respects its priority. Hence he transposes his refutation of idealism from the place where he denied the permanence and reality of self to be given, to the place where he asserts the actuality and reality of our external experience. It had been formerly an appendix to his refutation of the superior certainty claimed for our knowledge of the pure Ego; it now becomes an appendix to his demonstration of the equal certainty of our knowledge of all empirical phenomena.

The argument can be thus briefly summarised. We can prove against Descartes, that internal experience, which he thought so certain, is only possible by presupposing external experience, which he thought uncertain. But this proof will not be intelligible if we have not mastered Kant's discussion on the Principle of Permanence. It was there shown that we cannot possibly perceive change or indeed any *determination* in time, without having something permanent wherewith to contrast the changes. Now when I consider my own existence, I cannot but be conscious of it

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as *determined* in time.<sup>1</sup> If so, it must be determined by some permanent, in regard of which alone, the changes of any internal experience can be known as changes. 'This permanent can be no intuition within me, for there are no determinations of my existence within me but representations, and these are the very phenomena which await their determination from some permanent distinct from them.' But what permanent can there be distinct from our representations, and yet possible in intuition? Of course, the old theory suggested the permanent Ego, in contrast to its own passing manifestations. If we had an intellectual intuition, which could be applied to the pure Ego, it might doubtless serve this important purpose. But as we shall show more fully hereafter, this *I am* is no intuition, but a *logical con-*

<sup>1</sup> Kant lays stress on the difference between a mere play of representations and an empirical experience which determines them in time. 'If it be objected to my proof,' says he, in substance (note to second preface, p. xl.) 'that it is only the representation of external things of which we are immediately conscious, and not [phenomenal] external things themselves, I answer that the very representations which you admit are determined in time, and therefore demand some permanent as the necessary condition of their determination. It is therefore impossible to escape my conclusion that internal experience presupposes external experience, whether you can understand the thing or not.' To put the matter into a simpler form. Suppose you say to me that after all I cannot have anything before my mind except intuitions of external things, and these are, of course, within me, I answer, with Kant, that it is not true that your external experience is a mere set of mental modifications, for you have omitted this important additional element—that they are fixed or at least determined in time. Your existence can be marked out in years and days; your external experience does not come at random, but in fixed order, and in an order which you can only very partially determine for yourself. In many cases these your representations are forced upon you. What does all this mean? Simply that your fleeting existence is in relation to a permanent external something, which determines it in time, and without which all your representations would form no legitimate *experience*.

*dition* accompanying every act of the understanding, and only called permanent improperly, because it must accompany each of these acts. We must have the permanent of which we are in search homogeneous with the changes which it determines. If it be not in the same plane of knowledge, so to speak, it is for our purpose useless. Then again, a thing *per se* would be perfectly useless for the purpose, as it could not possibly be represented in space or in time, and therefore could not determine representations taking place in space and time.<sup>1</sup> What, then, can this permanent be? It can be nothing but that phenomenal substratum, or substance, expounded under the *Principle of Permanence*, which represents to us the whole of time, and so makes its determination possible. It is the way we have of representing to ourselves the existence of phenomenal things. It is, of course, no separate intuition, as there is none such perpetually accompanying us; but it is a possible intuition, and being at the same time a necessary Principle underlying experience, we use the empirical criterion of *solidity* (or impenetrability) when we wish to find it in our ordinary experience. This is what Kant means when he says in his explanatory note that this representing to ourselves something permanent in existence is not necessarily having any permanent representation. These latter are fleeting and various; the former is *an external thing, distinct from all my representations*—that is to say, the per-

<sup>1</sup> Yet this is the absurdity with which Kant has been charged. In fact his argument has been absolutely reversed by his critics. *E.g.*, when Kant says: 'The perception of this permanent is only possible through a thing external to me and not through the mere representation of a thing,' Kuno Fischer (*Critique*, Eng. Trans. p. 98), tells us that this *Ding an sich* is the thing in itself. When Kant speaks of *external objects in space*, he does not necessarily speak of *objects external to the mind*; this his critics have failed to observe.

manent substratum of phenomena, which occupies the whole of time, which never originates or decays, which can never be increased or diminished in nature.<sup>1</sup> This is the only suitable permanent, which can determine our internal sense in time, and hence our internal *experience* is only possible through external experience.

Before proceeding, let us turn all this abstruse argument into the language of common life. How do we practically determine the time and place of our own existence, the duration of our thoughts, the reality of our waking thoughts, as opposed to dreams and visions? Is it not by showing that they are simultaneous with external permanents, and therefore determined by them? Does the poet contrast the change and current of his thoughts with his permanent self, or with the permanence of external nature around him? Did not the most vulgar impersonation of common sense reply to Berkeley, by appealing to the 'empirical criterion of substance'—to solidity, in proof that our internal experience was necessarily combined with our equally certain external experiences? Lastly, when a man closes his eyes, and shuts out, as far as he can, external impressions,—when he lets his fancy wander, or his thoughts apply themselves to abstract subjects,—do we not then find that he rapidly loses the sense of determination in time; that he has no measure within himself, no comparison with any fixed

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. xl. The reader will not have read this exposition without being struck with the analogy to Mill's *permanent possibilities of sensation*, which play so important a part in his latest philosophical work. The true basis of this substratum of sensibility was shown long ago in the works of Kant, to which Mill's argument bears in some respects a strong verbal resemblance. See especially his account of our passage from the permanent possibilities (or substratum of sensibility, as Kant would say) to a belief in existence distinct from them (or to things *per se*, as Kant would say), *Exam. of Hamilton*, p. 230 (3d Edition).

standard, no Atlas upon whose fixed support his thoughts can perform their revolutions? Is not this again an empirical example of Kant's truth: that internal experience—that is, the regulated, legitimate connection of internal phenomena—is only possible by presupposing external experience?

Of course, it is not asserted that all so-called external experience has this dignity. There is such a thing as fancy, and how its objects are to be distinguished from those of the external sense, is to be determined by the rules which distinguish experience generally (even internal experience) from fancy.<sup>1</sup> But the very distinction would be impossible, if there were not such a thing as real external experience, nor could we ever have fancied the reality did it not exist. Our fancies are imitations of the receptivity of sense by the spontaneity of the imagination.<sup>2</sup> The position, therefore of the idealists is completely overthrown. If either of the two departments of our experience is more immediate or more important than the other, it is not internal but external experience. They are, however, as we have amply seen, both immediate, and both equally real and certain. There is nothing either inconsistent, or illogical, or unreasonable in this argument. It is the language of common sense translated into Kantian dress, and its basis in the understanding explained. Neither can there be the smallest doubt that this is the true meaning and purport of the passage in Kant's system.

§ 6. The reader who has followed the argument of this chapter will now be in a position to estimate the comments commonly made upon Kant's *refutation of Idealism*. It has

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 250, for this argument in the First Edition.

<sup>2</sup> The question how a thinking subject can have external intuitions, he lays aside in both editions as insoluble. Cf. Second Preface, p. xli., note, *sub fin.*, and vol. ii. p. 263.

been persistently assumed, in spite of his explicit denial, that it was directed against Berkeley.<sup>1</sup> It has been persistently assumed, in spite of his explicit statement that it affected external *experience*, that it was intended to prove the existence of things *per se* in space. Even the careful and laborious Ueberweg, who could not avoid seeing in Kant's text that he was directing himself against Descartes, invents a parallel reference to Berkeley, and labours to show, what no one disputed, that Kant's refutation of problematical idealism does not refute dogmatical idealism.<sup>2</sup> It must be allowed that Kant's want of direct reference to his first Analogy of Experience throughout the argument is likely to mislead the unwary reader, and when the philosophers came upon such expressions as, 'an external thing apart from our representation,' and, 'a representation of the permanent distinct from a permanent representation,' they, so to speak, met an ugly fence in a rough hunting country. Yet the discussion of the substratum in phenomena had occurred but lately, its empirical criterion had been discussed, and so they might fairly have been expected to recollect what they had read only a few pages before.

But the substratum of phenomena had been tacitly identified with the thing *per se* (which Kant had expelled from experience), even though a permanence of substance

<sup>1</sup> Fischer, *Commentary*, p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. his *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philosophie*, iii. p. 195, note. Ueberweg is far the most accurate and trustworthy of the commentators we have met. If he had laid proper stress on Kant's explanation of the Permanence of phenomenal substance, he might have seen the proper bearing of the argument now under discussion. He has especially vindicated Kant against the charge of inconsistency in his various editions, but has, we think, only obscurely apprehended the whole of his case. Mr. Matthew Arnold's estimate of the Germans is as true in philosophy as it is in philology; they are rather erudite and painstaking than acute or clear in criticism.

under changing attributes is a distinctly empirical notion,<sup>1</sup> and if not embodied in Kant's account of experience, would leave a fatal and disgraceful gap. The critics were never able to grasp, though it was written down plainly before them, that Kant could hold the 'inner possibility of matter' (vol. ii. p. 244) to be nothing but phenomenon; that he considered permanence a necessary condition in experience, though it be not itself given directly as an object of experience; that he used *substantia*, and *substratum*, in a phenomenal sense;<sup>2</sup> lastly, that he properly used the word *thing* for the permanent substance given in space, as well as for the unknown transcendental cause of phenomena, always appending '*per se*' to the latter. But so accustomed were they to speaking of things *per se*, that they hastened to set down the 'thing apart from our representations' as a thing of this peculiar kind. It will hardly be expected of us to prove from the *Kritik* Kant's perpetual use of the term *things* for objects of sense and experience. The term occurs a hundred times.<sup>3</sup> Nor do we expect that any one who lays stress on such a point will be likely to appreciate the weightier arguments already adduced. It is worth mentioning, lest it should be a stumbling-block to younger students, and for that reason alone.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. ii. pp. 256, 257, a most important passage.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. *substantia phenomenon* repeatedly through his work.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. in the *Kritik*, §§ 22 and 23 of the *Deduction* (p. 90), also the conclusion of the *Postulates* (p. 176), the Distinction of Phenomena and Noumena, p. 182; the appendix on *concepts of Reflection*, p. 191; the 6th sect. of the *Antinomy*, p. 308; the *Prolegomena* (vol. ii.), pp. 54 *sqq.*, etc. etc.

We should perhaps not have concluded this chapter without noticing that Kant himself, strongly and explicitly, in his second preface, asserts the identity of the two editions in substance, and invites comparison of them, as expanding different parts of the same arguments, without differing either in propositions or in proofs (cf. *Kritik*, pp. xxxix.-xli.), save only in the method of proof there added to the former edition.

## CHAPTER XV

### THIRD CHAPTER OF THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES.

#### § 1. *On the Distinction of all Objects generally into Phenomena and Noumena.*

‘We have not only now travelled through the land of pure understanding, and carefully reviewed each part of it, but even surveyed it, and assigned to each thing its place in it. But the land is an island, and by nature itself shut in with unchangeable bounds. It is the land of truth (a charming name), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the proper home of illusion, where many a bank of fog, and many a fast-melting iceberg lies to us of new lands, and by ever deceiving with false hopes the exploring mariner, involves him in adventures, which he can never either abandon or bring to a successful close. \* Before risking ourselves upon this ocean, in order to make certain whether it can afford us any hopes, it may be desirable to cast one more glance upon the chart of the country we are about to leave, and ask (a) whether we cannot rest content with this land in default of other domains; (b) on what title we hold this country against all opposing claims? A summary may be of use, even though a full answer to these inquiries has already been given in the course of the Analytic.

After so many repetitions, however, we shall spare the

2. The land of  
truth is the land  
of pure understanding  
which has been  
exhausted by the  
human mind  
standing in the  
front of the  
in the direction

reader the additional recapitulation, and proceed to the passage in which he speaks of the Definitions of the Categories. The results indeed of the Analytic have hitherto been so sober and shabby, in confining all our knowledge to experience, that many might be disposed to question the utility of so long and dry a discussion. It may be urged in reply, says Kant, that no presumption is more offensive than that of demanding beforehand the results of an inquiry, when they would not even be intelligible, if at once stated.

§ 2. But yet there is an aspect which can be made clear to the most dull and discontented learner. It is this, that however well plain common sense may get through the world, without analysing the sources of its knowledge, upon one point it must be in the dark, and that is on the limits of its use, and on the spheres which lie within and without it respectively. This requires Metaphysic for its settlement, and without it the plain man may be wandering into blunder and illusion, which he cannot foresee or avoid. So then our conclusion was really of the last importance, when we showed that the Categories are only of empirical use. The case was similar with the notions of Mathematic, and they will serve us as a good example. These axioms about space and about magnitude are generated a priori in the mind, and yet require to be constructed in intuition, without which they have no *sense* or meaning. We draw the straight line between two visible points. We measure magnitude by number, and this we learn through sight by our counting boards, or strokes used as units.

That the Categories and Principles are similarly circumstanced appears moreover from this, that we cannot give a real definition of any of them—that is to say, make the possibility of its object intelligible, without descending



forthwith into the conditions of sensibility, where alone they can have meaning.<sup>1</sup> No one can describe magnitude except by saying that it is the determination of something by thinking how often a unit is repeated in it. But this *how often* is based upon succession, which implies time and the synthesis of homogeneous units. So Reality, Permanence, and Cause are mere idle words except we take in Time, as has been amply shown in the discussion on the *Analogies*. So the Contingent can only be grasped by seeing the existence of something follow upon its non-existence, or *vice versa*, in time. Possibility, Actuality, Necessity, these too can only be explained from the pure understanding by manifest tautologies. The logical possibility of *concepts* is very different from the transcendental possibility of *things*. Our Principles are accordingly nothing but Principles of the exposition of phenomena, and we must substitute for the proud title of an Ontology, which asserts a synthetical *a priori* knowledge of things generally, the more modest one of an *Analytic* of the pure understanding.

We may express this truth by saying that the pure Categories, deprived of the formal conditions of sensibility, have merely a transcendental *meaning*, but not a transcendental *use*. They are nothing but pure forms, indicating how the understanding must proceed in knowing any objects; but in no case can these pure forms of themselves give or suggest to us any objects.

<sup>1</sup> He develops the difficulty about defining the Categories in some passages, which we have given from his First Edition, in vol. ii., Appendix B, *a* and *b*. As an additional difficulty he tells us that the Categories can only be defined by judgments, whereas all such judgments imply and presuppose the Categories. It is the old difficulty of endeavouring to explain a necessary element of our knowledge by means of that knowledge which presupposes this element in fusion with other elements. Cf. above p. 96, note.

§ 3. How is it, then, that the belief in *noumena* has arisen? And yet this belief is an old and well-established one in philosophy. We here prefer to follow the exposition of the First Edition, which is translated in the second volume, as it brings out more clearly the contrast between the phenomenal substratum and the thing *per se*, than his later exposition.

The ordinary objects of experience are called *phenomena*.<sup>1</sup> If we assume things which are merely objects of the understanding, and might be given to some other, say intellectual, intuition, these *intelligible* (as opposed to *sensible*) things should be called *noûmena*. At first sight it might be supposed that the very limited notion of phenomena established in the Aesthetic indicated plainly the objective reality of *noumena*, as distinguished, not logically, by greater and less clearness of knowledge, but generically. For if the senses only represent things *as they appear*, some other sort of knowledge should be at least possible, which should comprehend them *as they are*, apart from our sensibility. This opens a new field, a world of thought apart from sense, nay, perhaps, even intuited, as Schelling afterwards maintained, by some intellectual intuition. There is indeed, as has been shown in the Analogy of Permanence, something permanent conceived, as distinct from our representations, and to which they all refer. This is, however, an *x*, or unknown quantity, which brings our unity of apperception into connection with the unity of diversity in sensuous intuition. Accordingly, this transcendental object is inseparable from

<sup>1</sup> Kant has hitherto used the word *Erscheinungen*, *appearances*, as the German synonym. As there is no danger of error in using phenomena in English, and as there is no other naturalised term which fully corresponds to it, we have preferred using it throughout the former part of the work. *Appearance* seems to imply illusion, which would be quite false, according to Kant's notions.

sensuous data, without which it would never have come into our minds. It is merely the representation of phenomena under the notion of object generally—a notion determined, or rendered definite, only by the diversity of the phenomena.

Why, then, have we not remained content with the substratum of sensibility, but added *noumena* to *phenomena*? Simply because no confusion was simpler, and because men could not rest satisfied with so negative a notion. When sensibility is removed, the understanding is still able to *think* by means of its forms, and these are naturally identified with the thing that appears, as opposed to the appearance. No doubt, the inference from phenomena to noumena is so far valid that it is necessarily suggested by phenomena. But this affords us a *negative* meaning for noumena—they are *not objects of sensuous intuition*. If we proceed to describe them positively as *objects of non-sensuous intuition*, we dogmatise as to whether there be intuition distinct from that with which we are endowed, and, moreover, as none of our Categories apply to such an intuition, even were it not imaginary, we cannot advance one step towards any knowledge of its objects.

Kant means by a *problematical* concept, 'one that contains no contradiction; that is connected with other cognitions as a limitation (*Begrenzung*) of given concepts, but of which the objective reality cannot be in anywise known.' Such is the notion of a *noumenon*. It is in itself not contradictory. It is necessary to show the limits of sensuous intuition and its objective validity, and indicates that there is a field to which that intuition does not extend. But yet its possibility cannot be made out, and though our understanding extends *problematically* farther than phenomena, there is no intuition or notion of an intuition, by

This is Kant's  
weakness  
according to  
3rd Caird.  
See Caird,  
Hegel 121

means of which our understanding could be used *assertorically* beyond this field. The *Noumenon* is then a *bounding concept* (*Grenzbegriff*), repressing the pretensions of sensibility, not invented at random, but necessarily and unavoidably connected with the limitation of sensibility.

Concepts may be divided into intellectual and sensuous, but we cannot admit a similar division of objects into *phenomena* and *noumena*, in a *positive sense*; we cannot even call the noumenon a peculiar *intelligible object* of our understanding; we should rather say that the understanding to which it belongs is itself a problem, of which we can never conceive the possibility.<sup>1</sup>

Kant objects to a recent use of (*mundus*) *sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*, whereby the sum total of phenomena, if intuited, is called the world of sense—if thought, as connected by rational laws, the world of reason.<sup>2</sup> The mere observation of the starry heaven would be the former, the system of Copernicus or Newton the latter. This is mere fencing with the real difficulty, which is to determine whether understanding or reason have any uses when their objects are no longer phenomena; a question quite beyond any astronomical theory, however scientific, and which we have answered in the negative. Such a distinction between things as they appear and as they are, is to be taken merely in an empirical sense, or within experience, and

<sup>1</sup> 'The notion of a noumenon is therefore no concept of an object, but the problem unavoidably connected with the limitation of our sensibility, viz. whether there may not exist objects quite independent of its intuition—a question which can only be vaguely answered, by saying that as our sensuous intuition does not apply to all things indiscriminately, there is room for more and for other objects, so that they cannot be absolutely denied, but neither, in the absence of any definite notion, can they be affirmed as objects for our understanding' (*Kritik*, p. 206).

<sup>2</sup> *Verstandeswelt*, properly *world of understanding*; but this expression is not English.

does not touch the question whether the pure understanding can give us objects. We have shown, however, that *sense* and *understanding* can only give us objects in *combination*, and that when isolated, their representations are for that purpose idle.

If any reader still feels any difficulty on the subject, Kant proposes to him his usual test; let him try to employ the pure Categories by themselves in framing a synthetical assertion, analytical propositions being of no avail for increasing our knowledge. Take for example: all that is here, exists as substance; or: all that is contingent exists as the effect of some other thing, which is its cause. Whence can he get, or how can he use these notions, apart from any reference to possible experience? Where is the medium (above, p. 36) in which they can be combined? If he cannot answer this difficulty, he must confess that the region of noumena is a mere vacuum, of use as a limit, but totally devoid of positive objects, and foreign to human cognition.

## CHAPTER XVI

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APPENDIX *on the Ambiguity of the Concepts of Reflection, produced by a confusion of the empirical and transcendental use of the understanding.*

§ 1. REFLECTION is not directly concerned with obtaining notions of objects, but it is the mental attitude of discovering the subjective conditions by which we can attain notions. Of course, the first question which it raises is this: to what faculty is the notion due? Is it in sense, or in understanding, that notions are to be compared? Thus many a judgment is due to habit or inclination, and is assumed, for want of reflection, to originate in the understanding. Judgments which are immediately certain, like those of Mathematic, require no *investigation* of their truth; but even these, and *a fortiori* all others, require *reflection*, or a consideration of the faculty from which they arise. The act of making this comparison, and of distinguishing whether they arise from sensibility or understanding, Kant calls *transcendental Reflection*. The relations in which notions stand to one another in our mental states are those of *identity* and *diversity*, of *agreement* and *opposition*, of *internal* and *external*, of *determinable* and *determining* (matter and form). It makes a great difference in what faculty these comparisons are carried out.

In seeking objective judgments we compare concepts, and thus we obtain universal judgments by means of their *identity*, we obtain particular by their *diversity*, we obtain affirmation by their agreement, etc. The concepts adduced might accordingly be called *concepts of comparison*. But if we look beyond mere logical form, to the content of the concept, we find that their relation to one another is not to be determined without regard to the faculty in which they arise, and thus before we use the mere comparison (or logical reflection) we must apply the transcendental reflection just described, which is the real basis of any objective comparison of notions. This imperative duty we shall now undertake, and apply it to the operations of the understanding.

§ 2. 1. *Identity and Diversity*. If an object be presented to us repeatedly [in space] with the same internal features, such as quantity and quality, then as an object of the pure understanding, it is always the same numerically identical thing, and not many; but as a phenomenon, the accurate comparison of our several notions of it is of no avail to prove its identity, for in spite of the most accurate sameness of internal qualities, the difference of place at the same time suffices to prove numerical diversity. So from Leibnitz's point of view, who regarded phenomena as things *per se*, but confused by our senses, his Law of *indiscernibility* (*principium identitatis indiscernibilium*) was irrefragable. But we have shown that phenomena are objects of sensibility, and that the understanding is, as regards them, of empirical use only, and thus numerical diversity is given by space, of which the parts, however similar, can never be identical. Leibnitz, accordingly, was in error for want of employing transcendental reflection, and his law is no real law of nature. It is merely

an analytical rule, when we compare things by mere concepts.<sup>1</sup>

2. *Agreement and Opposition.* If reality be considered merely through the understanding (*realitas noumenon*), no conflict of realities can be conceived, as, for example, that in which they mutually cancel each other, as:  $3 - 3 = 0$ . Among phenomenal realities this is of constant occurrence, such as opposing forces, or joys balancing sorrows. General Mechanic even gives an *a priori* rule for the empirical conditions of this opposition, depending on *direction*, which is quite foreign to the transcendental notion of reality. Though Leibnitz hardly insisted upon this denial of opposition between substances explicitly as a new principle, his followers expressly adopted it. They hold for example that all evil is nothing but the consequence of the limitations of creatures, negation being the only possible opposition to reality. In the same way they were able to unite all reality in *one* being, without fear of such reciprocal limitations as must take place in phenomena. They opposed to realities nothing but their logical negations.

3. *The Internal and External.* In an object of pure understanding that alone is truly internal which has no relation (as to existence) to anything different from it. The inner determinations of a Phenomenal substance in space are on the contrary nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing but a mere complex of relations—such as attraction, repulsion and impenetrability; we know no other qualities

<sup>1</sup> We have brought together under this and the following heads the two repetitions of the argument in the *Kritik*, pp. 196 and 202, and incorporated them with Kant's present statement, with the view (ever present to us) of curtailing the prolixity of his exposition. The reader will find that we have omitted no material point in any of these repeated discussions. There is no part of the *Kritik* so prolix. Kant comes back over and over again to his refutation of Leibnitz with great complacency.



which make up substance, as we find it in space, and they all relate directly to something apart from them. Such qualities will not serve for a substance as an object of pure understanding. The only internal accidents we can conceive are those given us by internal sense—either *thinking* or something analogous to it. Thus Leibnitz made of all substances, which he regarded as *noumena*, simple subjects with a faculty of representation, and called them monads.<sup>1</sup> Hence, too, he could not conceive the community of these substances as anything but a *pre-established harmony*, and rejected all physical influence. For as each substance is purely internal, it cannot be related to any other, and there must be some third thing causing them to correspond mutually, not by continual and special influence (the system of Divine assistance), but by their depending on an original cause, from which they obtain their existence and permanence, and with it their mutual correspondences.

4. *Matter and Form.* These are two concepts which are at the basis of all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of the understanding. The former means the determinable, the latter its determination, both in transcendental meaning, abstracting from all other questions. The old Logicians called the universal *matter*, but the specific difference the *form*. In every judgment the given concepts are the matter, their relation by the copula the form of the judgment, and thus it is all through our thinking. Hence, according to the pure understanding, matter precedes form, and accordingly Leibnitz assumed first monads and an inner faculty of representation in them, and then based upon this their external relations and

<sup>1</sup> His argument was: Every real object has an inner nature, independent of and prior to its relation to other beings; only mind has such an inner nature, and so each monad has perception.

community. Space was only possible as the relation of substances, and time as the connection of them as reasons and consequences. This is correct enough if space and time were attributes of things *per se*. But as sensuous intuitions, which they are, the form of the intuition, or subjective constitution of sensibility, must precede sensation, or matter. And so this *doctrine of space and time* originated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection. Leibnitz then gave a false account of the peculiarity of these forms when he attributed it to the *confusion* of our notions about objects, so that we translated the mere dynamical relations of things into independent intuitions. Nay, he even wished to make his view, which could only suit noumena, valid for phenomena, which were to him cognitions differing from those of the understanding only by a lesser degree of clearness.

As Kant afterwards observes (p. 202), Leibnitz's whole system is based upon a manifest logical fallacy.<sup>1</sup> For though by the *dictum de omni*, etc., everything that belongs to or contradicts any general concept, also belongs to or contradicts all the particulars contained under the concept, yet it is absurd to modify this principle so as to say that whatever is not contained in the general concept is not contained in the individuals or particulars under it, for in this consists the difference of the particular and the universal, that the former contains additional comprehension. Yet this is the fallacy on which Leibnitz built his system. Because two *notions* of things in general have no differences, therefore the *things* themselves are really identical; that is to say, the absence of distinctions, in the absence of intuition, is supposed to hold good when things come to be intuited. The same criticism is applied to all the other heads by Kant.

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.* inferring from the negation of the antecedent in hypothetical reasoning the negation of the consequent.

§ 3. *Remarks on the Ambiguity of the Concepts of Reflection.* When we have assigned to a notion its position in the sensibility or pure understanding, this may be called its *transcendental place*, and when this is generally done we have a *Transcendental Topic*, like the *Logical Topic* of Aristotle, used by teachers and orators, which indicated under certain heads where they could find proper materials for the subject in hand.

The *transcendental topic*, however, contains merely the above-mentioned four heads of comparison and distinction. They differ from the Categories, in that they do not expound objects according to their several concepts, but rather expound, in all its variety, the comparison of representations, which precedes our notion of things. This comparison requires the reflection above described, otherwise we fall, as Leibnitz did, into a transcendental *amphiboly* of these concepts. Our principle has enabled us to analyse his famous *intellectual system of the universe*, and show that it depends on a fundamental confusion. 'Thus he *intellectualised* phenomena, as Locke *sensualised* the Categories according to the system of *noogony*, if I may so call it, in deriving them all from reflection.'<sup>1</sup> Neither of these great men saw that the two faculties were distinct in kind, but only able to produce knowledge by conjoint action.

The practical result is as follows: Matter is the *substantia phenomenon*. I seek its inner qualities in all parts of space, and in all effects which can only be external intuitions. We have accordingly no absolute, but only a relative, internal, which consists of external relations. Any other internal is a mere hallucination, and no object for our understanding; the transcendental object, which is at the

<sup>1</sup> This is the old and once received view of Locke's philosophy, which has been exploded, at least in our University, by the teaching of Dr. Webb (*Intellectualism of Locke, passim*).

basis of the phenomena, and which we call matter, being a mere something, which we could not even comprehend, were it described to us. In this sense, then, the complaint *that we cannot discover the internal constitution of things* is mere idle talk. Observation and analysis of phenomena penetrate into the secrets of nature, and how far this may be done in the lapse of time is hard to say. But (as Locke said long ago) such investigations will not bring us a whit nearer to the origin of our sensibility, its relation to things, and the transcendental ground of this unity. For even ourselves we know only through internal sense, and as phenomena. Hence our Kritik of the process of reasoning by mere reflection is of great use and importance. For when we apply the notions gained by ordinary logical reflection to objects generally, without determining their sources, there forthwith appear limitations which distort the empirical use of them, and show that the representations of things in general are not merely *insufficient*, but even *self-contradictory*, apart from sensuous conditions.

§ 4. Before leaving the analytic, Kant adds a table which he considers desirable for completeness's sake. In the *Prolegomena*, he mentions (p. 111) that he did it to show how universally the Table of the Categories is applicable, seeing that the most abstract notions of something and nothing range themselves under these heads.

The highest concept usually set down in transcendental philosophy as a starting point is the division into the Possible and the Impossible. But this, as every division does, implies a concept to be divided, which is here the concept of *something* in general, taken problematically. To this corresponds the notion of *nothing*, of which the subdivisions here follow.

(1.) To the concept of all, many, and one (in Quantity)

is opposed that of *none*, which removes them, and is a concept without object, such as the *noumena* above spoken of, which cannot be classed among possibilities, while on the other hand they cannot be affirmed impossible. Such are imaginary forces assumed in nature, not self-contradictory, but not provable. They are to be called *entia rationis*.

(2.) Negation or *nothing* may be the denial of reality (Quality) or of the absence of an object, such as cold, which is the negation of heat. This is a *nihil privativum*.

(3.) We may have the mere form of intuition without matter, such as pure space and time, which are mere formal conditions (in Relation) of something. Such a nothing is to be called *ens imaginarium*.

(4.) The object of a self-contradictory concept is of course *nothing*, and is (as to Modality) impossible. This is a *nihil negativum*.

Thus we have NOTHING subdivided into (a) empty concepts without objects (*ens rationis*); (β) Empty object of a concept (*nihil privativum*); (γ) Empty intuition without object (*ens imaginarium*); (δ) Empty object without any concept (*nihil negativum*). (a) differs from (δ) by being not impossible. (β) and (γ) are on the contrary empty data for concepts. Pure form is not an object any more than negation.

We have now completed the analysis of the positive side of the great *Kritik*. The reader who has had the patience to consider with care Kant's argument up to this point may expect to find his difficulties almost at an end. The Dialectic is so completely a consequence of the positive principles established in the Analytic, that we shall content ourselves with a much briefer exposition of it, delaying on some details which are perplexing, but referring constantly to the principles already laid down, which we presume to be now familiar to the student.

## CHAPTER XVII

### TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.—PART II. THE DIALECTIC

#### I.—Of Transcendental Illusion.

WE called Dialectic in general a *logic of illusion* (*Schein*) in the Introduction to Transcendental Logic (p. 76, *supra*), and this is the strict sense in which we shall use the word. We do not mean by it a *logic of probability*<sup>1</sup> (*Wahrscheinlichkeit*), for probability is truth, though it is truth cognised on insufficient grounds; and though the information we gain by probable reasoning is imperfect, it is not necessarily deceitful; hence then this branch of logic belongs not to Dialectic at all, but to Analytic. Again, *illusion* is not the same thing as *phenomenon*; in order that we may understand this, let us ask ourselves what is, in general, the nature of error?<sup>2</sup> The senses by themselves cannot err in a judgment, for they do not judge at all; likewise the understanding cannot err without extraneous influence being brought to bear on it, because the formal element of all truth consists in accordance with its laws. In fact no power in nature

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle uses the term in this sense. Cf. *Topica*, i. 1, 3, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. with what follows, *Hamilton Lectures*, iv. p. 135. 'Error does not lie in the conditions of our higher faculties themselves, and these faculties are not by their own laws determined to false judgments or conclusions. If this were otherwise, knowledge would be impossible, —the root of our nature would be a lie.'

can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence, since we have no other source of cognition but these two, sensibility and understanding, and since neither by itself can go wrong, it follows that error is caused solely by the unobserved influence of the sensibility on the understanding; so it happens that the subjective <sup>1</sup> grounds of a judgment blend with and are mistaken for the objective, and thus illusion arises. We may illustrate this mathematically; an erroneous judgment is like the resultant of two forces: in order to expose its falsity, we must resolve it into its two components. In pure *a priori* judgments, as we saw before,<sup>2</sup> this must be done by means of transcendental reflection, by which the right place is assigned to each representation, and the influence of the sensibility upon such representation is made apparent.

But further, there are different kinds of illusion. There may be empirical illusion, as often occurs in optical appearances; in this case the judgment is misled by the faculty of imagination. Or there may be logical illusion, caused by want of attention to logical rules; this at once ceases when the fallacy is exposed. But we are not concerned with either of these; we consider here only transcendental illusion, which, in spite of all warnings of criticism, tempts us beyond the empirical use of the categories, and deludes us with the dream of an extension of the sphere of *pure understanding*.

Here we must carefully distinguish the words *transcendent* and *transcendental*.<sup>3</sup> That which precedes experience as its necessary condition is *transcendental*; a principle which, on the other hand, tends to transgress the bounds of experience, is *transcendent*,<sup>4</sup> as contrasted with one

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 116.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, p. 229.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*, p. 41.

<sup>4</sup> A transcendent object then is one absolutely beyond experience. We shall see in the sequel that what is *constitutively transcendent* may be *regulatively transcendental*.

whose application is entirely confined within the limits of possible experience, which is called *immanent*. The principles of the pure *Understanding* are immanent, of empirical use only, as we saw in our *Analytic*; what we now wish to do is to expose the illusion arising from the *transcendent* principles of pure Reason, and to show the grounds of this ever-recurring though futile tendency to seek for supra-sensuous knowledge. And one remarkable point about this transcendental illusion is that it does not, like logical illusion, cease after it has been exposed; <sup>1</sup> it has its basis in the nature of Reason itself, and so is natural and unavoidable. There exist in Reason certain subjective rules and maxims of its exercise, which have all the appearance of objective principles; we cannot do away with this misleading similarity: all we can do is to point out that it *is* misleading and illusory.

¶ This statement has been absurdly misinterpreted by many of Kant's critics. They have spoken of Kant setting up the reason against itself, as if he had made it the source of errors which it could not unveil. Because Kant showed that these delusions could be made to contradict each other (and were therefore irreconcilable with reason) the critics who read that they were unavoidable and natural, also inferred that they were perpetual and not to be refuted. We shall see in the sequel that Kant solves them all. But just as in the case of certain optical delusions, when the error, though exposed, still mocks us, so here the antinomies or contradictory conclusions of the pure reason still have their force, and are still apt to make us trip, even after a sound criticism has thoroughly exposed them. It is therefore desirable that the reader should hold fast this illustration of Kant's, and not vilify reason because it some-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 264.



times misleads him, any more than the senses, which also mislead. For both afford him remedies for their own imperfections.

## II.—*Of pure Reason as the seat of Transcendental Illusion.*

*A. Of Reason in general.*—There is of Reason, as there is of Understanding, a purely formal or logical use in which no account is taken of the content of Knowledge; but there is also, as we shall see, a real or transcendental use in that it contains the origin of certain concepts and principles (*Grundsätze*), not borrowed from Sense or Understanding. We may expect, as in the case of the Understanding, that the logical concept will give us the key to the transcendental.

We before defined the Understanding as the *faculty of Rules*; we now distinguish Reason by calling it the *faculty of Principles (Prinzipien)*. But this requires explanation, for the term principle is ambiguous. In logic the term is used to denote any general proposition, inasmuch as it may be made the major<sup>1</sup> premiss of a syllogism. And cognition from principles may be described as knowing the particular in the general *by means of concepts*.<sup>2</sup> In this sense every syllogism is a form of deducing some kind of cognition from a principle. But when we look into the matter, we see that if the major of our syllogism be a mere general proposition of Understanding (whether it be a *priori* or empirical), we cannot with propriety speak of the reasoning as cognition *from concepts*, for, to establish the major, we

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bacon, *De Aug. Sci.* v. 2.: 'In syllogismo enim fit reductio propositionum ad *principia* per propositiones medias,' etc.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 435.

must bring in experience or pure intuition, or the conditions of a possible experience. So for definiteness we may speak of such general propositions as *comparative principles, principles* properly so called being *synthetical cognitions from concepts* such as the Understanding cannot supply. We shall thus reserve the name *Principle* for those propositions which form the beginning of all knowledge, which depend on no others, and on which all others depend. As the Understanding then is a faculty for producing unity among phenomena according to rules, Reason is the faculty for producing unity among the rules of the Understanding according to Principles.

B. *Of the logical use of Reason.*—The distinction between immediate and mediate inference is a familiar one; it is only with the latter, however, that Reason is, strictly speaking, concerned, Understanding being competent to perform the former; i.e. the proper sphere of the Reason is syllogism, and it acts in this way. In every syllogism there is a *rule* or major supplied by the Understanding, then the Judgment subsumes a particular case under the condition<sup>1</sup> of this rule, and finally the Reason draws the conclusion. So then different kinds of rules will give rise to different kinds of syllogisms, and hence syllogisms may be divided, just like judgments, into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. The importance of this we shall see hereafter, but we make one remark now. It often happens that a conclusion is put forward as a judgment to see whether it does not follow from other judgments by which a perfectly different object has been thought. If I succeed in showing that it does, then I have brought my conclusion under a rule *which is valid for other objects of know-*

<sup>1</sup> The 'condition' of the rule is in fact the middle term of the syllogism.

ledge also ; in other words, I have reduced my number of principles ; that is, Reason tries to reduce the great variety of the knowledge of the Understanding to the smallest number of principles, and thereby to produce in it the greatest unity.

C. *Of the pure use of Reason.*—We ask now : Is there a pure use of Reason as well as a logical ? Is it an independent source of concepts and judgments ? Does it prescribe a law to objects, or is it merely a subjective law of economy applied to the stores of the Understanding. Does it contain *synthetical* (not merely *analytical*) *a priori* principles (*Grundsätze*) and rules ? If so, what are they ? We first repeat what we said as to the relation between Understanding and Reason in their logical use. Reason applies itself to concepts and judgments, the Understanding applies to intuitions ; the unity of the former is a *collective* unity, that of the latter is *distributive*—the unity of a possible experience. In short the Reason is related to the Understanding very much as the latter is to Sense.

What does the ordinary logical procedure of Reason imply ? In it Reason seeks to reduce any given judgment to a general rule ; but this rule itself will again be subjected to the same process, and its conditions sought by means of a prosyllogism, so that we may in fact say that Reason seeks to find for any *conditioned* cognition of the Understanding the *unconditioned*, whereby complete unity of knowledge may be attained. But a *synthetical a priori* principle lies at the basis of this, viz. we are assuming that 'if the conditioned be given, all its conditions, i.e. the Unconditioned, are also given.' This principle <sup>1</sup> is a *a priori*, for it is the necessary condition of the ordinary logical process above described ; it is also *synthetical*, for it asserts the uncon-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 51, *supra*.

ditioned to be given with the conditioned<sup>1</sup>—not merely that a condition is given, which would be an analytical proposition, if we merely judge it of the concept conditioned, but would be the principle of causality if we judged it of objects of experience.

Our problem in the Transcendental Dialectic is then to determine whether this principle has objective validity, or whether it is a merely logical precept which bids us ever seek complete unity. We propose to show that it has not objective validity—in other words, that there are no synthetical *a priori* propositions of pure reason; or, as we said before (p. 36, note), that Metaphysic is impossible. The truth is that Reason, as regards experience, can only be used analytically (whereas the Understanding is used synthetically). Any attempt to apply the Reason to objects synthetically must result in illusion and error. The use of the principles (*Grundsätze*) of the understanding is *immanent* only, the principles (*Grundsätze*), on the contrary, resulting from this highest principle (*Princip*) of pure Reason would be *transcendent*; but unfortunately the principle itself is not objectively true—it is a mere demand.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is the synthetical *a priori* principle lying at the basis of the Ideas of Reason, just as the synthetical unity of apperception lies at the basis of the Categories (see p. 121). The Ideas are its various phases. Many critics have confused it with the Category of causality, which merely asserts that every phenomenal object has a condition and is thereby perfectly satisfied without necessarily ascending any higher. Now the special peculiarity of the Reason is, that, guided by this synthetical proposition, it necessarily seeks for higher and higher conditions; so that, as Kant says (*Kritik*, p. 233), 'all pure concepts in general are concerned with the synthetical unity of representations, but concepts of pure Reason (Ideas) with the unconditioned synthetical unity of all conditions in general.'

<sup>2</sup> Cf., however, carefully, *Kritik*, p. 399.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### BOOK I

#### *Of the Concepts of Pure Reason*

THE Concepts of Pure Reason are not obtained simply by reflection but by inference, in this differing from Concepts of the Understanding. The objective validity of the latter depends upon this fact, viz. because they constitute the intellectual form of all experience, it is necessary that their application should always admit of being exhibited in experience. But concepts of Reason are not so limited; their very name seems to refer to a kind of cognition related to empirical cognition as a whole to its part, its object being the whole of possible experience to which no actual experience can be adequate. Concepts of Reason, then, serve for *comprehending* (*begreifen*),<sup>1</sup> just as by means of concepts of understanding we *understand* (*verstehen*) perceptions. If they contain the unconditioned they refer to something to which all experience may belong, but which can never itself be an object of experience. Now, according as they do or do not possess objective validity we shall call them *conceptus ratiocinati* (concepts legitimately inferred) or *conceptus ratiocinantes* (sophistical


<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kant's *Introd. to Logic*, p. 55, Abbott's Trans.

concepts). However, to this we shall again return, merely remarking now that as we called the concepts of the pure Understanding, Categories; so we shall call the concepts of pure Reason, Transcendental Ideas.

§ 1. Of Ideas in General.—In order that we may fully appreciate the meaning of this term we must go back to Plato. He meant by an Idea something which cannot be derived from sensibility, and which, moreover, far transcends even the concepts of understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself<sup>1</sup>), inasmuch as in experience nothing corresponding to it can be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experiences like the Categories. He saw that our faculty of knowledge has a much higher vocation than merely to spell out phenomena according to a synthetical unity, and thus to read them as experience. He noticed that our Reason naturally tries to reach cognitions to which no object of experience can correspond, but which nevertheless have reality, and are not mere cobwebs of the brain. Such ideas he found especially in the practical sphere, in Teleology as well as in Ethics, and herein he was right. However, we do not follow him in every particular, *e.g.* in his extension of these Ideas to the speculative sphere, in his mystical deduction of them, and in the exaggerations which led him to hypostatise them; in all these points we regard him as misleading. But as regards the principles of Ethics, of Legislation, and of Religion, his work is specially valuable, as it is only by means of Ideas that these principles can be laid down: to deduce them from experience is illusory. We cannot now enter upon such inquiries; the point here to be remarked is that we should, in the interests of philosophy, strive to preserve the term *Idea* in its original signification. There is

<sup>1</sup> In his treatise on the Categories.

no lack of names adequate to express every kind of representation without our having to encroach on terms which are proper to others. The following is a graduated list of them. The genus is *Representation* in general. Under it stands *Representation with consciousness*<sup>1</sup> (*perceptio*), the forms of which may be thus tabulated.



An idea or a concept of Reason is then a concept formed from notions which transcends the possibility of experience; it is 'a necessary concept of Reason to which no corresponding object can be given in the world of sense.'

§ 2. *Of Transcendental Ideas.*—We saw in our Analytic that the forms of judgments converted into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions, gave us Categories; now we naturally inquire, Will not the forms of syllogisms

<sup>1</sup> Apparently the other sub-class would be *Representation without consciousness*, but Kant does not say so. He is always very careful not to commit himself on the subject of the existence of latent mental modifications. His definition of *notion* should be remarked—'a pure concept, in so far as it has its origin in the Understanding, not in the pure image of the Sensibility.' It is noteworthy that this is exactly the sense in which our own Berkeley used the term. Cf. Fraser's *Selections from Berkeley*, pp. 95 and 335. We may compare with the table generally the table of *Degrees of Knowledge* given, *Introd. to Logic*, p. 55.

applied in like manner to the synthetical unity of intuitions give us the pure forms of Reason, *i.e.* Ideas? To unfold this, it is necessary to examine the form of a syllogism somewhat minutely. The function of Reason in its logical use consists in the universality of the cognition according to concepts, and the conclusion is a judgment which is determined *a priori* in the whole extent of its condition. The proposition 'Caius is mortal' might be taken from experience by means of the understanding only; but to reduce it to syllogism I have to find a concept (*man*) which contains the more general condition under which the predicate of this judgment is given; then subsume the minor, Caius is a man, under this condition taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), and so arrive at the knowledge of my object—Caius is mortal. 'Hence in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict the predicate to a certain object, after having thought it [the predicate] under a certain condition in the major in its whole extent.'<sup>1</sup> To speak logically, the major must be universal. Now to this universality (*universalitas*) corresponds totality (*universitas*) of conditions<sup>2</sup> in the synthesis of intuitions. So the transcendental concept of Reason is the concept of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned, *i.e.* the *unconditioned*.

And, as there are three Categories of relation, so we

<sup>1</sup> This is a difficult sentence, because the doubt at once arises, 'How can we say that the predicate in an affirmative syllogism of the first figure is universal?' But the point is, it is not *mortal* that is taken universally in the premiss, but *mortal men*—the major term (mortal), under a certain condition, viz. that it is to be regarded for the moment as applicable only to human creatures. In no other way can we explain Kant's language, which at best is misleading. Of course the predicate of the major premiss, though not logically universal, is still used in a far wider application than in the conclusion.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. note, p. 241.



shall find three Ideas; we must therefore seek for an unconditioned (1) of the *categorical* synthesis in a *subject*, (2) of the *hypothetical* synthesis of the members of a *series*, (3) of the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts in a *system*. There are exactly as many kinds of syllogisms, each of which tries to advance through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned; the first to the subject which itself is no longer a predicate; the second to the presupposition which presupposes nothing else; the third to that aggregate by means of which complete division of any concept can be determined. Hence the pure rational concepts of totality in the synthesis of conditions are necessary, at least as problems, in order to raise the unity of the Understanding if possible to the Unconditioned, and they are founded in the nature of human Reason even though they may have no valid application *in concreto*. We must here guard against an ambiguity which presents itself. The phrase *absolutely possible* may signify one of two things—either (1) that which is possible (*interné*) *in itself* (the *least* that could be said of any object), or (2) that which is possible *in every relation*, which is the *most* that could be said of an object. Now the latter signification is the one in which we are going to employ the term. Absolute necessity, in our usage, is not synonymous with internal or intrinsic necessity. Thus, though we can say that the opposite of that which is intrinsically impossible is absolutely necessary (for if a thing is intrinsically impossible it will be impossible in every relation), we cannot conversely say that the opposite of the absolutely necessary is intrinsically impossible.

With this provision, then, we may say that the transcendental concept of Reason has for its object nothing less than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions—that is, the Unconditioned. Reason has for its aim to collect into

an *absolute whole* all acts of the Understanding, to give a *rational unity* (*Vernunftseinheit*) to the *synthetical unity* (*Verstandeseinheit*) which is thought in the Category. Hence the objective employment of the Ideas is *transcendent*, that of the Categories being *immanent*. We have established now *three* points about the Ideas:<sup>1</sup> (1) they are concepts of pure Reason regarding all empirical cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of conditions; (2) they are *not* arbitrarily assumed, but supplied to us by the very nature of Reason, and have therefore a necessary relation to the whole use of the Understanding; (3) they are *transcendent*; in this differing from the Categories that no<sup>2</sup> object can be presented in experience which shall be adequate to them.

When we use the word *Idea* we say as regards the object<sup>3</sup> (as of an object of the pure Understanding) *very much*, but as regards the subject (*i.e.* in respect of its actuality under empirical conditions) *very little*, because an Idea as the concept of a maximum can never be given adequately in the concrete. Now because in the speculative employment of Reason the latter is the whole aim, and as in this case merely to approximate to a concept which can never be attained in practice is the same as if the concept were non-existent, we are wont to say of a concept of this kind (*e.g.* the absolute totality of phenomena), 'it is only

<sup>1</sup> This may be regarded as a *Subjective* or *Metaphysical Deduction* of the Ideas, corresponding to the *Metaphysical Exposition* of Space and Time (*supra*, p. 49), and to the *Metaphysical Deduction* of the Categories (p. 81), answering the question, 'If there be *a priori* forms of Reason, what are their characteristics?'

<sup>2</sup> And for this reason, as Kant remarks in § 3, no *objective* deduction of the Ideas is possible.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently this contrast between *object* and *subject* means nothing more than that though an Idea may be defined and its nature explained, its relation to experience cannot be determinately given inasmuch as it is quite beyond the sphere of experience.

an Idea, in a disparaging kind of way. But on the other hand, because in the practical employment of the Understanding we have only to do with action according to rules, the Idea of practical Reason can always be given actually, though not actually, it is, in fact, the indispensable condition of the practical employment of Reason. And so the Idea of Reason is always fruitful, and we have no right to say, in the light of Wisdom (e.g.) that 'it is only an Idea,' but we have to recognize the Idea of the necessary unity of all practical reason, at least determine all practice as an original, and so actual, determining condition. The Ideas then are regulative in two respects: first, that though not themselves determining any subject, they guide the Understanding, and regulate it with a canon of procedure; secondly, that they furnish a connecting link, as it were, between Physics and Ethics: the latter now, however, we here disregard. We are now concerned with the logical form of all knowledge of Reason, and are considering whether or not Reason is a source of knowledge enabling us to regard objects in themselves as determined synthetically *a priori* in relation to one another as its functions. We have before gone through the details of the syllogistic process, and there is no need to do so again, but we observe here that the series of syllogisms (*practically practical syllogisms*) to which Reason leads can be continued either on the side of the conditions (*per pro-syllogismos*) or of the conditioned (*per episyllogismos*) to an indefinite extent. But the ascending and descending are also differently related to the faculty of Reason. For if a conclusion is given (as it always is) only as conditioned by its premises, Reason, which seeks complete knowledge, will demand all its conditions—in other words, will require the ascending series to be complete, given in its totality, unconditionally true. But there can be no such necessity

for completing the *descending* series; Reason is perfectly indifferent as to how far *it* proceeds. The sole aim of pure Reason is absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the *conditions*, not absolute completeness on the part of the *conditioned*. If we once have a completely and unconditionally given condition, no concept of *Reason* is required to complete the series, for the *Understanding* can take by itself every downward step. Thus the transcendental Ideas serve only for ascending in the series of conditions, till they reach the unconditioned—that is, the Principles. With regard to descending to the conditioned, there is no doubt a widely extended logical use which Reason may make of the laws of Understanding, but no transcendental one; and if we were to form an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis (*progressus*) as, e.g. of the whole series of all future changes in the world, such would be a mere *ens rationis*,<sup>1</sup> an arbitrary fiction of thought, but not a necessary presupposition of Reason.

§ 3. *System of Transcendental Ideas*.—We have seen that there are three kinds of dialectical syllogisms, corresponding to the three modes of conclusion by which Reason may arrive at cognitions from principles, and that in all these it is the object of Reason to ascend from the conditioned synthesis to which the Understanding is always restricted, to an unconditioned which the Understanding can never reach. Now the most general relations which our representations<sup>2</sup> (*Vorstellungen*) can have are (1) Relation to the Subject; (2) Relation to Objects, either as phenomena or as objects of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 236.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. with this the similar statement quoted in the App. to vol. ii. p. 266, where he distinguishes these three syntheses as respectively syntheses of the conditions—*a*, of a thought in general; *b*, of empirical thinking; *c*, of pure thinking.

thought in general. So that in fact the conceivable relations of our representations are three in number. First, the Relation to the subject ; Second, to the manifold of the object as a phenomenon ; Third, to all things in general. Hence all transcendental Ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the first of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) *unity of the thinking subject* ; the second the absolute *unity of the series of conditions of phenomena* ; the third the absolute *unity of the conditions of all objects of thought* in general.

The thinking subject is the object-matter of *Psychology*, the sum total of all phenomena (the world) the object matter of *Cosmology*, and the thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all which can be thought (the Being of all Beings), *Theology*. So it is that pure Reason presents us with a transcendental doctrine of the soul (*psychologia rationalis*), a transcendental science of the world (*cosmologia rationalis*), and a transcendental knowledge of God (*theologia transcendentalis*). These Ideas follow the thread of the Categories, as we might expect, for pure Reason never relates directly to objects, but to the concepts of objects framed by the Understanding.

And it is noteworthy that there is<sup>1</sup> among them a certain connection and unity, and that pure Reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one system. From the knowledge of ourselves to a knowledge of the World, and through it to a knowledge of God is a progress<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Caird, *Philosophy of Kant*, pp. 533 sqq.

<sup>2</sup> Kant added a note in the Second Edition, in which he says that the above *analytical* order, though essential to be observed in a preliminary inquiry, is not the order in which Metaphysic would treat of the Ideas *synthetically*. The three great objects of Metaphysic are God, Freedom, and Immortality, and it would aim at showing that the first and second concepts, considered together, will inevitably lead to the third as a necessary conclusion.

so natural that it looks like the logical march of reason from premises to a conclusion. Whether, however, there does exist here a relationship, such as does between the logical and transcendental procedure of Reason, is a question which can only be answered further on. It is sufficient now for us to have shown the nature, origin, and number of the transcendental concepts of Reason, as distinguished from those which properly belong to the sphere of Understanding.

## CHAPTER XIX

### BOOK II

#### *Of the Dialectical Syllogisms of Pure Reason*

THE transcendental (subjective) reality of these pure concepts of Reason rests on the fact that we are led to them by a necessary syllogism. Of these dialectical syllogisms there are three kinds (the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive),<sup>1</sup> which we shall here distinguish briefly, and afterwards develop in detail in the succeeding chapters.

§ 1. 'I conclude from the transcendental concept of the Subject which contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I have in this way no concept,'—*i.e.* though of the subject, apart from its relation to experience, I have no concept. This I call the Transcendental *Paralogism*.

§ 2. 'I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory concept of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series on one side, the correctness of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no concept either,'—*i.e.* I do not perceive that the argument can be retorted. This I call the *Antinomy* of pure reason.

§ 3. 'I conclude from the totality of the conditions

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 248.

under which objects in general, so far as they can be given to me, must be thought, the absolute synthetical unity of all the conditions of the possibility of things in general,'—*i.e.* whether they are given in sense or not. In fact 'I conclude from things which I do not know according to their mere transcendental concept, a Being of all beings, which I know still less through a transcendent concept, and of whose unconditioned necessity I can form no concept whatever. This I call the Ideal of pure reason.'

¶ It may be well, before beginning the chapter on the Paralogisms, to give an explanation of Kant's statement (p. 248, *supra*) that the Categorical Syllogism leads us inevitably to the idea of the Absolute Subject. It seems to be this. Reason always seeks *completeness* of knowledge, and whereas Understanding would be satisfied with and would rest in the mere judgment 'Caius is mortal,' Reason asks, Why? Primarily because Caius is a man and all men are mortal. But why is he a man? Because he is a Roman citizen, and so on *ad inf.*, through an indefinite series of pro-syllogisms; so that complete explanation is impossible, for the furthest step would be 'because he is Caius,' which would convey no information at all. That is, to quote Kant's own language in the *Prolegomena* (vol. ii. p. 124), 'Pure Reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its proper subject, and for this subject, which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate, *its* subject, and so on indefinitely (or as far as we can reach). But hence it follows that we must not hold anything at which we can arrive to be an ultimate subject; and that substance itself never can be thought by the Understanding, however deep we may penetrate, even if all nature were unveiled to us. For the specific nature of our Understanding consists in thinking everything discursively—that is, representing it by concepts, and so by mere predi-



cates, to which therefore the absolute subject must always be wanting.' Nothing short of a knowledge of the absolute subject could give us completeness; this we cannot have, though we are always striving to attain to it. A logical parallogism consists in falsity of a syllogism in form irrespective of its matter. A transcendental parallogism is one in which we are led into this formal falsity through a transcendental ground, and so it has its foundation in the very nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable though not insoluble illusion.

We have seen that the categorical syllogism leads us to the Idea of the Absolute Subject; that is, we have now come to a concept of great importance, though a perfectly content-less one, as we shall find hereafter—the concept of the Ego. This *I think* must be regarded as a transcendental concept of judgment, though it can have no place in the list of categories, inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought belongs to consciousness.<sup>1</sup> And it is upon this *I think* that the whole pretended science of Rational Psychology is based; from this starting point an attempt is made to investigate the nature of the soul, independent of all empirical aid. For if the smallest empirical element of thought, or any particular perception of my internal state, were mixed up among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would no longer be a *rational* but an *empirical* doctrine of the soul. It might be objected at the outset that such a science is on the face of it impossible, for the very proposition from which it starts '*I think*' postulates an internal experience, and therefore introduces an empirical element. But this objection is not well founded, for it is not any particular act of experience that is postulated by Rational Psychologists, but merely the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 140.

apperception 'I think,' without which all concepts, even transcendental ones, would be impossible. Internal experience *in general* and its possibility must not be regarded as *empirical cognition*, but as *cognition of the empirical in general*; <sup>1</sup> and so its discussion comes under the investigation of the possibility of all experience, which is certainly transcendental. We proceed to show in other ways also that the so-called science of Rational Psychology is quite illusory and fallacious.

¶ We have now two separate discussions of the Paralogisms before us, that of the First Edition (given very briefly over again in the Second), the synthetical discussion—and that of the Second Edition, the analytical discussion. It will be convenient to keep them distinct, for even in the short synthetical discussion given in the Second Edition there are some variations from the statements of the First Edition, especially in connection with the fourth Paralogism.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 44.

## CHAPTER XX

### SYNTHETICAL TREATMENT OF THE PARALOGISMS

278  
LET us start, not with the *judgment* 'I think,' but with the *concept* 'I, who am a thinking being,' and endeavour, as Rational Psychologists, therefrom to develop the transcendental doctrine of the soul. We shall, as always, follow the guidance of the Categories, though we shall reverse the usual order and begin with the Category of Substance (by which a thing is represented in itself). The points to be established are:<sup>1</sup>

1.  
The Soul is SUBJECT. (260)

2.  
As regards its quality, it  
is SIMPLE. 262

3.  
As regards the different  
times in which it exists,  
it is numerically identical—that is, UNITY not  
Plurality. Not in Person 263

4.  
It is in relation to possible objects in Space.<sup>2</sup> 267

<sup>1</sup> Compare carefully his second and more systematic statement of these propositions, App. to vol. ii. p. 271, which was omitted in the Second Edition.

<sup>2</sup> That is, as Mr. Caird points out, 'It is an *actual* object in relation to *possible* objects in Space.'

If these propositions were established, all would follow that we want. Props. I. II. III. would give us respectively the *Immateriality*, the *Incorruptibility*, and the *Personality* of the Soul, and all three together would give us *Spirituality*. Prop. IV., giving us the soul in relation to objects in space, gives us its connection (*commercium*) with a body, i.e. *Animality*; and this last, limited by *Spirituality*, gives us *Immortality*. Before we consider in detail the proofs which have been offered for these propositions, let us again repeat that we have nothing to start from but this perfectly contentless representation, 'I, who think,' which cannot even properly be called a concept; it is only a consciousness which accompanies all concepts. By this I, or He, or It which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought =  $x$ , which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from them, we cannot form the least concept, so that we are really turning round it in a perpetual circle, having already to use its representation before we can form any judgment about it. But next it might be asked, Why is this common to all thinking beings because (suppose) true of myself? Why must every thinking existence be regarded as a self-conscious being? The reason of it is that we are constrained to attribute to things *a priori* all the attributes which constitute the conditions under which alone we can think them; and the only way in which I can get a representation of a thinking being is through self-consciousness. That is, the argument is only hypothetical; 'If there be an *I, who thinks*,' anywhere, his soul will possess these properties. The *I think* is here taken in a problematical sense, not in so far as it may contain the perception of an existence, like the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*, but in regard to its mere possibility. Lastly, this

ms. 282  
See the  
common  
on the ground  
2. his  
Hegel's 147

general remark gives us the key to the whole discussion : cognition implies not only *thought*, but *intuition*. It is not merely through my thinking that I cognise an object, but only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness in which all thinking consists. And so I cognise myself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the function of thought. All the *modi* of self-consciousness in thought are hence not concepts of objects (categories), but simply logical functions which do not present to thought an object to be cognised, and cannot therefore present my Self as an object. Not the consciousness of the *determining*, but only that of the *determinable* self, i.e. of my internal intuition, is the object.

*First Paralogism—of Substantiality.*

PROOF :<sup>1</sup> That which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.

A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.

Therefore it exists also only as such, i.e. as substance.

<sup>1</sup> We have taken, for this paralogism, the form of proof given in the Second Edition. In the case of Paralogisms II. and III., the proof is given more fully in First Edition. Paralogism IV. is stated differently in the two editions. In the First Edition the proof of the First Paralogism runs thus : That of which the representation is the absolute subject of our judgments, and which consequently cannot be used to determine anything else (as predicate), is *substance*.

I, as a thinking being, am the *absolute* subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be used as the predicate of anything else.

Therefore I, as a thinking being (soul), am *substance*.

*Critique of First Paralogism.*

This argument is a *sophisma figure dictionis*, for the words *substance* and *thought* are taken in different senses in it all through. 1. Substance in the major premiss means *logical* subject—subject of a judgment; but substance in the conclusion means *metaphysical* subject—subject in a judgment, substratum, self-subsistent being. If it be said that this is not meant, but that in the conclusion also, substance = logical subject, the whole argument is useless, for we could never thence deduce the *permanence* of the soul, which is really the point at issue. In the *General Remark on the System of the Principles* (above, p. 199), we saw that from mere thought without intuition we cannot establish the objective reality of any concept, e.g. from 37  
mere thought we cannot say that the concept of a thing which can exist for itself only as subject, but not as predicate, possesses any objective reality; in fact, we cannot argue from the logical to the metaphysical sense of the word substance. In order to do this we must have at the foundation of our cognition a permanent intuition; but in internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my thought. We may indeed perceive that this representation of the Ego is ever recurring in every act of thought (above, p. 216), but not that it is the fixed and permanent intuition in which thoughts (being transient) alternate.

2. The word *thought* is also taken ambiguously. For in order that the major may be true, it must be a general term equivalent to 'thought or intuited'; but in the minor the word must be used in its restricted sense as opposed to 'intuited,' for by virtue of internal intuition the soul is presented as an *object* to thought, not as a *subject*. Or

again, in the major the word is used as it applies to objects generally, consequently to objects as given in intuition; but in the minor only as it relates to self consciousness. 'Here no object is thought, but there is only represented the relation to self, as subject (as the form of thought).'

So that we may say that the first syllogism of transcendental psychology only palms off upon us a pretended discovery, by setting up the continual logical subject of thinking, as the cognition of the real subject of inherence. That the Ego, the determining self, is the logical subject of thought is an analytical proposition; but to say that it is *substance*, and therefore permanent, is a synthetical proposition, and one impossible to prove. 'The statement that "the soul is a substance," then denotes a substance only in Idea but not in Reality.'

### *Second Paralogism—of Simplicity.*

PROOF: A thing, of which the action cannot be regarded as the concurrence of the action of several things, is *simple*. Now the soul or thinking Ego is such a thing. Therefore the soul is simple.<sup>1</sup>

### *Critique of Second Paralogism.*

This is the 'Achilles'<sup>2</sup> of all the dialectical syllogisms of pure psychology: its argument may be put into a popular form as follows:

'Every composite substance is an aggregate of many; and the action of any composite, or that which inheres in it

<sup>1</sup> Cf. a similar argument in Butler's *Analogy*, pt. I. ch. i. Compare also Mendelssohn's *Phædo*, where this argument is to be found in some detail.

<sup>2</sup> That is—the strong, though not invulnerable argument.

as such, is the aggregate of many actions or accidents, divided among a number of substances. Now, an effect which arises from the concurrence of several acting substances is possible when this effect is merely external (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the joint motion of all its parts). But the case is different with thoughts, which are accidents belonging internally to a thinking being. For supposing that this composite did think, each part of it would contain part of the thought; but all of them only when combined, the whole thought. Now this is contradictory. For since the representations which are contained under the different parts (suppose the individual words of a verse) are never [by themselves] a whole thought (a verse), so thought cannot be inherent in a composite as such. Thought, therefore, is only possible in a substance which is not an aggregate of many substances, but absolutely simple, for different representations in different subjects would as little produce a single thought as a number of single words at random would a line of poetry.

The so-called *nervus probandi* of this argument lies<sup>1</sup> in the proposition: that many representations must be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject to make up one thought. Now this is a synthetical *a priori* proposition; how is it to be proved? As synthetical it cannot be proved from mere concepts; as *a priori* it cannot be deduced from experience, for experience cannot give necessity, and besides the concept of absolute unity is beyond its sphere. The fact is that here, as in the previous paralogism, the formal proposition of apperception, I think, is the whole basis on which rational psychology ventures to extend her cognitions; and the mistake is the old one of exalting a merely subjective condition into an objective. That

<sup>1</sup> I.e. in the minor premiss.



is, it is true that knowledge is impossible unless I *think myself* as simple; but that does not prove that I *am* absolutely simple; *logical* simplicity does not prove *real* simplicity. The fact of the simplicity of the representation of a subject is not, for that reason, a cognition of the simplicity of the subject itself. So I may be allowed to say 'I am a simple substance' only in this sense, that the representation of my Ego never contains a synthesis of multiplicity; but this does not give me the least information with regard to the Ego as an object of experience. Just as the proposition 'the soul is substance,' in the only sense in which it can be proved, is not of the slightest concrete value, and does not enable me to prove the soul's permanence; so the proposition 'the soul is simple,' when understood properly, is of no value in proving that the soul is not corporeal.

But further, if this cardinal proposition which we are considering (that all which thinks is simple substance) were conceded all objective reality, in the pure meaning of a mere judgment of Reason, we shall now show that we could not even then deduce any sound conclusion respecting the difference between body and soul.

1. In one sense it is plainly true that the soul is not corporeal, viz.: that as it is represented to us as an object of the internal sense it cannot, so far as it thinks, be an object of the external senses, or a phenomenon in space, *i.e.* soul as a phenomenon is different from matter as phenomenon. 2. It is plainly improper to ask whether the soul, as a thing *per se*, is or is not different from matter as phenomenon; for a thing *per se* must be of a different nature from the determinations which merely constitute its states. So, 3, the real comparison is between the soul as a thing *per se* and the intelligible something at the basis of

external phenomena. Now we know nothing whatever of this latter; phenomenal matter is composite, but for aught we know this intelligible something may be simple.<sup>1</sup> And therefore, even admitting the simplicity of its nature, the human soul is not at all proved to differ internally from matter, as regards their respective *substrata*.

So this concept of simplicity is useless in the only case where it would be of service (*i.e.* to determine the peculiar and distinguishing feature of our subject, when I compare myself with the objects of external experience); it has no application extending to real objects and cannot possibly, therefore, enlarge our knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

### *Third Paralogism—of Personality.*

PROOF: That which is conscious of its own numerical identity at different times is, so far, a Person.

Now the soul has this consciousness.

Therefore, it is a Person.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. his strong statement in the Second Edition, *Kritik*, p. 252. 'Both kinds of objects differ from each other, not internally, but only so far as the one *appears* (*erscheint*) externally to the other; possibly what is at the bottom of phenomenal matter as a thing in itself, may not be so heterogeneous after all as we imagine.' He here approaches Monism very nearly. Cf. also in First Edition, vol. ii. p. 253. 'The transcendental object which lies at the basis of internal intuition, as well as of external phenomena, is neither matter nor a thinking being *per se*, but a basis of phenomena unknown to us, and these give us the empirical concept of the first as of the second.'

<sup>2</sup> Kant remarks in the Second Edition, that it would be very curious if the simplicity of substance which is so difficult to detect in the phenomena of external intuition, should be presented immediately in the poorest representation of all, *i.e.* in thought. The whole discussion practically overthrows Mansel's theory of the Ego, which is very similar to the one under consideration.

*Handwritten notes:*  
H/V  
I think  
and can  
be more  
positive  
than this  
but not  
idealist.

*Critique of the Third Paralogism.*

The point to be considered is, in what sense is the minor premiss true? This we proceed to discuss. When I regard my own internal phenomena, I find them to be all subject to the condition of *time*; but this time, again (and the phenomena in it), I perceive always as in me, as a form of my internal sensibility; hence in [internal] apperception *self* is the highest condition to which time is subject. For this reason the identity of self has been regarded as the necessary condition of my existence in time. This is true subjectively, but not so objectively or absolutely; for, suppose another man perceives me, he perceives me through his external sense, and I am [also] to him *in time*. But, though he readily admits and believes in my consciousness being accompanied with a full consciousness of identity, this identity is not to him the condition of the time in which he places me. He places *me in time*, instead of placing *time in me*. And the feeling of identity which he allows in me is to him no proof that my *self* is objectively permanent; for it is not necessarily implied by the time in which he places me. The identity, then, of the consciousness of myself at different times is only a formal condition of my thoughts and their connection, and does not demonstrate the numerical identity of my subject, in which, notwithstanding the logical identity of the Ego, such a change might have taken place as to preclude its [numerical] identity. We may illustrate this physically. A perfectly elastic ball which strikes full upon a similar one imparts to it all its motion (or all its state). Now conceive a whole series of substances, each of which imparts its state and the consciousness thereof to the next in order. In such a case the last substance would be conscious of all the states of

the previously changed substances as its own, since those states were transferred to it along with the consciousness of them ; nevertheless, it would not have been the very same person in all these states. That 'all fleets' then is a tenable hypothesis ; at least there is nothing in the mere fact of self consciousness which necessarily contradicts it. To sum up : the proposition of the [logical] identity of the subject amidst all the manifold representations of which I am conscious is an analytical one ; but this does not prove the identity of the Person, 'by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of circumstances.' To prove this we should require not merely analysis, but synthetical judgments based upon a given intuition. Nevertheless the concept of personality (as well as that of substance and simplicity) may remain, so far as it is transcendental, and means a unity of the subject otherwise unknown to us, but in whose states there is a thorough-going connection through apperception. And so far this concept is both necessary and sufficient for all practical uses : but we can never depend upon it to extend our self-cognition through pure Reason.

*Fourth Paralogism—of Ideality (of external relation).<sup>1</sup>* Mm 298

PROOF :—Whatsoever can only be inferred to exist, as the cause of given perceptions, has but a *doubtful* existence.

Now all external phenomena are of such a kind that their present existence cannot be perceived immediately, but we infer them to exist as the causes of given perceptions. 202-3  
Sup.

Consequently the existence of all the objects of the

<sup>1</sup> First Edition.

external senses is doubtful. This uncertainty I call the ideality of external phenomena; and the doctrine which holds this ideality is *Idealism*, in contrast to which the assertion of a possible certainty of objects of the external senses is called *Dualism*.<sup>1</sup>

### *Critique of the Fourth Paralogism.*

¶ The reader who has worked through chapter xiv. will have no difficulty whatever in understanding Kant's argument here. There are really only two points to be attended to: (1) the difference between the Cartesian (or empirical) and the Kantian (or transcendental) idealism, and (2) the definition of *actuality* given in the second Postulate of empirical thought. // 195-196

In the first place it is quite natural that a Rational Psychologist or Transcendental Realist should be forced into this empirical idealism; for of course if the objects of our senses are things *per se* existing quite independently of our sensibility, there can be no guarantee for the actuality of the representations which our senses give of those things. On the other hand the Transcendental Idealist may quite consistently call himself an Empirical Realist, for 'since he considers matter, and even its internal possibility,'<sup>2</sup> to be

<sup>1</sup> The thesis to be proved is: 'The soul is in relation [an *actual* object] to *possible* objects in space' i.e. it is not only *substance*, *simple* and *personal*, but it *independently exists*. We have now got to the Category of Modality, and Rational Psychology desires to show that the existence of the soul is quite independent of the existence of external things. The line of proof adopted here is the attempt to show that the existence of external things is only doubtful. As Kant says in the Second Edition (p. 247), problematical Idealism is perfectly unavoidable in this rationalistic system, 'for if the existence of external things is not requisite to the determination of the existence of a substance in time, the existence of these external things is a gratuitous assumption.'

<sup>2</sup> This phrase possibly means the occult forces or elements, which

nothing but phenomenon, which apart from our sensibility is nothing at all, he only considers it as a kind of representations (intuition), which are called external, *not as if they referred to objects external in themselves*, but because they refer perception to space, in which all things are reciprocally external, while space itself is within us.<sup>1</sup>

The whole force of this Paralogism rests on the false assumption that the objects of sensibility are things *per se*. According to the true doctrine laid down throughout the *Kritik*, external things exist just as much as I myself do; with regard to their actuality, I have just as little need of inference as with regard to the actuality of my thoughts; for they are both nothing but representations, the immediate perception of which is a sufficient proof of their actuality. This is quite in accordance with our former definition of actuality<sup>1</sup> given in the second Postulate of Empirical Thought, 'that which is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is actual' (above, p. 193). 195

So then internal experience is not a whit more immediate and certain than external, and therefore we cannot base on the supposed doubtfulness of external experience any argument which would establish the independent existence of the soul.

#### *Discussion in Second Edition.*

¶ So far the First Edition. The proof of the paralogism hinted at in the Second Edition (*Kritik*, p. 242) is some- may be discovered by experiment or observation. Cf. *Kritik*, pp. 384, 414, and 419 for similar phrases. The last of these passages, however, would point to a different explanation.

<sup>1</sup> It may be here observed that the argument has been confused throughout by translators rendering Kant's '*Wirklichkeit*' by *reality*. *Reality* comes under the second class of Categories, not the fourth; and we are here concerned with the *actuality* of the Categories of Modality. Cf. p. 94, note, and p. 195, *supra*.

what different. The paralogism, as given there, would proceed thus: The soul independently exists, for we are conscious of ourselves as distinct from external phenomena. The critique on this is obvious: That my consciousness of myself is distinct and different from my consciousness of other things is an analytical proposition, but from such mere analysis I cannot at all infer 'whether or not this consciousness of myself is possible without external things through which representations would be given to me, and whether or not, therefore, I can exist merely as a thinking being (without being man).' And in fact, in the Refutation of Idealism (cf. p. 215), we showed that external experience was not merely on a par with internal, but that the latter required the former to guarantee its actuality.

As Mr. Caird points out, Kant goes further here than he did in the Refutation of Idealism, for he here questions the possibility of even a pure consciousness of self, without external perception (*Phil. of Kant*, p. 547); whereas there he had only maintained that the knowledge of the phenomenal self through internal sense presupposes the knowledge of other objects through external sense.

## CHAPTER XXI

### ANALYTICAL TREATMENT OF THE PARALOGISMS (SECOND EDITION)

So far we have been developing the propositions of Rational Psychology in synthetical order, applying successively the categories of relation, quality, quantity, and modality to the concept 'I, who am a thinking being,' and we have seen that in all four cases the results arrived at are fallacious. We proceed to show that the analytical method will lead to equally useless results.

Let us now start with the *judgment* 'I think,' in order that we may discover, by means of it alone, how the Ego determines its existence in time and space; that is, we lead off with an actuality (modality), and the properties of a thinking being in general are then to be deduced from the mode in which this actuality is thought, after everything empirical has been abstracted. Rational Psychology says:<sup>1</sup>

1.

*I think*

2.

as *subject*

3.

as *simple subject*

4.

as *identical subject*

in every state of my thought.

<sup>1</sup> It may be noticed that this analytical discussion is especially directed against Descartes's *Cogito ergo sum.*



*Critique.*

With reference to the statement 'I think, *as subject*' (2), we have already shown that the concept of subject can here be taken only in a logical and not in a transcendental sense; the fact that I must be the logical subject of my thought does not prove that I must be a substance. And as regards statements 3 and 4, how am I to establish them? How am I to go beyond the unity of apperception, indispensable for the possibility of experience, and so pass the bounds of experience? If I am a *materialist* I cannot establish (3) the simplicity of the subject, for in space everything is composite. 'Apperception is something real, and its simplicity lies in its very possibility. Now in space there is nothing real which is simple; for points, which are the only simple things in space, are merely bounds, but not constituent parts of space.'<sup>1</sup> Again the identity or permanence of the Ego (4) during every act of thought can no better be proved by analysis of this 'I think' if I am a *spiritualist*; for there is nothing permanent given in internal intuition, as we have before shown, p. 216 (cf. vol. ii. p. 252). In fact we may say generally that the proposition 'I think' can afford no sure basis to Rational Psychology, and that for two reasons.

1. The proposition is empirical and contains the determinability of my existence merely in reference to my representations in time. Of course it is not meant that the Ego in the proposition is an empirical representation;<sup>2</sup> (it is purely intellectual) but merely this, that without some empirical representation which presents to the mind material for thought, the judgment 'I think' could not be formed.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 272, also Hamilton's *Reid*, pp. 922, 923.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 253.

*See 270  
supra*

And so the proposition is simply equivalent to 'I exist thinking.' Descartes was wrong in *inferring* the 'I exist' from the 'I think,' for his major premiss must be 'Every thinking being exists,' which would not be true, as it would assert that the property of thought constitutes all beings possessing it necessary beings. The one proposition is not to be regarded as an inference from the other, just because, when rightly understood (*i.e.* as limited by time), they are identical.

2. The proposition is synthetical as involving existence. However, the existence in the proposition is not a category, inasmuch as the category never applies to an indeterminately given object, but only to one of which we have a concept, and of which we wish to know, apart from this concept, whether it does or does not exist. But existence is here given quite indeterminately, merely as something real in sensation which awaits determination from the Categories, and therefore I cannot say, 'I exist as substance, accident, etc.,' which would be synthetical additions to my merely existential judgment; the mode of my existence cannot then be determined by means of this simple self consciousness.

So our conclusion must be that Rational Psychology does not exist as a *doctrine* furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves; it is nothing more than a *discipline*,<sup>1</sup> fixing unpassable bounds to speculative reason in this field of thought, guarding against a soul-less materialism on the one hand, against a vague spiritualism on the other. This refusal of our reason to give satisfactory answers on certain points should teach us to abandon fruitless speculation and turn our self-knowledge to practical uses.<sup>2</sup> The whole fallacious science has its origin in a mere misunderstanding.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 432.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Locke, *Essay*, Introduction, § 6.

'The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is taken for an intuition of the subject as an object ; and the category of substance is applied to it.' Or to put the same thing in another way, 'The dialectical illusion in Rational Psychology arises from our confounding an Idea of Reason (that of a pure intelligence) with the altogether undetermined concept of a thinking being in general. I think myself in relation to a possible experience, whilst I abstract from all actual experience ; and infer therefrom that I can be conscious of myself apart from experience and its empirical conditions. I consequently confound the possible abstraction from my own empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self ; and I believe that I am cognising the substantial in myself as a transcendental subject ; when I have nothing more in thought than the unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all determination as the mere form of cognition.'

*Refutation of Mendelssohn's proof of the Permanence  
of the Soul.*

A common argument for the immortality of the soul is this. The soul is simple, hence it possesses no plurality, no parts, is indivisible and therefore cannot perish by *disruption*. Mendelssohn saw that this argument is incomplete, for it may be said that the soul does not perish by *disruption*, but by *vanishing* ; and so he offered in his *Phædo* the following proof of the impossibility of the latter hypothesis. It is admitted that the soul cannot disappear *gradually* by *disruption* ; now if it does so *suddenly* — between the moments of its existence and non-existence there is no time. But between any two moments there is

always time; otherwise the law of continuity is violated. Hence the soul can no more disappear suddenly than gradually, and therefore is permanent.

The flaw in the argument consists in the assumption that 'the soul has no parts.' Even supposing it proved that the soul does not possess *extensive* quantity, it may yet admit of *intensive* quantity—that is, degrees of reality in regard to all that constitutes its being. Consciousness<sup>1</sup> certainly admits of degrees (above, p. 166), and of an infinite number of degrees down to its total disappearance. Consequently the faculty of being conscious admits of like diminution, and may, if not by *discription*, at least by gradual *remission* of its powers, be finally reduced to nothing. This involves no breach of the law of continuity. So the permanence of the soul beyond life remains undemonstrated and indemonstrable.

A further remark may here be made. Some people<sup>2</sup> say that we must admit at least the possibility of thought, after this life has ceased, though we have no knowledge of it except when it is limited by its present empirical conditions. It is very easy to answer these people by introducing other possible theories which are in no way bolder than theirs. 'Such, for example, is the possibility of the division of a *simple substance* into several, or conversely the coalition of several into one simple substance. For although divisibility presupposes a composite, it does not necessarily require a composite of substances, but only of degrees (of the manifold faculties) of one and the same substance.

<sup>1</sup> This may be seen at once if we consider that we may have representations present to consciousness, which are not *clear*—that is, which are not fully distinguished from other representations, and of this obscurity there may be any number of degrees. Cf. Leibnitz on *clearness* and *distinctness* of concepts.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. Mendelssohn, in his *Phædo*. Discourse I. *sub. fin.*

Now we can think all the powers and faculties of the soul, even that of consciousness, as diminished by one half, the substance still remaining. So also we can represent to ourselves without contradiction this extinguished half as preserved, though not within the soul yet outside it; and we can hold that, as in this case, everything that is real in the soul and has a degree—consequently its entire existence—has been halved, a particular substance would arise outside the soul.' In the same manner several simple substances might coalesce into one, nothing being lost thereby except the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance would contain in itself the degree of reality of all the former substances. When once we begin with such vague and unprofitable speculation, there is no end to it.

Thus in this region of thought, criticism has shown that it is impossible to make any dogmatic assertion concerning an object of experience, beyond the bounds of experience. But it is to be remarked that the necessity of admitting a future life upon the principles of the speculative and practical Reason combined has lost nothing by this criticism; for the mere speculative proofs which we have been discussing never had any influence on the common reason of men. The really weighty, popular, and practical proof remains untouched, viz. the proof arising out of the consideration that man's faculties, desires, and natural gifts reach far beyond earthly use—they are out of all proportion to our terrestrial needs; and as we find from the *analogy of nature* that means and ends are always proportioned, we must only conclude that hereafter there will be a sphere in which these faculties and desires will have full scope.

*General Remark on the Transition from Rational  
Psychology to Cosmology.*

We stated (p. 272) that 'I think' is an empirical proposition. Now such a proposition is based on an empirical intuition, and its object is phenomenal; so that it might seem as if, according to our theory, the soul was changed altogether even in thought into phenomenon, and so our consciousness (being in fact mere illusion) would rest upon nothing. Here then we must make a distinction. Thought, taken by itself, is merely the logical function which binds together the manifold of a possible intuition, and so is pure spontaneity; it does not represent the subject of consciousness as phenomenon, because it does not consider whether the mode of intuiting it be sensible or intellectual. When I represent myself as the *subject* of thought or as the *ground* of thought, these modes of representation are not the categories of Substance and Cause. If I wished to know myself, then these categories would have to be applied as usual to my sensuous intuition; but here I only wish to be *conscious of myself* as thinking; in this consciousness I am BEING ITSELF (*Wesen selbst*), and of this Being nothing further is given in thought.

But secondly, if the proposition 'I think' is to be equivalent to 'I exist thinking,' it is no longer the mere representation of a logical function; it determines the subject in relation to existence, and so the aid of internal sense is required. We have now not only the spontaneity of thought, but we have also the receptivity of intuition. It is plain then that any cognition of myself of this kind must be phenomenal, for the internal empirical intuition is sensuous and presents us only with phenomenal data, which do not furnish anything to the object of the pure

*Consciousness* for the knowledge of its own separate existence, but can serve the purpose of experience only.<sup>1</sup>

*Consideration on the whole of pure Psychology as an appendix to the Paralogisms.*<sup>2</sup>

‘If we contrast the *doctrine of the soul* [psychology] as the physiology of the internal sense with the *doctrine of bodies*,—as a physiology of the objects of the external sense,—we shall find (in addition to the fact that in both we know a great deal empirically) this remarkable difference, that in the latter much can be cognised *a priori* from the mere concept of an extended incompressible being; whereas in the former, from the concept of a thinking being, nothing can be cognised synthetically *a priori*. The cause is this. Although both are phenomena, yet the phenomenon presented to the external sense has something permanent or fixed, which gives a *substratum* lying at the basis of changeable determinations, and so gives us a synthetical concept, namely, that of space and a phenomenon in it. (above, p. 217). Time, on the contrary, which is the only form of our internal intuition, has nothing permanent in it; so that it only lets us know the change of determinations, not the determinable object.’ And so, as we have seen, Rational Psychology gives us no synthetical propositions about the soul. But still, though it does not add to our knowledge of the properties of the soul, it serves this valuable purpose

<sup>1</sup> Briefly: *That* I think, I am assured of by pure consciousness; but *how* I think or *how* I exist I can only tell by calling in the aid of internal sense, and so bringing down the question to the region of phenomena.

<sup>2</sup> We insert this here; it was left out in the Second Edition of the *Kritik*.

that it secures us from the danger of Materialism. 'This is done by the rational concept of our thinking self, which we have set forth; for instead of there being any danger that if matter were taken away, all thought—and even the existence of thinking beings—would consequently vanish, it is rather clearly shown that, if I take away the thinking subject, the whole world of matter must vanish, being only what appears in the sensibility of our subject as a species of its representations.'<sup>1</sup>

We are now in a position to consider three additional dialectical questions (cf. p. 259) which form the proper object of *Rational Psychology*, viz. (1) the possibility of the community of the soul and an organic body, *i.e.* the *animality* and condition of the soul in this life; (2) the *commencement* of this community, *i.e.* the state of the soul at and before birth [the question of *pre-existence*]; (3) the end of this community, *i.e.* the state of the soul at and after death (the question of *immortality*).

1. As question (1) is commonly understood it comes to this: How can there be a community between two heterogeneous substances, mind and matter? And three different hypotheses have been made in order to answer this, viz. the doctrines ( $\alpha$ ) of *Physical Influence*, ( $\beta$ ) of *Pre-established Harmony*, ( $\gamma$ ) of *Supernatural Assistance*.<sup>2</sup> Now if we consider the problem critically we shall see that there is a fallacy in its very statement, and hence in all the solutions. For the all-important distinction between phenomena and noumena is overlooked. All three theories make the fundamental presupposition that soul and body are distinct *per se*; and, as theories, are only possible under this

<sup>1</sup> As Mr. Caird points out (*Philosophy of Kant*, p. 549), this sentence contains the real answer to all theories of Materialism.

<sup>2</sup> Respectively due to Descartes, Leibnitz, and Malebranche.



supposition. But how could we know this to be true? We have seen before (p. 265) that at least such an assumption is perfectly gratuitous. And so our *Kritik* leads us to the conclusion that such a statement of the problem involves gross dualism. The real problem is this: 'How can external intuition (viz. that of space) be at all possible in a thinking subject?' And this problem is insoluble; we can never supply this gap in our knowledge—we can only indicate it by ascribing external phenomena to a transcendental object as their cause, of which however we have not and cannot have any notion.

2 and 3. So also is it with the problems of pre-existence and immortality. Stated in their proper form they will be as follows:—Before the commencement of that kind of sensibility by which something appears to us in space, how were those transcendental objects intuited, which in our present condition appear as bodies? And when that kind of sensibility ceases by which transcendental—and now wholly unknown—objects appear to us, will all intuition of them consequently cease? We cannot answer such questions; we cannot reasonably pretend to know on what the actuality of external phenomena depends, even in the present state, and therefore we cannot assert positively whether it will or will not continue after death.<sup>1</sup> So that the whole dispute about the nature of the soul and its connection with the external world merely arises from our supplying the gaps in our knowledge by paralogisms of the Reason, in that we make our thoughts to be things and hypostatise them, whence arises an imaginary science, both as regards its affirmations and its negations.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the strikingly similar language of Butler, *Anal.* I. ch. i.

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON

WE now proceed to consider the dialectical procedure of pure Reason in reference to *hypothetical* syllogisms. Here our aim is to reach the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the phenomenon; as in the preceding discussion our argument was concerned (following the analogy of the categorical syllogism) with the unconditioned unity of the *subjective* conditions of representations generally.

We shall term all transcendental ideas, in so far as they relate to the synthesis of phenomena, *cosmical concepts*<sup>1</sup> (*Weltbegriffe*), partly on account of this unconditioned totality, on which the concept of the world-whole rests—a concept which is itself only an Idea—partly because they relate solely to the synthesis of phenomena, which is empirical;<sup>2</sup> while, on the other hand, the absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible things gives rise to an Ideal of pure reason, which is quite different from the cosmical concept, although it stands in relation with it.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, pp. 263, 508.

<sup>2</sup> *I.e.* the word *Welt* on the one hand applies to phenomena, and on the other, in the transcendental sense, signifies the absolute totality of the content of existing things (*κοσμος*).

<sup>3</sup> It is essential to bear this distinction in mind all through. Cf. *Kritik*, pp. 232-236, etc.

And just as the paralogisms of pure reason formed the foundation of a dialectical psychology, so it will be seen that the antinomies, which here result, place before us the transcendental principles of a pretended pure Rational Cosmology.

§ 1. *System of Cosmological Ideas.* — In order to enumerate with systematic precision these Ideas according to a principle, we must remark two things. —

1st, That pure and transcendental concepts arise from the Understanding alone; the Reason does not give birth to any new concept, but only frees the concept of the Understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible experience (above, p. 26), and thus tries to raise it beyond the bounds of the empirical, though still in connection with it, as was fully explained above (p. 242). Hence then we may say that the transcendental ideas are properly nothing but categories raised to the unconditioned, and they may be arranged in a table corresponding to that of the categories.

2nd, All the categories do not serve for this,<sup>1</sup> but only those in which the synthesis constitutes a series, and a series of subordinated (not of co-ordinated) conditions. And, as we saw before (p. 250), absolute totality is required of Reason only in so far as concerns the *ascending* series of the conditions of a conditioned, and not when we are *descending* to the consequences. The *descending* or *pro-*

<sup>1</sup> It must be remembered that Kant is here only speaking of *Cosmological Ideas*; the categories in which the synthesis does not furnish us with a *series* may of course be raised to the Unconditioned, but when they are, they do not give the *Cosmological Ideas*, but the *Psychological* or *Theological*, leading not to the absolute unity of a series of conditions of phenomena, but to the absolute unity of the thinking subject, or of the conditions of all objects of thought in general. Cf. *Kritik*, p. 234.

*gressive* series, proceeding *in consequentia*, cannot be regarded as given, but only as capable of being given (*dabilis*). The Cosmological Ideas on the other hand are occupied with the totality of the *regressive* synthesis, and proceed *in antecedentia*.

Let us now try to construct our table of cosmological ideas in accordance with that of the Categories; in other words, let us seek the complete series of the conditions of a given phenomenon.

1. As to *Quantity*, the two original *quanta* of all our intuition are Time and Space. Every object of intuition is *composite*, i.e. extended in time and space.<sup>1</sup> As regards *time*, it is in itself a series, and so in this respect the transcendental idea of the (regressive) series of the conditions of a given conditioned is merely the whole of past time. But it may be said a similar remark cannot be made of space, for how can the extension of *space* be regarded as a regressive series of conditions? Are not the parts of space simultaneous? To this we reply: Though all the parts of space are co-ordinated, yet they must be *apprehended*<sup>2</sup> successively, and are hence (*a*) a *series*. As in the *measurement* of space we take units successively, and as these units are evidently limited and conditioned by the succeeding units, we have (*B*) a series of *conditions* and conditioned. And as no space can be given or produced by another as a result, but is only *limited* by it as a condition, this limitation is (*γ*) rather a *regressive* than a progressive series. Hence then I have a right to demand the absolute totality of phenomena in space, just as in time. Whether my demand can be satisfied is a question to be answered in the sequel. So then my first Cosmological

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 163, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, § 27.

Idea is the *absolute Completeness of the Composition of the given totality of all phenomena.*

2. As to *Quality*. All matter, as being in space, is divisible or consists of parts. Its reality depends on the reality of each of its parts; they are its conditions: the parts of parts are its remote conditions. So here is our regressive synthesis, the absolute totality of which is required by Reason. This can only be obtained by a completed *division*, and so our Idea is *the absolute completeness of the Division of a given totality in a phenomenon.*

3. As to *Relation*. (a) The category of Substance will not furnish us with a cosmological idea, as we can get no regressive series. For accidents (in so far as they inhere in a substance) are co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series: and in relation to substance they are not properly subordinated to it, but are the modes of existence of the substance itself. (b) The same holds good of substances in *community*, which are mere aggregates and have no exponent of a series. For they are not subordinated to each other as conditions of its possibility, which may be said of spaces, as above explained. (c) Hence, therefore, it is only in the category of Causality that we can find such a series as we want, a series of causes to a given effect, and our third Cosmological Idea is that *of the absolute completeness of the origination of a phenomenon.*

4. As to *Modality*, the concepts of the possible, the actual, and the necessary conduct to no series, except so far as the *contingent* in existence must always be regarded as conditioned, and as pointing according to a rule of the Understanding to a condition under which it is necessary to rise to a higher condition until, in the totality of the series, Reason finds unconditioned necessity. So our fourth Cosmo-

logical Idea is that of *the absolute completeness of the Dependence of the Existence of the changeable in a phenomenon.*

This Unconditioned may be thought either (a) as existing merely in the entire series, in which all the members are conditioned and only the totality<sup>1</sup> (*Das Ganze*) of them quite unconditioned—and in this case the regress is called infinite; or (b) the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series to which the other members are subordinated, but which itself stands under no other condition.<sup>2</sup> In the former case the series is a *parte priori* without bounds, without beginning, *i.e.* infinite, and although entirely given, yet the regress in it can never be completed, and can only be called potentially infinite. In the latter case there exists a First in the series, which is called, with reference to past time, the *beginning of the world*; with reference to space, the *boundary of the world*; with reference to the parts of a given limited whole, the *simple*; with reference to causes, absolute *spontaneity* (freedom); and with reference to the existence of changeable things, absolute *necessity of nature.*

Now the word nature has been used in two senses, which we shall distinguish. (1) Nature, understood *adjective* (*formaliter*), signifies the complex of the determinations of a thing, according to an internal principle of causality, *i.e.* stands for a *Mathematical* whole.<sup>3</sup> On (2) the other hand we understand by nature *substantive* (*materialiter*), the sum total (*Inbegriff*) of phenomena in so far as they by virtue of an internal principle of causality are connected with each

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 284.

<sup>2</sup> In the one case, in the language of Hamilton, we may say that the Unconditioned is *infinite*, negating extrinsic dependence; in the other case it is *absolute*, positing intrinsic independence.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. above, p. 135, and *Proleg.* p. 99.

other throughout. This is a *dynamical* whole. If we wish to use language exactly we will use *World (Welt)* to signify the mathematical whole of phenomena and the totality of their synthesis, whether by composition or division; and we will term the world *Nature* when it is regarded as a dynamical whole. If then we adopt this terminology, we shall restrict the phrase<sup>1</sup> *cosmical concepts (Weltbegriffe)* to the first two Ideas of Rational Cosmology, calling the latter two *transcendent concepts of nature (transcendente Naturbegriffe)*.

§ 2. *Antithetic of Pure Reason.*—Transcendental Antithetic is an investigation into the antinomy of pure Reason, its causes and its result. If we apply our Reason not only to objects of experience according to the laws of understanding, but venture to extend it beyond these bounds, there arise sophistical (*vernünftelnde*) propositions which can neither hope for confirmation nor fear refutation in experience. Each of them is not only in itself self-consistent, but can point to conditions of its necessity in the very nature of Reason, only that unfortunately its opposite can produce equally valid and necessary grounds for its support. The questions which naturally arise in such a Dialectic of pure Reason are therefore—(1) In what propositions is pure Reason unavoidably subject to antinomy? (2) On what causes does this antinomy depend? (3) Whether and in what way can Reason in spite of this contradiction find a way to certainty?

A dialectical theorem (*Lehrsatz*) is different from a sophistical, *firstly*, in that it is not an answer to an arbitrary question, but to one naturally and necessarily forced upon us; and, *secondly*, in that it carries with it an illusion which cannot be dispelled,<sup>2</sup> even when we are no longer deceived by it.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 281.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 238, *supra*.

Now when we meet with dialectical propositions of this kind, which seem to contradict each other, and yet which seem to be equally susceptible of rational proof, the method to be adopted for finding the truth is what we call the *sceptical method*. That is, we set ourselves to discover whether the object of the struggle is not a mere illusion, which each side strives to reach, but which would be of no gain even if it were reached.<sup>1</sup> This is quite a different thing from *scepticism*, or that artificial and scientific agnosticism which undermines the foundations of all knowledge in order to destroy our belief and confidence in it. For the sceptical method aims at certainty by endeavouring to discover in a conflict of this kind, conducted honestly and intelligently on both sides, the point of misunderstanding. Such a method may be dispensed with in mathematics or in physics, where we can appeal either to pure intuition or to experiment; but in transcendental philosophy, where we have no such sure criteria for testing the falsity of an assertion, its use is indispensable.

¶ We now proceed to develop the conflicts of the transcendental ideas in order; but before doing so we state Kant's position. You may affirm or deny the completeness of composition, division, origination, or independence. Here are 'eight propositions which contradict one another in pairs, but each of which necessarily belongs to Metaphysic, which must either accept it or refute it (*although there is not one that has not in its time been held by some philosopher*).' Now you may choose any of the eight you please, and Kant undertakes to prove its opposite. 'That is to say, we cannot have, with regard to the phenomenal series, the completeness of antecedence which

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Kritik*, p. 450, and also cf. *supra*, p. 18, on the distinction between the *dogmatical* method and dogmatism.



reason demands. In brief a cosmical metaphysic is impossible, and this is the indirect proof of 'Transcendental Ideality.' (Prof. Maguire's *Lectures on Philosophy*, p. 160.) The proofs of these different propositions now follow: their critical solution comes afterwards.

## CHAPTER XXIII

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### THE ANTINOMIES

#### *First Antinomy (of Quantity)*

THESIS.—The world has ( $\alpha$ ) a beginning in time, and is ( $\beta$ ) also limited in regard to space.

PROOF.—For ( $\alpha$ ) if it had no beginning in time, an eternity must have already elapsed. But the infinity of a series consists in the very fact that it can never be completed by means of a successive synthesis; therefore an infinite series already elapsed is impossible, and the world has a beginning in time.<sup>1</sup> ( $\beta$ ) If it were unlimited in regard to space, then it must be an infinite given total of co-existent things. But an infinite can never be given, for *quâ* infinite it can neither be given in a single intuition, nor can it be given in a series of successive intuitions of

<sup>1</sup> It has been objected by Dr. Erhardt in his *Kritik der Kantischen Antinomienlehre*, that this proof is fallacious, for *infinite* is used in two senses—( $\alpha$ ) as that which has no beginning; ( $\beta$ ) as that which can never be completed through a successive synthesis. But it is not easy to see how the synthesis of a series which has no beginning could ever be completed, and probably Kant would say that the transition from meaning ( $\alpha$ ) to meaning ( $\beta$ ) is therefore perfectly legitimate. Somewhat similar objections were raised to the proofs of thesis and antithesis in all the antinomies by Prof. Maguire as far back as 1874.

its parts, for a complete synthesis of this kind would require an infinite time, already shown to be impossible.

Kant adds that he might have proved the thesis also by starting with a false notion of the infinity of a given quantity—the mathematical conception—that it is a quantity greater than any other; but of whatever number of parts we take a quantity to be, we can add to this number. Therefore, etc. But this notion of an infinite quantity assumes a *given* unit, and the argument based on it would equally well disprove the possibility of a finite body having an infinite number of component parts. The proper transcendental notion of infinity is that adopted in the text; it does not answer the question, How large? but the question, How often must I repeat a unit of *any size I choose to assume*, to obtain it? Hence in proportion to the unit assumed, infinites may vary greatly in quantity.

ANTITHESIS.—The world has no beginning and no boundaries in space, but is infinite in respect both ( $\alpha$ ) to time and ( $\beta$ ) space.<sup>1</sup>

PROOF.—( $\alpha$ ) If it be not infinite with respect to time, it must have had a beginning; therefore there must have been a time when the world did not exist, *i.e.* a void time. But in a void time nothing can originate, for there is no reason why it should originate at one moment rather than at another; and therefore the world could never have come into existence at all. Hence the world cannot have had a beginning. ( $\beta$ ) If it be bounded in space, it must exist in a void space (which is not bounded). We then have not only a relation of

<sup>1</sup> It may be observed that all the proofs (cf. the subsequent remarks on the fourth antinomy) of thesis and antithesis are *indirect*. And it must be constantly borne in mind that, on the assumption that phenomena are things in themselves, all the proofs are regarded as perfectly valid and conclusive by Kant. The whole force of his subsequent reasoning depends on this.

things *in* space, but a relation of things *to* space. But as the world is an absolute whole, out of and beyond which no object of intuition can be discovered, this relation to *void space* is virtually relation to no object, is nothing. Hence then the world cannot be regarded as bounded in space.<sup>1</sup>

In fact, if we assume the existence of a bound to the world either in space or in time, we are forced to assume two nonentities (*Undinge*), void space and void time. On this argument Kant makes the following remark. It may be said by a philosopher of the school of Leibnitz, this assumption is not necessary; <sup>2</sup> space and time are only the relations of things and not supposable beyond them. Instead of a 'first beginning,' all that you need assume is an existence *which postulates no other condition* in the world; instead of 'bounds of extension,' all that you require is '*limits of the world-whole*;' <sup>3</sup> you get rid of time and space in this way. In reply we need only say we are not talking of a *mundus intelligibilis*; we are talking of a *mundus phenomenon* and its quantity, and we cannot ignore the conditions of sensibility without destroying its very being. If we ignore space in general as an *a priori* condition of the possibility of phenomena, the whole world of sense vanishes, which alone forms the object of our inquiry.

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*Second Antinomy (of Quality)*

THEESIS.—Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nothing but the simple or what is composed of it.

PROOF.—If composite substances do not consist of simple parts, then if all composition were annihilated in

<sup>1</sup> Contrast carefully with this the critical solution, p. 318, *infra*, which is quite different.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 49, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Proleg.* p. 154.

thought *nothing* would remain. But with substances composition is only a contingent relation, an external state, apart from which they must still subsist as permanent beings. Hence our hypothesis is false, and therefore there must be simple parts as the first elements of all composition.

It must, however, says Kant, be observed that the above inference of the simple from the composite is only true of self-subsistent beings. That is, 'if I speak of a whole which consists necessarily of simple parts, I understand thereby only a substantial whole, as the true *compositum*, i.e. the contingent unity of the manifold, which, given as *separate* (at least in thought), is brought into a mutual connection, and thus constitutes one thing.' For example, the above argument does not apply to (a) space or to time. Space is not a *compositum* in the above sense, it is rather a *totum*; for its parts are possible only in the whole, and not the whole by means of the parts. It might perhaps be called<sup>1</sup> a *compositum ideale*, but not a *compositum reale*. And so also with time. Again the argument (b) will not apply to *that which only belongs to the state of a substance*, even though this state possesses quantity, i.e. a certain degree of change does not arise from the accumulation of many simple changes.

So we must not suppose that the inference of the simple from the composite is valid of *everything* composite. As a matter of terminology, Leibnitz's word *monad* should be reserved for 'the simple,' given immediately as simple substance (e.g. in self-consciousness); while the word *atom* should signify merely the simple, as an element of the composite. So then this thesis might well be called Transcendental *Atomistic*; but as the word has been used to designate a particular theory of corporeal phenomena,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 50, *supra*.

it is better to call it the dialectical principle (*Grundsatz*) of *Monadology*.

ANTITHESIS.—(a) No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and (β) there exists nowhere in the world anything simple.

PROOF.—(a) For suppose that a composite does consist of simple parts. Composition is only possible in space, therefore each simple part must occupy space.<sup>1</sup> But everything which occupies space contains parts external to each other, and is therefore composite. Hence it follows that the supposed simple element must be a substantial composite, which is self-contradictory. (β) Grant that an absolutely simple object were found in experience. The empirical intuition of such an object must contain no manifold whatever. But of this we could never be sure; for though we were not conscious of any manifold in an object, we could not therefore assert that no manifold was there. So then absolute simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatever; as, therefore, an absolutely simple object cannot be given in any experience, and as the world of sense must be regarded as the sum total (*Inbegriff*) of all possible experience, nothing simple exists in the world.

This second proposition (as banishing the simple from nature) goes further than the first, which merely banishes it from the intuition of the composite. Hence we were unable to prove it from the concept of a given object of external intuition (of the composite), but were obliged to prove it from the relation of such given object to a possible experience in general.

REMARKS.—The Monadists do not see that it is one thing to say that the *concept* of the composite requires the *concept* of the simple; quite another thing to dis-

<sup>1</sup> Vide p. 163, *supra*.

cover for the *intuition* of the composite, the *intuition* of the simple. It is this latter that is quite impossible. Of course, as in Antinomy I, the Leibnitzians may try to evade the argument by denying that space is the condition of the possibility of objects of external intuition; but let us again remind them that we have only to do with phenomena; their position would be tenable enough if bodies were things in themselves.

'The second dialectical assertion (in the antithesis) possesses the peculiarity of having opposed to it a dogmatical proposition, which, alone among all sophistical assertions, undertakes to prove evidently, in the case of an object of experience, the actuality of that which we counted before as merely belonging to transcendental ideas, viz. the absolute simplicity of substance.' The proposition is that the Ego is a simple substance. We need not now repeat what we said before on this subject (cf. pp. 262-5); we merely remark that even if the Ego in relation to itself were absolutely one, still, when this subject is regarded *externally* as an *object* of intuition it would, as phenomenon, be composite. And it must always be regarded in this way, if we wish to know whether there is or is not contained in it a manifold whose parts are external to each other.

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### *Third Antinomy (of Relation)*

THESIS.—Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality from which the phenomena of the world can be deduced. To explain them, we must necessarily assume, in addition, a causality through freedom.

PROOF.—Suppose that there is no other kind of causality than that according to laws of nature. Then everything *that happens* presupposes an antecedent which it follows

inevitably according to a rule. But this antecedent itself was also something that once *happened*, and therefore presupposes another antecedent. Hence, then, if everything happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature, there can never be any *first* beginning; *i.e.* there is never a sufficient cause for anything, which contradicts the law of causality itself. So that to suppose that "all is nature" is self-contradictory, and therefore we must admit another kind of causality, through which something happens without its cause being determined according to necessary laws by a preceding cause. That is, we are forced to admit an *absolute spontaneity* of causes, which originates of itself a series of phenomena proceeding according to laws of nature, *i.e.* we must have *Transcendental Freedom*.

REMARKS.—It is important to bear in mind that this *transcendental Idea* of Freedom is something quite different from the *psychological concept* of the same.<sup>1</sup> Freedom, in the transcendental sense, is merely the faculty of beginning an event spontaneously; it is the stone of stumbling in philosophy, because people are not careful to preserve this strict sense of the word. Now what we have proved so far is this—that a free cause is absolutely required to account for *the origin of the world*. Hence [as freedom is a *vera causa*] we feel ourselves authorised to admit a faculty originating a series in time, not only at the beginning of things, but in the ordinary course of nature: *i.e.* we attribute free action to substances. We must not think the fact that everything has a beginning in time any difficulty; for an origin as to causality is a different thing. Such an event as the act of a free agent must of course *succeed*, but does not *proceed from*, its temporal antecedents.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Proleg.*, p. 141 n., and cf. for a full account of the difference *Theory of Ethics*, p. 190.



It may be observed that this need of a free first cause to account for the origin of natural phenomena was felt by all philosophers of antiquity (the Epicureans excepted), and led them to the doctrine of a *primum mobile*.

ANTITHESIS.—There is no freedom, but everything in the world takes place solely according to laws of nature.

PROOF.—If there be such a thing as a faculty originating a state of itself, we are led to strange consequences. For every beginning of an act presupposes a state in which the cause is not yet active, and a dynamically primary beginning of an act presupposes a state which has no causal connection with the preceding state of that cause—that is, in no wise follows from it. Hence we have a *post hoc*, in no way determined by a *propter hoc*, by which the natural law of causality is totally destroyed. If then we admit transcendental freedom we are admitting something which can be met with in no experience, and which actually destroys the unity of experience; it is consequently a mere fiction, and we have nothing but nature to fall back upon. Freedom (independence) from the laws of nature is doubtless a *deliverance* from restraint, but also from the *guidance* of all rules.<sup>1</sup> Nature and transcendental freedom differ from each other as conformity to law and lawlessness; and if we assume the latter we are at once giving up the possibility of any system at all.

REMARKS.—The argument of the advocate of this Transcendental Physiocracy may be put thus. *If you do not admit a mathematical first in relation to time, you have no need to seek a dynamical first in regard to causality.*

<sup>1</sup> Kant points out very clearly the inaccuracy of such a statement, *Theory of Ethics*, p. 65—"Although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless," etc.

There is no evidence that there is any such dynamical first. The unity of experience requires us to suppose that substances have always existed in the world, and so there is no difficulty in believing that the change of their states, *i.e.* a series of changes, has always existed too. This infinite series is certainly incomprehensible, but so are all ultimate facts, *e.g.* the fact of change. And, further, even if we do admit the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom, it can only exist out of and beyond the world. To attribute such a faculty to substances in the world is to substitute chaos for cosmos, to contradict the law of causality, and so to take away our sure test for distinguishing actual experience from visionary dreams.

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*Fourth Antinomy (of Modality)*

THESIS.—There exists an absolutely necessary being belonging to the world, either as a part, or as the cause of it.

PROOF.—The world of sense, as the sum total (*das Ganze*) of all phenomena, contains a series of changes. (For without such a series the representation of the series of time itself, as a condition of the possibility of the world of sense, could not be given to us.)<sup>1</sup> Now every change stands under its condition, which precedes it in time and renders it necessary. But [see p. 242] the existence of a given conditioned presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. Hence *something absolutely necessary must exist if change is to exist as its consequence.*

<sup>1</sup> Objectively [logically], time, as the formal condition of the possibility of change, precedes all change; but subjectively [chronologically], and in the actuality of consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is given only on occasion of perception.

*This is what M. Cousin also says*

Further, this necessary thing must belong to the world of sense. For suppose it did not; then, as the beginning of a series in time can be determined only by that which precedes it in time, a necessary being outside the world could never originate a series of changes in the world. Its causality must belong to time, and therefore it must itself be in the world, and so our supposition that our necessary being exists outside the world leads to absurdity. Hence, then, we have proved that 'there is contained in the world [of sense] something that is absolutely necessary (whether it be the whole world-series itself, or only a part thereof).'

REMARKS.—The above argument, which ascends from the conditioned in phenomena to the unconditioned in concepts, is commonly called the *cosmological proof* of the existence of a necessary being, and is the only one which can be here employed. Taken by itself it does not show whether this necessary being belongs to the world or not; but still we have seen that if we take as the foundation of it the fact of *change in the world*, we shall have to conclude that the necessary being must also be in the world, otherwise we shall be guilty of making an unwarranted *saltus* (μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος). And the truth of this may be shown in another way, as follows.


As we saw before (page 200), the word *contingent* is ambiguous. The *empirically contingent* is that which can only exist as the consequence of something else. The *intelligibly contingent* (and this is the proper meaning of the word) is that, the *contradictory* of which is possible—that of which the non-existence can be conceived. Now *change* cannot be proved contingent in the latter sense; it is only empirically contingent, and therefore can only lead to a necessary being *in* the time-series, and hence the Unconditioned at which we arrive must be regarded as *in* the world.

ANTITHESIS.—There does not at all exist any absolutely necessary being, either (*a*) in the world, or (*b*) out of it, as its cause.

PROOF.—For if (*a*) be true there are only two possible cases. Either the absolutely necessary being must be a First Cause, unconditionally necessary, and therefore uncaused, which would be at variance with the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena in time [as was proved before in the antithesis of Antinomy III.]; or else it must be identified with the infinite series of world causes, in which case we shall have a series contingent and conditioned in all its parts, and yet as a whole absolutely necessary. But this is a self-contradictory supposition, for the *existence* of an aggregate cannot be necessary if no single part of it possesses necessary existence.<sup>1</sup> If (*b*) be true we are led into the absurdity of holding that the causality of a cause, which itself is out of time, can begin in time, as we showed more fully under the thesis. So the conclusion of the antithesis is, that a necessary being exists nowhere.

REMARKS.—In this Antinomy there is a very remarkable contrast. The very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis the existence of an original being, proved in the antithesis with equal strictness its non-existence. We found first that *a necessary being exists* because the whole time past contains the series of all conditions, and with it, therefore, the unconditioned; secondly, that *there does not exist any necessary being* for the same reason, viz. that the whole time past contains the series of all conditions—

<sup>1</sup> It might be objected that this is not obvious, and further, that it is contradictory to Kant's own statement (p. 285) that 'the unconditioned may be thought as existing merely in the entire series, in which all the members without exception are conditioned, and only the totality of them quite unconditioned, in which case the regress is called infinite.'



things are themselves, therefore, in the aggregate, conditioned. The explanation is this. We attend in the thesis solely to the *absolute totality* of the series of conditions, the one of which determines the other in time, and thus arrive at a necessary unconditioned. In the antithesis we consider on the contrary the *contingency* of everything that is determined in the *time-series*.

¶ A good deal of misapprehension as to this fourth Antinomy has arisen through not attending to Kant's language, which is, as usual, very precise. In the first place we must establish the differences between Antinomies III. and IV. We believe that the main point of importance is to be found in the statement (*Kritik*, p. 345) that here the series is not a series of *intuitions*, as in the other Antinomies, but of *concepts*. This marks out the fourth Antinomy as quite different from the others. Moreover, in the Antinomy of Relation we are discussing the nature of the *causality* of substances: Is this causality ever free, or is it always in accordance with the law of nature? In the Antinomy of Modality we ask: Is there such a thing as a substance independently existing, a *causa sui*? Without considering now the way in which substances act, we inquire, Is there any substance anywhere possessed of independent existence? The thesis asserts that such a necessary being (for necessary it must be if unconditioned) must exist in the world, while the antithesis denies that it exists anywhere. And<sup>1</sup> there are three possible ways in which the thesis may be true—this necessary being may be (a) a *part*, or (b) the *cause* of the world, or (c) may be identified with the whole cosmical series.

<sup>1</sup> For a confirmation of this, *vide* p. 309, *infra*. 'If we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary being, whether it be the world itself, or something in the world, or a cause of the world,' etc.



The antithesis denies the possibility of any of these suppositions, and shows in detail that neither (b) nor (c) can be true. Case (a) hardly requires separate refutation, for any part which is unconditionally necessary will be a *causa sui*, and hence uncaused; and so this opinion is practically open to the same difficulties which beset case (b), in which really it must merge. So far all is clear, but several objections have been raised. *e.g.* (1) How, it is asked, are we to explain the fact that both thesis and antithesis refute the notion of the necessary being existing *outside* the world as its cause? As they agree here perfectly, might not this argument be eliminated from both sides? (2) How does it happen that the proof of the thesis in this Antinomy is direct, and so different from the seven other proofs, which are all *ad absurdum*?<sup>1</sup> (3) It seems no proper part of the thesis to urge that the *whole* cosmical series is necessary, for in the other antinomies the thesis always asserts the unconditioned to be *absolute*, while the antithesis says that it is *infinite* (cf. *supra*, p. 285).

To answer these—(1) Let us remember exactly what we want to prove in each case. In the thesis we desire to show not only that a necessary being exists somewhere, but that it exists *in the world*. That this latter point is essential may be seen from the statement of the thesis given in the *Proleg.*, p. 133. 'In the series of the world-causes there is some Necessary Being.' And in the antithesis we are striving to show not only that a necessary being does not exist in the world, but that it does not exist at all. Hence, then, it is requisite in both cases to disprove the notion that a necessary being may exist outside the world. The above statement of the argument will enable the reader to judge of the correctness of Professor E. Caird's

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Fischer's *Commentary*, p. 219.

statement (*Phil. of Kant*, p. 574). 'The parallelism between thesis and antithesis would have been more complete, if Kant had not introduced under the former the proof that the necessary being must be in the world,' etc. This misses the real point of the argument. (2) The proof of the thesis is *not* direct. We begin by stating the general principle (p. 242), underlying all the arguments of the Dialectic, and then we show indirectly that this Unconditioned to which the given conditioned leads must be in the world, for if it were out of the world its causality could not be in time. (3) In the thesis we say: There is an unconditioned *causa sui* in the world; in the antithesis we say: All is contingent. This is exactly parallel to Antinomy III., where we say in the thesis, there is such a thing as free causation; and in the antithesis, all causation is in accordance with the law of nature. Critics have not been careful enough in distinguishing Antinomies III. and IV.; hence these mistakes, *e.g.* Professor Wallace tells us (*Kant*, p. 186) that the fourth Antinomy 'is only a slightly altered form of the third.'

Professor Maguire has pointed out (*Lectures*, p. 163) that opinions (a) and (b) were held respectively by Descartes and Leibnitz, and that the complicated form of the arguments arises from the fact that Kant is stating opinions that have actually been held.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. 309, note.

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## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THESE CONFLICTS

§ 3. THE dialectical assertions which we have been considering are so many attempts to solve four natural and inevitable problems of reason. There can be neither more nor less than four, because there are no other series of synthetical hypotheses which limit Reason in endeavouring to grasp the Unconditioned. Let us now briefly consider what side in the controversy we should most willingly take if we were guided only by considerations of interest, leaving altogether out of account any logical test of truth.

We may remark in the assertions of the antithesis a complete uniformity in the mode of thought and a perfect unity of maxims, viz. we here adopt the principle of pure *Empiricism* not only in the explanation of the phenomena in the world, but also in the solution of the transcendental ideas of the universe itself. The assertions of the thesis, on the contrary (apart from the empirical mode of explanation employed within the phenomenal field), are grounded on intellectual beginnings, and its maxims are so far not simple.

On the side of the thesis, or of *dogmatism*, we find—1. A practical interest, inasmuch as the different theses are so many foundation stones on which morality and religion are



built up, supports of which the counter-assertions would deprive us.—2. A *speculative interest*, inasmuch as the dogmatist at least has a solution to offer, while the holder of the opposite opinion cannot do much more than say that the problem at issue is insoluble, as each question ever points to another question, and so on *ad infinitum*.

But on the other hand empiricism holds out to the speculative interests of reason certain attractions and advantages far exceeding those that the dogmatist can offer.<sup>1</sup> For with the empiricist the understanding is always on its own proper ground, namely, the field of possible experience, the laws of which it can investigate, and by means of which it can attain certain and clear knowledge without end. While it stays on this ground it is safe from error; but if, as often happens, empiricism, in relation to Ideas, becomes dogmatic in its turn and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its intuitive knowledge, it becomes guilty of a want of modesty all the more blamable because an irreparable inquiry is thereby inflicted on the practical interests of Reason. Here, then, is the difference between Epicureanism<sup>2</sup> and Platonism; the former encouraging

<sup>1</sup> Kirchmann remarks that the side of the antithesis would have much greater speculative interest *now* since Darwin's labours, which have enormously increased both the number of antecedents and the length of time involved in the series, than when Kant wrote.

<sup>2</sup> It is doubtful, says Kant, whether Epicurus ever put forward these propositions as objective assertions. If he meant them to be no more than logical maxims he would have shown thereby a more genuine philosophic spirit than any of the philosophers of antiquity. That, in the explanation of phenomena, we must proceed as if the field of inquiry were enclosed by no Boundary or Beginning of the world; that we should accept the material of the world as it must be, if we want to learn anything about it from experience; that we must look for no other origination of events than that brought about by the law of nature; and that no cause distinct from the world must be appealed to—are all correct and indispensable scientific maxims, but we must take care not

Science at the expense of the Practical; the latter, though supplying excellent practical principles, neglecting physical investigation and substituting therefor idealistic *explanations* of natural phenomena.

3. The side of dogmatism has also the advantage of popularity; for the common understanding<sup>1</sup> likes to have some firm and definite basis on which its theories may be founded, and does not find the least difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis. And, further, it thus finds itself in a situation where not even the most learned can have the advantage of it; for one peculiarity of the concepts which it assumes is that *no one knows anything about them*. So indolence and vanity are strongly in favour of dogmatic principles. Again, human Reason is by nature architectonic, i.e. it regards all cognitions as belonging to a possible system, and therefore accepts only such principles as are capable of being placed along with others in a general system. But the propositions of the antithesis are of such a character that they render the completion of an edifice of cognition impossible. Hence, then, the architectonic interest of Reason (which demands a priori not empirical but pure rational unity) serves as a natural recommendation for the assertions of the thesis.<sup>2</sup>

to turn them into objective laws without very good reason. [However, as Fischer points out (p. 224), Epicurus was an atomist, and atomism is in every case nearer to asserting simple substances than to denying them.]

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bacon, *De Aug. Sci.*, v. 4. 'Magno studio appetunt homines aliquem habere intra se cogitationum Atlantem, aut polos, qui intellectus fluctuationes et vertigines aliquando regent.'

<sup>2</sup> Fischer paraphrases well: 'Our reason is interested in knowing the unconditioned object or absolute unity of things which is the universe; it is also interested in systematically combining its knowledge into a whole of science. The former may be called the *speculative*, the latter the *architectonic* interest.' *Commentary*, p. 222.

§ 4. *The transcendental problems of pure Reason, in so far as they must absolutely admit of a possible solution.*

To attempt to solve all problems and answer all questions would be ridiculous, but nevertheless there are certain sciences of such a nature that every question arising within their sphere (*questiones domesticæ*) must be capable of an answer from the same sources as those from which the question springs. Transcendental Philosophy is such a science; all questions raised by the pure Reason must be answerable by the pure Reason, and we cannot here excuse ourselves by the plea of unavoidable ignorance—a solution is absolutely requisite.<sup>1</sup> In particular cosmological questions can even be answered *as regards the constitution of their object*, for it must be given empirically, and leaves only the question of adequateness to its Idea. This is a peculiarity of the cosmological Ideas, for they alone can postulate their object and the empirical synthesis requisite for its concept as given; and the question which springs from them relates only to the progress of this synthesis, so far as it is to contain absolute totality—which is no longer empirical. The general question, 'What is the constitution of a transcendental object,' would be unanswerable; in fact the question itself *is nothing*, for it is concerned with the constitution of a something which can be thought through no determinate predicate—being quite beyond the sphere of objects which can be given to us. So to such questions, *e.g.* as those which would arise in Transcendental Psychology, no answer is the proper answer. But in our present inquiry we cannot by complaints of the narrow limits of that Reason escape the obligation to give at least a critical solution; for all these questions relate to an

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Preface, p. 4, *supra*.

object which can be given nowhere else than in our thoughts, viz. the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of phenomena. If we are not able to say anything certain about this from our own concepts, we must not throw the blame on the *thing* as obscure (for no such thing can be given in experience), but on our *Idea*, corresponding to which we obstinately assume an actual object. In all possible perceptions we are always subject to *conditions*; we never come to the Unconditioned so as to be able to decide whether it is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the synthesis or in an absolute totality of the series without beginning.<sup>1</sup> Phenomena can only be explained so far as the conditions of that explanation are given in perception; but the sum of that which is given, considered as an *absolute whole*, is itself<sup>2</sup> no perception. Yet it is this very whole the explanation of which is required in the transcendental problems of Reason. As, therefore, the solution of these problems can never occur in experience, a dogmatical solution is impossible. The critical solution, at which we shall soon arrive, does not consider the questions objectively, but only with reference to the basis of the cognition on which they rest.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Hamilton's *Law of the Conditioned*.      <sup>2</sup> Read *keine* for *eine*.

<sup>3</sup> The heading of the above section sufficiently refutes the old and now exploded charge against Kant, that he made the Reason a source of unavoidable and insoluble delusion. Sir Wm. Hamilton says, e.g. (Lectures, ii. p. 543) 'He makes the Reason a complexus of antilogies,' etc. Kant held what none of his critics would have denied, 'that there are some principles of our nature perpetually leading us astray' (*Mansel. Proleg. Log.* p. 153), but he also held that when Reason leads us into error, it must also be able to lead us out again. And, in fact, in the discussion which succeeds, he gives a most elaborate critical solution of these antinomies into which Reason inevitably falls. Cf. *Kritik*, pp. 394, 410.



tioned be an empirical concept. Hence a *bounded* world is too small for our concept.

II. If every phenomenon in space (Matter) consist of an *infinite number of parts*, the regress of the division is always *too large* for our concept. If the *division* of space stop at any member (the simple) it is *too small*, for that member admits of a regress to more parts contained in it.

III. If all events happen in accordance with the law of *nature*, the series of conditions *a parte priori* must be prolonged for ever, and this is *too large*. If we admit origination from *freedom*, we are compelled to ask the *why* of the first cause; and so to go beyond it, so that this supposition is *too small*.

IV. If we admit an *absolutely necessary being* (whether it be the world itself, or something in the world, or the cause of the world), we must place it in a time infinitely distant from any given moment; for otherwise it must be dependent on some other and older existence. But such an existence is unapproachable by our empirical concept, and *too large* to be reached by a continued regress. If, on the other hand, we believe that everything belonging to the world—whether as condition or conditioned—is *contingent*, every given existence is *too small* for our concept, for it compels us to seek for some other existence on which it depends.<sup>1</sup>

So in all cases the *cosmical Idea* is<sup>2</sup> either too large or

<sup>1</sup> There is a difficulty here. In the first three antinomies, the object of the antithesis in each case is too large, and that of the thesis too small, for the concept of the understanding; but when we come to the fourth antinomy we find the very reverse. This is very curious in a book so systematic as the *Kritik*, nor is it easy to see any way in which the discrepancy can be explained. Cf., however, p. 300 for a possible explanation.

<sup>2</sup> We express ourselves thus (says Kant), and do not say conversely that the empirical concept is too large or too small for the cosmological Idea, because a possible empirical concept is the only standard by which

too small for the empirical regress, and consequently for every concept of the understanding, and hence we are led to the well-founded suspicion that the errors we have been considering arise from subjective causes.

§ 6. *Transcendental Idealism as the key to the solution of pure Cosmological Dialectic*

The doctrine of Transcendental Idealism proved in our Aesthetic asserts that all things intuited in space and time, *i.e.* all objects of an experience possible to us, are nothing but phenomena or mere representations; while the transcendental realist regards these representations as things in themselves. This is not to be confounded with empirical or material idealism, which, while admitting the actuality of space, doubts the existence of objects extended in it, and so leaves us without a sufficient criterion to distinguish between dreaming and truth. Transcendental or formal Idealism, on the contrary, allows that the objects of external intuition as intuited in space, and all changes in time as presented to the internal sense, are actual. But, nevertheless, time and space, with all the phenomena therein, are not in themselves *things*; they are nothing but representations, and cannot exist apart from our minds. The objects of experience, then, are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and have no existence apart from it. That there may be inhabitants in the moon, though no one has ever perceived them, must certainly be admitted; but this assertion means only that we may meet with them in the possible progress of experience. For [according to the Second Postulate, p. 193] everything which stands in connection with a perception according to the laws of the progress we can judge an idea. Thus we do not say the man is too large for his coat, but, the coat is too small for the man.

of experience is actual. In fact, to call a phenomenon an actual thing, prior to perception, can only mean that we must meet with such a perception in this empirical progress.

The faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivity—a capacity of being affected in a certain manner with representations, the relation of which to each other is a pure intuition of time and space. These representations, in so far as they are connected and determinable in this relation according to the laws of the unity of experience, are called *objects*. We may, if we like, term the merely intelligible cause of phenomena in general, the transcendental object—but merely in order to have something to correspond to sensibility; this non-sensuous cause is completely unknown to us, and cannot be intuited as an object.

It is essential to insist that the only criterion of actuality we have is that contained in the Second Postulate. Things in themselves, without any relation to possible experience, are for me non-existent, consequently are not objects, for they are not contained in the series of the empirical regress.



## CHAPTER XXV

### THE CRITICAL SOLUTION

#### § 7. *Critical decision of the Cosmological Conflict of the Reason with itself*

The whole antinomy of pure Reason rests on this dialectical argument: If the conditioned is given, the whole series of its conditions is also given; but objects of sense are given to us as conditioned, therefore, etc. (see p. 242, *supra*). On this reasoning we make one or two remarks.

*Firstly*, So much is obviously true: If the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of all its conditions is required. For this is but a logical postulate of Reason—to pursue, through the Understanding, as far as possible, that connection of a concept with its conditions which is inherent in the concept itself.

*Secondly*, If both conditioned and condition are *things in themselves*, and if the former be given, not only is the regress to the latter *required* (*aufgegeben*), but the latter is actually *given* (*gegeben*) with the former; and so in this case the complete series of conditions (and consequently the unconditioned) is given, the conditioned being only possible through that series.

But, on the other hand, if I am dealing with phenomena

which, as mere representations, are not given at all, if I do not attain to a knowledge of them, I cannot draw any such inference. If the conditioned is given, I can only say that a regress to the conditions, *i.e.* a continuous empirical synthesis in that direction, is *required*, and that conditions must exist which are given through that regress.

So we may now see that there is in the above dialectical syllogism a *sophisma figurae dictionis*. The major premise uses 'conditioned' in the transcendental signification of the pure category, but the minor in the empirical signification of a concept of the understanding applied to mere phenomena.<sup>1</sup> The fallacy is natural, but still a fallacy. The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, and the whole series of conditions in the major, are in no way limited by time, and are free from any concept of succession. The empirical synthesis, on the contrary, and the series of conditions in phenomena, subsumed in the minor, are necessarily successive and given as such in time only. There is then this fatal mistake in the argument adopted by both parties as the foundation of cosmological assertions. However, we may go still further and show not only that their premises are unsound, but that they are disputing about nothing, and that a certain transcendental illusion has been mocking them with visions of actuality where there is none.

Of two contradictory propositions one must be true and the other false. This we may call *analytical* opposition. But if two opposite judgments pre-suppose an inadmissible condition, *both* will fall away, because the condition has itself disappeared, and we cannot in such case infer the truth of one from the falsity of the other.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Briefly, in the major we speak of the conditioned as *cogitable*, in the minor as *intuitable*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Proleg.* p. 136, for a very clear statement of this.

This we may call *dialectical* opposition. For example, take the two statements. The world is finite; the world is infinite. These may both be false. For what right have we to assume, as we do when we make either of these statements, that the world may in itself be determined in regard to quantity? If we regard them as analytically opposed, we are assuming that the world—the whole series of phenomena—is a thing in itself. This we have no right to do. We know it only in the empirical regress of the series of phenomena, and not in itself. This series is always conditioned, and so the world is never completely given: it is not an unconditioned whole, and so does not exist as such either with an infinite or finite quantity.<sup>1</sup> And the same may be shown of the other antinomies. The number of parts in a given phenomenon is in itself neither finite nor infinite; because phenomenon is nothing existing in itself; and its parts are given only in the regress of the decomposing synthesis, which is never given as absolutely complete. The same is true of the series of subordinated causes, or of the conditioned up to unconditioned necessary existence; because as a series of subordinated representations, it consists only in the dynamical regress, prior to which it cannot exist as a self-subsistent series of things in themselves.

Thus the antinomy of pure Reason is merely dialectical, and is the conflict of an illusion produced by applying the idea of absolute totality—admissible only as a condition of things in themselves—to phenomena which exist only in our representations and, when constituting a series, in a

<sup>1</sup> Kant compares Zeno's paradoxes to the antinomies, and seems to think that when Zeno denied that God was either at rest or in motion, what he had in view was to show that properly neither motion nor rest could be predicated of God as an absolute being. The two statements were *dialectically* not *analytically* opposed.

successive regress. And this furnishes us with an indirect proof of the Transcendental Ideality of phenomena, if we are not satisfied with the direct proof set forth in the *Æsthetic*. *E.g.* If the world is a whole existing in itself, it must be either finite or infinite. But the antithesis and the thesis respectively show that these assertions are false. Therefore the world, the sum-total (*Inbegriff*) of all phenomena, is not a whole existing in itself: phenomena are nothing but mere representations, and this is what we mean by Transcendental Ideality, as expounded in § 6.

It is important to observe, once more, that the proofs of the four antinomies are not mere sophistry; they are perfectly valid on the supposition that phenomena (or a world of sense which includes them all) are things in themselves. So, though transcendental dialectic does not favour *scepticism*, we see how useful is the *sceptical method*.

§ 8. *Regulative Principle*<sup>1</sup> of Pure Reason in relation to the Cosmological Ideas

As through the cosmological principle of totality no maximum of the series of conditions in the world of sense considered as a thing in itself is *given*, but is only *required* in the regress, so that principle cannot be regarded as an *axiom*,<sup>2</sup> but merely as a *problem*. That is, it is not a *principle* of the possibility of experience and of the empirical cognition of objects of sense, and so not a principle of the Understanding; for every experience is confined within its own bounds (according to a given intuition). Neither is it a constitutive *principle* of Reason

<sup>1</sup> To distinguish *Grundsatz* from *Princip*, for which we have only one word in English, we have generally italicised *principle* when it stands for *Princip*.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 368, *infra*.

authorising us to extend our concept of the world of sense beyond all possible experience, and asserting the absolute totality of the series of conditions to be *given* in the object. It is merely a principle for the extension of experience as far as possible, forbidding us to regard any empirical bounds as absolute; as a *rule*, telling us *how we ought to proceed in our empirical regress*, but not *anticipating*, prior to that regress, what is *given in the object*. Let us call it, therefore, a *regulative principle*. Now, if we were dealing with a *progress* (from condition to conditioned), it would make no matter whether we spoke of a progress *in infinitum* or *in indefinitum*, for such a possible progress in the phenomenal series always proceeds to infinity; but in the case of a *regress* we must make a distinction.

(1.) If a whole is given in empirical intuition, the regress in the series of its internal conditions proceeds *in infinitum*, e.g. the division of any given portion of matter. For that matter is complete, and so, with all its possible parts, is given; the more remote members of the division are given prior to the division. That is, the division proceeds to infinity.

(2.) On the other hand, if only one member of the series is given, from which the regress is to proceed to absolute totality, the regress is only *in indefinitum*. For example, if we want to construct a genealogical pedigree, the regress proceeds from any one member to one still higher, and so on, and nowhere meets with any empirical boundary; but the series of ancestors is not given in its absolute totality in any experience prior to the regress, which then only proceeds *in indefinitum*. Of course, in neither case is the series of conditions to be regarded as given as infinite in the object: they are not things in themselves, but only phenomena, which, as conditions of

each other, are only given in the regress itself. The distinction may be variously stated by saying that in case (1) it is *possible* to recede *to infinity*; as more members are empirically given than I can arrive at in the regress, it is ever necessary to *find* the other members of the series; in case (2) it is *possible to infinity* to recede; as no member is empirically given as absolutely conditioned, and so a higher member is always possible, it is necessary to *inquire* for other members.

§ 9. *Of the empirical use of the Regulative Principle of Reason with regard to all Cosmological Ideas.* Mem 419

We have now established the *validity of the principle of Reason, as a rule for the extension of experience*, not as an *axiom*; as regulative, not constitutive. In fact we have changed what was a *dialectical* principle into a *doctrinal* one, just as useful in science as if it were an axiom for the *a priori* determination of objects. We proceed in detail to the critical solution, by means of it, of the several antinomies.

I. The ground of the regulative principle of Reason here, as in the other cases, is the proposition that in our empirical regress no experience of an absolute boundary is discoverable. So it merely remains to ask whether this never bounded regress is to be called *indefinite* or *infinite*. And it is plainly only *indefinite*, for the reason explained in the last section, viz. the world is not given in its totality in any intuition. So that to the question concerning the world-quantity, the first and negative answer is: The world has no beginning in time, and no absolute boundary in space. For if it had, it would be bounded by void time or void space; now, being phenomenal, its boundaries must be phenomenal, and therefore objects of perception. But we www 420

can have no perception of anything that has no content. Therefore an absolute boundary of the world is empirically, and so absolutely, impossible.<sup>1</sup> From this follows the affirmative answer: The regress in the series of phenomena, as *determining* the world-quantity, proceeds *in indefinitum*. But it does not give us any *determined* concept of it; still less a concept of an infinite quantity. [Briefly, Is the world finite? No. Is it infinite? No, for it has no absolute quantity. We can only say that the empirical regress must go on *ad indefinitum*.]

II. Here we are dealing with the totality of the division of a whole given in intuition, and therefore, as we saw (p. 317), the regress will proceed *in infinitum*. But still we are not entitled to say of a whole of this kind, that it *consists of an infinite number of parts*; for although all the parts are contained in the division of the whole, the *whole division* is not contained therein. The division is contained only in the regress, which first makes the series of parts actual. So we can only say in this case, the whole is infinitely divisible. We may fairly argue in the case of space as a *quantum continuum*, that division can never surpass the limits of composition, for otherwise space, which is not self-subsistent, would cease to exist, and this is impossible. But, it may be objected, this argument would not apply to a *body* in space, for it may be said that *substance*, the subject of the composition, must remain in its elements, even after their conjunction in space—which constitutes a body—is annihilated. The answer to this is obvious. *Phenomenal substance* (and this is all we can talk about) is

<sup>1</sup> Kant calls attention to the fact that this proof is entirely different from that given in the antithesis of Antinomy I.; for there it was taken for granted that the world is a thing in itself. And so too, the conclusion drawn was different, for there the actual infinity of the world was inferred.

not an absolute subject, and so the argument will not hold. Further, this infinite divisibility can only be predicted of a *quantum continuum*; it depends altogether on the nature of space. We cannot assert of a *quantum discretum*, such as an organised body, that every organic part is itself organised *ad infinitum*. For in such a case the number of organic parts is always definite and can only be determined from experience.

With this caution, then, we may sum up briefly thus: In a whole given in intuition is there any simple part? No. Is everything composite, is there an infinite number of parts? We do not know, though we must believe the whole to be infinitely divisible.

*Transition from the Mathematical to the Dynamical  
Antinomies.*

Before going further we must notice a remarkable difference between the Cosmological Ideas, the first two indicating a *mathematical*, the last two a *dynamical* synthesis of phenomena.<sup>1</sup> Now, in a mathematical series of phenomena, no other than a sensuous condition is admissible; heterogeneous members cannot be united *mathematically*, and it is for this reason, as we have seen, that both thesis and antithesis in the first two Antinomies must be regarded as false<sup>2</sup> [for they attribute phenomenal attributes to a thing in itself]. But it is not equally true to assert that what can be *dynamically* united must be homogeneous; a dynamical series of sensuous conditions may admit also a heterogeneous condition, which is not a member of the series, but as *intelligible* lies outside it.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 162, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> A quantitative unconditioned is an absolute contradiction.



And from this fact we shall find a result to follow which we should not have expected from an Antinomy, viz. that in the Dynamical Antinomies both the thesis and antithesis may be regarded as true from different points of view, and thus satisfaction is done to the Understanding on the one hand and to the Reason on the other.

[In short, in no case are the thesis and antithesis logical *contradictories*; in the Mathematical Antinomies they are more like *contrary*, in the Dynamical like *sub-contrary* propositions.]

III. We can conceive only two kinds of causality—through Nature and through Freedom; and the transcendental (not merely physiological) problem before us, is to determine whether the latter is necessarily inconsistent with the former. We<sup>1</sup> already have defined freedom in the pure transcendental sense as the faculty of beginning an event spontaneously; and it is now to be observed that this is postulated by the common practical concept of freedom, viz. the independence of the will<sup>2</sup> from coercion through sensuous impulses. Without transcendental we cannot have practical freedom. Now, on the hypothesis of the *absolute reality* of phenomena—if phenomena are things in themselves—nature is a sufficient cause for every event, and freedom is impossible. But if, on the contrary, phenomena be mere representations connected according to empirical laws, they must have a ground which is *not* phenomenal. From this consideration we may be able to arrive at a solution of the Antinomy, to which we now address ourselves.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. 295, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Theory of Ethics*, p. 188.

<sup>3</sup> It is to be remembered that the question before us about Freedom is *not psychological* but *cosmological*. It is not sufficient to oppose the indirect testimony of consciousness by itself to a principle like that of

*Possibility of Causality through Freedom in harmony with  
the universal law of Natural Necessity*

All phenomena are representations, and as such suggest a transcendental object or noumenon. Now, if a subject possesses in itself a power which is not an object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which it can be the cause of phenomena, the causality<sup>1</sup> of this being may be regarded from two points of view. (a) It is *intelligible*<sup>2</sup> as regards its action—the action of a thing itself; (b) It is *sensible* as regards its *effects* as a phenomenon. And since every cause must have a law of its causality, according to which the effects follow, which we call its *character*, we may express this by saying that the causality of every phenomenal subject has both an *intelligible* and *empirical* character. The acting subject in its intelligible character is subject to no conditions of time—in it there is no *before* or *after*—and so the intelligible causality does not form part of the series of empirical conditions which necessitate the event in the sensuous world, and therefore can never be immediately cognised. In its empirical character the subject will obey the law of nature—all its actions will be explicable according to natural laws; while in its intelligible character, on the other hand, it is free and independent of natural necessity, which exists

causality. What we want to show is that a cosmological principle corresponding to this testimony of consciousness is not necessarily contradictory to causality. And except freedom be overthrown in this way and declared *a priori* impossible, our internal consciousness of *ought* and the moral law must be allowed to have weight.

<sup>1</sup> The *causality* is the action of the *cause*. The student should be careful not to confuse the two.

<sup>2</sup> "That in an object of the senses which is not itself phenomenon, I term *intelligible*," says Kant at the beginning of this section.

only in the field of sensibility. Now all this is mere general theory without proof, but at all events we may say this. There is nothing impossible in the supposition that there are *some*<sup>1</sup> natural causes which have a power that is only intelligible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by empirical conditions, but solely upon grounds of the understanding; so, however, that the *action in the phenomenon* of this cause must be in accordance with all the laws of empirical causality.

If we apply this to actual experience, what do we find? Man, to whom the rest of nature reveals itself only through sense, cognises himself, not only by his senses, but also by mere apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions.<sup>2</sup> He thus is to himself on the one hand a phenomenon; but on the other, in respect of certain faculties, viz. Understanding and Reason, an *intelligible* object. Now that this Reason of his does possess the faculty of causality, or that at least we are forced so to think, appears from the *imperatives* which present themselves in the moral sphere. The word *ought* indicates a

<sup>1</sup> Kant does not say that all natural causes have an intelligible character.

<sup>2</sup> Hence, what might be a mere invention in the case of the noumenon, supposed to be the basis of external phenomena, is raised to a more conceivable position in the case of internal phenomena; for here we are convinced that there is a noumenon acting through intelligible faculties, being conscious of these faculties, and also not being conscious that they are determined from without. And the moral imperatives show that we ascribe causality to this noumenon—not only the power of becoming a phenomenon, but also the further causality of determining its empirical character. But it is to be observed that there seems no reason to think, because free action is conceived by us only in the Reason, that therefore Reason must be the only free cause or intelligible character in nature. [This is the inference of Fischer and Schopenhauer.]

possible action, the ground of which is nothing but a mere notion. Whatever number of motives nature may present to my *wish*, the moral *ought* is beyond its power to produce. So that it would seem quite possible (from these considerations as to the nature of the moral imperative) that Reason should stand in an actually causal relation to phenomena. If it does, it must of course exhibit an empirical character. For every cause supposes a rule, according to which certain phenomena follow as effects, and <sup>1</sup> every rule requires uniformity in these effects—(this is the very ground of the concept of cause as a *power*). Hence then the *elective will*<sup>2</sup> of every man has an empirical character; *i.e.* a certain causality of his reason manifests in its phenomenal effects a rule,<sup>3</sup> according to which his actions and their motives may be explained. Viewed on this phenomenal side, then, no human action is free; so if we only consider the question *physiologically*, by simple observation, we shall be led to regard the law of nature as the only law of the human will. But if we consider a human action, from the other point of view—in relation to Reason as its producing cause—it would appear as if we had come upon a rule and an order very different from that of nature. For Reason often tells us that what *has* happened *ought not* to have happened; and indeed we sometimes fancy that we have met with a case in which an action was done on moral, *i.e.* rational grounds. Of this, however, we can never be quite certain, as our estimate of an action can only relate to its empirical character;

<sup>1</sup> Is this the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature, that the same cause will always produce the same effect?

<sup>2</sup> Following Mr. Abbott (*Theory of Ethics*, p. 268, note), we translate *Willkühr* (arbitrium) *elective will*, as opposed to *Wille* (rational will).

<sup>3</sup> This shows why he chose the word *character*.

that it is truly moral could never be proved from observation.

It may, however, be said: Suppose that the possibility of reason standing in a causal relation to phenomena be admitted, how does that save freedom, if the action in its empirical character is to be regarded as necessary? The answer is: *because the empirical character is itself determined by the intelligible character*, of which it is but the sensuous schema. An action, so far as it is to be ascribed to Reason as its cause, does not follow from it according to empirical laws. That is, not the conditions of pure Reason, but only their effects in the phenomenon of the internal sense, precede the act. We cannot say that the causality of Reason in its intelligible character *begins to be*, as it is not subject to time-conditions at all; but we may say this. If Reason is causal, it is a faculty through which the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects first begins; the rational condition, being non-sensuous, cannot be said to have any beginning.<sup>1</sup>

*obj*  
*Ans*  
<sup>1</sup> Kant anticipates (*Kritik*, 254) an objection which might be based upon his theory of the intelligible and empirical character. He holds that the Idea of duty, which can never be found in experience, furnishes us with the *a priori* law according to which we legislate for our actions, and by which we determine their merit or demerit. Hence every action may be regarded as not only resulting from what preceded it in time, but also from the intelligible character of the man, which itself indeed can never be cognised, but the effects of which are cognised in the empirical character. Supposing, then, that the objector says to Kant: You say that I cannot know the Ego to exist except I make it an object; and to do this I must have it determined in some way (more than the mere vague subject of the *Cogito*); and you add that all such determination must be sensuous, and so phenomenal. On your own principles you have supplied me with an *a priori* determination of self through the intelligible character, and so *a priori* and intellectual; on this, then, I may base a rational psychology. To this Kant answers: It is true that I allow an *a priori* determination of self through the moral law,

And although we can never *prove* from experience that Reason is causal (for no empirical proof is sufficient for a transcendental proposition), yet our ordinary judgments on the morality of human actions presuppose that it is so. For example, suppose a man tells a lie. We may proceed to examine the empirical character of the offence by tracing it to its sources, *e.g.* a defective education, bad company, want of reflection, strong temptations, etc. Now, although we believe the action to have been completely determined by all these circumstances, yet we blame the offender all the same. Why? Because we consider that his Reason is a cause which could have and ought to have made him speak the truth, independently of all empirical conditions it is completely free, and so, no matter what the temptation, if the action be estimated according to its intelligible character, it must be regarded as blameworthy. That is, we regard the causality of Reason not merely as a co-operating agency, but as complete in itself. It is the permanent condition of all actions, for it does not itself exist in time; it is, relatively to new states, *determining* but not *determinable*. Hence we cannot ask: Why did not Reason determine itself differently? The question ought to be thus stated: Why has not Reason, through its causality, determined certain phenomena differently? But this is a question which admits of no answer; for a different intelligible character would have generated a different empirical character. As to why the intelligible character generates such and such phenomena, and exhibits such and such an

and that the intelligible character does determine us; but how? only by producing the *empirical* character. Though the determining comes from within, is intellectual and *a priori*, the determination is wholly—so far as we can know it—phenomenal, and subject to the laws and restrictions of phenomena.

*This is no satisfactory answer, I apprehend.*

empirical character under certain circumstances,<sup>1</sup> it is beyond our power to say; nor is it the question at issue here.

To sum up: it must be noted with care in the first place that we have not attempted to prove the *actuality* of Freedom. For such an argument would not be transcendental—it would not be limited to the discussion of mere concepts; and further, it is obvious that we can never infer from experience what cannot be thought in accordance with its laws. Further, we have not even tried to prove the *possibility* of Freedom; for we can in general cognise the possibility of no real ground, and of no causality from mere concepts *a priori*. All that we have attempted is this—to show that nature and freedom are *not contradictory*, and this we have certainly done.

¶ Fischer thus explains Schopenhauer's position (*Comm.* p. 247). 'If the intelligible cause be nothing but a necessary will, it must be the *Will* which must be at the basis of *all* phenomena—of all representations. And this is the point of the Kantian philosophy from which Schopenhauer deduces his own. The real solution of the cosmological problem, which Kant declares to be insoluble, and therefore avoids, is, according to Schopenhauer, "*the world as will*.'" This is a false inference from Kant, and part of that perverse system of interpretation which would force absolute idealism upon him. He uses the will as *illustration* of what may not impossibly be the case with all phenomena, but does not say that it *is* the only intelligible cause. He is always most careful not to assert dogmatically that the noumenon at the basis of external phenomena is identical with that at the basis of internal. That the logical result of Kant's own principles is absolute idealism may be true enough; but

<sup>1</sup> Cf. for similar questions which cannot be answered, as dealing with ultimate facts, *Kritik*, pp. 89 and 377.

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Definition  
"but  
metaphysics"

most certainly Kant himself believed the reverse. The difficulty of the whole discussion arises from the fact that he is so careful not to dogmatise on this point, and that in consequence he treats the subject with great generality as a cosmological problem.

IV. In the case of the fourth Antinomy we have to do not with the unconditioned causality, but with the unconditioned existence of substance (as was before pointed out); and consequently the series before us here is not one of intuitions, but of concepts. As in the third Antinomy, if phenomena were things in themselves the antithesis would have to be adopted, and a necessary being as condition of the existence of sensuous phenomena could not be arrived at. But, on making this important distinction between phenomena and things in themselves, we may see, as in the last section, that both thesis and antithesis may be regarded as true from different points of view. For the *regulative principle* of Reason guiding us is, that everything in the world of sense must possess an empirically conditioned existence. But this does not in the least exclude the existence of a non-empirical condition of the whole series, *i.e.* an unconditioned necessary being, which, as unconditioned, would not itself be a member of the series. And the difference between this solution and that given for Antinomy III. may be stated thus. There the thing itself<sup>1</sup> as cause (*substantia phenomenon*) belonged to the series of conditions, and only its *causality* was regarded as intelligible; whereas here the necessary Being must be regarded as quite *outside* the sensuous series (*ens extramundanum*) and merely intelligible, for otherwise it would be subject to the phenomenal laws of contingency and dependence.

As before, we do not attempt to prove the existence or

<sup>1</sup> Not, of course, the thing *in* itself.



even the possibility of such a being ; we only desire to show that the contingency of natural phenomena is quite consistent with the assumption of such an intelligible condition of the whole empirical series. Of course, too, the empirical employment of Reason will not be affected by such an assumption ; it will still continue its operations in the field of nature on the hypothesis that everything is contingent.<sup>1</sup>

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS.

So long as the object of our rational concepts is the totality of conditions *in* the world of sense, our ideas are transcendental, but yet *cosmological*. If, however, we place the Unconditioned—with which we have especially to do—*outside* that world, our ideas become *transcendent* : for they serve not only for the completion of the empirical use of Reason, but they separate themselves entirely from it, and make for themselves objects, the material of which is not taken from experience, and the objective reality of which is not based on the completion of the empirical series, but on pure concepts *a priori*. The cosmological Idea corresponding to the fourth Antimony is the only one which urges us to take this step ; it requires us to look for an object different from phenomena—an intelligible object—with which all contingency must cease. Now once having admitted, outside experience, a self-subsistent actuality, phenomena can only be regarded as contingent modes of representing intelligible objects employed by beings which are themselves intelligences. But of intelligible objects

<sup>1</sup> The solution then briefly is—Phenomenally, all is contingent ; but still there may belong to the world of sense, as its noumenal ground, an absolutely necessary being. Both thesis and antithesis may thus be considered true.

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experience can tell us nothing, and so the very first step we have taken beyond the world of sense obliges us to begin with the investigation of the absolutely necessary Being, and to derive from our notions of it the notions of all things in so far as they are intelligible. This we shall attempt in the next chapter.

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## CHAPTER XXVI

### THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON

§ 1. *Of the Ideal in general.* — By the *Ideal* I understand, says Kant, the Idea not merely in *concreto* but in *individuo*, i.e. an individual thing determinable or even determined by the Idea alone. We have already seen that no Idea can be phenomenally represented in *concreto*, and it would appear that the Ideal is still farther removed from objective reality. It has a prominent place in Plato's philosophy as an *Idea of the divine mind*—an individual object present to the pure intuition of the Deity, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the primary ground of all phenomenal copies. But without entering into this, it is plain that there are Ideals in the *moral* sphere which serve as archetypes, just as there are ideas which afford rules for conduct; the wise man of the Stoics will occur to every one. And although we cannot ascribe objective reality to these Ideals, yet are they indispensable as standards by which to judge of any action, because Reason requires the concept of that which is perfect in its kind in order to estimate the defects of that which is imperfect. Here we must not confuse Ideals of the Reason with Ideals of Sensibility, or creatures of the imagination: the former are always based upon determinate concepts and serve as models for imitation; of the latter no

concept can be had, and they are based upon no rule—they can never afford a standard for judgment. In fact, Reason aims at complete determination according to rules *a priori*; and hence it presupposes an object which must be completely determinable according to Principles, though without the sufficient conditions in experience; the concept of this object—the Ideal—is therefore transcendent. This we shall now develop in detail.

§ 2. *Of the transcendental Ideal (Prototypon transcendentale).*—Every concept, in relation to that which is not contained in it, must be subject to the principle of *determinability* [Law of Excluded Middle], viz. to the logical Principle that of any two contradictory predicates only one can belong to a concept. But further, every thing, as regards possibility, is subject to the principle of *complete determination*,<sup>1</sup> viz. that of every possible pair of contradictory predicates one *must* belong to it. This is no mere analytical law, but is based on a transcendental presupposition, viz. that of the *totality of all possible predicates*—the material for all possibility which must contain *a priori* the data for this or that *particular possibility*. We may put the case in this way. Reason always seeks complete knowledge; to obtain complete knowledge of any particular thing we must know which of every possible contradictory pair of predicates belongs to it; and so the Idea which guides our procedure must be the Idea of the sum-total of all possibility. Or again, in order to attain to complete knowledge of any particular thing *x*, we must proceed by disjunctive syllogisms thus, *x*, is either A or not A; it is either B or not B; it is either C or not C; and so on, until we have exhausted the field of possibility, gone through every possible pair of con-

<sup>1</sup> This, accordingly, is the transcendental parallel to the Law of Excluded Middle (cf. pp. 128 and 159, *supra*).

contradictory predicates, and decided which of each pair belongs to the object in question. Our guiding idea is plainly  $A + B + C + \dots$  the sum-total of all possible *positive* predicates—i.e. the transcendental Ideal, for it represents an individual object completely determined by and through the mere idea. As all its attributes are positive, it must be *one*, for it will be thus determined in every respect. Again, as negatives but indicate the absence of reality, this primitive concept (*Urbegriff*), containing no derived or negative concepts, may be described as the idea of the sum-total of reality (*omnitude realitatis*). All true negatives are then nothing but *limitations*, a term which could not properly be applied to them did not the unlimited (the all) form the basis of one primitive concept. By this complete possession of reality is the concept of a thing in itself represented as completely determined; and the concept of an *ens realissimum* is the concept of an individual being, inasmuch as of all possible contradictory predicates, that one which absolutely belongs to *being* is formed in its determination.

It is obvious that in this procedure Reason does not presuppose the *existence* of such a being, but only the *Idea* of it—for the purpose of deducing from an unconditioned totality of complete determination the conditioned, i.e. the totality of the limited. The Ideal is therefore the *prototype* of all things, which as imperfect copies or *ectypes* derive from it the material of their possibility, approaching it more or less nearly, but never reaching it. All the manifoldness of things only comes from the various ways of limiting the concept of the highest reality which forms their common substratum; just as all figures are only various modes of limiting infinite space. Hence this *omnitude realitatis* is also called the *Primal Being* (*ens originarium*); as having

no existence superior to it, the *Supreme Being* (*ens summum*); and, as everything conditioned stands under it, also the *Being of all beings* (*ens entium*).

It should not be described as an *aggregate* of many other derived beings, for these latter presuppose it, and therefore cannot be said to make it up; and so it follows that the Ideal must be thought as *simple*. It is, then, in this view, regarded rather as the *ground* than as the *sum-total* of things; and their manifoldness depends not on any limitation of the primal Being itself, but upon that of the complete series of effects which flow from it. To this latter belongs our whole sensibility, together with all reality in phenomenon, which certainly cannot belong to the Idea of the supreme Being as a *constituent* element.

All this, however, does not indicate the objective relation of an actual object to other things, but only of an Idea to concepts, and so leaves us in perfect ignorance of the existence of a Being of such surpassing excellence. If we proceed to hypostatise this Idea, as we inevitably do, by introducing existence into it, we arrive at the concept of God in its transcendental sense, and so the Ideal of pure Reason becomes the object-matter of a transcendental<sup>1</sup> Theology. But by such an employment of the Idea we are overstepping the boundaries of its determination and admissibility. Reason merely placed it as the concept of all reality, at the basis of the complete determination of things in general, without requiring that this concept be given objectively. It is necessary to point out the source of dialectical illusion which Reason thus falls into when it not only regards the possibility of all things as deduced

<sup>1</sup> We should naturally expect *transcendent* here; but Kant is not very strict in his use of this word in this part of the *Kritik*. Cf. p. 238, *supra*.

from a single possibility (viz. of the highest reality), but also presupposes this *as existing* in a particular Primal Being. The illusion arises thus. The possibility of objects of sense (as we saw in the Analytic) is a relation of them to our thought, by which something (the empirical form) may be thought *a priori*; while that which constitutes the *matter* (the *reality* in the phenomenon, corresponding to sensation) must be given from without.

Such an object is completely determined only when it has been compared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by means of these either positively or negatively. So then the material of the possibility of all objects of sense must be presupposed as given in one whole, and only on the limitation of this whole can the possibility of empirical objects, their difference from each other, and their complete determination, be founded. Hence it follows that nothing can be an object *to us* unless it presupposes the sum-total of all *empirical* reality as the condition of its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us to consider this principle, which is valid only for *objects of sense*, as valid with respect to all *things in general*; thus we are led to regard a merely empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things as phenomena, as a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general. And then we proceed afterwards to *hypostatise* this Idea by changing dialectically the *distributive* unity of the empirical exercise of the understanding into the *collective* unity of an empirical whole, and by regarding this whole of phenomena as an individual thing containing in itself all empirical reality.

¶ Kant says in a note that a further mistake is made in personifying this ideal. 'For the regulative unity of experience is not based upon phenomena themselves (Sensi-

bility alone), but upon the connection of the manifold by the Understanding (in an apperception), and thus the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability (possibility) of all things seem to reside in a Supreme Understanding, and consequently in an *Intelligence*.'



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## CHAPTER XXVII

### PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

§ 3. REASON soon becomes aware of the illusion which it falls into when it regards a mere creation of thought as an actual being, and introduces existence into the concept of the Ideal; but nevertheless it is compelled to seek some resting-place in its regress from the given conditioned to the unconditioned. And the following seems to be the natural course of its procedure. If we admit the existence of any one thing, we must also admit that something exists by *necessity*, for the contingent always presupposes the necessary: in this way we persuade ourselves that *some* necessary being must exist. We next ask ourselves, 'What is this necessary being?' Which of all our concepts of possible things is most agreeable to the concept of a being which exists *unconditionally*? It is the concept of the *ens realissimum*, the sum-total of all reality, the primal basis of things; and consequently Reason, in its ordinary course, regards this *ens realissimum* as the absolutely necessary being which it seeks.

There is a certain amount of truth in this conclusion, but it is not exact. If we were compelled to make up our mind one way or the other as to the nature of necessary being, we should inevitably decide that it is the *ens realissi-*

*mun*: but we are not so obliged, in a speculative point of view. All we can say is that if a being is the sum-total of all reality it must be necessary, but we have no right to infer that *because* it is necessary therefore it is identical with the sum of all reality. Even allowing the inference from contingent to necessary existence, it still remains to be proved that the *ens summum* is the *only* necessary existence (cf. p. 343, *infra*).

In a practical regard, however, we *must* make up our minds: certain moral obligations lie upon us, which would be obligations without motives except upon the supposition of a Supreme Being to give effect to practical laws; and that being so, it is natural that we should place the *ultimate* causality where we place the *supreme* causality, viz. in that Being which contains originally in itself the sufficient ground of all possible effects. In this way, though in the speculative sphere Reason be incompetent to prove the Being of God, yet is this a necessary postulate of Reason in the practical sphere. In speculative proofs<sup>1</sup> we must either try to demonstrate of the most real being that it necessarily exists, or of necessary existence that it constitutes the most real being; and according as the proof takes its departure from the rational concept of the *ens summum* or from the empirical concept of conditioned existence, it will be *a priori* and *transcendental* or *a posteriori* and *empirical*. The empirical proof again may start from two different points: either it begins from the existence we can experience, quite independent of its form and order, or it begins from the consideration of the order of natural existence. The first starting point is the exist-

<sup>1</sup> As Hegel puts it: 'Either we may begin with Being and proceed to the abstraction called Thought; or the movement may begin with the abstraction and end in Being' (Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, p. 86).

ence of the world (indeterminate experience); the second, the existence of the order of the world (determinate experience).

Rational theology then may put forward three proofs of the Being of God: the transcendental (*ontological*), the *cosmological*, and *physico-theological*; but these three constitute all possible proofs.

§ 4. *The Ontological Proof.*—We have seen that the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a mere Idea, which serves but to indicate a certain unattainable perfection and rather to bound the Understanding than to extend it to new objects. People have been foolish enough to attempt to prove the existence of this absolutely necessary being, without first considering whether it is even cogitable. It is easy to define it as that of which the non-being is impossible; but this does not help us much, for what tests of possibility or impossibility can we apply to an abstraction like the Unconditioned? Some philosophers again have thought to explain this concept of the *absolutely necessary* by an appeal to examples; such a proposition, they said, as *a triangle has three angles* sufficiently illustrates its character. But all these pretended examples are taken from *judgments*, not from *things*; and the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not at all identical with the absolute necessity of *things*. Thus, if in an identical judgment I reject the predicate and retain the subject, there arises a contradiction; and hence I say, the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I reject the subject as well as the predicate no contradiction arises, because there is *nothing left* which could be contradicted. Take the proposition, 'the *ens realissimum* is absolutely necessary'; both subject and predicate may be simultaneously rejected in thought without any contradiction arising.

However, it has been said<sup>1</sup> [by Wolff and his school], there is *one* concept in which the non-being or the removal of the object *would* be self-contradictory, and this is the concept of an *ens realissimum*. For the *ens realissimum* as containing only positive predicates cannot be self-contradictory, and therefore must be possible. It possesses all reality (the argument proceeds), and therefore must include in its concept the notion of being; hence it exists. In this argument there are two fallacies. (1) The absence of contradiction is a sufficient criterion of the *logical* possibility of a *concept*; it is not a sufficient guarantee of the *real* possibility of a *thing*. Kant himself has given quite a different test (p. 193, above). (2) All existential judgments are synthetical; you cannot infer the being of a *thing* from the mere concept of it. Being is not a real predicate—that is, a predicate which can be added to the concept of a thing; it merely brings the thing into relation with my concept of it. The synthetical element in an existential judgment is not the enriching the subject with a new predicate, but the bringing the subject into a new relation to my experience. There is no more in a hundred *actual* dollars than in a hundred *possible* dollars, as far as the content of the *concept* goes, though there is a very real practical difference. As far as the *pure category* is concerned, we have no test by which to distinguish possibility from actuality; and consequently it is idle to attempt to infer the latter from the former. If we were dealing with an object of sense, this difficulty could not arise, nor could such a mistake be made as to confound the existence of a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. for a similar answer Descartes—'L'existence du triangle ne doit pas être comparée avec l'existence de Dieu; parcequ'elle a manifestement en Dieu une autre relation à l'essence qu'elle n'a pas dans le triangle' (*Cousin's Edition*, 1824, vol. ii. p. 291).

thing with the concept of it ; for by the *concept* the object is thought only as in harmony with the general conditions of a possible empirical knowledge, while by its *existence* it is thought as contained in the context of collective experience. In truth, all our knowledge of *existence* relates but to the field of experience, and any *existence* outside that field, though it cannot be declared absolutely impossible, is a *hypothesis* which we have no means of justifying. The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of God is therefore insufficient ; and we might as well hope to increase our knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as a merchant to increase his capital by adding a few noughts to his cash account.

¶ The popularity of Kant's criticism of this argument, Hegel has remarked, results probably from his homely illustration of the 100 dollars. Every one can see that in the case of the dollars you cannot deduce the *being* from the mere *notion* ; but it is important to remember that the illustration is not quite apt. "The very nature of a finite object is expressed by saying that its Being in time and space is discrepant from its notion. God, on the contrary, ought to be what can only be "thought as existing" ; His Notion involves Being. It is this unity of the Notion and Being that constitutes the notion of God."<sup>1</sup> What Kant has shown is that on the supposition that Sensibility is different in source from Understanding, you cannot infer existence in space and time from a mere concept. But Hegel saw that this supposed difference in source was a

<sup>1</sup> Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, p. 92. Kant points out very clearly (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, pp. 414, 415, Hartenstein's edition, 1867) the connection between his doctrine of Possibility and Actuality, and his theory as to the difference in source of Sensibility and Understanding. The whole passage deserves careful study.

fiction ; Sensibility as well as Understanding is but a phase of Thought, and so Kant's laborious argumentation here is not worth much. Kant's great merit was to point out the necessary and *a priori* element in the Sensibility ; his great defect was to isolate it from and oppose it to the Understanding. Had Sensibility and Understanding a common root (as he hints in some passages), the distinction between analytical and synthetical propositions would be only one of degree, and his criticisms would have no force. We have not had special occasion to remark this before, but unless this be seen, the whole drift of the *Dialectic* is lost ; and, we will add, the position which Kant occupies in the history of Philosophy cannot be appreciated.

§ 5. *The Cosmological Proof* proceeds in a much more natural way than the ontological, the subtlety of which is due to the scholastic philosophy [Anselm] ; it infers from the unconditioned necessity of some being its unbounded reality. It was called by Leibnitz the *argumentum a contingentia mundi*, and may be stated as follows. If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must exist. But I myself exist ; therefore there exists an absolutely necessary being. And this necessary being must be the *ens realissimum*, for such a being alone rests on itself and has all the conditions of its existence in itself ; the *ens realissimum* alone can be completely determined *a priori* through its concept.

This proof (called *cosmological*, because the object of all possible experience is the world) begins in the minor premise with experience, unlike the ontological proof ; and inasmuch as it takes no account of any peculiar property of objects of sense by which this world may be distinguished from other possible worlds, it differs also from the physico-theological proof. We may readily see that we have an old

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sophism here in a new dress, for the only use the cosmological proof makes of experience is in the first step, to tell us that a necessary being exists; but experience cannot tell us what are the properties of this necessary being, nor can it identify it with the *ens realissimum*. Indeed, when we go into details we find in this argument a perfect nest of dialectical assumptions, as follows:—

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(1) The transcendental principle—everything that is contingent must have a cause, which is the basis of the major premise in the syllogism at the beginning of the proof—has no significance except in the world of sense. We have before pointed out (p. 298) that the intellectual concept of contingency (which is all that we can here apply) is simply that of which the non-existence is possible; but the contingent, in this sense, we have no right to refer necessarily to a cause.

(2) There is involved in the proof the inference to a first cause from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes being presented one after another in the world of sense. This is an inference which Reason does not permit us to employ as a principle even within experience, still less to extend it beyond experience where there is no chain of causes at all. [In fact the error committed is the same as that which is apparent in the thesis of the 4th Antinomy.]

(3) Supposing this series of conditions to be completed, this could never be done by a being which itself lies totally beyond and apart from the senses; the *ens realissimum* does not complete the series, being separated therefrom by an impassable gulf.

(4) The whole procedure is an *ignoratio elenchi*, because it brings us back to, and assumes the validity of, the ontological argument, which it professes to avoid. For, passing

to the second stage of the proof, what right have you to say that the absolutely necessary being arrived at must be the *ens realissimum*? To put it strictly, you have assumed that all absolutely necessary beings are *entia realissima*; but no *ens realissimum* is different from any other—what is valid of some is valid of all. Hence the assumption really is, in a converted form, that all *entia realissima* are necessary beings. But this was the very *crux* of the ontological argument, and you are here again guilty of the old blunder exposed in § 4.

‘The logical possibility of a concept of all united reality (the test of which possibility is the absence of contradiction) is confounded with the *transcendental*, which requires a principle for the practicability of such a synthesis; but such a principle is applicable to the field of possible experiences only.’ The cosmological argument thus only tries to evade by a mere trick the proof of the existence of a necessary Being *a priori* by mere concepts.

The truth is that though it is quite allowable to admit the existence of an all-sufficient Being, a cause of all possible effects, in order to assist Reason in the quest after unity, yet we cannot assert that such a Being exists necessarily. This unconditioned necessity which we require as the ultimate support of all things, is the true abyss of human Reason. Eternity itself, terrible and sublime as it is, does not produce the same giddy impression, for it only *measures* the duration of things, but does not *support* them.

Many powers of nature, says Kant in conclusion, which manifest their existence by certain effects, remain for us inscrutable; they evade our observation. The transcendental object which forms the basis of phenomena, and, in connection with it, the reason why our Sensibility possesses these



rather than any other ultimate conditions, remain for us inscrutable. But an Ideal of pure Reason cannot be termed inscrutable; because it has to adduce no credential of its reality further than the need felt by Reason to perfect all synthetical unity by means of it. It is not given as a thinkable object; being a mere Idea it must find in the nature of Reason its place and its *solution*; for the very essence of Reason consists in its ability to give an account of all our concepts, opinions, and assertions,<sup>1</sup> — either as objective, or, if they are illusory, on subjective grounds.

*www 475* *Explanation of the dialectical illusion in these transcendental proofs.* We naturally inquire next, What is the cause of this dialectical illusion by which we connect the concepts of necessity and supreme reality, and hypostatise that which can only be an Idea? First of all, it is a perfectly natural (though as we have seen not a reliable) procedure to infer that if anything exists, something must exist necessarily; and it is on this inference that the cosmological argument rests. But again I find that I cannot think the existence of *any individual* thing as necessary; nothing prevents me from thinking its non-existence. In other words, I cannot *complete* the regress to the conditions of existence, without admitting a necessary Being, but I can never *begin* from such a Being. Now if (1) I must think something necessary as the basis of all existing things, and yet (2) am not justified in thinking of anything as in itself necessary, the inevitable conclusion is that necessity and contingency do not concern things themselves; otherwise these principles would contradict one another. It is plain indeed that they cannot be regarded as objective; for if all that we perceive in things must be regarded as conditionally

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 306, *supra*.

necessary, it is impossible that anything which is empirically given should be absolutely necessary.

It follows from this that the absolutely necessary Being (which we require by our first rule) must be regarded as *outside* the world, inasmuch as it is useful merely as a Principle of the highest possible unity of phenomena, and we cannot meet with any such necessary existence *in* the world (by our second rule). As an example of the mistakes that have been made by not attending to both these rules, it may be noted that the philosophers of antiquity regarded all *form* in nature as contingent, but *matter* as original and necessary. Now they only attended to the first regulative principle,—they overlooked the second; if they had regarded matter, not relatively as the basis of phenomena, but according to its being—in itself—they would have seen at once that it was not absolutely necessary; it can be annihilated in thought without any contradiction—every one of the real properties of matter, being derived, are only conditionally necessary. Matter (and generally all that belongs to the world) is not congruous with the Idea of a necessary primal Being, even as a Principle of the greatest possible empirical unity; this Being, as we have shown by our second regulative principle, must have its place assigned outside the world.

These remarks will make it plain that the Ideal of a Supreme Being is but a regulative Principle of Reason, requiring us to regard all means in the world as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary cause, in order to found upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity, according to general laws in the explanation of phenomena. By a transcendental *subreptio* we regard this formal Principle as constitutive, and hypostatise this unity. We make a similar mistake as to space. Space originally makes possible all shapes or figures, which are properly but different limita-

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tions of it; and thus, although it is only a Principle of Sensibility, we take it for an absolutely necessary, self-subsisting thing, for an object given *a priori* in itself. It is in this way that Ideas are regarded as actual objects; and principles, only *regulative*, are regarded as if they were *constitutive*.

§ 6. *The physico-theological proof.*—Since then neither the concept of things in general, nor the experience of any one being in general, can give us what we require, it remains to try whether a *determinate experience*, viz. the things of the present world, their constitution and order, may not enable us to establish the existence of a Supreme Being. We can hardly expect, indeed, that any satisfactory proof will be thus afforded, as we have seen so clearly in the preceding sections that the peculiarity of an Idea consists in the fact that *no experience* can be adequate to it.<sup>1</sup> If the Supreme Being lies *within* the empirical series, it must itself be conditioned; if it be supposed *outside* the series, how are we going to bridge over the chasm between it and experience? But, inasmuch as everywhere around us we see a chain of causes and effects, of means and ends, we are inevitably led up to a Supreme Being, which, as the cause of the origin of the world, may also secure its permanence. To this, then, we attribute a degree of perfection *beyond everything else that is possible*; which we can easily do, though only in the faint outline of an abstract concept, if we represent to ourselves all possible perfections united in it as in one substance. Such a concept agrees with the Law of Parcimony, is not self-contradictory, helps to extend the empirical use of Reason, and does not conflict with any experience we have. Now this proof will always deserve to be treated with respect; it is the oldest, the clearest,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Proleg.* p. 116.

and most in accordance with human Reason; but nevertheless it is not demonstrative, as we shall see if we detail the chief points in it.

It may be divided into four steps. (1) There are in the world clear signs of an arrangement full of definite purpose, carried out with great wisdom, existing in a whole indescribably complex in *content* and unbounded in *extent*. (2) This end-adaptation (*Zweckmässigkeit*) is quite extraneous to the things of the world, and belongs to them only contingently; that is, the nature of different things could not through such a variety of means conduce to the same ends, unless these means had been specially selected and adapted thereto by a *rational* disposing Principle, in accordance with fundamental Ideas.<sup>1</sup> (3) There exists therefore a sublime and wise cause (or more than one), which must be the cause of the world, not merely as a blind and all-powerful Nature through unconscious *fecundity*, but as an intelligence by *freedom*. (4) The *unity* of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the mutual relation of the parts of the world as portions of an artistic edifice—with certainty, as far as our observation reaches, with probability even beyond that range by all laws of analogy.

In this argument we assume plainly an analogy between certain products of nature and those of human art; but since these latter are the only ones of which we know completely both the cause and the way in which it produces its effect, no other course is open to us. Reason would have no right to pass over a causality which it knows, for obscure and undemonstrable principles of explanation, which it does not know. But there are two vital flaws in the proof. In the first place, the end-adaptation and harmony of so many works of nature proves contingency

<sup>1</sup> Cf. all through *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, pp. 379, 418.

2 merely in the *form*, not in the *matter* of the world. And so the proof at most can give us a *world-architect*, who is very much limited by the capabilities of his material; it does not give us a *world-creator*, to whose Idea everything is subject. And so it fails to establish what it aims at—an all-sufficient Original Being: to demonstrate the contingency of matter, we must have recourse to a transcendental argument, which is the very thing we have been trying to avoid. So that, when analysed, the physico-theological proof depends on the cosmological, just as we saw that this last depended on the ontological. And, in the second place, we infer from the order and end-adaptation visible in the world, the existence of a cause *proportionate thereto*; but how can we vindicate an argument from *finite* order and good, to *infinite* wisdom and goodness? No one will be bold enough to say that he has such a perfect insight into the relation between the magnitude, order, and unity of the world of observation and an Omnipotent, all-wise, Individual Being.<sup>1</sup> Physico-theology can therefore give no definite concept of the supreme world-cause, and so is insufficient to serve as the basis of religion. The attainment of absolute totality is thus quite impossible on the empirical path: the ontological proof, through pure concepts of Reason, is the only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far transcending the empirical use of the understanding be possible at all.<sup>2</sup>

§ 7. *Kritik of all Speculative Theology.*—The different

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Theory of Ethics*, p. 236.

<sup>2</sup> These criticisms on the cosmological and physico-theological proofs both rest, it must be observed, on the supposed insufficiency of the ontological argument. If that be admitted (and Hegel has shown that Kant's objection to it is not sound), the other two proofs appear in quite a different aspect. Cf. Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, pp. 87-88, for some instructive remarks on this subject.

methods of procedure we have been considering may be classified in the following way. Leaving out of account that theology which is based upon revelation, Rational Theology may cogitate its object either by pure Reason and through transcendental concepts only, as the *ens originarium*, *ens realissimum*, *ens entium*; or by a concept borrowed from our own mind, as the Supreme Intelligence. A man who adopts the former method (*Transcendental Theology*) is called a *Deist*; he holds that we may know the existence of an Original Being by mere Reason, but that our concept of it is transcendental only, as of a Being which possesses all reality, but a reality which cannot be further determined. He who adopts the latter method (*Natural Theology*), on the other hand, is a *Theist*; such an one maintains that Reason is capable of determining its object more closely in analogy with nature, namely as a Being which through understanding and freedom contains in itself the original ground of all other things. The Deist admits a *cause* of the world only (whether through the necessity of its nature or though freedom remains undecided); the Theist admits an *author* of the world. Briefly, the Deist believes in a God, the Theist in a living God. According as the transcendental theologian adopts the Cosmological or Ontological line of argument, his science will be (a) *Cosmotheology* or (b) *Ontotheology*. A twofold course is also open to the natural theologian, according as he looks at the Supreme Intelligence as the principle either of *physical* or *moral* order and perfection; in the one case his science is (c) *Physico-Theology*, in the other (d) *Moral Theology*.<sup>1</sup> Now Kant claims to have shown the impossi-

<sup>1</sup> Not theological ethics; for in that science moral laws *presuppose* the existence of a Supreme Governor of the World, while Moral Theology on the other hand *grounds this upon* moral laws.

bility of (a), (b), and (c) in the preceding discussion, and so his conclusion is that Rational Theology can have no existence unless it be founded upon Moral Laws (d). He does not develop this line of argument here, but refers to his Kritik of the Practical Reason for its elucidation. The speculative proofs are, however, not without their use. The Design argument, for example, though insufficient of itself, yet prepares the Understanding for theological knowledge and gives to it the right direction.

The transcendental arguments likewise are useful in a *negative* aspect: they *correct* our concept of a Supreme Being; they show that all phenomenal elements must be eliminated from it, and they put an end to all opposing assertions, be they *atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic*. It is plain that the same arguments which show the inability of Reason to demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial.

This Supreme Being is then for purely speculative Reason a mere Ideal, but still a *perfectly faultless* one, which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. And if moral theology is able to supply what is deficient in speculation, then will transcendental theology be no longer merely problematic, but indispensable in the determination of the concept with which we are concerned. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence apart from the world (not as a world-soul), eternity as free from time conditions, omnipresence as unaffected by space conditions, etc., are transcendental predicates; and their purified concepts, needful for every system of theology, can be derived from transcendental theology alone.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

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### THE REGULATIVE USE OF THE IDEAS

THE Dialectic has now confirmed the truth of the negative conclusion of the Analytic, viz. that all inferences which would lead us beyond the field of experience are fallacious and groundless; but it teaches us also that Reason has a natural inclination to overstep these bounds, and that Ideas are as natural to it as categories to the Understanding. There is this difference, however, that the latter lead us to truth, or the agreement of our concepts with their objects, while the former produce merely an irresistible illusion, which only the severest Kritik can remove. Still the Ideas must have their own proper use, if we could only discover what it is, for everything grounded in the nature of our faculties must have some purpose.<sup>1</sup> When we mistake them for concepts of actual objects, they become *transcendent* in their application, and deceive; but they probably have, too, an *immanent* use, when they will be directed to the employment of the Understanding in the sphere of experience. Thus all errors of *subreptio*, of misapplication, are to be attributed to defects of Judgment and not to Understanding or Reason.

It was before pointed out (page 242, *supra*) that the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 238, *supra*.



Reason is related to the Understanding very much as the latter is to sensibility. As the Understanding brings unity into the manifold of objects by means of concepts, so the Reason brings unity into the manifold of concepts by means of Ideas, making a certain *collective* unity the aim of the operations of the Understanding, which otherwise is occupied with a *distributive* unity alone. Accordingly transcendental Ideas should not be employed as *constitutive*; they are not concepts of actual objects; when thus regarded they become dialectical. But they have an admirable and indispensably necessary *regulative* use in directing the Understanding to a certain aim towards which all its rules converge. An idea is like the imaginary focus of a pencil of rays, which, though not a point from which they actually proceed, is regarded as such by a natural illusion; it helps us, however, to *systematise* our knowledge, to explain it according to one principle, which always is the proper function of Reason. It will make this matter clearer to point out that there are two methods by which Reason may proceed, the *demonstrative* and the *hypothetical*. In the former case our universal is *certain* and we deduce by syllogism our particular from it; in the latter case the universal with which we start is *problematical* only, a mere Idea, while the particular is certain. The problem then is to establish the universality of our problematical rule by an examination of particular cases; and if *all particular cases which can be produced* follow from the rule, we may conclude it to be universal.<sup>1</sup> But it is plain that we

<sup>1</sup> This principle Kant lays down in his *Introd. to Logic* (Abbott's Translation), p. 43: 'If all the consequences of a cognition are true, then the cognition itself is true. For if there were any falsity in the cognition, *some* false consequence must needs exist.' Cf. also p. 75. It is involved in his *transcendental proof* (cf. p. 378, *infra*).

can never know all *possible* cases that may arise, and so this hypothetical method of procedure does not lead to the absolute universality of the rule; this use of Reason is merely *regulative*, intended to bring particular cognitions into unity as far as possible, and such unity is the criterion of the truth of the rule. From the above considerations we can see that we can only assert this *systematic unity* of cognitions to be a logical principle aiding the Understanding; it can by no means be regarded as a *transcendental* principle of Reason. But again, a logical law of this sort would be devoid of meaning or application without a transcendental principle at its basis; otherwise Reason would be proposing as its aim an Idea contrary to the constitution of nature, viz. the Idea of the unity of the fundamental powers of nature. This can be best explained by going into some detail.

1. *The Principle of Homogeneity.*—In order to reach unity science must constantly unify its concepts—must seek what is homogeneous in them and class it as their higher genus. Hence we have as the *logical* law of genera, *Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*—the well-known Law of Parcimony. The scholastic philosophers erred in setting this up as a law of nature, of *things*. The cause of the mistake was this, that the law is not merely a subjective, economical plan of Reason adopted to save trouble; for Reason does not merely *suggest* the rule, but *commands* the Understanding to follow it, although we are quite unable to determine the proper bounds of the unity sought. And further, if there existed among phenomena so great a diversity of content that the Understanding could not discover the slightest similarity between them, the law would be inapplicable though commanded by Reason. Hence, then, it is more than a logical law; it presupposes a

*transcendental principle*, not constitutive but *regulative*, according to which homogeneity is necessarily presupposed because without it no empirical concepts, and consequently no experience, would be possible.

2. *The Principle of Specification.*—To the logical principle of genera, which postulates identity, corresponds another—that of *species*, which requires manifoldness and diversity in things, notwithstanding their accordance in the same genus. Reason here forbids the Understanding to consider any species or sub-species as the *lowest* possible, *Entium varietates non temere sunt minuende*. And this logical law, like the last, must be based upon a transcendental law of specification; it cannot be deduced from experience, for empirical specification very soon stops in the distinction of diversities. But, as before, this transcendental principle is not constitutive; it does not require an *actual infinity* of variety in the things that are to become objects; it is only regulative, prescribing to the Understanding<sup>1</sup> the duty of looking for sub-species under every species, and minor varieties under every variety.

This Principle bids us notice differences, as that of homogeneity bade us notice agreements; and Kant notices that, according as a man is an empiricist given to analysis, or a speculator given to synthesis, he will be inclined to lay stress on one or other of them. The one brings out the faculty which corresponds to *wit*; the other that which we call *judgment*.<sup>2</sup>

3. *The Principle of Continuity of Forms.*—This law of

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Caird puts this well. 'Conception can never be adequate to perception, although it must continually strive to make itself so. We can never define the individual, yet the individual is the end which in all definition we strive to reach.'—*Phil. of Kant*, p. 656.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Locke, *Essay*, ii. xi. 2.

the *affinity* of all concepts requires a continuous transition from every species to every other by a gradual increase of difference; intermediate species are always to be regarded as possible. *Datur continuum formarum*. This unites the former principles by prescribing homogeneity in the greatest variety, through the gradual transition from one species to another: thus indicating a kind of relationship of the different branches, as having all sprung from the same stem. And as in this way there arises no void in the whole extent of possible concepts, we may say: *Non datur vacuum formarum*. As in the other cases, this logical law of continuity presupposes a transcendental principle at its basis (*lex continui in natura*); and it is equally plain that such continuity of forms is a mere Idea. For (1) the species in nature are actually divided and form *quanta discreta*, and (2) we cannot make any definite empirical use of the law, as not the smallest criterion of affinity is indicated by it to tell us how far we ought to pursue the gradation of differences.

If we were to arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order required for their empirical use, they would stand thus: *Variety*, *Affinity*, and *Unity*. The remarkable feature about them all is that they seem to be transcendental; and although they contain for the guidance of the empirical use of Reason mere Ideas which Reason can only approach as it were asymptotically,<sup>1</sup> yet they possess as synthetical *a priori* propositions a more than subjective though undefined validity, serving as rules for possible experience. And also in the elaboration of experience they are of service as *heuristic*<sup>2</sup> principles; but with all this a transcendental

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.* it never arrives at them, though always approaching them, as a curve does its asymptote.

<sup>2</sup> *I.e.* they enable us to ask a question, but do not supply the answer.

deduction<sup>1</sup> of them in the sense already known to the reader is quite impossible.

A difficulty occurs here. In our *Analytic* we distinguished (p. 173) the dynamical Principles of the Understanding, which are regulative principles of *intuition*, from the mathematical, which are constitutive of *intuition*. These laws are, however, all constitutive in relation to *experience*, because they make the concepts without which experience could not exist *a priori* possible. But our present principles of pure Reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical *concepts*, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be given, and therefore they can have no object *in concreto*. How then can they be regarded as having objective validity at all? The answer is to be found in the fact that the Idea serves as an *analogon* to the sensuous schema, the difference being that the application of the categories to the schema of Reason is not a knowledge of the object itself (as in the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but only a rule or principle for the systematic unity of all employment of the Understanding.<sup>2</sup> We shall, in short,

<sup>1</sup> But cf. next page.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Theory of Ethics*, p. 160. 'The physical law, being a law to which the objects of sensible intuition, as such, are subject, must have a schema corresponding to it—that is, a general procedure of the imagination (by which it exhibits *a priori* to the senses the pure concept of the Understanding which the law determines). But the law of freedom (that is, of a causality not subject to sensible conditions), and consequently the concept of the unconditionally-good, cannot have any intuition, nor consequently any schema supplied to it for the purpose of its application *in concreto*. Consequently the moral law has no faculty but the Understanding to aid its application to physical objects (not the imagination); and the Understanding, for the purposes of the Judgment, can provide for an Idea of the Reason, not a *schema* of the Sensibility, but a law, though only as to its form as law; such a law, however, as can be exhibited *in concreto* in objects of the senses, and therefore a law of

best describe these principles by calling them *maxims*,<sup>1</sup> *i.e.* they are 'subjective principles, not derived from the constitution of the object, but from the interest which Reason takes in a certain possible completeness of our knowledge of the object;' and we shall thus avoid the contradictions which must arise if we regard them as objectively true in any other sense.

*Of the ultimate aim of the natural dialectic of human reason.*—The Ideas cannot, as we have seen, admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories; but if they are to have objective validity and be anything more than empty creations of thought, some kind of justification of them must be possible. And this, their *transcendental deduction* [in a new and limited sense], may be said to consist in showing that they produce systematic unity in the laws of the empirical use of Reason. Except in the case of the Cosmological Ideas (which are antinomial), there is, of course, nothing to prevent us from admitting the possibility of their being objective; but nevertheless all that we can assert for them is, that they are schemata of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all cognition. Thus the transcendental and only determinate concept of God presented to us by speculative reason is in the narrowest sense *deistic*; even if we admit a Divine Being we can have no concept of the internal possibility of His supreme perfection or of the necessity of His existence. But it is to be observed that I may admit a thing *relatively* without being obliged to do so *absolutely*; for example, I look upon all connections in the world *as if* they were ordered by a

nature. We can therefore call this law the *Type* of the moral law.' Mr. Caird (*Philosophy of Kant*, p. 659) gives another illustration of this schematism of the Reason—from the idea of a practical *maximum*.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Theory of Ethics*, p. 105.

supreme reason, and I then may represent to myself that Supreme Being through concepts, which, properly speaking, are only applicable to the world of sense. For inasmuch as I make only a *relative* use of my transcendental hypothesis, as the substratum of the greatest possible unity of experience, I am quite justified in representing it so; though *absolutely*, as existing by itself, I can apply no sensuous predicates to it at all.<sup>1</sup>

The highest formal unity, which is based upon natural concepts alone, is the unity of *purpose*; and the speculative interest of Reason forces us to regard all order in the world as if it originated from the design of a Supreme Intelligence. This principle opens out to Reason in the field of experience new prospects, and invites it to unite the things of the world according to teleological laws. If we keep to this as a regulative hypothesis, we cannot go very far wrong; error can have no worse result than that, where we expected to discover a teleological connection, only a mechanical or physical connection appears. But if we employ the Idea of a Supreme Being as a constitutive principle, instead of restricting it to regulative influence, we shall be liable to make serious mistakes. One error which will naturally arise is that of *ignava ratio*; reason will *indolently* refer physical phenomena immediately to the Will of God without taking the trouble of investigating their physical causes. Another error into which we are likely to fall in such case is that of *perversa ratio*; we shall be prone to begin at the wrong end, to give an anthropomorphic determination to the concept of a Supreme Intelligence and then proceed to impose aims upon nature. That is, by a sort of a *δοτερον πρότερον*, we shall very probably be tempted to distort empirical facts until they accord with the results of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Proleg.* p. 162.

our *a priori* reasonings. Against such mistakes we shall be guarded by this Kritik of Theology.

In conclusion, as we have frequently said that it is always possible to answer the questions which pure Reason raises, it may be well to point out the critical answers to a few questions which may naturally occur. Suppose it be asked (1), Whether there is something different from the world, which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according to general laws? our answer is, *Certainly*. For the world is a sum of phenomena; there must therefore be some transcendental basis of these phenomena—that is, a basis thinkable by the pure Understanding alone. If (2) we are asked whether that Being is a substance, of the greatest reality, necessary, etc., our answer is, *This question is without meaning*, for I cannot apply the categories beyond the world of sense. If (3) the question be whether we may not think this Being according to the *analogy* of the objects of experience, the answer is, *Undoubtedly*, but only as an Idea and not in reality. Again it will be asked (4), *Can* we then admit a wise and omnipotent Author of the world? *Without doubt*, and not only we can but we *must*. But (5) do we not thus extend our knowledge beyond the field of possible experience? *By no means*, for we have only presupposed a something of which we have no conception whatever as to what is by itself; the idea is valid only relatively to the use of our Reason *in the world*. However (6), Can I make any use of this concept in the rational investigation of nature? *Yes*; that is its very purpose; but you must be careful, when regarding physical processes as the result of *design* on the part of the Supreme Being, to remember that you have no right to regard this last idea as anything more than regulative. When using these analogies you must be always



aware that they are for you nothing more than analogies. A certain dim consciousness of this true use of the idea, says Kant, seems to have dictated to the philosophers of all times the moderate language used by them concerning the cause of the world; we find them employing the expressions *divine wisdom* and *wisdom of nature* indifferently—nay, rather preferring to use the latter.

¶ So then the conclusion of the whole matter for Kant is that Reason contains only regulative principles; illusion arises through regarding them as constitutive. It is not hard to see that this negative result is the only possible one for him; his *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* in the complete isolation of the Sensibility and Understanding prevented him from rising to the conception of an intuitive understanding on the one hand, and on the other from reckoning seriously with the capacity of pure thought to supply us with knowledge which must be as true as anything we can attain. But the object of this commentary being to expound, not to criticise, we leave the Dialectic without further remark. The value of the study of Kant as a *propædæutic*, and this is all he claims for himself, will remain even though we do not go with him in all his conclusions. The service he did in the past by clearing away the cobwebs of the Wolfian Metaphysic can hardly be appreciated by us who, in this century, have entered into his labours, and with difficulty understand what attraction that Metaphysic had for the men of his time.

## CHAPTER XXIX

### TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

IF we regard the whole cognition of pure speculative reason as an edifice, of which we have at least a general notion, it may be said that in our Elementology we have examined the materials and determined to what edifice they belong, and what its height and stability. Our present task in the Methodology relates not to the *materials*, but to the *plan* of the building. So then we understand by 'Transcendental Doctrine of Method' the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason, and we shall treat successively of its Discipline, its Canon, its Architectonic, and its History, and this from the transcendental point of view. Such a task has before been attempted under the head of *practical logic* in vain, for general logic,<sup>1</sup> not being limited either to any particular kind of cognition or to any particular objects, can give merely the heads of possible methods for the several sciences, and employs a technical terminology in each case, the meaning of which the pupil can only learn subsequently.

#### *The Discipline of Pure Reason*

We have seen before that the peculiar province of nega-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 72, *supra*.

tive judgments is to prevent error, and therefore they are of especial use in cases where the tendency to form judgments transcending possible experience is great, and the error resulting from such illusion dangerous. The restraint which is employed to repress, and finally to extirpate, the constant inclination to depart from certain rules is called *discipline*: it is distinguished both from *culture* and *instruction*, in that it is of a purely negative character.

That such talents as imagination and wit, which ask a free and unlimited development, require in many respects the corrective influence of Discipline, every one will admit: it may seem strange, however, that reason, whose proper duty is to prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of the mind, should itself require this corrective. It does not indeed require it, either in the field of possible experience, where its principles (*Grundsätze*) are subject to the test of observation, or in the sphere of Mathematic, where its concepts must always be presented in pure intuition; but, when we can obtain neither of these tests, as in its transcendental use, when it proceeds according to pure concepts, here discipline is very necessary to keep it within the limits of possible experience.

We must notice that in this, the second part of the *Kritik*, discipline is directed not to the *content*, but simply to the *method* of the cognition of pure reason; the former task has been completed in our Elementology. The latter is also necessary; for the employment of reason in the transcendental sphere being quite unique, without such a discipline errors would unavoidably arise from the following of methods which, however suitable to reason in other inquiries, would be out of place here.

§ 1. *Discipline in the sphere of Dogmatism.* Mathematic is a brilliant example of the extension of pure reason

without the aid of experience. We ask, then, What is the difference between the *mathematical* method and that which in philosophy we call *dogmatical*? The answer is:<sup>1</sup> Philosophical cognition proceeds from concepts, while mathematical cognition can only proceed by means of the construction of concepts. By the construction of a concept we mean the *a priori* presentation of the corresponding intuition; we construct, *e.g.* a triangle, either by mere imagination in pure intuition, or upon paper in empirical intuition; but in both cases quite *a priori*. The individual figure drawn upon paper, though empirical,<sup>2</sup> serves to indicate the concept in its universality, because we attend to the *act*, not to the *result* of the construction, which is performed under certain universal conditions. Even an empirical figure on paper suggests the general procedure of the understanding, and so forms the basis of apodeictic proof. Philosophical cognition accordingly regards the particular only in the general; mathematical, the general in the particular, or rather in the individual.

Some have said that the feature which distinguishes Philosophy from Mathematic is, that the former has to do with *quantity*,<sup>3</sup> the latter with *quality*. We are now in a position to see their error; they have mistaken the effect for the cause. Only concepts of *quantity* can be constructed, and so the cognition of *qualities* through reason must be discursive, through concepts. The difference between the two methods of cognition is formal; it does not result from a difference

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Prolegomena*, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> We have here Kant's answer to the question, How can an individual figure and an individual demonstration be valid universally? Cf. for another answer, Locke, *Essay* iv. i. 9. We may also remark that this passage illustrates the schematism, and enables us to see what Kant's views were as to the meaning of general terms. Cf. p. 147, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Kant's *Introduction to Logic*, p. 13.

of object matter. Philosophy, as well as Mathematic, treats of quantities, *e.g.* of infinity, but in a different way.

It may also be observed that in Mathematic we construct not only quantities (*quantia*), as in geometry, but also mere quantity (*quantitas*), as in algebra, where we abstract altogether from the qualities of the object. In this science general signs are adopted to denote symbolically the construction of concepts (*viz.* such signs as  $+$ ,  $-$ ,  $\sqrt{\phantom{x}}$ ), and also arbitrary symbols (letters such as  $x$ ,  $y$ ,  $z$ ) are substituted for the concepts of pure quantity according to their various relations. Constructions are performed in intuition with this apparatus, just as valid as, and more general than, geometrical conclusions.<sup>1</sup>

If an *a priori* concept contains a pure intuition, it can be constructed, and we can proceed intuitively: if it contains but a synthesis of possible intuitions, it cannot be constructed, and we must proceed discursively. Such synthetical propositions with respect to things in general, the intuition of which cannot be given *a priori*, are called transcendental; they only contain the rule according to which we must look empirically for a certain synthetical unity of what cannot be represented in *a priori* intuition. The transcendental concept of substance [the indefinable subject of qualities], for example, does not denote an intuition, but merely the synthesis of empirical intuition which cannot be given *a priori*, and so no determining synthetical proposition can spring from it; we can only get a principle of the synthesis of possible empirical intuitions. The same is true of cause; in this case I go beyond the empirical concept of an event, not however

<sup>1</sup> This is Kant's full explanation of the way in which algebraic demonstrations are to be brought under intuitions in space and time. Cf. Mill, *Logic*, vol. i. p. 287.

tion giving the concept of cause *in concreto*, the conditions of time, which may in experience accordance with that concept.

transcendental efforts to get beyond the limits of are so alluring that it may be well to show more difference between the mathematical and the philosophical method, and so to prove that the employment of Mathematic cannot be of the slightest service in the field of philosophy. The exactness of Mathematics rests on *definitions, axioms, demonstrations*. We show that none of these, in the strict mathematical sense, can be obtained in philosophy.

*Definitions.* A *definition* is the representation, upon words, of the complete concept<sup>1</sup> of a thing within

Hence we cannot expect to obtain a definition of an empirical concept, *e.g.* of gold, for the progress of science is constantly adding new predicates or removing old ones; so that such a concept never remains within fixed limits. In a logical language, it is not *precise*. All we can obtain is what we may call a *description* or *explication*. We cannot define an *a priori* concept, *e.g.* substance, be defined, but we can never be sure that our analysis is complete; we may say that we cannot get beyond an *exposition*.

As regards *arbitrary* concepts,<sup>3</sup> these are certainly not susceptible of definition, for they are made up of words; but I can never say, when they depend on conditions, that I have thus arrived at a definition of an object, for the existence of a concept does not

rest on the laws of logical definition and cf. *Introd. to Logic*, pp.

in such cases, the denotation rather than the connotation is the important point.

Apply the same to notions and complex ideas generally. *Essay* ii. 22. 2.

guarantee the existence or even the possibility of anything corresponding. Perhaps I ought here to describe my explanation as a <sup>1</sup> *declaration* (of my project).

iv. There remains then, as alone susceptible of definition properly so called, concepts containing an arbitrary synthesis, which can be constructed *a priori*. Such are mathematical concepts, and this because in Mathematic, and in it alone, is such a construction possible. We see then that philosophical definition (so called) is only exposition (analytical), but mathematical definition is by construction of concepts (synthetical).

Hence we observe that though we may—nay, must—begin with definitions in Mathematic,<sup>2</sup> we end with them in Philosophy. We must of course assume provisional and imperfect definitions at the commencement of our inquiry even in this case, but a complete analysis of them is the last step. And further, mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous as regards content, though mistakes may occur now and then as to form. Analytical definitions, on the other hand, are very liable to error either of excess or defect.

2. *Axioms*. These, so far as they are immediately certain, are synthetical principles *a priori*. Now, philosophical cognition is always discursive, by means of concepts, and therefore can never be axiomatic; for a synthetical connection between two concepts is only immediately apparent through intuition. Mathematic, on the contrary, may possess axioms, because in it, by means of the construction of concepts, two predicates may be connected *a priori*, and

<sup>1</sup> Apparently in this case, though Kant does not say so, the third condition of definition is not fulfilled—that is, the precise number of predicates of an arbitrary concept cannot be determined on primary grounds (*ursprünglich*).

<sup>2</sup> In Mathematic definitions belong *ad esse*, in Philosophy *ad melius esse*.

united. Philosophical principles, then, are discursive and deductive; axioms are self-evident. It is true that in the Analytic certain 'axioms of intuition' were spoken of, but the principle<sup>1</sup> there instanced, far from being an axiom, served only to indicate the principle (*Principium*) of the possibility of axioms in general, being itself only a principle (*Grundsatz*) based on concepts. It was introduced in that place, because it is necessary for transcendental philosophy to establish even the possibility of mathematics.

3. *Demonstrations.* Apodeictic propositions may be divided into two classes, possessing intuitive and discursive certainty respectively, to which the names *mathemata* and *dogmata* may be given. It is only to a proposition of the former class that the term *demonstration* can be applied, and hence it is plain, as before, that philosophical proofs, which must be discursive and not intuitive, cannot be demonstrative; we may call them *acroamatic*, as being taught by words only.

The method of philosophy cannot then be dogmatical (though it may be systematical), for pure speculative reason does not possess a single direct synthetical proposition from concepts, *i.e.* does not possess a single<sup>1</sup> dogma to start from. Even such a proposition as 'Every effect has a cause' is not a dogma, for it is not based merely on concepts; but, in order to establish it, we require to bring in the possibility of experience. The proper term for such a proposition is Principle (*Grundsatz*), not dogma or precept (*Lehrsatz*), because, although it does not require to be proved, it possesses the remarkable peculiarity of rendering its own proof, experience, possible.

§ 2. *Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics.*—We saw

<sup>1</sup> All intuitions are extensive quantities. Cf. p. 163, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 36, *supra*.



that the apparent contradictions into which reason fell in the Antinomies could be reconciled with each other by adopting the distinction between phenomena and noumena. In certain other cases, however, reason falls into an antithetic, which cannot be so easily accounted for. For example, take the counter assertions: There is a God—there is no God: the soul is mortal—the soul is immortal. Here we have two pairs of contradictory propositions, of which, in each case, one must be true and the other false; but we cannot tell which, for we have no sure basis for an argument on either side. Hence, though we cannot demonstratively prove the existence of God or the immortality of the human soul, we have the consolation that no one can prove the opposite. Now what we mean by the *Polemic* of Pure Reason is this defence of a proposition made by reason in opposition to the dogmatical counter-assertions of other people. By such a Polemic, however, we can only oppose and disarm our opponents—we cannot attempt to defend our own side; to do the latter would at once be dogmatical.

But we need not always have recourse to scholastic arguments. We may safely accept those propositions which agree with the speculative interests of reason in its empirical use, and which are the only means of reconciling them with our practical interests. It is quite allowable to employ, in the presence of reason, the language of a firm *faith*, though we may have to give up all pretensions to *knowledge*.

Properly speaking, then, there is no insoluble antithetic of pure reason, nor should there be any such thing as a Polemic; two people ought not to dispute about things the reality of which neither can present in actual or even in possible experience. Both parties in such case are fighting with their own shadows: their combat is as unending as

that of the heroes in Walhalla. Nothing will put an end to these foolish disputes but *criticism*, which will show that *knowledge* is unattainable on such matters, and that we should be content with a rational *faith*; we have then an unassailable position. However, it must be observed that it is impossible to satisfy Pure Reason in conflict with itself, by a mere *sceptical* solution: scepticism cannot be a permanent condition of the human mind. Consciousness of ignorance ought to be the strongest impulse to investigation. Here we come upon an important distinction; ignorance may be (a) of facts or (b) of the bounds of cognition. If ignorance is accidental it should incite us (a) to investigate facts *dogmatically*, (b) to investigate the bounds of cognition *critically*. With regard to the manner in which these inquiries are to be pursued we may see *a posteriori* (a) that reason, as a matter of fact, has<sup>1</sup> *limits*, but (b) the determination of its *bounds* can only be accomplished *a priori*; and is a matter of *science*, not of mere *perception*. For instance, every one knows that he can only see a certain portion of the earth's surface at any given time, and so his perception is limited; but unless he knows that the earth is a sphere, he cannot tell what are the bounds of possible perception; this can only be found out *a priori*. Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, the limits of which are only known in a general way, but ought to be compared to a sphere, the radius of which can be determined from the curvature of a portion of its surface (*i.e.* from the nature of its synthetical *a priori* propositions).

The procedure of reason may be described as at first *dogmatic*; then it subjects its facts to *ensorship*—it sees that they may be doubtful beyond certain limits—it declares itself to be *limited*: this is the *sceptical* stage. But lastly,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Proleg.*, p. 154.

not merely the facts of reason, but reason itself in its whole power and in regard to its fitness for *a priori* knowledge, is placed under examination: this is the final and *critical* stage, in which the actual *bounds* of reason are determined *a priori*. Now we are actually in possession of *a priori* synthetical cognitions [as we proved in the *Analytic*], but till we can point out the limits and bounds of their use, we are dogmatists. And this must be possible to determine; reason originates the concepts in question, and therefore will be able to solve all problems immediately concerning them and which inevitably arise (cf. p. 307, *supra*).

We can now see Hume's position in philosophy: he was a *sceptic* (perhaps the ablest of all sceptics)—he did good service in showing the insufficiency of dogmatism, and in pointing out that knowledge was limited, but he never advanced to the critical standpoint—he never pointed out the *bounds* of knowledge. And we may say that his fundamental mistake arose as follows:—

*A priori* synthesis of the Understanding derives all its validity from the fact that the judgments we form relate to objects of possible experience; and though we cannot proceed *immediately* beyond the contents of a given concept, we can *a priori* discern the law of its connection with other things, by reference to the possibility of experience itself.<sup>1</sup> *A priori* synthesis of the Reason, on the other hand, is impossible, because we have here no third term with which we may *a priori* discern the connection of our concepts, and so determine their connection with each other. Now Hume did not distinguish between the valid procedure of Understanding and the dialectical attempts of Reason; he regarded the spontaneous generation of Understanding and Reason, independently of the impregnation of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 159, *supra*.

experience, as alike impossible. His error lay, not in denying the possibility of Metaphysic, but in refusing to recognise the just claims of Physic.

For example, he thought that the Law of Causality possessed only a subjective necessity—was only contingent. Here he mistook the contingency of our determination *according to the law*, for the contingency of the *law itself*. It may be only contingent that an effect A has been produced by a particular cause B, but it is objectively necessary that A should have had some cause. As was pointed out before (p. 40), he did not take a large enough view; he viewed Causality as an isolated and unique principle, whereas we have given in our Analytic a complete table of similar principles.

§ 3. *The discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.*—There are two conditions which must be fulfilled that an hypothesis may be regarded as legitimate. i. Its object must be possible: reason must not attempt to form concepts of objects which do not harmonise with the conditions of the possibility of experience, Space, Time, and the Categories. ii. It must be adequate to determine *a priori* all the consequences that require explanation; it must be independent of subsidiary hypotheses. Hence then a valid hypothesis must be not only *possible* but *useful*.

For example, to suppose that the soul is a simple substance would be to violate the first condition; though, on the other hand, it is quite admissible to *think* it simple, in order to employ, in our inquiries into mental phenomena, the Idea of the complete and necessary unity of the mental faculties. Such an hypothesis we call *transcendental*. We may next notice that an hypothesis of this nature is quite inadmissible in the sphere of *phenomena*; it

might help to satisfy the Reason, but it would not help the Understanding in dealing with objects. Natural events must be explained by natural laws; we must not introduce the *deus ex machina* into physics.<sup>1</sup> In fact, by hyperphysical explanations of physical facts, we not only do not advance Reason, but we deprive it of the fruits which spring from the cultivation of its proper soil, Experience.

The only legitimate sphere for Transcendental Hypotheses is that of *Polemic*, not *Dogmatic*; and the reason of this is, as we saw before, that all synthetic propositions of pure reason possess the peculiarity that, though not susceptible of proof, they are equally incapable of disproof. So, plainly, if there is a *practical* necessity of reason to believe in a certain proposition, which cannot be proved false, we are perfectly justified in maintaining its truth, even though we cannot on the other hand prove it to be true. *Melior est conditio possidentis*. These hypotheses of pure reason, though they are but leaden weapons, not having been steeled by any law of experience, are quite as useful as any that can be employed by opponents. To take another example: Suppose a materialist to say that mind is a function of the organism, and to appeal in support of his doctrine to the admitted fact that mental powers seem to be largely dependent on conditions of the body. We at once weaken the force of his argument by the assumption that the body is only the fundamental phenomenon, which is the condition *in our present state* of sensibility and therefore of thought. The body, far from being the cause of thought, is only its restrictive condition.

Such an assumption cannot be *disproved*, and so we at once show our opponent that the laws of experience and nature do not exhaust the field of possibility, and that,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 358, *supra*.

therefore, whatever he may think of our position, he has no right to regard his as established, there being another alternative which he cannot show to be impossible. It must never be forgotten, however, that such hypotheses, in the speculative sphere, are not valid as independent propositions, but only in relation to opposite transcendent assumptions.

§ 4. *The Discipline of Pure Reason as to Proofs.*—The proofs of transcendental synthetical propositions are distinguished from the proofs of all other synthetical *a priori* propositions<sup>1</sup> (e.g. in Mathematic) by this, that in them Reason does not apply itself directly to an object through its concepts, but has first to prove the objective validity of those concepts and the possibility of their *a priori* synthesis. The neglect of this preliminary consideration has been the source of much error: attempts have been made in vain to prove such propositions by the principle of inseparable association. For example, all previous efforts to prove the principle of Sufficient Reason have been fruitless; here philosophers seem to have abandoned proof, and appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind.

And if in synthetical *a priori* propositions in the sphere of Understanding, a necessary preliminary to proof is the *deduction* of the possibility of the synthesis, such a deduction must be still more indispensable in the case of an assertion of Pure Reason, where I aim at going beyond my empirical concepts by the aid of mere Ideas. For, take the supposed proof of the simplicity of the soul derived from the unity of apperception. It looks plausible; why does it fail? It is because the notion of absolute simplicity is not a concept which can be referred directly to a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 364, *supra*.

perception ; as an Idea, at best, it can only be inferred. In fact, to argue from the simplicity of *a thought* to the simplicity of the *subject of thought* is a step which requires justification. We should first of all have established the validity of this step—have established the possibility of connecting our concept of the soul *a priori* with the Idea of a simple being. Now, how can our concept of simplicity be thus expanded? In the language of Spinoza, how can we elevate an abstraction into a *res completa*? The possibility of this *a priori* synthesis cannot be established, and therefore the supposed proof is only a paralogism.

1. The first rule that we arrive at is, then, not to attempt a Transcendental Proof before we have first considered from what source we are to derive the principles on which it is to be based. If they are principles of Understanding they are only applicable to objects of experience, and therefore we cannot arrive at Ideas by their means. If they are principles (*Grundsätze*) of Pure Reason they are only *regulative* of experience. All this we have shown before.

2. A second peculiarity of transcendental proof is this :—For every transcendental proposition only *one* proof can be found. If I am drawing conclusions not from concepts, but from intuitions, as in Mathematical or Experimental Science, then I may arrive at the result by several different methods. But, on the other hand, every transcendental proposition sets out from *one* concept, and posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of the object according to that concept. There can, therefore, be but one ground of proof, because, besides this concept, there is nothing else by which the object could be determined. The proof can contain nothing more than the determination of an object in general according to that unique concept. For example, in our Transcendental Analytic, we inferred that 'Every

effect has a cause,' from the single condition of the objective possibility of the concept of an event; that is, we showed that an event could not be determined in time unless it were subject to such a dynamical rule. In the same way, if we want to prove that 'Every thinking being is simple,' we must pay no attention to what is manifold in thought, but keep the concept of the Ego alone in view. So also with the transcendental proof of the existence of God, which rests entirely on the reciprocability of the two concepts of a *most real* and of a *necessary* Being, and cannot be sought elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> If more reasons than one are produced by the dogmatist for any transcendental proposition, we may be sure that he has not got *the* one on which the whole force of the proof must rest, that his reasons are false and sophistical—mere special pleading.

3. It will hence follow, in the third place, that transcendental proofs must be always *direct*, not *indirect*. In one respect indeed, *apagogic* or indirect proofs have the advantage of being more easily understood, but they can, at best, only show *that* a proposition is true, not *why* it is so: an *ostensive* or direct proof, on the contrary, not only establishes the proposition, but gives it grounds. The reason why apagogic proofs are so much used in the different sciences appears to be as follows. In hypothetical reasoning we may legitimately argue from the negation of the consequent to the negation of the antecedent; but the only case in which an argument from the affirmation of the consequent to the affirmation of the antecedent is valid is this—if we have enumerated *all possible* consequents.<sup>2</sup> If *every possible consequence* of an hypothesis be true, the

<sup>1</sup> In fact a transcendental proof is an argument from an effect to its only possible cause. Cf. p. 45, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 352, note.



hypothesis itself must be true ; but it is needless to point out that it is not possible in practice to discover all possible consequences of a given proposition. Hence the *modus tollens* or indirect method is often substituted for the direct *modus ponens*, being easier and just as valid. However, this apagogic method is only admissible in sciences where it is impossible to mistake a merely subjective representation for objective truth. Now in *Mathematic* such subreption is impossible, and so in that science the apagogic method is valid and useful. In *Physic* we may guard against mistakes in its employment by multiplying our observations ; however, the method here is not rigid, and is of little use. But when we come to *Metaphysic*, the sphere of pure Reason, the proper region of dialectical illusion, the method is quite useless. Here, in order to prove any synthetical statement, it is not sufficient to establish the inconceivability of the opposite, for error may arise in two ways. (a) This supposed refutation may merely show the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions of reason, e.g. in the Dynamical Antinomies ; it does not follow that, because the thesis and antithesis are subjectively opposed, they are not both true from different points of view. (b) On the other hand, as in the Mathematical Antinomies, both thesis and antithesis may be false and dialectical, being based on an impossible concept (an absolutely existing world of sense). In this latter case the rule applies : *Non entis nulla sunt predicata*.

## CHAPTER XXX

### CANON, ARCHITECTONIC, AND HISTORY

#### *The Canon of Pure Reason*

WE have seen that the proper use of a philosophy of pure speculative reason is negative only ; it does not supply us with an *Organon*, only with a *Discipline* ; it rather guards us from error than furnishes us with new truth. At the same time, there must be *some* source of positive Knowledge in the sphere of Pure Reason ; how else can we account for the irrepressible desire of the human mind to get beyond mere experience, to arrive at the Unconditioned ? May we not hope that in the *practical* sphere, which we have not considered as yet, Reason may meet with better success than it has had in the *speculative* ?

Now, if there be any legitimate exercise of Reason at all, there must be a *Canon* for its procedure. By a Canon is meant the sum-total (*Inbegriff*) of the *a priori* principles of the right use of the cognitive faculties. General Logic supplies us with a merely formal Canon of both Understanding and Reason.<sup>1</sup> Our transcendental Analytic is the Canon of the pure use of the Understanding. What we now proceed to investigate is a Canon of Pure Reason, and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Introd. to Logic*, p. 3.

we shall confine ourselves to the practical sphere, for we have seen that its speculative exercise is dialectical.

§ 1. *Of the Ultimate End of the pure use of our Reason.*—The speculative interest which Reason has in its three Ideas is very small, for they are transcendent, not immanent, and so are of no use in explaining empirical facts. Hence, then, since they are of no service as regards *knowledge*, and yet are so strongly urged upon us by Reason, it is plain that their real value and importance relate to our *practical* interest. Now the moral laws alone, not being empirically conditioned, but being absolutely imperative, are the products of pure practical reason, and hence they alone admit of a canon such as we seek: that is, there is a Canon of practical Reason, if and if only there be moral laws. In fact, Reason, in its pure use, is wholly directed to the three problems of the Freedom of the Will, the Existence of God, and the Immortality of the Soul. These themselves, however, have a still further object, namely, to know *what ought to be done*, if the will be free, if there be a God, and if there be a future World. As this concerns our conduct, with reference to the highest end of life, we see that the last intention of nature was really, in the constitution of our Reason, directed to the Moral alone.

We may further notice that the question of transcendental freedom is entirely speculative, and that the existence of practical freedom<sup>1</sup> can be proved from experience alone: hence in our Canon we have only to do with two questions, viz. Is there a God? Is there a future life?

<sup>1</sup> 'A will which is independent of sensuous impulses and can be determined therefore by purely rational motives, is a *Free Will*.' This is the meaning of practical freedom; for Kant's definition of transcendental freedom, cf. p. 295, and *Proleg.* p. 141.

§ 2. *Of the Ideal of the Supreme Good, as determining ground of the ultimate end of Pure Reason.*—The whole interest of my Reason is centred in the three following questions:<sup>1</sup> What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?

The first question is purely speculative, and Kant considers that he has sufficiently answered it in the *Kritik*. The second question is purely practical: the answer is, 'Do that which will render thee worthy of happiness.' The question, 'If I act so as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope on that account to obtain it,' is both practical and theoretical, and is really that one with which we are here concerned. Now, before answering it, we assume that there are Moral Laws which command absolutely (and therefore can be obeyed), *i.e.* that actions done from purely rational motives are possible. Assuming this is to say that Pure Reason contains in its practical use principles (*Prinzipien*) of the *possibility of experience*, namely, of such actions as, in accordance with moral precepts, might be met with in the *history* of man. That is, we establish the systematic unity of nature and the objective reality of these principles in the practical sphere, though we could not do so speculatively. We call the world, thus regarded, a *moral* world; it is only an Idea, but it is an Idea which may have (and ought to have) an influence on the world of sense. In this intelligible moral world happiness would be necessarily proportioned to morality; freedom, as impelled or restrained by the moral law, being itself the cause of general happiness. But, in postulating this moral world, we must postulate the condition under which alone it is possible, *viz.* the idea of an intelligence in which the most perfect moral will united with the highest blessedness is the cause of all

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Introd. to Logic*, p. 15.

happiness in the world so far as it stands in strict relation to morality, *i.e.* the *Ideal of the Supreme Good*. In plain language, we are necessitated by Reason to regard ourselves as belonging to a world in which our happiness is to be exactly proportioned to our virtue. This is not the case in the present world of sense, nor could it ever be the case except under a perfect moral governor. Hence God and a future life are two hypotheses which are necessary consequences of the moral law; if they were not true, the moral law could be only an idle dream. Without them the ideas of morality may be objects of praise and admiration, but cannot be springs of purpose and action, because they would fail to fulfil all the aims which are natural and necessary for a rational being. In short, the Supreme Good consists of *two* distinct elements, Virtue and Happiness.

This *moral* theology has the peculiar advantage over *speculative*, that it leads inevitably to the concept of a *single*, most *perfect*, and *rational* First Cause, whereof speculative theology does not give us even an *indication* on objective grounds, far less a *conviction*. The only way in which we can establish the existence of a *single* Being at the head of all natural causes is to take our stand on moral unity as a necessary law of the universe, and thence infer that there must be *one* supreme will which comprehends all these laws within itself. This systematic unity of ends in the world of intelligences then leads to the teleological unity of all things which make up this great whole according to universal natural laws, just as the former unity is according to universal and necessary moral laws. In this way the practical and speculative reason become united.<sup>1</sup> The world must be represented as having originated from an Idea if it is to

<sup>1</sup> This is the point of departure of Kant's idealistic successors.

accord with that use of Reason, without which we should be unworthy of the possession of Reason—the moral use. Hence the investigation of Nature becomes teleology, and further, this notion of design in Nature gives rise to a *transcendental theology* which takes the ideal of the highest ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity.

§ 3. *Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.* When Reason in its canon asserts apodeictically upon the basis of its moral laws, the faculty of freedom, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul, it assumes these three propositions with a certainty excluding all doubt, and yet, strange to say, they cannot be demonstrated scientifically. The nature of our assent to them, then, is a point that requires further clearing up.

If a judgment is valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and we call our assent to it *conviction*; but if it has its ground only in the peculiar character of the subject, the name *persuasion* is given. The former can always be communicated to others; the latter cannot.

Or we may express ourselves thus: There are three degrees of holding for true, three *modi* of assent, Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge. Opinion is subjectively as well as objectively inadequate, is a mere *problematical* judging. Belief is objectively inadequate, but is subjectively adequate, an *assertorial* judging. And Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively adequate; what I know I regard as *apodeictically* certain.<sup>1</sup> I must never venture to *be of opinion* without *knowing* at least something by which my judgment, problematical in itself, is connected with truth, which connection, although not perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of such

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noticing how clearly Kant distinguishes objective from subjective necessity in this passage.

connection must be certain. For if, with respect to this law, I have nothing but opinion, it is all a mere play of the imagination bearing no relation whatever to truth.

In the judgments of Pure Reason opinion has no place; for in them the principle of connection must be universal and necessary. Hence the sphere of opinion can neither be Mathematic nor Ethic; here there must be knowledge. We must not hazard an action on the mere *opinion* that is allowed; we must *know* it to be so. In the transcendental use of Reason, on the contrary, mere *opinion* is insufficient, but *knowledge* is too strong a term. Speculatively here we cannot form a judgment at all, because the subjective grounds on which we hold a thing to be true cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries. Nor can the *theoretically* insufficient acceptance of a truth be called *belief* except from the *practical* point of view. And this practical reference is either to *skill*<sup>1</sup> or to *morality*, the former being concerned with any arbitrarily proposed ends, the latter with absolutely necessary ends only.

I. As an example of the former case, a physician believes, say, that his diagnosis is correct in a case of disease, and acts accordingly; such a belief, contingent indeed, but nevertheless giving the ground of the actual use of means in certain actions, is called *pragmatical*. In proportion as a man holds this kind of belief strongly, he is ready to *bet* on it, and this is a fair test of its strength. But it must be observed, further, that in many cases where our judgment is purely theoretical, in which we cannot undertake any correspondent actions, we can still represent to ourselves in thought the possibility of such actions, for which we suppose ourselves to have sufficient grounds, if

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. *Theory of Ethics*, p. 32.

any means existed of ascertaining the truth. And so there is in purely theoretical judgments an *analogon* to this pragmatistical belief in practical matters, which we will call *doctrinal* belief; my belief of the existence of God, which is produced in my mind by the pursuit of physical science, is of this character. As a condition of a contingent, but not unimportant end, namely, that I may have guidance in the investigation of nature, it is necessary to admit a wise author of the world.<sup>1</sup> Mere doctrinal belief, however, is rather unstable; we often lose it on account of difficulties in speculation (though in the end we always return to it).

II. We now turn to *Moral* Belief. Here action is absolutely necessary, and I must obey the moral law in all points. The end in this case is incontestably established, and, as far as we know,<sup>2</sup> only one condition is possible under which that end could agree with all other ends and thus have practical validity, viz. the existence of God and of a future world. Hence I inevitably believe this, and this belief is *moral*. My conviction may not be *logically* certain, but it is *morally* certain; my belief in God and in another world is inextricably interwoven with my moral nature.

To sum up, then, our Canon consists only of these two articles of belief; in respect to the essential ends of human nature, the highest philosophy cannot effect anything more than that guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding.

<sup>1</sup> Kant means by belief, 'assent which is sufficient to influence action' (*Introd. to Logic*, p. 58, note). Our conviction of the existence of God derived from our investigation of nature is such that we act on it when occasion arises; it is stronger than mere opinion, and so we call it *belief*, but *doctrinal* belief, to distinguish it from *moral* belief derived from the evidence of the moral law. Compare with this, Butler's use of the phrase 'practical proof' in the Introduction to the *Analogy*.

<sup>2</sup> Vide p. 380, *supra*.



*The Architectonic of Pure Reason*

*Architectonic* is the art of system, and reason always requires that knowledge should be reduced to system—that is, that our different cognitions should be ranged under one idea. This leading idea is the rational concept of the form of a whole in which both the extent of its manifold contents and the plan belonging to each part are determined *a priori*. When we view a science from such a standpoint, it is like an organism (*articulatio*), not a mere aggregate (*concrevatio*). It grows internally, but not externally—like an animal body, the growth of which adds no new member, but without changing the proportion of the parts renders each member stronger and more efficient for its own purpose.

This Idea requires for its realisation a *Schema*, i.e. an essential variety and order of parts determined *a priori* from the principle of the end in view. A Schema which is not designed according to an Idea, but empirically in accordance with contingent ends, can only give us *technical* unity in our science. In order to get *architectonical* unity, the schema must give *a priori* the outline (*monogramma*) of the science and the division of it into parts according to the Idea; the parts must be shown to have an essential affinity, in that they all depend on one supreme and internal end, which renders the whole possible. A science must have made considerable progress before such a conception of it can be grasped; its originator seldom sees it in its full extent and true character. Scientific systems *seem* to grow like worms by a kind of *generatio æquivoca*, by the mere confluence of concepts; though really they all have a *schema*, like an original germ, in accordance with which they are developing. And just because this germ lies in reason in

all cases, it is possible to systematise human knowledge, to construct an *Architectonic* of it.

We may first notice that knowledge may be either *historical* (*cognitio ex datis*) or *rational* (*cognitio ex principiis*). With the former we have nothing to do: we are only concerned to sketch the plan of the Architectonic of cognition from *pure reason*. As to rational cognition, we before divided it (p. 363) into *Mathematical*, which proceeds according to the construction of concepts, and *Philosophical*, proceeding from concepts themselves. Mathematical knowledge cannot be merely *historical*; <sup>1</sup> a man cannot really accept a mathematical truth without appreciating the steps by which it is arrived at, and so it may be said that mathematics may be *learned*; philosophy, on the other hand, cannot be learned except in the historical sense. A person who has made himself acquainted by reading with the tenets of a philosophical system, but who has not thought them out for himself, cannot be called a philosopher; 'he is only the plaster-cast of a living man.'

So far we have been regarding Philosophy as equivalent to rational knowledge from concepts. Now this is only the *scholastic* concept of the science; from such a concept we could never attain more than mere *logical* perfection. In this regard the end of a science is *skill*; it is directed towards certain arbitrary objects, and its purpose is fulfilled if these are attained. And so, in the scholastic sense, we are philosophers if we can *philosophise* well, if we are masters of the art of reason (*Vernunftkünstler*). But there is also the *cosmical* concept of philosophy, which has much more dignity. According to it philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential

<sup>1</sup> Historical knowledge is the mere knowledge *that* a thing is, as distinguished from knowledge *why* it is.

ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humane*); the philosopher is not a mere master of the art of reason, but a lawgiver. The mathematician, the physicist, and the logician are only masters of the art of reason; but besides these there is the philosopher, the ideal teacher who uses them all as instruments for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. We do not pretend that he anywhere exists, but nevertheless the Idea of his legislation exists everywhere in the reason of every rational being; and so, according to this Idea, we may determine what kind of systematic unity philosophy in its *cosmical* concept<sup>1</sup> requires, and also accordingly we may make out its subdivisions.

Now, plainly, if the perfect systematical perfection of reason has been reached, there can be but one highest end—the destination of man, and so philosophy, in the highest sense, is really Moral Philosophy, as in fact it was regarded by the ancients. Indeed, even at present we popularly speak of a man who has his passions under proper control as a *philosopher*.

We now proceed to classification. Knowledge being either *empirical* or *a priori*, we shall subdivide philosophy into (a) pure, (b) empirical. To the latter we shall return presently. As to the former it may be either *Propædæutic*—that is, *preparatory* and *critical*, or a systematical body of *doctrine*, usually called *Metaphysic*. It is however not uncommon to include both criticism and doctrine under this head, but we adopt the above distinction for the sake of clearness. Next, *Metaphysic* may be either of Nature or

<sup>1</sup> 'By a cosmical concept,' says Kant, 'I mean one in which every man necessarily is interested.' Compare with this the use of the same phrase on pp. 281, 286. With the whole passage the student should compare *Introd. to Logic*, pp. 14-15.

of Freedom, may be *speculative* or *practical*; when practical it is called *Ethic*. The extreme importance of having our classification of the sciences thus constructed on definite principles is plain, for Metaphysic has never before been clearly explained. When it was spoken of, *e.g.* as the science of first principles of cognition, this definition gave no clue to its real nature, for there was no criterion given which might distinguish *first* principles from those which were acquired later. The differences in kind between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge, and between philosophical and mathematical cognition, lie at the root of the whole matter, and Kant proudly claims for himself that he was the first to observe them. The Metaphysic of Nature consists of two parts, *Transcendental Philosophy (Ontology)* and *Rational Physiology*. The former treats only of Understanding and Reason themselves in a system of concepts and principles which relate to *objects in general*; the latter treats of *nature*—that is, the complex of *given* objects. This latter again may be either *immanent* or *transcendent*, the first if it takes account of the conditions under which alone objects can be given *us*, the second if it regards a connection of the objects of experience which transcends all experience. Transcendent Physiology treats then of the external connection of the whole of Nature with a Being above Nature (*Theology*), or postulates an internal transcendental connection of its parts (*Cosmology*); and as the objects of the senses are twofold, either of *corporeal* or *sentient* nature, we may have two branches of Immanent Physiology also, rational *Physics*<sup>1</sup> and rational *Psychology*.

Now such a division is prescribed by the fundamental

<sup>1</sup> Kant points out that he does not mean by this what is commonly called *physica generalis*, which is rather Mathematic than a philosophy of nature.

idea of a philosophy of pure reason, and so it is *architectonic*, adequate to its essential aims, and not merely *technical* and accidental.

In conclusion, two questions may naturally be asked.

i. How can I expect knowledge *a priori*, i.e. Metaphysic, of objects so far as they are given to our senses *a posteriori*? how can I expect to have a *rational physiology*? The answer is: We take from experience nothing beyond what is necessary to give us an object of external or internal sense; in the one case by the mere concept of matter (impenetrable and lifeless extension), in the other by the concept of a thinking being (in the internal empirical representation *I think*). ii. How shall we classify *empirical psychology*? We reply: It comes under *applied philosophy*; it has, properly speaking, nothing to say to Metaphysic. It may, however, retain its present place under Metaphysic for convenience sake, but as a mere guest until it is provided with a proper home in a systematic Anthropology, the proper pendant of Empirical Physics.<sup>1</sup>

Such is the general idea of Metaphysic. It must be observed that we have shown that though it does not supply the *foundation* of religion, it must always remain its *bulwark*. This is true philosophy; it leads to wisdom, and the way to it is the way of science.

### *The History of Pure Reason*

We can only, of course, under this head, give the merest sketch; it is striking that Theology has always, in the past, formed the beginning of speculative inquiry rather than the end.

We may classify philosophers in three ways:—

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. ii. p. 253.

i. With regard to the *object* of rational cognition, they must either be *Sensualists* with Epicurus or *Intellectualists* with Plato.

ii. In relation to the *origin* of pure rational cognition, they are either *Empiricists* or *Noologists*; they either follow Aristotle and Locke, or Plato and Leibnitz. Locke is peculiarly inconsequent in his empiricism, for having derived all concepts and principles from experience, he yet endeavours to apply them to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul (though both lie entirely outside the bounds of possible experience).

iii. In relation to *method*. If we pass over the *naturalist* of pure reason who relies altogether on what he calls *common sense*,<sup>1</sup> the only methods in use in the past have been the *dogmatic* (e.g. Wolff) and the *sceptical* (e.g. Hume). The one scientific path which has not yet been tried is the *critical*, and this Kant commends to his reader as a path of great promise in the future.

*+ this is further developed by Fichte, Schelling & Hegel*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Proleg. p. 182.

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